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A bstr a ct
The lack of economic analysis on export-led shrimp farming in India has 
become of major national importance as a result of the Indian Supreme Court’s 
December 1996 decision to ban the shrimp farming sector. The ban was a direct 
result of concerns over the impact of shrimp farming—in terms of its degradation of 
the environment and marginalization of local people from coastal resources. In 
addition to questions raised with respect to the nature and extent of environmental 
and socio-economic externalities of this sector, recent parliamentary debate raised 
equally important questions regarding the sustainability of shrimp farming under a 
variety of production methods. However, assessment of the productive efficiency of 
shrimp farms under increasingly intensive production methods is lacking.
Parametric and non-parametric approaches to measuring the productive 
efficiency of shrimp farms are applied to farm-level data collected from the 
Kandaleru region in India. First, technical efficiency is modelled, measured and 
explained by estimating a restricted translog stochastic frontier production function 
using maximum-likelihood methods. The variation of technical efficiency indices 
across the shrimp farm sample is explained using farm specific characteristics and 
managerial variables. Farm mechanisation, location and size are found to be 
significant factors explaining total inefficiency. Second, scale effects are extracted 
from the total efficiency index by applying Data Envelopment Analysis techniques. 
An inverse relationship is found to exist between farm size and efficiency.
Next, social and environmental impacts facing rural inhabitants as a result of 
the shrimp farming sector’s growth and development are assessed using primary 
survey data collected from twenty-six villages located adjacent to shrimp farms. The 
most frequently cited problem by local inhabitants is blocked access to public areas. 
This is followed by problems of agricultural land salinity, well water salinity, 
unemployment, fodder & fuelwood collection problems and health problems, 
respectively.
The immediate policy direction is clear: larger farmers could reduce the 
intensity of production to maximise efficiency and minimise input slacks to reduce 
the risk of environmental degradation both within the aquatic pond environment and 
to the natural ecosystem. Similarly, they could enable free but supervised access 
through their farms to public areas such as the Bay of Bengal, Kandaleru creek or 
public pasture lands.
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Part I
Assessing Shrimp Farming’s Growth & Development
Introduction
The rising demand for shrimp in Japan, the United States, and Western 
Europe has fostered dramatic growth in Asian brackishwater shrimp farming. 
Since 1990 this sector has annually captured over 80 percent of the world market 
and has generated over US$20.8 billion in foreign exchange for the region 
(Csavas 1995: 73). Amidst its economic boom, intensive brackishwater shrimp 
culture is creating concern over its degradation of the environment (Flaherty and 
Kamjanakesom, 1995; APO, 1995: 6; Southgate and Whitaker, 1992; Stonich, 
1992; Doumenge, 1990) and its marginalization of local people from coastal 
resources (Sebastiani et al, 1994; Baily, 1988). While governments continue to 
provide means for urban-based investors and large corporations to develop large- 
scale shrimp culture along Asia's coastline, the markets have yet to incorporate 
the environmental and social costs of this economic activity. Instead, the 
environmental and social costs associated with shrimp farming’s negative 
externalities are borne by the rural poor, who rely on natural coastal resources for 
their livelihood.
Over the past two years, India has received more attention than its equally 
prolific neighbours with respect to shrimp farming. This is a result of the 
December 1996 Supreme Court Ban on this sector. With India's several 
thousand kilometer long coastline predominantly settled by rural fishers and 
farmers, the fate of this environmentally fragile zone and its inhabitants has been 
put into question by the rapid development of shrimp culture (SC Notification, 
1996). As in the rest of Asia, Indian shrimp aquaculture has been promoted by 
governmental bodies and international and multilateral lending agencies as a 
means of generating foreign exchange through exports and enhancing 
supplementary income generating opportunities for impoverished small scale 
fisherman through job creation (World Bank, 1986; Flaherty and 
Kamjanakesom, 1995: 27-8). Donor agencies such as the World Bank and Asian
12
Development Bank have approved over US$500 million in loans since 1986 to 
develop approximately 1.5 million hectares of public coastal wetlands1 and over
122,000 hectares of coastal land for Indian shrimp aquaculture (World Bank, 
1986; Sukumaran and Devraj, 1995).
The role that brackishwater shrimp aquaculture development is playing 
on India’s economy is substantial. Indian marine exports were the second largest 
foreign exchange earner in 1994-1995 primarily because of high value shrimp 
exports to Japan, Europe and the United States. Shrimp (captured and cultured) 
constituted 70.2 percent of total Indian marine export value in 1994-1995 which 
slipped slightly to 67.3 percent in 1995-1996 due to fluctuations in export prices.
Currently, 58,376 hectares of coastal land throughout India's maritime 
states are estimated to be annually producing over 35,000 metric tons of shrimp 
(MPEDA, 1996). Private entrepreneurs are also rapidly entering the industry. In 
two south-eastern coastal states, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, over 180 
privately financed semi-intensive shrimp aquaculture farms have been 
constructed in the past few years (NEERI Report, 1996). According to the latest 
export statistics, farmed shrimp alone generated over 1,500 Crore Rupees for the 
Indian economy in 1995-1996 (MPEDA, 1996). The questions remains, at what 
cost and to whom?
The first four chapters of this dissertation are concerned with assessing 
the growth and development of shrimp farming. In this context, both the positive 
benefits and negative externalities of shrimp farming are discussed. However, 
our primary focus is on the negative externalities of brackishwater aquaculture as 
several claims are made in the literature denouncing this sector., but with little 
empirical support. While the focus on negative externalities is the mostly widely 
discussed topic in the shrimp farming debate, it is the least critically assessed.
Chapter One provides an overview of Asian shrimp farming and its 
impacts. The productive capacity of the most prolific shrimp farming nations are 
discussed and some of the better known impacts (both positive and negative) are 
reviewed. Moreover, this chapter sets out the research objectives and highlights
'Public coastal wetlands in India have traditionally provided a large source of consumption goods 
such as fish and other brackish water foods for the subsistence poor who are landless and own 
few assets.
2 One crore Rupees is exactly 10 million Indian Rupees.
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the contributions of the dissertation. Chapter Two presents a discussion of the 
methodology used to survey over 500 Kandlaeru shrimp farms and inhabitants of 
twenty-six rural and coastal villages located adjacent to them. Chapter Three 
analyses the growth and development of shrimp farming along the Kandaleru 
river—one of the most prolific shrimp farming areas in India. Finally, Chapter 
Four examines the impact of the changing land use pattern (allegedly caused by 
shrimp farming’s growth in coastal areas) on agricultural labour.
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Chapter 1
An Overview of Asian Shrimp Farming & Its Impacts
1.0 Introduction
While traditional methods of cultivating shrimp have existed for 
centuries, several dozen maritime developing countries have been supporting 
intensive shrimp farming over the past decade. Heralded as a means of earning 
foreign receipts from exports and in creating jobs, the shrimp farming sector has 
been left virtually unregulated. Today, however, domestic and international 
pressure is mounting on countries exporting cultivated shrimp. Environmental 
activists, international NGOs, international organisations and the industry itself 
have called for international efforts to improve shrimp farming technology and to 
ensure its sustainable development. This is particularly true as the global shrimp 
farming sector has faced several set backs over the past several years as a result 
of a growing awareness of its negative environmental and social impacts.
This chapter presents an overview of global shrimp farming and its 
impacts. Section 1.1 discusses the rapid rise in global farmed shrimp production 
and compares this to the production of captured shrimp. Section 1.2 explains the 
process of farming shrimp. Section 1.3 discusses the environmental and socio­
economic impacts allegedly caused by shrimp farming. Section 1.4 moves away 
from the world stage and discusses the growth and development of Indian shrimp 
farming from 1900 to 1998. Section 1.5 presents the three primary research 
objectives of this dissertation. Finally, the contributions of this research are 
discussed in Section 1.6.
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1.1 Overview o f Shrimp Farming
The importance of cultured shrimp in world consumption has grown 
significantly over the past eighteen years. In 1980 cultured shrimp made up less 
than 3 percent of the market in terms of volume. Today, farmed shrimp makes 
up approximately 25 percent of annual global production (see Figure 1.0). In the 
past ten years alone, global shrimp aquaculture production has grown over 400 
percent, from 213,017 metric tons in 1985 to 931,788 metric tons in 1995 (FAO, 
1996). In 1996, global farmed shrimp production declined as a result of 
widespread disease which led to significant crop loss. 1997 shrimp production 
will most likely show an increase from 1996 levels as a result of an overall 
successful global harvest (Minnesota Commodity Exchange Board, 1998).
Figure 1.0
World Production of Shrimp, 1980-1996 
(Cultured & Captured, MT)
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Source: FAO Aquaculture Statistics, 1996
According to FAO’s most recent aquaculture statistics, the major global 
producers of farmed shrimp are Thailand, Indonesia, India, China, Philippines, 
Ecuador, and Taiwan (see Figure 1.1). These seven countries contributed 
approximately 86 percent of the global cultured harvest in 1995. The remaining 
14 percent came mostly from a half dozen South American countries including 
Belize, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia. The Asian region 
has been by far the largest shrimp producing region in the world, capturing over 
80 percent of the global market (FAO, 1996).
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Fisure 1.1
Global Cultured Shrimp Production ('000s MT)
1985-1994
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Source: FAO Aquaculture Statistics, 1996
The main species of cultured shrimp are classified as penaeid and include 
the Black Tiger, Kuruma, Whiteleg, Blue, Brown Tiger, Banana, and Indian 
White varieties. However, the Black Tiger variety are known to command the 
highest overall price globally and seem to be the cultured species of preference.1 
The average nominal per kilogram price for Black Tiger shrimp between 1993 
and 1997 was approximately $US 13.85 (INFOFISH Trade News, 1996).
1.2 Brackishwater Shrimp Aquaculture
1.2.1 The Process o f Farming Shrimp
The infrastructure needed to support basic shrimp culture in rural coastal 
areas is minimal. Shrimp farmers are usually unrestricted in their search for a 
viable locality for production. Two geographic constraints include close access 
to the sea or brackishwater/estuarian areas and preparing ponds on soils 
conducive to producing successful harvests, namely clay. Shrimp farmers must 
purchase or lease privately owned land from rural land owners or from the 
government. In many cases, this involves purchasing mangrove forest areas, 
purchasing or leasing agricultural land and/or wasteland. Government and public 
access land is also encroached for shrimp farming. Once purchased or leased 
and land is dug to form ponds, usually one hectare in size. Next, the pond is
lO to f'- 00 CD o CN CO N-CO 00 00 co oo cn cn cn CD cncn O) CD CD cn cn cn cn CD CD,— ,— ,— T“ , — , — , — , — , —
17
filled with water pumped from the sea or the adjacent brackishwater body. Upon 
completion of the pond, shrimp fry are purchased from local hatcheries or from 
village agents and stocked. The fry are fed with purchased inputs from local feed 
mills or locally produced feed. Several months later the shrimp are harvested, 
packed in ice and sent to a peeling shed where they are block frozen for export.
The main shrimp species cultured in India are the black tiger shrimp (P. 
monodon) and white shrimp (P. indicus) with freshwater shrimp cultured in small 
quantities (Sukumaran and Devraj, 1995: 310. The life cycle of the penaeid 
shrimp is characterised by offshore spawning, migration of post-larval or juvenile 
shrimp to estuaries, juvenile growth in brackish water areas of inshore estuaries, 
and finally a return as young adults to the spawning grounds. Shrimp culture, by 
contrast, is the method of raising shrimp in a controlled environment. A more 
technical description is “ intervention in shrimp fisheries, involving physical 
control of the organism at some point of the life cycle other than at harvest” 
(FAO, 1984). This intervention can be minimal (i.e. catching shrimp seed stock 
in coastal lagoons and raising them in natural ponds that eventually lead to 
increased harvests) or maximal (i.e. spawning and growing shrimp in an 
artificial, closed system environment).
There are predominantly four shrimp farming or culture techniques used 
throughout the world: extensive, modified-extensive, semi-intensive, and 
intensive methods that yield on average 500 kilograms, 800 kilograms 2,000 
kilograms and between 2,000-10,000 kilograms per water spread hectare 
respectively (Hirasawa, 1995: 218). In traditional paddy-cum-shrimp farming 
all the nutritional requirements for farming shrimp are derived from the 
surrounding natural ecosystem with no conscious human manipulation in the 
feeding process. Traditional shrimp farming is therefore not considered a culture 
technique according to the strict FAO (1984) definition (CIBA, 1997). In 
extensive, modified-extensive and semi-intensive culture the natural carrying 
capacity of the shrimp farm is enhanced by employing intentional fertilisation 
and supplemental feeding techniques to increase yields. In intensive culture 
methods all the nutritional requirements for raising shrimp are met from sources
1 According to the USA Commodities & Grain Exchange located in Minnesota.
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external to the natural ecosystem. Once shrimp are raised to commercial size, 
they are sold to local traders who transport them to port cities and sell the harvest 
to urban agents (BOBP, 1996). The agents sell the shrimp to packaging 
companies who export the shrimp either frozen or fresh for international 
consumption, mostly to Japan, the United States and Europe.
1.2.2 Industry Status
Because of its need for ancillary services such as seed hatcheries, feed 
mills, ice plants, and processing plants, the shrimp farming sector in conjunction 
with ancillary services can be classified as an industry. While the shrimp 
farming sector can be defined as the collection o f shrimp farms involved in the 
actual process o f culturing shrimp, the shrimp farming industry refers to the 
shrimp farm sector plus the ancillary services that support the cyclical culture 
operation o f shrimp farms. The distinction between the shrimp farm sector and 
the shrimp farm industry as defined above is made in this thesis.2
1.3 Environmental & Socio-economic Impacts
Since the sector’s economic boom in the mid-1980s, there has been a 
growing body of literature on the social and environmental impacts of shrimp 
farming. Most of the literature, however, remains uncritical in its discussion of 
social impacts and sparse in its assessment of the environmental impacts 
(Barraclough and Finger-Stich, 1997: 11-13). One partial explanation is that in 
many of the case studies, the authors seldom distinguish between the different 
agents involved in shrimp farming and how exactly they are affected. Oftentimes, 
conclusions are based on generalisations and mostly anecdotal evidence. This 
thesis both models and measures the socio-economic and environmental impacts 
of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture on rural producers in Nellore District, a
2 These definitions are provided by the author since there are no standard definitions marking the 
difference between the shrimp farming sector and the shrimp farming industry. Some author’s 
such as Hempel and Winther (1996) point out that there is a shrimp farming industry, but do not 
explain why it should receive industry status.
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major shrimp producing region in south-eastern India. However, before 
presenting the case study on Nellore District, the concerns raised and conclusions 
drawn by authors of other studies are presented.
Specifically, there is a growing literature claiming that the shrimp 
farming sector is responsible for the degradation of the environment and for the 
changing face of the rural landscape and the labour force. Much of the current 
literature focuses on shrimp farming’s negative impacts. In the following section 
the existing literature on the environmental and social impacts is surveyed. 
Moreover, some of the lesser known positive benefits of shrimp farming are 
discussed.
1.3.1 Shrimp Disease & General Mismanagement
The type of culture method employed or production technology used is 
allegedly linked to the level of profitability and the nature of negative 
externalities. Ideally, the more intensive the production process, the greater the 
output and profit. However, experts agree that this occurs at a greater risk to the 
environment and to those people who rely on coastal resources for their source of 
livelihood (Hiraswara, 1995: 218). The possibility of catastrophes on national 
scale are well documented in the case of Taiwan's 1987-88, China's 1989-90, and 
Ecuador's 1988-89 intensive shrimp farming disasters where annual production 
fell from 90,000 Mt. to 45,000 Mt., 199,000 Mt. to 150,000 Mt., and 70,000 Mt. 
to 55,000 Mt. respectively (Chong 1995: 224). In the Taiwanese example, the 
shrimp farming industry throughout the country collapsed with production 
dropping over 50 percent (Chen, 1990). By 1989, the shrimp farming sector in 
Taiwan was essentially defunct. According to the latest statistics, Taiwan is an 
insignificant player in the Asian region’s dominance of global shrimp production.
These falls in production were allegedly due to unsustainable intensive or 
“ superintensive” culture methods which sought to boost production by initiating 
higher stocking densities and greater feed inputs holding pond size constant. The 
process of intensification produced cramped culture grounds, water pollution, 
and disease that destroyed entire harvests (Iwama, 1991: 194-202; Moore, 1989).
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Like a domino effect, effluent discharge rife with disease from one pond 
infiltrated downstream ponds through water intake from common waterways. 
The longer term effects have been higher production costs, water pollution, 
declining groundwater tables, and lingering disease (Moore, 1989).
In India, shrimp aquaculture faces an additional challenge on the 
production side since biological and technical knowledge of its culture is limited 
and infrequently reaches the entrepreneur (Patil and Krishnan, 1997b). The 
industry is not only vulnerable to changing economic conditions such as the 
fluctuating international price for shrimp, but also to the outbreak of disease. In 
order to determine the optimal stocking rates, feed formulas, and disease 
treatment, farmers often rely on trial and error or imported knowledge that is not 
necessarily applicable to Indian climate and conditions (Patil and Krishnan, 
1997b). Imported feed and high stocking densities (the two inputs necessary for 
intensive culture) are allegedly responsible for water pollution and shrimp 
disease (APO, 1995). As the quantity of imported shrimp feed has risen from 
121 tonnes in 1988 to 6,243 tonnes in 1994 (MPEDA, Cochin quoted in 
Nandeesha 1995: 228) there is growing concern of ecological disasters similar to 
those exhibited in Taiwan. Nonetheless, the opportunity of generating large 
profits encourages aquaculture expansion in India and throughout the Asian 
region.
The drop in market share once controlled by Taiwan has enabled new 
producing countries with undeveloped coastlines such as the Philippines, China, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and India) to fill the void (Csavas 1995: 123).3 However, 
many similar environmental problems faced by Taiwan’s shrimp farmers are now 
surfacing in these countries (Flaherty and Kamjanakesom, 1995; Iwama, 1991). 
In addition, there is increasing concern over the socio-economic impacts of 
shrimp production on coastal inhabitants of poorer countries.
3 In 1987 Taiwan controlled over 35 percent o f Asia's total output and 31 percent o f world 
production (FAO Aquaculture Statistics, 1996).
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1.3.2 Local Negative Environmental & Socio-economic Impacts
The environmental and socio-economic impacts arising from shrimp 
farming are inexorably linked. Social impacts may include the redistribution of 
wealth, the changing nature of resource rights to traditionally used public lands, 
human rights issues, changes in employment and the overall social structure of 
communities (Hempel & Winther, 1997; Claridge, 1996).
Many of the negative socio-economic impacts of shrimp farming arise as 
a result of degradation of the natural environment. There have been several 
concerns raised over the environmental implications of shrimp farming in coastal 
areas. Specifically, shrimp farmers have been accused of mangrove forest 
clearing, ground water depletion and/or salinization, well water and agricultural 
land salinity as a result of pond bottom seepage and discharge of polluted 
effluent into ecosystems. They have also shouldered the blame for the decline in 
wild stocks as a result of excessive stocking. The severity of each environmental 
externality depends on the magnitude of the impact on the ecosystem (i.e. its 
impact on flora and fauna) and ultimately on human populations. Many of the 
environmental impacts have both direct and indirect ways of affecting the overall 
well-being of local communities competing for the same natural resources as 
shrimp farmers. This discussion first traces the recognised linkages between the 
environmental problems allegedly caused by shrimp farming and the alleged 
impacts on rural inhabitants. This is followed by a discussion of some of the 
more well known positive socio-economic impacts, in section 1.3.3.
Mangrove Forest Conversion
Mangrove forests are an important component of coastal ecosystems in 
tropical and subtropical regions of the world. They grow prolifically in tidal 
estuaries and salt marshes along the coast and provide tremendous benefits to 
indigenous peoples inhabiting these areas. Specifically in India, mangrove 
forests are used by local people as a source of firewood, construction material, 
income generating activities and own consumption such as fishing (MSSF,
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1996). Mangroves are also a well known source of rich bio-diversity. They 
serve as a nurse-bed for fish and crustaceans that also serve as a natural 
protection zone against flooding and typhoons. With their destruction, these 
benefits naturally disappear.
There is a growing literature suggesting that mangrove clearing is a 
consequence of urbanisation, commercial logging, unrestricted fuelwood 
collection from coastal inhabitants, charcoal making, agriculture, fish pond 
construction, salt flat development and industrial development in addition to 
shrimp farming (Gujja & Finger-Stich, 1995:29). While it is clear that shrimp 
farming is not the only cause of global mangrove forest depletion, it is believed 
to be one major player. There is, however, a debate taking place over shrimp 
farming’s contribution to global mangrove forest loss. Even at the individual 
country level there is much dispute over the proportion of mangrove forest loss 
as a direct result of shrimp farming.
Phillips et al (1993:174-175) estimate that over 765,500 hectares of the 
world’s mangroves have been cleared for shrimp and fish culture with over 80 
percent of global conversion occurring in Asia. The degree to which mangroves 
are being cleared for the purpose of shrimp farming, however, varies between 
countries. The FAO estimates that 34 percent of Thailand’s shrimp farming area 
was primarily mangrove forest areas ten years earlier (NACA, 1994: 15). In the 
Philippines between 50 to 60 percent of mangrove deforestation is attributed to 
shrimp and fish culture (FAO/NACA, 1994; Pollnac, 1992:17). In peninsular 
Malaysia, Ong (1982) reports that between 20 to 25 percent of mangrove regions 
was earmarked for shrimp farming. The largest remaining mangrove in the 
world, the Sundarbans in India and Bangladesh are also believed to have been 
have been systematically denuded as a result of shrimp farming. FAO/NACA 
(1994:26) report that approximately 35,000 hectares of shrimp farms have 
replaced vast stretches of West Bengal’s mangrove areas. Similarly, on the 
Bangladeshi side, the Department of Forests claim 9,250 hectares of mangroves 
have been cleared for shrimp farming (Sultana, 1994:14).
While shrimp farming is blamed for destroying large tracts of mangrove 
areas, the data available are often incomplete and contradictory (Hempel and
23
Winters, 1997:47). Local and regional studies are often generalised as 
representative of the national situation. In addition, some studies have found that 
mangrove forest areas are not ideal sites for shrimp culture. This has led to 
shrimp entrepreneurs staying away from mangrove areas. Boyd (1997) for 
example suggests that the highly acidic soil and large amounts of organic matter 
found on mangrove cleared farms make these areas less than ideal for culturing 
shrimp. This fact is also reported by farmers in at least two countries, Thailand 
and India.4 Nonetheless, without readily available satellite imagery, it is difficult 
to pin point exactly what proportion of mangroves are denuded as a result of 
shrimp culture. The expert literature does suggest, however, that the remaining 
mangroves must be preserved.
Ground Water Depletion
Water is a key input in shrimp farming and salinity levels of 15 to 20 
parts per thousand (ppt) are thought to be ideal. While traditional aquaculture 
systems rely on natural tidal action to ensure the pond water is appropriately 
oxygenated, more intensive systems require a mix of pumped water from ground 
water reservoirs, the sea or brackishwater bodies to make sure the appropriate 
salinity level is reached and not breached.
Competition for groundwater from different sectors has shored up with 
the advent of intensive shrimp farming. Before shrimp farming, ground water 
was pumped for irrigating agricultural land and for domestic consumption by 
local inhabitants. Although there has been concern in many parts of the world 
over possible depletion of ground water in drier seasons, for the most part, the 
resource has been used adequately.5 The entry of shrimp farming is reported in 
some studies, however, to have tipped this balance.
A case study of the Rancot district in Thailand reports that 33 cubic 
meters of freshwater are pumped per day for each metric ton of shrimp produced.
4 Based on comments made during the ADB Seminar on Shrimp Farming and the Environment 
on September 15-16, 1997 in Manila.
5 This is presently true of India according to the Brackishwater Fish Farmers’ Development 
Authority in Nellore city, India.
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The groundwater table dropped 4 meters between 1989 and 1991 as a result of 
excessive pumping for shrimp farming (NACA, 1994: 46). In areas of highly 
concentrated intensive shrimp farms such as in the Philippines and Taiwan, 
depleted water tables as a result of excessive pumping led to land sinking by 
three meters (Chiang and Kuo, quoted in Barraclough and Finger-Stich, 1995). 
The Indian Supreme Court after weighing all the available evidence concluded 
that competition with shrimp farmers for groundwater result in loss of water 
supplies for the cultivation of rice and other vital agricultural crops (Supreme 
Court Notification, 1996:12). Boyd (1997:5), however reports that while farmers 
outside Asia seldom pump groundwater to fill shrimp ponds, the practice is even 
rare in Asia. This, however, is a point of view shared by a minority group of 
scholars. They argue that in coastal areas fresh drinking water is becoming an 
increasingly scarce resource, not because of the excessive pumping of ground 
water reserves by shrimp and rice farming, but increasingly because of water 
pollution. This is discussed next.
Water Pollution
Shrimp farming has allegedly been responsible for two types of water 
pollution, (i) saltwater intrusion into groundwater reservoirs, and (ii) pollution of 
near-shore waters and estuaries from high concentrations of biological and 
chemical effluent discharge from shrimp farms. Saltwater intrusion into 
groundwater is often a result of water seepage through the pond bottom. The 
consequence of increasingly saline water tables is enormous for coastal 
inhabitants for the simple reason that water drawn from village wells becomes 
unusable for human and animal consumption. The lack of fresh water in many 
villages adjacent to shrimp farming clusters has several socio-economic impacts.6
The use of organic fertilisers, drugs and antibiotics and chemicals while 
increasing the growth prospects of shrimp, have also made the internal pond 
ecosystem less stable. Nitrogen and phosphorous based fertilisers are used to
6 .These are discussed in Chapter Seven.
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stimulate phytoplankton growth in semi-intensive and intensive shrimp ponds. 
In addition, unconsumed feed inputs and faecal matter increase the organic and 
nutrient content of the pond water. Antibiotics are used to protect shrimp from 
disease and mortality. Chemicals are added to ponds for disease chemotherapy, 
pest control, disinfection and growth promotion. This mix of additives used to 
prevent disease and promote growth have several environmental consequences to 
both the internal (pond) and external (coastal waters) ecosystems.
The possible consequences of pond water discharge into coastal waters 
depend on the ecosystem’s capacity to assimilate its high organic load. The 
Indian Central Pollution Control Board estimates that about 2.37 million cubic 
meters of shrimp farm effluent are discharged each day in eastern India. This 
amounts to approximately 15,000 litres of effluent per kilogram of shrimp 
produced (Gujja, 1997:12). The negative externalities known to affect coastal 
waters as a result of pond water discharge include: siltation, eutrophication, 
oxygen depletion, toxicity and disease outbreaks (Dierberg and Kiattisimkul, 
1996). Excessive use of drugs, antibiotics and medicated feed are known to 
transfer to wild fish species causing genetic disorders (Chua,1993). There have 
aslo been several claims that general public health is adversely affected due to 
polluted discharge water.
Health Problems
Chemicals used in shrimp farming while only mildly toxic, can also have 
severe effects on the environment and people working around them. Boyd 
(1997) gives an account of places where shrimp farm discharge water has 
polluted coastal areas and human populations. Exposure to polluted discharge 
water can put local inhabitants at risk. Specifically, several field reports on the 
Indian situation suggest that fisher folk are most likely to suffer from minor skin 
irritation (Patil & Krishnan, 1997). Other reports allege more serious health risks 
including scabies and fever (Suresh Committee, 1996).
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Agricultural Land Salinity
In addition to raising the salinity level of groundwater reservoirs, seepage 
of brackish pond water into adjacent agricultural fields is allegedly a growing 
problem. Studies conducted in Thailand (Flaherty & Kamjanakesom, 1995), 
Bangladesh (FFI, 1997) and India (Patil & Krishnan, 1997) report damaged crops 
as a result of salt water intrusion into agricultural land. As a result, there are 
growing conflicts between rice and shrimp farmers.
Declining Wild Stocks
Shrimp fry collected from estuaries to meet the growing demand for 
stocking ponds have provided coastal inhabitants, mainly women and children 
with an opportunity to supplement household income. With shrimp farmers 
paying out Rs. 0.10 per seed7, the number of wild shrimp fry available to grow to 
maturity is believed to have declined (Algaraswamy, 1995:15). This is also a 
problem for fishermen who no longer enjoy handsome profits from shrimp 
capture. Afterall, shrimp captured from the sea at maturity and sold at the local 
market are more valuable to a fishing household than seed sales (BOBP, 1996). 
Shrimp fry collection has also led to the large-scale destruction of shrimp fry by- 
catch. Baneijee and Singh (1993) report that the by-catch can often consist of 
over 60 species of baby fish, less valuable penaeid prawns, sergestid, palaemonid 
prawns and crabs which are destroyed while capturing more popular species of 
shrimp fry.
Shrimp farming has also been accused of being an energy intensive 
method of producing food. This means that other edible species are used in 
cultivating shrimp. Pelleted shrimp feed contains between 25 percent and 50 
percent fish meal (Nandeesha, 1995:218). Fish meal is one of the main 
ingredients in shrimp feed and can account for 50 percent of the total cost (Gujja, 
1997:12). It is estimated that shrimp are fed three times their harvested weight
7 In the Kandaleru region, wild seed command a price o f up to Indian Rs. 0.25 per piece during 
the peak season.
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(Patil & KAA Database, 1997b). They are believed to convert on average only 
17 percent of the consumed feed into edible flesh (Gujja, 1997:12).
Blocked Access
Other problems directly faced by coastal inhabitants include denial of 
access to temples, burial grounds, open toilet areas and grazing land (Mohan, 
1996:7). In addition, fishers in India complain that they are unable to reach their 
boats at the beach. This is a consequence of shrimp farm development which 
blocks access between village communities and free access areas.
Land Conversion & Employment
There is considerable agreement in the literature that shrimp farming is 
displacing traditional employment opportunities for coastal inhabitants. 
Empirical studies conducted to prove or disprove this claim directly, however, 
remain sparse. Three categories of studies discuss this issue. Each one is 
discussed in turn.
The first series of studies conclude that shrimp farming requires far less 
labour inputs than traditional agriculture per unit area (especially paddy 
cultivation). Islam (1992) reports that in the Sarkira sub-division of Khulna 
District, Bangladesh, while 50 workers are needed to cultivate 100 acres of rice, 
only five workers are needed to culture shrimp for the same area. Hanning’s 
(1986) study of Java, Indonesia reports that a two hectare shrimp pond requires 
thirty days of family labour and sixty days of hired labour whereas thirty-two 
days of family labour and 120 days of hired labour are needed to cultivate rice for 
the same area of land. A second Indonesian study concludes that rice production 
employs an average of 76 workdays per hectare per crop while only twenty-six 
workdays per hectare per crop are required for semi-intensive shrimp farming 
(McCoy cited in Baily and Skladany, 1991). In India, Subramanian (1994:70 
cited in Clay (1996:108)) reports that local rice farmers claim that during a four 
month crop season, one hectare of land employs 60 women and 15 men. Shrimp
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fanning, they argue is not so labour intensive. Although they allude to the 
popular belief that shrimp farming is displacing traditional agricultural 
employment opportunities for local inhabitants these studies only compare the 
employment levels ip two different types of crop cultivation, namely shrimp and 
rice. PREPARE (1995:2) suggest that shrimp farming provides direct 
employment for only two persons per hectare in Andhra Pradesh.
A second series of studies in the literature, makes the claim that when 
agricultural land is converted to shrimp ponds there is a direct loss of 
employment opportunities for local labour. A study by the Centre for 
Communication and Development concludes that extensive shrimp production on 
670 hectares of land in West Bengal employed one third less labour than when 
the same area was used for rice paddy cultivation (undated: 25). These studies are 
perhaps the most informative, but remain scarce in the literature.
A third series of studies suggest that the type of employment generated by 
shrimp farming is often not available to local inhabitants (Snedaker et al,. 1986). 
This literature suggests that the on-farm jobs generated by the shrimp farming 
sector are mostly filled by labour from outside the shrimp farming region. For 
example, a CCD (undated) study concludes that about half of the West Bengal 
shrimp farming region’s labour force is recruited from outside the farming region 
and without local ties because they are thought to be more responsible. 
However, a FAO/NACA (1994b: 58) study in West Bengal suggests that on-farm 
jobs such as pond preparation and management are locally filled in addition to 
those off-farm jobs in shrimp processing. The study also suggests that 33,000 
hectares of shrimp ponds translate to 50,000 off-farm part time shrimp fry 
collection jobs for local people. Studies by Baud (1992) and Banerjee (1992), 
however, suggest that most off-farm processing jobs are filled by women from 
outside the shrimp farming region and mostly from the Indian state of Kerela. 
Whereas the literature does suggest that both on and off farm employment can 
benefit both local and outside labour, case studies going into any further detail 
are lacking.
A similar debate exists as to whether the owners of production are from 
the local area or from outside. The Bangladesh Department of Fisheries estimates
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that approximately 75 percent of shrimp farmers operating in Khulna and 
Satkhira districts during the early 1990s were non natives of these coastal 
districts. Similarly, in a study of several Bangladeshi coastal villages, only 10 of 
300 households obtained leases for shrimp farming (Sultana, 1994: 10-11). 
Sultana (1994) concludes that shrimp farming is beyond the reach for most local 
farmers but does not give reasons why.
The alarm raised by these studies may be slightly misleading. Whereas 
the literature does correctly suggest that rice farming employs a greater labour 
force than shrimp farming over the same unit land area, these studies do not 
prove that shrimp farming is actually displacing the traditional labour force. 
Instead, they conclude that i f  shrimp aquaculture were to replace traditional 
agricultural crops, then there would be the possibility of unemployment. The few 
case studies analysing the change in employment patterns due to the conversion 
of agricultural land to shrimp ponds are perhaps the most illuminating. These 
studies correctly point out the existing realities of employment changes due to 
conversion. They do not, however, indicate the total social costs of these 
externalities which would include any benefits accruing to the labour force such 
as a higher wage rate gained from employment in shrimp farming. Additionally, 
these studies suggest that entire fertile agricultural areas are being converted to 
shrimp farms, however, with little supporting data. The extent to which 
agricultural land is converted to shrimp farming most likely varies significantly 
between regions within a particular country and among countries.
Nellore District is considered one of India’s fastest growing shrimp 
farming regions. It is within the detailed case study of this district and 
particularly the economic activity taking place along one brackishwater body, the 
Kandaleru Creek that we are able to discuss the conjectures raised in the 
literature and place them within a solid analytical framework with data analysis.
1.3.3 Benefits Accrued from Shrimp Cultivation
The literature is abundant with criticisms of the practice of shrimp 
farming as discussed in the previous section. Less discussed in the literature are
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the benefits accrued from shrimp farming. Outside foreign exchange earnings 
from shrimp export and indirect “trickle down effects” associated with many 
export-led sectors, little documentation and discussion exists on the benefits of 
shrimp aquaculture. Next, several alleged benefits discussed in the literature are 
briefly reviewed. These include foreign exchange earnings through shrimp 
export, the growth and development of ancillary services supporting the shrimp 
farm sector, generation of off-farm employment, general gains in land 
productivity and an increased value of land and on-farm employment generated 
as a result of this sector’s growth and development.8
Foreign Exchange Through Trade
Shrimp culture is primarily an export-led sector. Shrimp are exported to 
developed countries as a luxury food, earning foreign exchange for the 
developing country. Still dominated by the Asian region, shrimp culture is 
gaining momentum in several Latin American countries and more recently, in 
Africa (FAO/World Bank, 1997). As mentioned before, cultured shrimp exports 
generate approximately $20 billion for the Asian region alone. Indian cultured 
shrimp exports in 1996 were valued at approximately US$ 430 million in current 
prices (MPEDA, 1997). Cultured shrimp exports are estimated to have generated 
between US$ 404 million to US$ 808 million for Bangladesh (Sharif et al., 
1996:153). According to Hempel and Winther’s (1997:24) World Bank 
commissioned study, country revenues from cultured shrimp exports range from 
US$ 300 million to US$ 1 billion.
Ancillary Services & Off-farm Employment
Ancillary services provide essential support services to the shrimp 
farming sector such as seed hatcheries, feed mills, ice plants, peeling sheds and 
processing plants. The development of each support service is partially 
responsible for the boom of this sector. Similarly, the strength of the shrimp
8 This research, however, does not attempt to measure the costs and benefits o f shrimp farming.
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fanning sector has encouraged the growth and development of supporting 
services. This has translated into jobs.
There is little discussion in the literature as to the role of ancillary 
services in shrimp farming. Only a few literature surveys mention the study of 
ancillary services as an area worth exploring.9 This research contends that there 
are several benefits accrued locally from ancillary services. Most prevalent, 
however, are the off-farm employment opportunities generated. This research 
particularly focuses on the growth of off-farm employment as a result of the 
introduction, growth and development of ancillary services.
An Increase in Land Productivity and Value
Land previously defined as “wasteland” and left idle is now being 
developed for shrimp culture. Moreover, since the advent of shrimp farming, 
coastal land prices have allegedly risen dramatically in Thailand, India, Indonesia 
and other shrimp farming nations (Barraclough and Finger-Stich, 1996).
On-Farm Employment
Non-traditional shrimp farming is believed to be highly capital intensive 
in many parts of Asia. However, while it is clear that shrimp farming does 
employ local inhabitants, most studies suggest that as compared to traditional 
agriculture, employment in shrimp farming is far less (see Section 1.3.2: land 
conversion & employment). Nonetheless, if previously unproductive land is 
converted to productive use, it can be assumed that there are significant 
employment gains. Moreover, this does not conflict with the belief that shrimp 
farming displaces agricultural labour.
9 For example, Hempel and Winthers (1997) and Clay (1996) mention this.
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Development o f Aquaculture Associations
The rapid growth of shrimp farming associations throughout the world is 
quite remarkable, but perhaps not surprising. Currently, these associations are 
taking on a more political role. This is a result of the mounting pressure placed 
on shrimp farmers by local action groups agitating against the sector. Shrimp 
farm associations could provide a forum to discuss best farm management 
practices. They could serve as forums to discuss and share technical knowledge 
to minimise disease and negative environmental and social impacts. Moreover, 
they could provide regulatory agencies with a forum with which to help guide the 
sector along sustainable lines.
1.4 Indian Shrimp Fanning (1900-1998)
1,4.0 Traditional Shrimp Farming
For centuries fisher-folk in coastal India have engaged in traditional 
integrated rice-cum-shrimp farming, specifically in the Pokkali rice fields of 
Kerala and the Sunderbands of West Bengal (Sukumaran and Devraj, 1995:301). 
This integrated farming technique roughly follows a seasonal, four period cycle. 
In the first period, rice is planted. In the second period rice is harvested. The 
bunds used to keep brackish estuarian river water from flooding the rice field are 
broken, allowing shrimp fry and smaller species of fish to enter the farm with the 
water flow. The bunds are then repaired, creating a pond-like environment. The 
shrimp fry are naturally fed by the rice grass and natural fertilisers in the soil. 
They grow for several months to maturity. In the third period, the shrimp are 
harvested. The harvest is small, approximately 50 to 75 kilograms per hectare. 
The bunds are then once again broken and the pond water flows black into the 
brackishwater river. In the fourth period, the monsoon rains wash away any 
excess salinity from the top soil of the farm. Rice is planted, and the cycle begins 
anew. This traditional system of shrimp aquaculture does not use processed feed,
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chemicals, antibiotics or any other unnatural inputs. It simply makes use of 
natural tidal action for capturing wild shrimp fry in the make-shift pond and for 
water exchange. Experts agree that it is ecologically and socially sustainable 
(APO, 1995).
1.4.1 The Blue Revolution
The method used to culture shrimp began to change in the early 1980s. 
Global supply of shrimp was fuelled by the growing markets of Japan, USA and 
Europe. In the United States, for example, shrimp were marketed as a “low fat, 
protein-rich health food.”10 The possibility of making large profits from shrimp 
cultivation led farmers and entrepreneurs to convert coastal lands into shrimp 
farms and to use intensive farming practices. With multinationals entering the 
industry, shrimp aquaculture quickly became a multi-billion dollar industry. 
Because of the way in which shrimp farming has rapidly changed the nature of 
the shrimp industry, aquaculture and shrimp culture specifically is referred to as 
the Blue Revolution.
MPEDA estimates that over 84,000 hectares of land from a possible 1.2 
million hectares of suitable land have been converted to shrimp farms in India. 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are India’s most intensive shrimp farming 
states. Between 1989 and 1993 the estimated area under shrimp culture in 
Andhra Pradesh grew from 3,430 hectares to approximately 11,000 hectares, and 
posted the fastest growth rate in India (Algaraswamy, 1995:37). This exceptional 
growth rate in many of India’s coastal states, however, proved unsustainable after 
1993.
1.4.2 Perfect Competition, Imperfect Knowledge
A shrimp virus outbreak in 1994 destroyed approximately 36 percent of 
the season’s shrimp production in India (Lundin, 1996) and over 50 percent of 
the harvest in the south-eastern coastal states such as Andhra Pradesh (MPEDA,
10 Viswanathan (1994) quoting USA advertisements
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1997). Those shrimp farmers lucky enough to receive news of the viral attack 
before their own ponds were infected, harvested early (with shrimp weighing 
only half their exportable weight) to cut their losses. However, even after the 
season’s crop was mostly destroyed by the viral attack, shrimp farmers remained 
autonomous. Many farmers remained reluctant to share knowledge of their 
culture systems or disease prevention techniques with each other.
Three years on, few shrimp farmers attribute the viral attack to 
environmental stress and water pollution as a result of overfeeding and overall 
inefficient pond management. The majority of shrimp farmers claim the virus 
was carried by defective seed imported from Southeast Asia. According to this 
study many small scale and marginal farmers (owning under one hectare of water 
spread area) believe that the virus was spread to aquafarms through the air rather 
than via common waterways used by all aquafarmers for water intake and 
effluent discharge in a given locality. “How else would the virus have spread so 
quickly?”, they argue. The gap in knowledge of the cause and spread of disease 
remains a hindrance to the sustainability of the industry.
Cultivating Technical Know-How
Since early on in shrimp farming’s boom, big corporate bodies and 
medium scale entrepreneurs sought technical knowledge and appropriate pond 
management techniques from Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia and sent 
employees on training missions to these countries.11 At home, some small and 
marginal farmers rode on government subsidy schemes and technical knowledge 
disseminated by governmental institutes designed to promote the industry.12 
Essentially, fisheries extension officers were trained in brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture through training courses offered by one of four government 
experimental research institutes in India. They, in turn brought knowledge of
11 Discussions with KAA farmers in February, 1997.
12 The national promotional body is the Marine Products Export Development Authority and the 
Central Institute for Brackishwater Aquaculture. State funded bodies include the various 
regional Brackishwater Fish Farming Development Authorities.
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shrimp culture techniques to the state, district and local mandal^ level. 
However, in every state, less than one percent of all small scale and marginal 
aquafarmers benefited from government sponsored training programs (BFDA, 
1997). The majority of small scale and marginal shrimp aquafarmers essentially 
claim to “learn by doing.” In an environmentally sensitive agri-business such as 
shrimp culture, this is a dangerous proposition. The government, however, is not 
entirely to blame.
Government Intervention
Despite the widespread support of the industry by the government 
through subsidy schemes amounting to as much as one lakh Rupees per farmer14, 
most small and marginal aquafarmers and corporate bodies were lured to shrimp 
culture by the possibility of large profit. In Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh the 
amount of land utilised for culturing shrimp grew at an alarming average annual 
rate of 45% from 1990-1997.15 Overall, during the early periods of brackishwater 
shrimp aquaculture (mid-1980s to 1993) the government adopted a laissez-faire 
attitude, allowing shrimp farmers to explore the full extent of shrimp culture with 
little to no restrictions. This however, rapidly changed with the advent of the 
“white spot” viral outbreak in 1994 and a writ petition filed in the Supreme Court 
on behalf of coastal fishers which called for a ban of the sector.
In response to the 1994 viral attack, a six month “crop holiday” was 
declared by the government to allow proper cleaning of the ponds and flushing of 
the brackishwater waterways used for communal water intake and effluent 
discharge. Although some farmers obliged, a majority (60%) continued culturing 
only to face another viral attack after a few months (MPEDA, 1996). Still, 
however, there was very little co-operation between farmers.
A second major setback to the industry occurred in 1995 when heavy 
monsoon rains and a massive cyclone led to widespread flooding in India’s 
south-eastern maritime states. Once again the industry lost a majority of its crop
13 local administrative area
14 $2,857 in 1997 dollars.
15 See Chapter 3
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and impressed upon shrimp farmers the vulnerability of shrimp culture to the 
natural elements.
1.4.3 Bumper Harvests in 1996
In 1996, by contrast, shrimp farmers throughout Nellore district and 
indeed throughout India reported bumper harvests. The heavy monsoon rains of 
the previous year were believed to have essentially flushed and cleaned most 
brackishwater bodies along the coast. Most small scale and marginal shrimp 
farmers were able to produce two good crops in this year with output ranging 
from 400 to 700 kilograms per hectare using extensive culture techniques (Patil 
& KAA Database, 1997). An average output of two to three metric tons per 
hectare was enjoyed by big corporate and large individual farmers under 
modified and semi-intensive culture techniques. This translated into an estimated 
$US 435 million generated by cultured shrimp exports to major markets in Japan, 
the European Union and the United States. The thousands of shrimp farmers’ 
hope of repeating their 1996 success in 1997 was dashed, however, with a ban on 
the sector by the Indian Supreme Court in December 1996. The SC decision was 
in part a result of the agitation of several NGOs claiming that shrimp farming 
was destroying the environment and the livelihoods of coastal inhabitants.
1.4.4 NGO Agitation Against Shrimp Farming
Environmental and social action groups agitating against shrimp farms in 
the coastal zone include the National Fisheries Action Committee Against Joint 
Ventures (NFACAJV), the Campaign Against Shrimp Industries (CASI), Land 
for the Tiller (LAFTI) a social action group of mainly landless labour, Gram 
Swaraj Movement (GSM), PREPARE, Peoples’ Alliance Against Shrimp 
Industry (PAASI), Nellore Citizens Welfare Forum (NCWF), Resource 
Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy founded by 
Vandana Shiva, and Sneha founded by P. Christy. Several of these local NGOs
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are financially supported by more internationally known NGOs such as Christian 
Aid.
Mr. S. Jaganathan, the octogenarian Gandhian and Sarvodaya leader led 
mass contact programs, protests and public meetings throughout the Thanjavur- 
Cauvery basin, Nagapatnam and Quaid-e-Milleth districts in Tamil Nadu. With a 
slogan, “prawn farms are prison farms” he built a vibrant resistance movement 
supported by thousands of landless labourers, marginal agricultural farmers and 
fisher-folk.
Women from fishing communities organised themselves into Women’s 
Societies in order to effectively agitate against the sector. Once working for the 
shrimp farms by either collecting shrimp fry or preparing bunds, several 
organised women groups have boycotted working for the shrimp sector. 
Environmentalists and NGOs joined hands with local villagers in agitating 
against the industry. Organised protests led to halts in pond construction work. 
Social tensions also resulted in heavy-handed police intervention and shootings 
in Tamil Nadu (Viswanathan, 1994:77; Rajagopal, 1995:3).
Government Brokered Deals
NGO and local agitation led to government brokered settlements between 
corporate shrimp farmers and local populations. For example, inhabitants of 
Kurru Pattapalam village led a mass protest against a nearby corporate farm 
which broke out in violence and led to the destruction of farm property. In the 
course of one year of the arrival of the adjacent corporate farm, the village’s 
drinking water turned saline, their access to the sea was cut off, and their huts 
began to collapse (The Hindu, July 21, 1994). The district collector convinced 
the farm to pay a monthly fee to cover the cost of transporting potable water to 
the village. In another well known case government officials in Nellore District 
brokered a deal between five corporate shrimp farms, Rank Aqua, Aquamarine, 
Carewell, Bommidala farms and Sharani Sindhu Shrimp Farms and Kurru fishing 
village. The Rs. 4 million deal enabled the village to relocate itself to a more 
stable location (The Hindu, July 21,1994).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, agitation was directed against corporate farms 
and not against the multitude of small and marginal shrimp farmers culturing in 
the district. Small and marginal shrimp farmers seem to coexist with fisher-folk 
in coastal villages. In contrast, large and corporate farms have come under 
increasing pressure both locally and internationally.
1,4.5 1996 Supreme Court Ban
The first formal claim that the financial success of the shrimp industry 
came at the expense of the environment and local farming and fishing 
communities was made by S. Jaganathan, Chairman of the Gram Swaraj 
Movement (GSM) to the Supreme Court of India. The GSM is a voluntary 
organisation “working for the upliftment of the weaker section of society” 
(Supreme Court Notification, 1996:168). The GSM sought enforcement of the 
Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) issued by the Indian Government on February 
19, 1991. The CRZ calls for the National Coastal Management Authority to 
safeguard coastal areas including marine life and coastal inhabitants. The GSM 
writ petition was filed by M.C. Metha a well regarded environmental lawyer in 
India and also Chairman of the Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action.
The court first issued notice on December 12, 1994 declaring that first, 
“coastal stretches of seas, bays, estuaries, creeks, rivers and backwaters which are 
influenced by tidal action (in the landward side) up to 500 meters from the high 
tide line (HTL) and the land between the HTL and low tide line (LTL) are (part 
of) the CRZ ” and second, that all Indian States must not permit any industry to 
construct “up to 500 meters from the sea water at the maximum high tide.” This 
order was subject to an inquiry on whether shrimp farming was indeed adversely 
affecting the coastal environment and its inhabitants. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court in 1995 called for immediate protection of coastal inhabitants whose lives 
were allegedly suffering because of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture 
development. The court mandated that (1) beach access be given to fishers 
through private shrimp farms; (2) conversion of agricultural lands to shrimp 
farms be banned; (3) groundwater abstraction for shrimp farming be immediately
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stopped; and (4) each developing shrimp farm must obtain a pollution certificate. 
This was the first real attempt by the government to regulate the industry. 
However, enforcement was a problem and many shrimp farmers managed to 
avoid abiding by the new laws.
The NEERI Report
On March 27, 1995, the court passed an order calling for the National 
Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) based in Nagpur, India 
to impartially investigate the impacts of shrimp farming and report back to the 
court. Based on the NEERI Report’s conclusions, on December 11, 1996 the 
GSM were rewarded by a ruling that called for the “destruction/closure” of all 
shrimp farms operating within 500 meters of any brackishwater body by April 1, 
1997 (Supreme Court Notification, 1996:62).
In response to the court’s decision, newly formed aquaculture 
associations successfully lobbied state and national parliamentarians. They 
argued that the NEERI Report was “unscientific” and that the court’s decision 
was based on circumstantial evidence. In fact some internationally based NGOs 
have suggested that the NEERI Report has become the most controversial 
assessment of ecological and social costs of shrimp aquaculture (Mathews, 
1997:1). This is a result of the ongoing debate between local NGOs and the 
international scientific community regarding the validity of the report’s overall 
methodology and conclusions. For example, over twenty international experts 
publicly condemned the report as “amateurish...and unscientific...,”16 “partisan 
and misleading...biased,”17 and “unprofessional...and based on faulty data.”18 
The cost-benefit analysis in the report includes only the social and environmental 
costs of shrimp farming without any mention or inclusion of benefits accrued 
from employment and growth of ancillary industries.19 NGOs, on the other hand
16 T.V.R. Pillay, Former Head, Aquaculture Division, FAO
17 E.G. Silas, Former Director, CMFRI
18 Rathin Roy, Senior Advisor, UNBOBP, FAO
19 Today, it is both nationally and internationally accepted within the scientific community that 
the NEERI Report does not appropriately assess the environmental and social impacts o f shrimp
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naturally support the report’s findings, however, with slight reservations. They 
offer very little comment on the method in which NEERI conducted their 
investigation.
On March 18, 1997 the Indian Parliament passed the 1997 Aquaculture 
Act which placed a moratorium on the original Supreme Court order, effectively 
saving the industry. Since then, however, the shrimp farming sector has been in 
a state of flux. Because of the two-time collapse of the Indian Government in 
1997, the Indian Parliament has been unable to take further action on shrimp 
aquaculture. In the meantime, the aquaculture industry and NGOs continue the 
debate whether shrimp can be cultured in an environmentally and socially 
sustainable way. This debate has now gained international importance. Despite 
a lack of clear direction, the Supreme Court order and subsequent events have put 
shrimp farmers on the defensive. Domestic and international pressure to prove 
that shrimp can be farmed sustainably has been placed squarely with the many 
aquaculture associations formed to protect the rights of their members. As early 
as a few weeks after the landmark judgement, shrimp farmers began to organise 
throughout India. This private and collective action, may in fact be the saving 
grace of the industry.
1.4.6 Opportunities for Collective Bargaining20
Since the Supreme Court’s decision to put an end to the export-led Indian 
shrimp farming sector, a number of important changes have taken place at the 
local level that may help ensure a degree of environmental sustainability. 
Previous to the ban, shrimp farmers shared little technical information with each 
other. Any knowledge transfers that occurred, took place within small extended 
family owned farms. Farmers were too busy in their daily culture operation to 
discuss production techniques like efficient feed use, appropriate stocking
farming in India. NGOs, however, continue to use the facts and figures presented in the report in 
their own crusade against the industry.
20 This sub-section is based on a compilation of my notes from group discussion with several 
dozen small, medium and large scale farmers culturing shrimp along the Kandaleru river.
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densities and effluent treatment with neighbouring farmers.21 As far as most were 
concerned, shrimp culture put previously unproductive “wasteland” to productive 
use and generated income far greater than any small scale crops traditionally 
grown on soils with moderate salinity. Each farmer operated in a perfectly 
competitive market with plenty of room in the market (and along brackishwater 
bodies) for entry of additional farmers and more competition. However, 
unknown to most shrimp farmers was the sensitivity of their lucrative crop to 
environmental stress, unpredictable seasonal changes (i.e. periods of heavy 
monsoon and cyclones) and to each other’s production methods.
Moreover, since the December 1996 Supreme Court order banning the 
industry, large public and private corporate farmers and the multitude of small 
scale farmers have rapidly banded together to save the sector and their own 
livelihoods. Between mid-December 1996 and March 1997, dozens of Shrimp 
Aquaculture Associations (SAAs) have arisen throughout India’s coastal 
districts. Each SAA comprises of both big and small shrimp farmers, rich and 
poor alike, farming around a specific brackishwater body. District-wide and 
state-wide associations have also recently formed where representatives are 
selected from among the executive committee members of local associations. By 
April 1997 the All India Aquaculture Association had formed.
The Kandaleru Aquafarmers’ Association (KAA) is a local organisation 
comprising of over 500 shrimp farmers that formed after the Supreme Court 
judgement. The farmers cultivate shrimp along the Kandaleru river, Nellore 
district, Andhra Pradesh (see the map presented in Figure 2.0 in Chapter 2). 
Each group of ten aquafarmers from a specific village locality select one member 
representative to the Association’s board. The board selects an Executive 
Committee made up of an Honorary President, President, vice-president, 
Secretary, Joint Secretary and Treasurer to take forward local level concerns to 
the necessary State and National bodies. In addition to the Executive Committee, 
an Action Committee comprising of press, technical, administrative, revenue and 
legal sections implement the decisions made by the Board. Decisions taken by
21 This is based on semi-structured group interviews o f Kandaleru shrimp farmers held in 
February, 1997.
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the Board are made known to the local farmers through their elected member. In 
the case of the KAA, there appears a high degree of solidarity.
For example, when the Supreme court order outlawed aquafarms 
operating within 500 meters of any brackishwater source, the Board decided that 
all farms along the Kandaleru would protest the court’s decision as a unified 
body. Even the few dozen aquafarmers unaffected by the apex order (i.e. those 
operating beyond the 500 meter mark) did not culture and therefore lost profits 
from a potentially lucrative crop. This level of solidarity and collective action 
may help promote the long run sustainable growth of the industry.
1.4.7 Benefits of Collective Action
The Supreme Court order has essentially managed to collectivise an 
otherwise disorganised, individualistic and solely profit-minded industry. The 
motivating factor in the development of regional associations has certainly been 
to fight the court order. However, in the long run, these associations could play a 
vital role in sustainable development efforts if amendments to the CRZ 
regulations are made such that shrimp aquaculture is exempted, albeit with a 
degree of modification.
First, corporate and small scale aquafarmers alike are just beginning to 
realise that their future growth and development depends on a clean environment. 
Co-operation could ensure that each farmer has access to greater scientific 
knowledge of their own production. This research suggests that there exists an 
overall lack of awareness of the necessity of a clean water source for shrimp 
culture among Kandalery shrimp farmers. As most shrimp farms in a specific 
locality use the same brackishwater source to fill their ponds and discharge their 
effluent, the probability of contaminating their downstream neighbour’s intake 
water is high. In fact, the viral disease outbreak of 1994 was most likely spread 
through common waterways. This general ignorance, however is changing with 
the formation of SAAs.
Second, smaller shrimp farmers will benefit from greater co-operation. 
With opportunities for small and marginal shrimp farmers to bargain collectively,
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they will be able to reduce their overall input costs by purchasing vital inputs 
such as hatchery seed at bulk discounted rates. Currently, corporate farms buy in 
excess of two million seed in bulk from hatcheries at a rate of Rs. 0.35 a piece. 
Small and marginal farmers pay a higher rate (up to Rs. 0.60 a piece) for a 
smaller volume (35,000 to 60,000 pieces). With collective action, groups of 
small shrimp farmers could purchase larger quantities at lower prices and 
distribute them amongst themselves. The same applies to other inputs such as 
feed and with capital costs such as motorised water pumps which could be shared 
between several marginal farmers. More importantly, however, are the benefits 
extended to the environment. With the ability to purchase hatchery seed at 
affordable prices, the stress placed on marine ecology from purchase of wild 
caught seed collected by coastal fishers will decline. This will also benefit 
coastal fishers. Shrimp fry previously caught and sold for pond stocking shrimp 
fry would now be able to grow to maturity in deeper off-shore waters. Local 
fishers would benefit from catching larger shrimp which have a higher per unit 
value realisation than shrimp fry.
Third, reduction of supplementary feed could ensure that the likelihood of 
breaching the carrying capacity of the pond is minimised. This would in turn 
minimise the production costs per kilogram of shrimp enabling small and 
marginal shrimp farmers to enjoy higher levels of profitability even when 
operating below their potential maximum yield. At a lower use of feed input, the 
possibility of pond bottom deterioration and water quality improvement may be 
achieved. Shrimp farmers would thus be operating at the maximum sustainable 
yield. This means that although output levels may decline from 1996 levels, the 
longevity of the production system would be extended with minimal output 
fluctuations from disease outbreaks (due to higher overall water quality) and thus 
less stress placed on the environment. Co-ordination between farmers would 
ensure that the latest scientific discoveries of appropriate feed use be shared 
quickly in a given region.
Fourth, private individual and corporate farmers would also benefit from 
greater co-ordination. Through the SAA, all shrimp farms along a brackishwater 
body could be monitored for viral attacks. Once a virus was detected, news
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could spread quickly to other farmers who would have appropriate action plans to 
save their crop. As large private and public corporate farms come to understand 
their dependency on even small and marginal farmers and other larger farmers for 
clean water intake, they will further support each other in disseminating 
knowledge of how to protect their common property resource, the brackishwater 
body.
Fifth, greater co-ordination between farmers means more opportunity for 
appropriate government regulation of the industry. For example, governmental 
use of existing informatic resources could ensure that the industry is 
appropriately regulated and develops sustainably to ensure that environmental 
degradation and disturbance to rural populations is minimised. Data obtained by 
space-borne remote sensing satellites coupled with geographic information 
system (GIS) can be used to identify environmentally fragile zones surrounding 
precious groundwater sources, fertile agricultural lands, and local village 
communities. Using these data, decisions could be made on which areas are 
suitable and unsuitable for shrimp aquaculture development. This data could be 
shared with each regional SAA to map areas of possible conflict between the 
industry, the environment and local populations. Satellite data could thus 
supplement ground level analysis and play a powerful role in monitoring and 
protecting India’s vast coastal resources and its traditional inhabitants.
The hope is that all members of Shrimp Aquafarm Associations will 
begin to share technical knowledge of culture practices, information on disease 
prevention through eco- friendly pond and effluent cleaning systems and 
scientific knowledge regarding the state of the environmental carrying capacity 
throughout the culture period. Although members of the SAAs appear willing to 
collaborate towards educating each other regarding sustainable aquafarming 
practices, it remains to be seen if this is solely lip service for the purpose of 
lifting the ban on shrimp culture. All members seem to agree, however, that 
there is plenty of room in the market for healthy growth of the industry. 
However, it remains to be seen that the various aquafarmers’ associations will 
continue collaboration if allowed to continue culture practices. As the market 
becomes saturated, and profit margins fall due to sharp declines in prices perhaps
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each aquafarmer will find it in his own interest to keep innovations to himself, 
thus undermining the strides made from collective action. This could be avoided 
through appropriate regulation and/or diversification of value added shrimp 
products. However, so far, it seems that the Supreme Court order could be seen 
as a blessing in disguise for the shrimp culture industry.
1.5 Research Obj ectives
The lack of research on the social, economic and environmental impacts of 
brackishwater shrimp farming in India has become of major national importance as 
a result of the Indian Supreme Court’s December 1996 decision to ban the industry 
and destroy any farms located less than 500 meters from any brackishwater 
source.22 In an emergency session in March 1997, the Indian Parliament passed the 
1997 Aquaculture Act that placed a moratorium on implementing the court order. 
This Act called for the establishment of an Aquaculture Commission to establish 
regulatory guidelines for the sustainable development of the shrimp farming sector.
To ensure that the Commission devises an appropriate regulatory 
framework to promote sustainable shrimp farming, several questions regarding the 
social, environmental and economic impacts of this sector must be answered. This 
amounts to exploring answers to key questions raised within three under researched 
areas of concern: (1) examining the relationship between shrimp farming and the 
impact of changing land use patterns on agricultural labour; (2) evaluating the 
productive performance of the shrimp farms themselves with respect to efficiency 
and sustainability; and, (3) measuring the socio-economic and environmental 
impacts of shrimp farming on local inhabitants. These are difficult tasks since the 
necessary data needed to explore these areas of research are deficient. 
Additionally, very little is known about this sector because it has developed and 
gained local and international attention only within the past five years.
The core objective of this research is therefore, to model and measure the 
efficiency of the brackishwater shrimp aquaculture sector and its socio-economic
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and environmental impacts on rural producers in India. This is accomplished 
within the context of a microeconomic analysis of the shrimp farming sector’s 
growth and development in the Kandaleru region, in particular. The Kandaleru 
region is located in Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh and is not dissimilar to the 
dozens of shrimp farming regions located throughout India.
1.6 Contributions of this Research
The specific study of shrimp production in the Kandaleru region and its 
socio-economic and environmental impacts on coastal producers make several 
significant contributions to the empirical field of study. Each contribution is based 
primarily on the analysis of one of three primary data sets collected from six 
months of fieldwork in India: (i) a general survey of over 500 shrimp farms; (ii) a 
detailed data set of production characteristics collected by surveying 82 shrimp 
farms; and (iii) a survey of coastal producers inhabiting one of twenty-six villages 
located adjacent to major shrimp farming areas. Moreover, the results themselves 
provide policy relevant recommendations which may contribute to the existing 
debate on the sustainability of shrimp farming. Specifically, the core contributions 
arising from this dissertation are a result of the following six areas of research.
1.6.1 The Growth & Development of the Shrimp Farm Industry
Current research on the growth and development of India’s shrimp 
farming industry is vague and anecdotal. This is mostly a result of limited survey 
data collected on general characteristics of shrimp farms and on ancillary 
services. This dissertation fills this void by analysing relevent primary data. The 
data analysis identifies relationships between farm size, ownership status, 
production technology, factor inputs and shrimp output of Kandaleru shrimp 
farms and traces its growth and development between 1993 and 1997. Similarly, 
the evolution, growth and development of ancillary services are examined. 
Analysis of both together, serves as a comprehensive review of one of the most
221S'. Jaganathan vs. G.O.I. (Kuldip Singh, J), December 11, 1996.
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prolific shrimp farming regions in the most prolific Indian shrimp farming state, 
Andhra Pradesh.
1.6.2 Direct & Indirect Employment
There have been few studies and much speculation regarding direct and 
indirect rural employment opportunities generated from brackishwater shrimp 
farming. Direct employment arises from either owning and operating a shrimp 
farm or by working for one. Indirect employment opportunities arise from the 
growth of ancillary services such as seed hatcheries, feed mills, ice factories and 
processing plants. Employment levels generated directly and indirectly from the 
growth and development of the shrimp farming sector and its accompanying 
ancillary services are assessed.
1.6.3 The Changing Pattern of Land & Labour Use
There is much debate as to how the growth of shrimp farming in the 
Kandaleru region has affected the pattern of land use and consequently the 
structure of the rural labour market. Government land previously classified as 
barren and unproductive is now supporting shrimp culture. Simultaneously, 
agricultural land is allegedly indiscriminately converted to shrimp farms as 
traditional agricultural farmers realise the potential for greater profits by farming 
shrimp. Moreover, there is growing concern by local and international NGOs 
over more frequently reported incidents of ground water salinity, agricultural 
land salinity and other environmental externalities. These are believed to be 
caused by shrimp farm development. In addition, the impact of both agricultural 
and non-agricultural land conversion on the local labour market is of concern. 
Overall, there are many questions, but few answers with respect to shrimp 
farming and the impact of changing land use patterns on agricultural labour. 
Therefore, this research explores the hypothesis that traditional agriculture and 
agricultural labour have been displaced since the advent of shrimp farming.
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1.6,4 Modelling & Measuring Shrimp Farm Efficiency
Very little is known about the economic performance of the shrimp 
aquaculture sector except that it is extremely volatile with significant profit made 
during a good culture cycle and financial losses and even bankruptcy as a result of 
crop failure from disease. This volatility translates to economic instability in the 
rural economy which has direct and indirect consequences for the shrimp farms 
themselves, ancillary services, and for the rural labour market. There are additional 
impacts as a result of price fluctuations in the international marketplace that can 
affect the overall rural economy since shrimp production is primarily an export-led 
sector. There has been a lack of adequate research on these topics as a result of 
insufficient microeconomic data. This is due to a combination of factors that 
include investing the necessary time and resources to carry out a rural based survey 
in a disorganised sector and the unwillingness of producers to share sensitive 
production data. In addition, shrimp farming has been met with local opposition 
which has made shrimp farmers protective of their trade and data collection efforts 
even more difficult.23
Because of growing social activism against shrimp production in rural areas 
of India, shrimp farmers have become wary of outside interest in their culture 
activities. This has made it exceedingly difficult for researchers to gain access to 
production statistics as well as descriptive data on the size of farms and the 
managerial characteristics involved in operating that farm. Therefore, very few 
comprehensive production data sets exist for shrimp farming. The data that do 
exist, however, are collected from government managed experimental stations and 
not from private shrimp farmers themselves. Only a few studies have analysed 
solid production data collected from the field. These studies, however, follow a 
handful of farms through several culture cycles and are therefore unrepresentative 
of a specific region. The advantages accrued as a result of analysing shrimp farm 
production is two-fold: to model, measure and explain technical and scale
23 Several medium and large scale shrimp farmers have put barbed wire around their farms to 
protect their crops from possible sabotage from local opposition groups.
49
inefficiencies among sample shrimp farms; and, to answer important questions 
regarding the economic behaviour of shrimp farms.
1.6.5 Identifying Environmental & Socio-economic impacts
No rigorous economic analysis exists on the impacts of shrimp farming on 
indigenous populations.24 A number of qualitative accounts based on informal 
interviews of villagers have been circulating. Qualitative studies provide good 
descriptive accounts of the ways in which rural populations have benefited and/or 
suffered as a result of shrimp farming. A majority of these published reports, 
however provide nothing more than anecdotal evidence at best to substantiate their 
claims.25 This is often a result of unstructured, unsystematic and overall haphazard 
data gathering efforts.26
The value-added of a comprehensive survey of rural populations inhabiting 
villages adjacent to shrimp farms is therefore three-fold: (i) to consistently and 
rigorously identify the negative social impacts of shrimp aquaculture development 
(i.e. caused by both environmental and non-environmental impacts of shrimp 
farming) on rural populations; (ii) to rank these concerns; (iii) to measure the 
severity of socio-economic problems the region faces as a result of shrimp farming.
1.6.6 Assessing the Determinants of Social Impacts
The final contribution of this research is an attempt to assess the 
determinants of social impacts on twenty-six villages surveyed in the Kandaleru 
region. Specifically, three questions are explored employing Probit and Ordered 
Probit models: (i) What are the determinants of social impacts faced by coastal 
and inland communities as a result of shrimp farming?; (ii) What farm and
24 This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive review of the literature presented throughout 
this research. Moreover, the same conclusion is substantiated by comprehensive reviews of  
literature on shrimp farming and its impacts conducted by the World Wildlife Fund (see Clay, 
1997), the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (see Barraclough & Finger- 
Stich, 1997) and the World Bank (see Hempel & Winther, 1997).
25 Some examples include Bundell & Maybin (1996), Justice et al. (1996), PREPARE (1996).
26 The most well known example in the Indian context is the NEERI (1996) report discussed 
earlier in this chapter.
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village characteristics, if any, explain why some villages are more or less likely 
to suffer from the negative consequences of a given social impact?; (iii) What 
impact does a small change in a significant village or farm characteristic have on 
the probability that the region suffers from a particular socio-economic or 
environmental problem? This empirical investigation is the first of its kind in 
assessing shrimp farming’s impacts on coastal inhabitants.
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Chapter 2
Survey Methodology & Data Collection
2.0 Introduction
Six months of fieldwork in the Kandaleru region of coastal Andhra 
Pradesh, India took place between November 1996 and April 1997. Sample 
survey methods were used as the primary survey instrument due to its economy, 
adaptability and overall accuracy (Casley and Lury, 1981:48). The basic survey 
instrument and technique were adjusted to fit the local socio-economic and 
demographic conditions. Overall, the techniques used to collect micro level data 
required refining over several months before arrival in India and rapid alterations 
to the basic survey structure when in the field.
This chapter presents a detailed account of the methodology devised to 
collect (i) basic information on over 500 shrimp farms operating along the 
Kandaleru river needed to survey basic characteristics of the sector in this region; 
(ii) detailed production data needed to model and measure shrimp farm 
efficiency; and, (iii) community data used to assess the environmental and socio­
economic impacts of shrimp farming on coastal inhabitants in south-eastern 
India. A detailed description of the fieldwork location is presented is section 2.1. 
An account of the historical and current events that helped facilitate the data 
collection effort is discussed in section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the 
methodology to construct and implement the 518 shrimp farm survey. Section
2.4 discusses the methods employed to survey inhabitants of twenty-six villages 
located adjacent to Kandaleru shrimp farms. Section 2.5 presents the 
methodology used to obtain detailed production data for a sample of 82 
Kandaleru shrimp farms. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 2.6.
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2.1 Description of Fieldwork Location
Nellore district is the southern most coastal district in Andhra Pradesh, a 
southeastern Indian state (see Figure 2.0). The southern most coastal state in 
India, Tamil Nadu is located directly to the south of Andhra Pradesh. Karnataka 
and Maharashtra are to its West, and Madhya Pradesh and Orissa are Andhra 
Pradesh’s northern neighbors. Nellore district is bounded by a 163 kilometer 
eastern coastline along the Bay of Bengal. It is sub-divided into twenty mandals, 
or administrative regions of which fourteen support brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture (BFDA, 1996). Five major brackish rivers, namely, Pennar, 
Swarnamukhi, Pyderu, Chippaleru, Kalangi and Kandaleru flow through this 
district and into the Bay of Bengal. The Buckingham Canal, a British made canal 
used to transport goods through the state runs parallel to the coastline and 
traverses the district. As a result of good brackishwater sources, the region has 
witnessed the rapid development of the shrimp aquaculture sector.
The Kandaleru river1 and surrounding region was chosen as the study site 
for this research for primarily four reasons. First, the Kandaleru river is unique 
in that it does not play host to any large scale industry other than to shrimp 
farming. Shrimp farms occupy both northern and southern banks of the river’s 
fifty kilometer stretch upstream from the Bay of Bengal. The only competing 
large scale agricultural commodity produced in the region is paddy. Crops such 
as bananas, ragi, salt and casuarian are cultivated at a much smaller scale. 
Although it is not uncommon that agricultural run-off containing pesticides and 
herbicides can pollute adjacent rivers, paddy cultivation does not have a history 
of polluting the Kandaleru (Rao, 1995:2). The Kandaleru river is therefore a 
model brackishwater body from which insights can be made regarding the 
impacts of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture on the environment and on local 
populations inhabiting its banks (CIBA, 1997; Rao, 1995:3).
Second, a variety of good quality secondary data exist for this region 
because of the river’s close proximity to the district capital, Nellore. Nellore city
1 Throughout this research the Kandaleru river is also referred to as the Kandaleru creek or 
Kandaleru basin.
53
is the district’s administrative center and hosts all the major government offices 
that oversee shrimp farming. These include the Brackishwater Fish Farmers’ 
Development Authority (BFDA), Inland Fisheries Inspection Office (IFIO), 
Pollution Control Board (PCB), Central Planning Office (CPO), Land Records 
Office (LRO), and District Collector’s Office (DCO). Each one of these offices 
was visited. Moreover, publicly available secondary data were collected from 
them. Approval to conduct field research in Nellore district was granted by the 
BFDA since the Kandleru region fell under its authority. Moreover, Nellore city 
also hosts many of the ancillary services that support shrimp farming activities. 
These include ice factories, seed hatcheries, feed mills and peeling and 
processing plants. Several were visited and managers were interviewed 
informally.
Third, because of the Kandaleru region’s local fishing port at 
Krishnapattanam and close proximity to a major rail link to Madras2 (Gudur & 
Nellore), shrimp are easily transported for export. Therefore, shrimp farming in 
the region has boomed in a relatively short period of time.
Finally, much of the literature and activism denouncing the shrimp 
aquaculture industry focuses on villages and farms located in Andhra Pradesh 
and Nellore district in particular. Moreover, several documents considered by the 
Indian Supreme Court cite the district by name and several of the official and 
unofficial reports used against the shrimp industry are based on studies 
conducted in the Kandaleru region.3
2 The offical name o f Madras was recently changed to Chennai.
3 These studies are produced by a range o f Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
government offices. They range from collections of field notes based on personal observation to 
analysis o f survey data. Brief reviews o f these studies are presented in Chapter One.
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Figure 2.0
Map of India, Andhra Pradesh & Nellore District
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2.2 Background to Fieldwork
The empirical field investigation of shrimp farms and the assessment of 
shrimp farms’ impact on rural communities took place between early November 
1996 and April 1997. The first month proved difficult as a result of the rapidly 
changing political climate. Initially, I intended to first survey Kandaleru shrimp 
farms to obtain data on general farm characteristics and more detailed production 
data. Farmers, however, were uncooperative in early November, as it was the 
harvest period and the busiest time of the year. Due to their unwillingness to 
cooperate, I decided to concentrate on conducting village impact surveys. After 
conducting a pilot survey in one of the Kandaleru villages, the political climate 
changed again, enabling me to turn back to surveying shrimp farms. This time, 
however, I had a substantial degree of support from farmers. The Supreme Court 
had essentially banned the sector in mid-December, 1996. The chronology of 
events summarized above is now discussed in greater detail.
Initial attempts to gain access to primary information regarding shrimp 
farm production failed. Several corporate shrimp farm administrative offices 
located in Nellore city were visited over two weeks. Most of the managers in 
charge of record keeping refused outright to discuss details of their farm 
production characteristics. November 1996 was the shrimp harvest period.4 
Most shrimp farmers were actively engaged in harvesting their shrimp crop and 
often too busy to answer survey questions regarding their culture methods. In 
fact, most of the corporate farm managers and larger scale shrimp farmers were 
suspicious of the interest shown in their production methods. This was a 
consequence of the national and international attention that both local and foreign 
environmental and social activists had raised in their attempt to ban the industry.5
Larger shrimp farmers were very aware that several international NGOs 
with local representation through sister organisations in India were claiming that
4 Although I realised before arriving in India that this could pose a problem, I was obliged to 
begin my field research at this time due to stipulations set by my funding source.
5 There were several NGOs actively campaigning against the shrimp farming sector in Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, India at that time. More well known NGOs include the Gram Swaraj 
Movement under the leadership o f S, Jaganathan, the Campaign Against the Shrimp Industry
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the brackishwater shrimp aquaculture sector was disturbing the balance of the 
coastal ecosystem through blatant disregard to the environment. Secondly, 
activists argued that the sector was displacing local inhabitants from their 
traditional occupations and in some cases displacing local peoples from their 
ancestral homes. In addition, activist groups had organized non-violent 
demonstrations against the sector. These demonstrations were held frequently at 
the local, state and national level. Shrimp farmers were additionally concerned 
about a 1994 petition calling for an outright ban on the shrimp farm industry. In 
November 1996 this matter was under consideration before the Indian Supreme 
Court.
During the first month of fieldwork in the shrimp-farming belt of 
southeastern India, it became clear that a different approach was needed. The 
period between crop cycles (December to February) seemed more likely to yield 
better results.6 The focus, therefore, shifted away from eliciting farm level data 
and more toward conducting village impact surveys. The rest of November was 
spent piloting the village impact survey prepared in collaboration with the 
Central Institute for Brackishwater Aquaculture to assess the impact of shrimp 
farming on local inhabitants living adjacent to the Kandaleru shrimp farms.7
As the 1996-1997 Rajiv Gandhi Foundation (RGF) Scholar, I was well 
received by many of Nellore city’s government offices. A letter of introduction 
from RGF proved very useful. The Chief Executive Officer of Nellore’s BFDA 
officially sanctioned two Fisheries Development Officers to assist me during the 
duration of my investigation.8 Each of the two Fisheries Development Officers 
had at least eight years of experience in the BFDA and four years of experience 
in the Kandaleru region. Their primary responsibility over the four years was to
(CASI), Land for the Tillers Freedom (LAFTI), The Association o f the Rural Poor (ARP), 
PREPARE and the Churches Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA).
6 1 believed that as a result o f their successful harvests and the interim idle phase, shrimp farmers 
might be willing to speak more freely and at longer intervals.
7 The Central Institute for Brackishwater Aquaculture (CIBA) is the government agency in 
charge o f promoting sustainable shrimp and fish aquaculture in India. CIBA, with its 
headquarters in Madras (Chennai) has several experimental stations around the country staffed 
with fisheries biologists and other fishery experts, scientists and fisheries economists. The pilot 
survey questionnaire was prepared at the London School of Economics and based on issues 
raised by secondary sources. The pilot study was modified after discussions with shrimp farm 
experts at CIBA to include local level concerns.
8 BFDA Chief Executive Order (November, 1997).
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oversee shrimp fanning in the region. A part of their responsibilities was also to 
monitor the concerns of village communities located in the shrimp-farming belt 
of the Kandaleru region. Both officers were fluent in the regional dialect and in 
English. Moreover, one officer had specialized knowledge over the sea-based 
villages located adjacent to sea-based shrimp farms, while the other officer was 
responsible for villages located adjacent to the Kandaleru creek. Both officers 
proved invaluable in helping to administer village surveys that were prepared to 
address the impacts of shrimp farming on local inhabitants’ well-being.
In early December, a pilot survey of one of the Kandaleru creek-based 
villages was conducted. However, the landmark decision by the Indian Supreme 
Court soon after, forced me to shift my focus from the villages back to the shrimp 
farms. This proved to be the turning point in my data collection activities. 
Detailed accounts of the survey methods are discussed next.
2.3 Shrimp Farm Survey Methodology
2,3.1 Preparing & Administering the Survey
In mid-December 1996 the Indian Supreme Court effectively imposed a 
national ban on all shrimp aquaculture production units. The order was effective 
immediately. As that season’s bumper harvest generated significant profits for all 
those involved in both production and in the supporting ancillary services, and 
enabled many farms to enjoy a healthy profit after several crop failures, this 
judgment was devastating.
Acting as an unofficial advisor to a group of local corporate shrimp 
farmers operating along the Kandaleru river, I participated in guiding the launch 
of the first Kandaleru Aqua Farmers’ Association (KAA).9 In doing so, I
9 At this stage, corporate shrimp farmers no longer viewed me as a threat, but as a possible ally in 
their attempt to organize. This was a result o f my connections to the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation 
which I believed they confused with the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation for Aquaculture located in 
Tamil Nadu. I also managed to gain the confidence of the local Rotary Club President who also
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stepped out of what could be seen as objective neutrality (Wolcott, 1995: 165- 
166). However, Kincheloe and McLaren, (1994:140) suggest “whereas 
traditional researchers cling to the guard rail of neutrality, critical researchers 
frequently announce their partisanship in the struggle for a better world.”10 My 
informal participation in the KAA does raise the question of data reliability. 
However, as discussed below, the method of data collection employed puts 
possible data bias into context.
The idea of the KAA was to collectivize the farmers culturing shrimp 
along the Kandaleru and form an Association with an elected board that could 
lobby against the Supreme Court’s decision. The first step was to announce the 
establishment of the KAA and solicit members. Over a period of a few weeks I 
accompanied a small group of corporate sector managers and large scale farmers 
and visited several shrimp farming localities along the Kandaleru. The group 
explained the meaning of the Supreme Court judgment and the reasons for 
initiating the KAA. Farmers were asked to form into groups of ten to fifteen and 
elect a representative from that group who could attend KAA meetings and 
communicate information back to the group.11 Approximately 42 representatives 
were elected to represent approximately 530 shrimp farmers.
Through each elected representative, my questionnaire, which also served 
as their official KAA “Membership Enrollment/Information Form” (EIF) was 
sent to all known shrimp farmers via the group leader (see section 2.3.3)12. Each 
farmer was expected to return the questionnaire with a joining fee of Rs. 100 to 
gain membership to the Association.13 A registration number between 1 and 530
had several dozen hectares o f shrimp ponds and therefore some clout amongst the shrimp 
farming community.
10 Although I don’t claim to be aligning myself with the shrimp farmers to somehow better the 
world, I did see an opportunity to gain substantive knowledge and data through my alliance.
11 Only two farmers were selected to represent over 150 marginal scheduled castes and scheduler 
tribes (SC-ST) farmers operating on land transferred to them by the government for the purpose 
o f shrimp farming.
12 This method introduces the risk o f selection bias. However, the response rate of over 98 
‘percent suggests that the group leader did take responsibility to ensure each o f his constituents 
filled out the questionnaire.
13 Marginal farmers who operated on land less than one hectare were exempt from the joining 
fee. Owner-operators on farms o f a size greater than one hectare were thought to be able to pay 
the nominal joining fee. Our discussions with small farmers suggest that the joining fee was not 
a deterrent from joining the KAA. Farmers with multiple farms were asked to register each 
farm. It is possible that the estimation o f 530 Kandaleru shrimp farms is an underestimate,
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identifying each shrimp farm was placed on each EIF.14 This number served a 
dual purpose: first, as a registration number and second, as a way of 
systematically counting the number of farms and keeping track of which farmers 
under each elected KAA official’s jurisdiction did not respond. Later I benefited 
from the fact that the KAA registration number also enabled me to follow up on 
the survey responses of individual farmers in a systematic way. This was most 
useful in my effort to collect production data from 82 sample KAA farms located 
adjacent to Tikkavaram and Bestapalem villages.
By mid-February 1997 the KAA had received almost 90 percent of the 
EIFs and by the middle of March, 98 percent had been received. Cross sectional 
data on basic farm characteristics are therefore collected for 518 shrimp farmers 
culturing along the Kandaleru creek, Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh.
2.3.2 Quick response
The motivation for owner-operators of marginal, small and medium size 
farms and managers of corporate sector shrimp farms to join the KAA and 
quickly return the questionnaire was two-fold. First, shrimp farmers along the 
Kandaleru were forced to stop producing shrimp due to the mid-December 1996 
Indian Supreme Court judgment. However, the court also ruled that all shrimp 
farms operating within 500 meters of the high tide line would be demolished by 
the end of March 1997. Approximately 98 percent of all shrimp farms in this 
region fall within this exclusion zone called the Coastal Regulation Zone, or CRZ 
(BFDA, 1997). Second, both small and large size shrimp farmers had little hope 
to save their livelihood without some form of collective action. They saw the 
initiation of the KAA as one positive step towards collective bargaining with the 
government.15
however. Any conclusions drawn from this research naturally corresponds to KAA shrimp 
farmers. It can be generalized to brackishwater shrimp farmers in general as a result o f the 
relatively uniform modes o f culture within India’s coastal shrimp farming states.
14 According to the KAA Board o f Directors, there are no more than 530 shrimp farms located 
along the Kandaleru. This, however, may be a slight underestimate o f the true number o f  
farmers.
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2.3.3 EIF Questionnaire
The final list of questions appearing on the EIF questionnaire was 
determined through semi-structured discussions with a subgroup of shrimp 
fanners in mid-December 1996.16 From these discussions, I discovered that 
shrimp farmers were not prepared to formally share certain production data and 
specific characteristics of farming methods via a formal questionnaire.17 These 
data were considered sensitive and private. With all farms identified by a 
specific KAA registration number, managers and owner-operators of each one 
could be followed up by the survey team for more specific and sensitive data 
collection. Overall, the general KAA survey response rate was an outstanding 98 
percent. Thus with little possibility of selectivity bias, the conclusions drawn 
from the data can be said to accurately reflect the characteristics of the shrimp 
farming sector in the Kandaleru region.
For the purpose of the EIF questionnaire, shrimp farmers occupying land 
on either the northern or southern bank of the Kandaleru were invited to join the 
KAA and to be included in the survey. Sea-based farms near but not adjacent to 
the Kandaleru were excluded from the KAA and therefore also from the survey.18 
However, 1996 and 1994 sea-based shrimp farm data were collected from the 
office of the regional Brackishwater Fish Farming Development Authority 
(BFDA) located in Nellore city. Similarly, general survey data on 1994 
Kandaleru shrimp farm characteristics were obtained from the same government 
agency. These data allow for some comparison between two time periods, the 
1993-1994 and 1996-1997 seasons.
15 This issue was discussed in Chapter One.
16 The original survey was prepared by myself at the London School o f Economics. This was 
altered in the field to take into account local conditions. Several informal group discussions 
between m yself and shrimp farmers took place at the guest house where I was based. The guest 
house was located in Gudur, the unofficial administrative center for the Kandaleru river. As a 
result o f its close proximity to one cluster of shrimp farms (less than three kilometers), several 
small and marginal farmers also participated in the group discussions.
17 Farmers were unwilling to disclose certain information regarding production technology as a 
result o f Indian Supreme Court Interim Order W.P.No.561/94 dated 9-5-95 which asked the State 
Government to place restrictions on shrimp farm units using specific culture technology. The 
EIF questionnaire, therefore asks for only basic (i.e. unthreatening) information on each farm.
18 Sea-based farms are those shrimp farms adjacent to the Bay o f  Bengal. These farms use the 
Bay o f Bengal for both water intake and effluent discharge.
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The EIF, written in English and in the local language asks each 
responding shrimp farmer to answer several questions characterizing their 
farms.19 The EIF asks each farmer for the name and address of the owner- 
operator and the location of the farm (i.e. nearest village). It asks for exact figures 
for each farms’ total land holding, total water spread area, total number of shrimp 
ponds, average yield per hectare during the bumper harvest of 1996 and during 
the disease year harvest of 1994 (or average yield per pond if the per hectare 
figure was unknown), land ownership status (leased, owned or government 
transfer), and location (i.e. name of the nearest village and approximate distance 
in kilometers from the farm). Illiterate shrimp farmers were assisted with the EIF 
by one of the elected KAA representatives.20
2,3.4 Bias
There are two types of bias that may be some cause for concern. The first 
type concerns the survey structure, sampling method adopted, and overall sample 
size. The second type arises from non-response and fictitious or exaggerated 
responses. Both forms of bias can easily lead to inappropriate conclusions as a 
result of bad data. While bias undoubtedly exist to some degree in the data, the 
question remains as to whether it is of significance.
The EIF survey asks for only general information on characteristics of 
farms operating along the Kandaleru river. As a result, there were no non­
responses to questions. In several hundred cases, farm sizes and the area water 
spread were given in acres. These figures were simply converted to hectares.21 
When the area unit was left off the size figure, it was not difficult to figure out
19 An example o f  the EIF is presented in Appendix 2A.
20 Each group o f  approximately ten shrimp farmers in each shrimp farming region along the 
Kandaleru elected one representative to the KAA Board. This representative in all cases was 
literate and served as the liaison between local fanners and the KAA. In each case, the 
representative elected was male, despite the fact that some farms are registered under women’s 
names. I am unable to determine whether the female owner is actually the owner-operator, or 
that her name appears on the ownership record so that one household can obtain additional 
subsidies by registering a two pond farm as two different farms. It is clear that several dozens o f  
illiterate small and marginal farmers participated in the KAA survey because of their ink thumb 
prints placed in lieu o f a signature.
21 Land area is measured in hectares throughout this dissertation.
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the appropriate unit area measure based on other information supplied in the 
survey. Less than 2 percent of the responses proved difficult in this regard. 
Nonetheless, each of the 518 responses was eventually successfully decoded with 
the appropriate units attached to numerical answers.
It is possible that the reported 1994 and 1996 average yields per hectare 
may be under or over stated and therefore biased. However, this does not seem 
to be widespread. Basic statistical cross tabulations reveal that only three farms 
report what look like outliers when comparing per hectare output and farm size. 
In all three cases, the farms reported extremely low output values. This may be a 
result of some form of crop disease that destroyed a large part of the crop. 
Alternatively, it may be the result of inadvertently attaching the incorrect units to 
the output response (i.e. kilograms as opposed to metric tonnes). Nonetheless, 
due to the large sample size of 518 farms, any bias is minimized as a result of 
aggregation. In addition, average yields per hectare classified by farm size are 
found to be consistent with the results of a more detailed survey of 82 shrimp 
farms.
Overall, in my view, there appears to be very little motivation for farmers 
to over or under estimate responses to any question in the KAA survey. The 
gravity of the Supreme Court order and local transparency of information seemed 
to maintain a degree of formality over farmers’ responses to the EIF.22
22 There is a high degree o f transparency as a result o f  the way in which EIFs were returned to the 
KAA. Each farmer filled out the EIF and gave it to the elected group leader for submission to the 
KAA. Each local fanner most likely realized that the elected group leader would be aware if  
there were any gross misrepresentations in their responses. It is possible that the entire group 
misrepresented their responses. However, this seems implausible as there does not appear to be 
anything to gain from this practice.
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2.4 A Survey of 26 Villages
In addition to the 518 shrimp farms surveyed, inhabitants of local villages 
located adjacent to these farms were also surveyed. There are approximately 
thirty-eight well known villages and several dozen smaller hamlets23 located 
adjacent to the major shrimp farming areas in fifteen coastal mandals in Nellore 
district, according to BFDA records. Some of these villages are coastal and 
located along the district’s 164 kilometer stretch of beach, while others are inland 
and located adjacent to one of the district’s five rivers.
Whereas the first challenge of this research (already discussed) was to 
collect data to characterize the Kandaleru shrimp farming sector, the second was 
to assess the impacts of shrimp fanning on rural inhabitants. To address this 
important issue, villages located adjacent to shrimp farms were identified and 
then surveyed. Primary data collected via the KAA EIF survey enabled 
identification of fourteen creek-based villages located adjacent to Kandaleru river 
shrimp farms. Secondary data collected from BFDA enabled identification of 
sixteen sea-based villages located adjacent to sea-based shrimp farms. In total, 
only twenty-six of the thirty identified villages were surveyed.24 This section 
presents the survey methodology used to assess the impacts of shrimp farming on 
these twenty-six villages.
2,4,1 The Survey Instrument
The survey of rural inhabitants used in this research is a hybrid of the 
community questionnaire methodology based on the Living Standard 
Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys of the World Bank and Rapid Rural 
Appraisal (RRA). The main objective of LSMS surveys is to collect data that 
can be used to assess household welfare, understand household behaviour, and to 
evaluate the effect of various government policies on the living conditions of the 
population (Grosh & Glewwe, 1995:3). The community questionnaire elicits
23 A hamlet is a small sub-division o f a larger village. The hamlet is usually located very close to 
its associated village.
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information regarding village infrastructure from community leaders and via 
group discussion. Specifically, it seeks to collect
information on local conditions that are common to all households in the 
area. This format is typically used only in rural areas since local 
communities are easier to define than urban areas. The information 
covered by the questionnaire usually includes the...quality o f  
health,...sources o f fuel and water,...and agricultural conditions and 
practices (Grosh &Glewwe, 1995:6).25
RRA is described as an “iterative and exploratory team approach.. .that 
begins and moves rapidly beyond preliminary observations and semi-structured 
interviews with key informants” (Wolcott, 1995:109). Preliminary data help 
guide the construction of appropriate survey or questionnaire instruments which 
are employed to collect data in a limited amount of time. Bernard (1994:151) 
suggests that three months is the minimum time needed “to achieve reasonable 
intellectualized competence in another culture.” While less than a week was 
spent in any given village surveyed, the survey team had at least five years of 
experience in these rural communities.”26 The survey of rural communities 
therefore employs methods of rapid appraisal, keeping questions short and 
focused around a few big issues (Spradley, 1979; Otto and Johnson, 1993:62). 
The specific details of this survey method are discussed in greater depth next.
2.4.2 Identifying Villages Located Adjacent to Creek-based Farms
Villages adjacent to shrimp farms are identified by a mapping or 
clustering technique.27 Moreover, a particular village can be classified as 
belonging to a particular group or cluster of shrimp farms. The EIF asks 
respondents to report the name of the nearest village to their farm and the 
approximate distance in kilometers. Farms are therefore clustered according to
24 Only 24 o f  the 30 identified villages were surveyed due to a lack o f time and resources.
25 This is not to be confused with the LSMS Household Questionnaire which is a detailed survey 
o f individual households in a given rural village.
26 While I spent only six months in the rural Kundaleru region, the Fisheries Development 
Officers assigned to help me conduct my survey had several years o f experience with many of 
the two dozen villages surveyed as part of this research.
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this response.28 In total, fourteen villages located adjacent to creek-based farms 
are identified. Thus, fourteen shrimp farming clusters are constructed.
Furthermore, each shrimp farm cluster is mapped by its distance from the 
Bay of Bengal.29 Since the EIF asked each farm to identify the nearest village, it 
is likely that the village itself is roughly at the center of the shrimp farm cluster. 
We can therefore map each shrimp farm cluster by its “x” distance to the village 
and “y” distance to the sea. Table 2.0 presents the names of the villages identified 
by shrimp farmers, the average distance between each cluster and associated 
village, approximate distance from the Bay of Bengal, and whether the cluster 
and village falls on the northern or southern bank of the Kandaleru river. Figure
2.1 illustrates the approximate location of each village.30
27 This method o f clustering farms by location follows Indian agriculture studies such as those 
found in Goel and Haque (1990).
28 For example, farms self-reported as situated closest to Lingavaram village are referred to as the 
Ligawaram shrimp farm cluster.
29 The distance between each shrimp farm cluster and the Bay of Bengal was determined by 
boating up the entire length o f the Kandaleru river and marking the distance traveled from the 
river mouth to the village (in kilometers). In most cases, even with the village located up to two 
kilometers inland, we were able to identity each villages’ beached boats. We used the boat 
landing area as a proxy for the center o f the shrimp farm cluster.
30 The location o f each village necessarily identifies the approximate location o f  each shrimp 
farming cluster.
66
Table 2.0
Location of 1997 Creek-based Shrimp Farms Along the Kandaleru
VILLAGES 
IDENTIFIED BY 
SHRIMP FARMS
N*
AVERAGE REPORTED 
DISTANCE OF CLUSTER 
TO THE NEAREST 
VILLAGE (KM): “X”
APPROXIMATE 
DISTANCE OF CLUSTER 
FROM THE BAY OF 
BENGAL (KM): “Y”
LOCATION
1 .Krishnapatanam 76 1.00 1 northern bank
2.Gummaladibba 3 1.00 2 southern bank
3.Epuru 44 1.00 10 southern bank
4.Venkatreddypalem 38 0.75 12 northern bank
5 .Tirumalampalem 16 0.75 14 northern bank
6.Puddiparti 85 0.50 16 southern bank
7.Lingavaram 7 0.50 18 southern bank
8.Momidi 4 1.50 20 northern bank
9.Bestapalem 63 1.50 28 southern bank
lO.Yeruru 20 1.50 32 southern bank
ll.Palicherpalem 12 1.50 34 southern bank
12.Tikkavaram 72 1.20 42 southern bank
13 .Kuttupattanam 9 1.20 44 southern bank
14.Tippaguntapalem 69 0.70
__ -
48 southern bank
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997; N is the approximate number of shrimp farms in each 
cluster.
2.4.3 Identifying Villages Adjacent to Sea-based Farms
Each sea-based shrimp farm was also mapped to the closest village to it.31 
In most cases, sea-based shrimp farms cover a much larger land and water spread 
area than the Kandaleru creek-based shrimp farms.32 Sea-based farms are 
therefore adjacent to multiple villages as reflected in Table 2.1 below. The BFDA 
survey does not ask each farmer to specifically indicate which village is closest 
to it. Instead, the BFDA data sheets identify sea-based shrimp farms and list the 
names of villages adjacent to each farm. Sixteen villages located adjacent to sea- 
based farms are situated between the Buckingham Canal and the Bay of Bengal.
31 Sea-based farms are mapped using survey data collected by the BFDA.
32 The average size o f  KAA farms is approximately 4.17 hectares (Patil & KAA Database, 1997a) 
as compared with the average size o f sea-based farms which is 22.38 hectares (Patil & BFDA 
Database, 1997).
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Figure 2.1
Villages Surveyed Along the Kandaleru River
note: number on map corresponds to the village with the same number as in 
Table 2.0. The map is not to scale; shaded areas represent water; Villages 
numbered 3,4,10 and 11 were not surveyed.
Table 2.1
Location of 1997 Sea-based Shrimp Farms Along the Bay of Bengal
VILLAGES 
ADJACENT TO 
BFDA SURVEYED 
SHRIMP FARMS
N*
AVERAGE REPORTED 
DISTANCE OF 
CLUSTER TO THE 
NEAREST VILLAGE 
(KM): “X”
APPROXIMATE 
DISTANCE OF 
CLUSTER FROM THE 
BAY OF BENGAL 
(KM): “Y”
TOTAL AREA 
COVERED BY 
FARMS (HA)
Venkateshwara-
pattapalem
Venkannapalem
Kothapalem
Korathur
1 .5 .6 200
Ramachandrapuram
Biscondapalem 7 .75 .75 524
Edurupattapalem 28 2 1 200
Pattapalem 1
Thattachettupalem
Chennarayanapalem
38 1 1 518
Gavallapalem 
Mahalaxmipuram 
Pattapalem 2
17 1 2 388
Andalamapalem
Thupillipalem
Vadamedu
1 1 2 47
source: BFDA Database, 1996; N* is the number o f shrimp farms in each cluster
The results of the coordinate x-y system of mapping shrimp farms to 
villages is a key component to the investigation of socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of shrimp farming on rural inhabitants. Clustering shrimp
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farms by identifying adjacent villages serves two purposes. First, it is now 
possible to survey those inhabitants living in villages adjacent to shrimp farm 
clusters. Second, from the results of village surveys and data on shrimp farm 
cluster characteristics, it is possible to identify which characteristics of shrimp 
farm clusters are statistically significant in explaining village survey responses 
regarding the farms’ impact on their general livelihoods. The next section 
discusses the methodology employed to survey the villages corresponding to 
each creek-based and sea-based shrimp farming cluster.
2.4.4 Identifying Environmental & Social Impacts: Methodological
Approach
A pre-tested questionnaire was used to identify and rank the major 
negative impacts of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture on the welfare of local 
populations inhabiting villages located adjacent to creek-based and sea-based 
shrimp farming clusters. Several questions adopted for the questionnaire were 
raised recently by NGOs and other concerned official bodies in Indian and 
international forums. Their overarching concerns stem from alleged negative 
impacts of the rapidly expanding brackishwater shrimp aquaculture sector on 
rural communities. The choice of villages surveyed arise from the EIF 
questionnaire responses which identify 14 creek-based villages and BFDA data 
that identify 16 sea-based villages located adjacent to major shrimp farming 
clusters.
The Pilot Survey
The village survey was piloted in December 1996 in Lingavaram village, 
one of the villages located adjacent to a shrimp farm cluster identified in the EIF 
questionnaire. The purpose of piloting the survey was three-fold: (1) to discover 
whether the survey methodology was appropriate given the characteristics of 
villages in this region; (2) to determine whether questions and answers were 
easily understood since a translator was needed; (3) to test whether group impact 
ranking was possible. The lessons learned from the pilot survey led to some
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modifications in the original methodology. First, group interviews were 
preferred to individual household interviews particularly because our presence in 
the village led to a large gathering at any given household. Second, interviews 
were open to both the male and female adults (who were in most cases the heads 
of the household). Third, additional questions were asked to elicit responses 
regarding the overall feeling toward the mid-December 1996 Supreme Court 
order.
Villages Surveyed
In total, twenty-six villages were surveyed. Sixteen of the total surveyed 
villages, or 62% were sea-based and located less than two kilometers from the 
Bay of Bengal. The remaining ten villages, or 38% of the surveyed villages were 
creek-based and located adjacent to Kandaleru Creek.33
Each of the twenty-six villages surveyed were chosen based on their 
proximity to previously identified shrimp farming clusters as discussed earlier. 
The sixteen sea-based villages were chosen after examining secondary data 
obtained from the Nellore BFDA which identifies the location of shrimp farming 
clusters. These villages were chosen due to their close proximity to at least one 
corporate shrimp farm. BFDA data reveals that corporate shrimp farms along the 
Bay of Bengal occupy the greatest land area adjacent to local villages. Thus, a 
sample of villages adjacent to large and corporate shrimp farms were identified 
and surveyed. The ten creek-based villages were selected from a total of fourteen 
possible villages adjacent to eleven major shrimp farming clusters. Each shrimp 
farming cluster was identified through the EIF survey. Table 2.2 provides 
descriptive characteristics of the surveyed villages near creek-based and sea- 
based farms.
33 There are two different types o f shrimp farms operating in the Kandaleru region, sea-based 
and creek-based. Sea-based farms pump intake water from the Bay o f  Bengal and discharge 
effluent back into the sea or into the Buckingham canal. They are situated next to the sea. 
Creek-based shrimp farms pump intake water and discharge effluent into the Kandaleru river. 
These farms are situated near the creek.
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Table 2.2
Summary Characteristics of Surveyed Villages
VILLAGE NAME OCCUPATION* POPULATION** NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS**
AVG.
SIZE
villages near creek-based farms
Gummaladabba fishing 1123 250 4.49
Lingavaram farming 100 23 4.34
Venkatreddypalem farming 88 20 4.40
Momidi farming 120 32 3.75
Tikkavaram farming 240 68 3.52
Krishnapattanam fishing 510 95 5.36
Bestapalem farming 1265 284 4.45
Puddiparti farming 240 54 4.44
Thirumalampalem farming 600 273 2.19
Tippaguntapalem farming 64 24 2.66
villages near sea-based farms
Venkateshwara-
pattapupalem
fishing 290 90 3.22
Edurupattapupalem fishing 624 161 3.87
Pattapalem 1 fishing 207 53 3.90
Thattachettupalem fishing 1475 568 2.59
Chennarayanapalem fishing 136 52 2.61
Ramachandrapuram farming 300 121 2.47
Biscondapalem fishing 100 30 3.33
Gavallapalem fishing 198 48 4.12
Mahalaxmipuram fishing 150 41 3.65
Pattapalem 2 fishing 252 114 2.21
Venkannapalem fishing 180 60 3.00
Kothapalem fishing 408 111 3.67
Korathur fishing 322 95 3.38
Andalamala fishing 415 97 4.27
Thupillipalem fishing 648 148 4.37
Vadamedu fishing 192 44 4.36
source: ‘denotes data from Patil & KAA Database, 1997; ** denotes data from BFDA, 1996
Both villages near sea-based farms and those near creek-based farms are 
diverse in their occupation and size. Two of the ten villages near creek-based 
farms can be classified as primarily engaged in fishing. The primary economic 
activity of the remaining eight is agriculture. In contrast, fifteen of the sixteen 
villages near sea-based farms are involved in fishing. Only one is involved 
predominantly in agriculture. Sample villages also vary by size. The smallest 
village near creek based farms has a population of 64, whereas the largest village 
in this group has a population of 1,265. A similar range is found to exist for 
villages located adjacent to sea-based farms.
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The Survey Teams
The research team consisted of two economists and two fisheries 
inspectors. The research team was split into two survey teams. Each survey 
team consisted of one principal investigator (an economist) and an inspector of 
fisheries assigned by the Brackishwater Shrimp Farming Development Authority 
(BFDA) to assist us.34 The first team under the direction of Dr. Mohan 
Krishnan, Senior Fisheries Economist, CIBA surveyed the sea-based villages. 
The second team, under my direction surveyed the creek-based villages.35 Both 
BFDA fisheries inspectors were familiar with the local villages, the local 
languages and dialects, village customs and traditions. They served as our guides 
and translators during the duration of the survey period. Transport, including 
Land Rovers and boats was provided by the BFDA and Nav Bharat Aqua Farms 
Ltd.
Village Questionnaire
The questions used for this survey were drawn from a wide body of literature 
addressing global concerns of rural based brackishwater shrimp aquaculture 
development.36 This includes points made in the Supreme Court directive 
outlining the alleged negative social and economic impacts of shrimp farming in 
southeastern India. The major socio-economic and environmental concerns were 
distilled into six questions that specifically take into account local conditions and 
circumstances. The six principal survey questions asked include:
34 All necessary official protocol was followed. We obtained the necessary permits to conduct 
the surveys and to mobilize government staff to assist us from the Chief Executive Officer, 
BFDA, Nellore. Discussions took place with staff at PREPARE, one NGO active in the region. 
Although they provided invaluable insights to the concerns o f the local population, they were 
unable to provide assistance in administering the survey. This turned out to be a blessing in 
disguise as their visibility in the villages we were surveying may have biased the responses.
35 Financial support to carry out the sea-based village survey was provided by the Central 
Institute for Brackishwater Aquaculture. Financial support for the creek-based village survey 
was provided in part by the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation.
36 Specifically, these questions were determined through discussion with local NGOs in the 
region, discussion with government officials involved in regulating brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture, and through the growing literature on this subject. See Barraclough and Finger-Stich 
(1996), Clay (1996) and Hempel and Winthers (1997). A critical review o f the literature is 
presented in Chapter One.
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• Has aquaculture development hindered your access to the creek or beach?
• Are you experiencing drinking water problems in your village? Have your 
village wells become saline as a result of shrimp farm development?
• Has aquaculture development resulted in seepage of saline water into your 
agricultural lands? Has this reduced your crop yields?
• Has aquaculture development led to unemployment problems for you or your 
family?
• Has aquaculture development led to health problems for you or your family?; 
to animal populations in the village?
• Has aquaculture development hindered fuelwood or fodder collection?
The questions were kept short and to the point as this was thought to yield 
clearly understood and reliable answers (Otto and Johnson, 1993:62). Several 
follow-up questions to each core question were asked when clarification was 
needed.
The survey was designed to elicit two types of responses from male and 
female household heads in each village. First, it was necessary to see if a 
particular social impact was common to each village. In this regard, respondents 
were asked for a definitive “Yes” or “No” answer to each of the above six 
questions. Second, respondents were asked to rank the severity of each of the six 
social impacts on their overall well-being relative to each of the other impacts. 
Moreover, two additional questions were asked to gauge how different villages 
viewed the Supreme Court order and to see if they were overall better or worse 
off than five years ago.
• Are you and your family better or worse off than five years ago?
• Are you in favor of the recent Supreme Court order to ban shrimp farms from 
operating in the Kandaleru region?
These two questions were asked to yield a “yes/no” answer. Interestingly, 
less than 20 percent of the sample were aware of the Supreme Court judgment. 
Table 2.3 summarizes responses from the survey. Further analysis of these 
results are presented in Chapters 7 and 8 of this dissertation.
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Table 2.3
Problems Identified by Coastal Farming and Fishing Communities 
Located Adjacent to Shrimp Farms in the Kandaleru Region, 
Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh.
% VILLAGES
REPORTING
PROBLEMS
Well
Water
Salinity
Access to 
Beach or 
Creek Blocked
Agricultural
Land
Salinity
Un/under
employment
Poor
Health
Fodder & 
Fuelwood
17 Fishing Villages 65% 94% 65% 76% 53% 12%
0 1 ) (16) (11) (13) (9) (2)
9 Farming Villages 66% 33% 89% 11% 0% 89%
(6) (3) (8) (1) (0) (8)
All 26 Villages 65% 73% 73% 54% 35% 38%
(17) (19) (19) (14) (9) (10)
Source: Patil and Krishnan (1997); note: the number o f villages responding in the affirmative, are 
in parenthesis. Note: The method used to assess each aggregate frequency is discussed in 
Chapter 7 o f  this dissertation.
Survey Method & Ranking Game
The creek-based survey team spent a minimum of one day in each village 
(in some cases several days) getting to know the concerns of that particular 
village community before conducting the formed survey. This enabled us to 
better guide our semi-structured discussions after conducting our formal survey. 
Of the ten villages next to creek-based farms, eight are identified as 
predominantly farming communities. Of the sixteen villages adjacent to sea- 
based farms, fifteen are identified as primarily fishing communities. A total of 9 
farming and 16 fishing villages were surveyed. The sea-based survey team was 
able to survey multiple villages per day. This was possible as a result of 
exploiting the predictable daily pattern of male and female members of the 
fishing communities.37
The method of surveying each village was as follows. We identified the 
village Panchayat (Chief) and explained the purpose of our survey and the 
surveying method we intended to use. In almost all of the villages surveyed, the 
village Chief was known to the Fisheries Development Officer. In most cases, the 
Chief suggested that he would call a meeting of the village household heads that
37 Fishing communities in this region historically follow common daily routines. The nature o f  
these routines make most adult males unavailable during the early mornings (when they fish) and 
adult females unavailable until mid-morning (they are usually involved in selling the catch). For 
greater discussion o f the daily life o f fisher-folk in Andhra Pradesh, please see BOBP (1988).
74
very afternoon. In some cases, the Chief informed us on which day to return to 
the village to conduct our survey. There was not a single case where we were 
denied permission to conduct our survey.38
Adult male and female heads of households were called together through 
the village Chief for an afternoon or early evening meeting.39 The village Chief 
explained the purpose of our visit and asked the assembled village household 
heads for their cooperation. The survey itself was administered in two stages. 
First, through the Fisheries Development Officer who spoke the local language 
we asked the assembled village household heads a series of questions related to 
the alleged impacts of aquaculture on various socio-economic aspects of their 
lives. They answered each question with either a “yes” or “no” response and 
indicated this by raising their hands. In most cases the answers were close to 
unanimous across the group. This made it relatively easy to assign a “yes” or 
“no” response as an aggregate village response to whether a particular social 
impact was distressing their family or village community. When there were 
notable differences we counted each response and probed deeper by asking 
additional questions.
Second, the assembled household heads were asked to rank the relative 
severity of each impact. This was accomplished by asking each individual in the 
assembled group to indicate which impact was most important to them by raising 
their hand when it was announced. For example, we asked “please raise your 
hand if you think well water salinity is the most important problem you face from 
the six major problems discussed.” Next, we inserted “agricultural land 
salinity/loss of agricultural crops” for “well water salinity” and repeated the 
question. We did the same for all six impacts. Next, we asked individuals to 
raise their hands when the second most important impact to their general well­
being was called out. Again the above mentioned question was repeated for each 
impact. We used this line of questioning in six “rounds” until all six impacts
38 Village Chiefs most likely cooperated because it gave them a sense o f importance to host a 
meeting called by a “foreigner” from an important organization with the Gandhi family name, 
namely, the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation.
39 Household heads were available mostly during afternoon hours because most fishing/farming 
activities took place during the morning and evening when the temperature was cooler. Members
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were ranked.40
The number of raised hands were noted for each question asked. Next, 
we repeated this for the next impact and so on. The results of this ranking game 
were later tabulated. Thus, a number 1 (most disrupting to the local population) 
to 6 (least disrupting to the local population) can be assigned to each question as 
it is the aggregated village response.
On average, we obtained a 32.1 percent turn out rate.41 Only in one case 
did we not conduct the survey since the sample size was not large enough to 
conduct our survey.42 Respondents included both males and females since in 
almost every case, the females accompanied the male household head to the 
village meeting either out of curiosity or as a result of the Chiefs notification.43 
Thus, the team asked questions to a group of both adult males and females. To 
eliminate any possibility of gender bias, the overall village response was cross 
checked with female concerns by semi-structured interviews of women at their 
own homes later that day or the following day. Overall, the results appeared 
consistent.44
Aggregate Rank Order
The final tabulated response used in our analysis is an aggregated 
composite for each village.45 This method of tabulation was adopted after 
running the more complicated pilot study which attempted to capture each 
individual response. The degree of complication introduced by tabulating each
o f  predominantly fishing communities, however were found to follow a more predictable daily 
pattern.
40 See Chapter 7, Appendix 7A for an account of the full ranking game for one o f the 26 surveyed 
villages.
41 See Table 7B.1 in Chapter 7.
42 The number o f households per village were known to us as a result o f BFDA data. The 
number o f  households amongst our village sample varies widely from 20 to 568. In some o f  the 
smallest villages our assembled bunch numbered far less than ten individuals. In one o f the 
larger villages, only a very few household heads turned up to our pre-planned meeting. We 
returned the following week to a larger gathering.
43 This is a modification o f  the original pilot survey which called for the heads o f  households 
who happened to be in most cases, male.
44 While no statistical cross-checking was possible, the overall concerns generated by the shrimp 
farming sector and relayed through respondents o f the group interviews were shared by the 
women that we informally interviewed at their homes.
45 We are unable to desegregate each individual response using this method. Therefore 
household level analysis cannot be used.
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individual response did not warrant the use of this method. In addition, the type 
of data of interest was more necessary for the village level than for each specific 
household. This is particularly true since the population of each village surveyed 
was primarily employed in either fishing or farming based activities and 
therefore shared common concerns. Overall, in the pilot survey, we found that 
each individual response was over 90 percent similar to the overall tallied village 
response. Therefore, we deemed the overall village response level of reliability 
adequate to effectively represent each household and to carry through the 
objectives of this study.46 However, differences in opinion between individuals in 
a common village were noted and further explored by the team.47
The aggregate rank order of each village impact was determined by 
tallying the responses for each village ranking game. The impact with the most 
votes received a rank of “1” and the impact with the least votes received a rank of 
“6”. Using this method, it is possible to assign a rank for each impact facing 
each village.
2.4.5 Bias
It is important to identify possible weaknesses in the data as a result of 
survey bias. There are several possible problems associated with the village 
survey data well worth noting. First, the survey itself only focuses on possible 
negative extematilities associated with shrimp farming. Each of the survey 
questions are couched in the negative, thus leading respondents to think of the 
costs and not the benefits to brackishwater aquaculture. This method has been 
known to bias results toward a greater number of slightly negative responses in 
other impact studies than a more neutral line of questioning.48 Second,
46 We are unable to separate out each individual response from our aggregated composite. This is 
a result o f not identifying how each and every individual responded to each o f  our questions. We 
simply counted hands. This method yielded superior results for the time required as compared to 
the household level type survey used in the pilot study.
47 It was not uncommon that only a few individuals in a fishing village would complain of a 
particular impact, say agricultural land salinity, whereas everyone else in the village reported that 
it was not a problem they faced. Upon further investigation, it was found that these particular 
individuals were predominantly farmers.
48 Comments from participants at the 1997 Agricultural Economics Research Association 
conference held in New Delhi, India in September 1997.
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respondents may have also disproportionately answered in the negative in order 
to receive compensation for damages. Villages in other regions were receiving 
compensation for damages caused by shrimp farms (i.e. well water salinity). 
Knowledge of this may have encouraged respondents to “cheat”.
Third, all discussion between myself and the respondents took place 
through the Fisheries Development Officer, who served as an interpreter. 
Therefore any communication of information between the respondents and the 
interpreter was conveyed with his own personal or professional bias. Fourth, the 
ranking game proved tedious. Initially, the Fisheries Development Officer had a 
difficult time explaining the nature of the game to respondents. This required a 
lot of conversation between himself and myself which disrupted the flow of the 
game. However, after initiating the game in the first several villages, the 
ranking game ran much more smoothly.
Aggregate village responses were constructed in the analysis to avoid 
introducing excessive survey bias. However, aggregation imposes its own 
limitations. A detailed discussion on the method used to analyze these data is 
presented in Part III of this dissertation.
2.5 Shrimp Farm Production Data
2,5.1 Research Objectives
The purpose of gathering and analyzing production data is three-fold: to 
model, measure and explain total, pure technical and scale inefficiencies among 
sample shrimp farmers; to answer important questions regarding the economic 
behavior of shrimp farms; and to examine the impact of the shrimp farming 
industry on the rural labour market. The research examines whether there are 
economies of scale in this sector, whether environmental quality plays a 
significant role in determining farm efficiency, and whether rural inhabitants are 
benefiting from employment opportunities generated by shrimp farms. The 
research also provides relevant information to help guide the Indian government 
in its current efforts to effectively regulate shrimp production and ensure its 
sustainable development.
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2.5.2 Background to Data Collection
To conduct this investigation of efficiency, more sensitive production 
data were collected from 82 shrimp farmers operating adjacent to Tikkavaram 
and Bestapalem villages in the Kandaleru region. These 82 farms amount to 
approximately 16 percent of the total 518 shrimp farm EIF survey responses 
returned to the KAA and 61 percent of the total number of shrimp farms located 
in these two clusters. These two localities were chosen for several reasons. First, 
farms in both shrimp clusters employ the full range of culture methods (i.e. from 
extensive to intensive farming). Second, there are a sufficient number of small, 
medium and large size farms to obtain a good representative sample of KAA 
farms. Third, the Tikkavaram cluster is located upstream from Bestapalem farms 
which enable investigation of whether location (a proxy for water quality) plays a 
statistically significant role in production.49 Fourth, farms from both clusters 
used in the analysis operate on a two crop season unlike other clusters located 
downstream which culture three times per year.50 Therefore the production cycle 
of farms in these two areas are relatively similar. Finally, this data set 
corresponds to the second crop cycle of 1996.
2.5.3 Methodology
First, the 518 KAA EIFs were sorted by clusters. The method of 
clustering farms together was based on the responses offered by shrimp farms as 
to the village closest to their farm. Farms clustered near Tikkavaram and 
Bestapalem villages were separated out from the rest of the sample. The EIFs for 
both Tikkavaram and Bestapalem clusters were sorted into three groups, namely, 
small, medium, and big farms (i.e. including both large and corporate farms). 
This was done to ensure that a representative sample of each size group would be
49 The hypothesis is that downstream shrimp farms are less efficient than upstream farms as a 
result o f classic upstream-downstream externalities.
50 Shrimp farm clusters located further downstream (closer to the Bay o f Bengal) are able to 
culture three times a year because o f less variability in water salinity. More upstream clusters are 
only able to culture twice a year due to inadequate salt content in the water as a result o f  
monsoon rains draining into the top o f the river from the nearby foothills.
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included and that issues of scale could be investigated. Next fifteen farms at 
random were chosen from each size category for each of the two clusters. In 
total, forty-five farms were selected for each cluster and there were 90 farms 
selected in total for interview. However, due to limited time, a total of eighty- 
five shrimp farms were surveyed.51 Of the 85 shrimp farms surveyed, data from 
82 are used in the analysis.52 Each farm was then identified by its address and 
KAA registration number from the EIF. Finally, data were collected at either the 
farm itself or at the household of the farmer.
Generally, larger farms had a records keeping office and a paid manager 
who provided the necessary production figures at the farm itself. Smaller farms 
tended to be operated by the owner who kept few written records. Nevertheless, 
in most cases, feed and seed purchase orders were available. In some cases, data 
on these two inputs were obtained via “recall” methods. Information on other 
production inputs were obtained through a series of questions asked by myself 
and conveyed through an interpreter. As the harvest season had just completed, a 
majority of the small and medium size farmers were interviewed at their 
households. Production figures were therefore easily communicated through 
recall.
2.5.4 Possible Bias of Recall Data
The questionnaire used to elicit data from shrimp farmers follows a 
standard written format used in most farm surveys (see Conway et al, 1987). This 
survey asks for details regarding basic farm, production and managerial 
characteristics used to culture shrimp in the bumper harvest season immediately 
preceding the survey. While written records were often available for large scale 
farmers, small and marginal farmers often kept no written records at all. Data 
were therefore solicited through mostly recall methods. Although there are well 
known reports of bias in farm level surveys based on recall data, de Corta & 
Venkateshwarlu (1992:109) suggest that production data concerning major
51 There was not a single case where the farm manager or owner-operator refused to answer our 
questions.
52 Three questionnaires are incomplete and therefore left out o f  the analysis.
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events are easier to collect by recall methods than regular seasonal events in 
India. As the second crop of 1996 yielded bumper profits, most shrimp farmers 
had little difficulty recalling the total amount of production inputs used.
2.5.4 Inputs, Farm Traits & Managerial Characteristics
Specifically, data on labour and capital inputs, farm specific traits and 
managerial characteristics were collected for each farm. Data regarding farm size 
and total amount of water spread area were provided by the returned EIFs. Data 
collected on land characteristics included total farm area in hectares, total 
waterspread area in hectares and the number of ponds per farm.53 From these data 
a fourth land variable was approximated, average pond size. However, asking 
farmers for specific information again provided a way to double check the 
accuracy of their EIF responses. There was no significant variation from the EIF 
responses.54
Data on labour inputs include the average number of workers needed 
daily for each of the three phases in production: bund preparation, daily operation 
and harvest. Data were also collected on the number of days needed to prepare 
the ponds for culture, to grow the crop to exportable harvest size (approximately 
35 grams per piece) and to harvest the crop. By combining these two sets of data 
it was possible to convert the reported daily labour inputs for each of the three 
production phases into total person-days per phase, total person-days per water 
spread area per phase, total person-days required overall and other variations.55 
In addition, fanners were asked to indicate what proportion of the total labour 
inputs used were hired locally.
Data on capital inputs include the number of aerators used per pond and 
whether the farm owned or jointly owned a water pump and the approximate size
53 In about half o f the sample, the total area o f the farm and total waterspread area were given in 
acres. These figures were converted into hectares. All analysis in this thesis is given on a per 
hectare basis. This is the most common unit o f measurement used in shrimp culture studies.
54 The Pearson correlation was strongly positive and significant at the one percent level.
55 This is possible because we obtained data on the approximate number of days per phase. In 
some cases we base our analysis on certain assumptions. For example, corporate farmers 
revealed that they could harvest 1.5 to 2 ponds per day using phase 2 labour inputs. This 
research used the average figure in the analysis.
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of that pump. Total feed inputs in kilograms and the total number of seed inputs 
purchased for the second crop cycle of 1996 were obtained. In addition, each 
farmer was asked to approximate how much of the feed was actually used. In 
most cases, each farmer said that all of the feed purchased was consumed. 
Farmers rarely purchased feed far in advance of the crop season or stored feed for 
future crops.
Data on farm specific characteristics included the origin of the feed 
purchased (i.e. foreign or domestic), the number of years the farm has been in 
operation (which was taken as a proxy for level of experience), whether the farm 
is owned or leased and whether the farm was a corporate entity (public or private 
limited) or individually/family operated. Data collected on managerial 
characteristics included the number of feeding times per day, the average 
stocking density per water spread hectare, the percentage of daily water exchange 
and whether the manager used tractor inputs or not in the bund preparation stage. 
From these data farms were categorized by several characteristics including size 
and technology type. An overview of the questions asked in the production data 
survey is presented in Appendix 2B.
2,5.5 Prices & Wages
Data on prices were not collected from the shrimp farmers by any formal 
survey method. Information on the purchasing price for seed, feed and aerator 
inputs was solicited from interviews with suppliers. Data on daily wages were 
collected via ad hoc discussions with farm hands. It became clear that the price 
vector of inputs faced by farmers had significant variation. This was a result of 
several different tied credit and input schemes made available to farmers of all 
sizes from seed hatcheries, feed mills and even processing plants. The nature of 
some of these contracts are discussed in later chapters. It is therefore difficult to 
draw any assumptions regarding the vector of prices faced by farmers in the 82 
KAA sample.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
An information gap exists between the socio-economic and 
environmental problems occurring in local areas, and effective policy making. 
The gap between the rural environment and policy formulation and 
implementation exists due to a lack of comprehensive qualitative understanding 
of ground level realities and a lack of quantitative data to objectively examine a 
variety of hypotheses regarding industry-community interactions.
Both primary and secondary data collected from six months of field work 
in the Kandaleru region, Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh, India provide a first 
attempt at rigorously examining the efficiency of the shrimp farming sector and 
its socio-economic and environmental impacts on rural communities. Moreover, 
the research is extremely timely in that the current session of the Indian 
Parliament is debating claims made in favor of and in opposition to this industry. 
Overall, the farm level and production data are representative of shrimp farms in 
a specific Indian locality, comprehensive in nature, and unique and original. 
Secondly, the village impact survey are comprehensive in that they cover twenty- 
six villages in the region and indicative of what many villages throughout India’s 
shrimp farming belt may be facing. Together, they provide the first 
comprehensive study on Indian shrimp farming and its impacts.
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APPENDIX 2A
Appendix 2B
Table 2B.1
Primary Inputs and Descriptive Farm Characteristics
Production Input Variables
LAND total farm area  in hectares
WSA total w ater spread area  in hectares
NOPNDS total um ber of ponds per farm
LAB1 total workers needed  per day for bund preparation (phase  1)
LAB2 total workers needed  per day for grow out period (phase 2)
lab3 total workers needed per day for harvesting period (phase  3)
DUR1 average duration of phase  1 in days
DUR2 average duration of p hase  2 in days
dur3 average duration of p hase  3 in days
SEED total num ber of seed  inputs used  in 2nd cycle per farm (number)
FEED total num ber of feed inputs used  in 2 nd cycle per farm (kilograms)
AERATORS total num ber of aerators used  in 2nd cycle per farm (number)
Farm Specific & Managerial Characteristics
LOCATION OF FARM? location dummy; 1 =tikkavaram, 0=bestapalem ;
SMALL FARM? small farm dummy; 1 =farms < 4  wsa; 0= otherwise
EXTENSIVE CULTURE? technology dummy; 1 =farms practicing extensive culture; 0=otherw ise
TRACTOR INPUTS USED? tractor u se  dummy; 1=farms using tractor inputs in p h ase  1; 0=otherw ise
CHEMICAL INPURTS USED? chemical u se  dummy; 1=farms using chemical inputs; 0=otherw ise
FOREIGN FEED USED m anufactured feed dummy; 1=foreign, 0=local
CORPORATE? corporate structure dummy; 1=corporate or private limited company; 0=otherwise
DO YOU OWN YOUR FARM? ownership dummy; 1=land u sed  by farmer is owned; 0= leased
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE? num ber of years of operation (proxy for years of experience)
WATEXCHANGE % ? percen tage of daily w ater exchanged
NUMBER OF DAILY FEEDING TIMES? num ber of tim es shrimp are  fed per day
Shrimp Aquaculture Output
TOTAL FARM OUTPUT total output of shrimp in kilograms
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Chapter 3
The Growth & Development of the 
Kandaleru Shrimp Aquaculture Industry
3.0 Introduction
Very little comprehensive survey data exist on production characteristics 
and on managerial practices used to farm shrimp. This has made the study of 
shrimp farming somewhat vague and anecdotal. Moreover, country or regional 
data used to compare farm characteristics of shrimp farming nations are often 
based on broad estimates.1 Nonetheless, they provide a reference point with 
which to begin investigations into global shrimp farming.
Case studies on Indian shrimp farming are particularly sparse in the 
literature, despite the fact that India has two well established government units 
promoting cultured shrimp production. General statistics on Indian shrimp 
farming come from one of two sources, the Central Institute for Brackishwater 
Aquaculture (CIBA) or the Marine Products Export Development Authority 
(MPEDA).2 These organisations make statistical information publicly available 
through annual publications. Documents referred to as representative of country 
data are based on estimates drawn from local government publications. While 
general data exist at the local level, they are not appropriately documented at a 
regional or national level.3 This is mostly as a result of a lack of co-ordination 
between local government offices and state and national government agencies.4 
In addition, as it is a rapidly evolving sector, locally collected shrimp farm data
1 For example, Rosenberry (1995-1998) annual publication, World Shrimp Farming is considered 
the most comprehensive publicly available global overview o f shrimp farming. It is used as a 
reference source for every literature review on the subject o f shrimp farming. The country 
statistics used in this publication (number o f  farms, total farm area, total water spread area, 
culture intensity, etc.), however are collected mostly from government fisheries departments. 
These data are usually broad estimates, at best. Future projections are based on the current 
country trends as observed by the author.
2 MPEDA even has international representation in Singapore, Tokyo, New York, and Frankfurt.
3 This became clear after reviewing local statistics collected from the local government agencies 
themselves.
4 This is an opinion shared widely among CIBA’s senior staff.
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becomes quickly out of date.5 Therefore, current year national statistics on farm 
level characteristics are often based on data collected several years before.
The most comprehensive regional study on Asian shrimp farm production 
to date, the NACA-ADB study has not yet been made publicly available. This is 
a farm level survey of seven Asian shrimp farming nations. However, basic 
summary production statistics from this study, which include India, have recently 
been published in Leung and Gunaratne (1997). The summary data on Indian 
shrimp farming made publicly available are roughly consistent with the 500 
shrimp farm survey data collected as part of this research.
Modem shrimp farming cannot survive without the existence of 
supporting services such as seed hatcheries, feed mills, ice factories and 
processing plants. While the shrimp fanning sector can be defined as the 
collection o f shrimp farms involved in the actual process o f culturing shrimp, the 
shrimp farming industry refers to the shrimp farm sector plus the ancillary 
services that support the cyclical culture operation o f farms.6 As a consequence 
of the union between shrimp farms and supporting services, global agri-business 
has a new member, the shrimp aquaculture industry.
In this chapter, the growth and development of the Kandaleru shrimp 
aquaculture industry between 1990 and 1997 is surveyed. This study draws on 
both primary and secondary data collected in the Kandaleru region. The 
methodology used to collect primary data is presented in detail in the previous 
chapter. Throughout this chapter, the primary 1997 Kandaleru data set is referred 
to as the KAA Database.7 Secondary data are sourced by the particular local 
government agency from where they were provided.8 Analysis of both together, 
serves as a comprehensive review of one of the most prolific shrimp farming
s This is evident by the cumulative average annual growth rate o f 19.5 percent exhibited by this 
sector in the Kandaleru region between 1993 and 1997. The latest available locally collected 
statistics were from 1993. 1997 data were collected by myself as discussed in the previous 
chapter.
6 As discussed in Chapter One, Section 1.2.2, these definitions are provided by myself since no 
recognised definitions exist with respect to the shrimp farming sector and shrimp farming 
industry.
7 Manipulations on this raw data are sourced as Patil & KAA Database (1997) throughout this 
thesis.
8 Manipulations on raw secondary data (i.e. 1996 BFDA raw data) by the author are sourced as 
Patil & BFDA (1996). Incorrect manipulations o f data, therefore fall squarely on the shoulders 
o f  myself.
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regions in the most prolific Indian shrimp farming state, Andhra Pradesh. It also 
serves as the foundation to evaluating the economic performance of shrimp farms 
(discussed in Part II of this thesis) and in assessing the socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of the sector on rural inhabitants (discussed in Part III of 
this research).
The structure of the chapter itself is as follows: Section 3.1 identifies 
relationship between farm size, ownership status, production technology, factor 
inputs and shrimp output amongst Kandaleru shrimp farms. Section 3.2 
discusses the growth and development of Kandaleru shrimp farms between 1993 
and 1997. Section 3.3 traces the evolution, growth and development of ancillary 
services, that is, those services supporting shrimp aquaculture. Specifically, the 
impacts on off-farm employment are addressed in this section. Section 3.4 
concludes.
3.1 1997 Kandaleru Shrimp Farm Characteristics
There are approximately 530 brackishwater shrimp farms located along 
the Kandaleru creek.9 Together, they occupy 2,166 hectares in total area of 
which 1,675 hectares or 77 percent is water spread.10 During the second culture 
cycle of the 1996 season, the 2,478 ponds in operation produced 1,788 metric 
tonnes of shrimp. This is an average of 450 kilograms of shrimp per pond or 620 
kilograms of shrimp output per water spread hectare. The final 1996 season’s 
harvest is considered the most successful in the sector’s ten year history. Similar 
to other shrimp farming regions throughout India’s coastal belt, Kandaleru 
shrimp farms vary significantly by size, intensity of production and ownership 
status. In this section, each characteristic is discussed in turn and relationships
9 According to the newly formed Kandaleru Aquafarmers’ Association (KAA) registry, there are 
518 registered members and no more than 530 farms in total along the Kandaleru creek. Cross 
sectional data were collected for 518 o f  die 530 shrimp farms operating along the Kandaleru 
creek, Nellore district, Andhra Pradesh. Data collected include each farmers’ total land holding, 
total water spread area, total number o f shrimp ponds, average yield during the bumper harvest o f  
1996 and during the disease year harvest of 1994, ownership status, and location (name and 
proximity o f the nearest village).
10 A water spread hectare denotes an area o f one hectare capable of cultivating shrimp. It is the 
land area under water.
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between them are compared and contrasted with the conventional wisdom on this 
sector.
3.1.1 Farm Size & Culture Area
On par with the national average11, 79 percent of Kandaleru shrimp 
farmers produce on land holdings of less than five hectares. There are 
approximately 253 small and marginal farmers operating on land holdings of less 
than two hectares in area. This constitutes 49 percent of all Kandaleru shrimp 
farmers. In contrast, 108 farmers or 21 percent of all Kandaleru farmers produce 
on land holdings greater than five hectares. Of these 108 farmers, 43 percent of 
the sample, or 8 percent of all KAA farmers operate on 10 or more hectares of 
land. The number of shrimp farms per size category and the share of each size 
category is illustrated in Table 3.O.12
Table 3.0
1997 Kandaleru Shrimp Farms by Size of Land Holdings in Hectares
Size, S (HA) S<1
marginal
1<S<2
small
2 <S<5 
medium
5<S<10
large
10 <S  
corporate All
No. Shrimp Farms 202 51 156 65 43 518
Share o f Total (%) 39 10 30 13 8 100
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997
In agricultural production, the total area sown is called the cropping area. 
The culture area in shrimp farming is equivalent to cropping area in agricultural 
production. It is the actual amount of land area used to culture shrimp, or water 
spread area. It is clear from Table 3.1 that the culture area of farms varies with 
farm size. Generally, farm size is positive and significantly correlated with 
culture area.13 This suggests that larger farms have larger water spread or culture 
areas. In contrast, however, the proportion of total land area under culture—the 
land utilisation rate—declines with farm size.
11 MPEDA (1996).
12 We draw upon the traditional Indian agriculture literature that define marginal farmers as those 
who own/operate less than one hectare of land; small farmers as those who own-operate between 
one and two (inclusive) hectares o f land; medium farmers own-operate between two and five 
(inclusive) hectares o f land; large farmers own-operate greater than five hectares o f land (see 
Acharya, 1992).
13 The Pearson correlation is 0.99 and statistically significant at the one percent level.
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Table 3.1
1997 Kandaleru Average Farm Size, Culture Area & Land Utilisation Rate
Size, S (HA) S<1
marginal
1<S<2
small
2 <S<5  
medium
5<S<10
large
10 <S  
corporate
ALL
1996 Averages 
Farm Size 0.456 1.384 3.107 7.045 24.65 4.18
Water Spread Area 0.440 1.212 2.498 5.659 17.81 3.23
Utilisation Rate 0.975 0.885 0.805 0.804 0.802
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997
Farmers operating on larger holdings do not culture over the entire land 
area despite the near certainty of significant profits if they succeed. This is 
particularly true of the six largest Kandaleru based farms (land holdings greater 
than 100 hectares) which have an average utilisation rate of 0.63. There are two 
reasons why this may be the case.
First, larger shrimp farms tend to adopt a plantation style layout with 
management offices, a pump house, farm machinery storage facilities, a canteen, 
a scientific laboratory to test water quality and sometimes a guest house on the 
premises. Smaller farms, by contrast, do not support this kind of infrastructure. 
Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the proportion of land area used to 
culture shrimp on the largest farms is less than that of the smallest size farms. 
Medium size farms, however, on average do not subscribe to plantation style 
farming. Therefore, the fact that the utilisation rate is essentially constant 
between medium, large and corporate farms is perhaps reason to support a second 
view.
Second, risk aversion may play an important role here as a result of costly 
fixed and variable inputs used in more intensive farming methods adopted by 
large-scale farmers. Moreover, farmer uncertainty exists over the amount of 
shrimp output produced due to the unpredictable nature of disease outbreaks. 
Good farm management can reduce the probability of own farm pollution and 
therefore disease. However, because a common brackish water body is used by 
all farms in the region for both water intake and discharge, each farm assumes a 
certain amount of risk of water contamination or disease. Larger farms, 
therefore may face greater risk. Not only are they subject to the risk of upstream 
pollution out of their control, but also to risk assumed by adopting more intensive 
culture practices.
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Overall, shrimp farmers of all sizes are believed to be constrained by a 
lack of technical and managerial knowledge necessary to ensure a successful 
crop. This notion is shared by other shrimp farming regions of the world too 
(Boyd, 1997). Interviews of farmers with land holdings of all sizes suggest that 
overall, KAA shrimp farmers tend to operate on a system of learning-by-doing. 
At least this is the impression communicated through semi-structured group 
discussions with KAA farmers. In fact, the results obtained from estimating 
inefficiency models in Chapters Five and Six suggest that shrimp farmers of 
similar size follow similar culture practices, however, with varying degrees of 
success. Some common production characteristics are presented in Section 3.1.3. 
In the next section, the relationship between land ownership status, land tenure 
status and farm size is discussed.
3.1.2 Land Ownership & Tenure Status
Of the 518 shrimp farms recognised as members of the KAA, 285 farmers 
or 55 percent reported that they own their farms, 81 farmers or 16 percent 
reported that they lease their farm land from private owners and 152 farmers or 
29 percent reported that they received their land through a government land 
transfer or lease scheme for the purpose of shrimp farming. In Table 3.2, KAA 
farms are categorised by size and ownership status.
Table 3.2
Ownership Status by Size of Land Holding in Hectares
Size, S (HA) S<1 1<S<2 2 <S<5 5<S<10 10 <S
marginal small medium large corporate
Land Owners 50 42 87 59 42
Share of Total Owned (%) 18 15 31 21 15
Share of Size Category (%) 25 82 56 91 98
Land Leased 0 9 69 6 1
Share of Total Leased (%) 0 11 81 7 1
Share of Size Category (%) 0 18 44 9 2
Land Transferred 152 0 0 0 0
Share of Total Trans.(%) 100 0 0 0 0
Share of Size Category (%) 75 0 0 0 0
ALL Shrimp Farms 202 51 156 65 43
Share of Total Farms (%) 39 10 30 13 8
Share of Size Category (%) 100 100 100 100 100
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997
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The data reveal that farm ownership status varies with farm size. Ninety- 
six percent of KAA farms operating on five or more hectares and 82 percent 
operating on an area between one and two hectares are owned by the operators. 
In the case of smaller farms, the owners are the individual farmer-operators. In 
the case of the larger farms, 71 percent are owned by wealthy shrimp farmers 
and 29 percent are either corporate entities with publicly owned shares or 
registered private limited companies.
Eighty-one percent of all shrimp farmers who leased land operate on 
holdings between two and five hectares. This is 44 percent of all medium size 
farmers. Of the 69 medium size farmers leasing land, a significant proportion are 
mostly non-natives of Nellore district. Their motivation for coming to the region 
and entry into the industry was in most cases entirely profit driven.14 Generally, 
farmers of this size category came to the Kandaleru region in 1993, before the 
first major shrimp disease outbreak.15
All 152 farmers reporting that they received land via a government 
transfer scheme were entitled to this benefit due to their classification as 
members of one of India’s Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes (SCST).16 
Each one of these farmers operates on a total land area of less than one half 
hectare. The nature of the government transfer allotment for SCST is discussed 
in Chapter 4.
3.1.3 Production Characteristics
The amount of shrimp output produced is directly related to the input 
combination used in production. Similar to production of any agricultural crop, 
the quantity and factor proportions of inputs define the intensity of production or 
culture technique employed. Exact definitions of different culture techniques 
vary in the scientific literature. Most experts agree, however, that the intensity of 
shrimp production is generally a function of one capital input used in particular,
14 Based on semi-structured group discussions with KAA shrimp farmers in Spring 1997.
15 This conclusion is supported by semi-formal group discussions with local shrimp farmers.
16 For a good discussion o f the scheduled castes and tribals in this region, please refer to BOBP 
(1993).
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the number of seed inputs per water spread hectare, or stocking density (SD). This 
relationship holds since the stocking density almost always defines the quantity 
and factor proportions of inputs required, especially feed inputs.17 Based on the 
stocking density, farmers of all sizes adjust feed inputs accordingly. Table 3.3 
defines four methods of shrimp culture based on the range of seed inputs 
employed. These definitions follow the available scientific literature on the 
subject of Indian shrimp farming.
Table 3.3
Five Culture Techniques Defined By Stocking Density
Culture method defined; 
intensity o f  production
Stocking Density 
number o f shrimp seed per water spread hectare
Extensive under 60,000
Modified Extensive 60,000 to under 100,000
Semi-Intensive 100,000 to under 200,000
Intensive greater or equal to 200,000
source: CIBA (1997)
There is also agreement in the scientific literature that seed and feed 
inputs in tandem define the capital intensity of shrimp culture. The level of 
production intensity, can therefore be equated to the level of capital intensity. 
Less intensive culture is less capital intensive, while more intensive culture is 
more capital intensive. Therefore, the combination of five primary inputs: land 
in hectares of water spread area, labour in total person-days per water spread 
hectare, seed inputs or stocking density, feed inputs in kilograms of feed per 
water spread hectare and the number of aerators per water spread hectare directly 
influence the production of shrimp output in kilograms per water spread hectare.
Pearson correlation coefficients between fixed and variable inputs and 
output are presented in Table 3.4. The results generally support the above 
mentioned claims with respect to input use and culture intensity. There is 
significant positive correlation between stocking density and output, land and 
labour use per water spread hectare over the entire sample. As suggested earlier 
the stocking density is thought of as the principal input that determines the 
intensity of production. The data suggest that farms of greater (smaller) overall
17 This is confirmed by econometric estimation results presented in Part II o f this thesis.
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size adopt more (less) intensive production methods; that farms adopting more 
(less) intensive production methods use greater (fewer) land, labour and seed 
inputs per water spread area; and that farms adopting more (less) intensive 
production methods have greater (smaller) yields.
Table 3.4
Matrix of Major Production Input Correlation
N=83 OUTPUT LAND LABOR FEED SEED AERATORS
OUTPUT 1.00
LAND 0.25♦ 1.00
LABOR 0.26+ -0.01 1.00
FEED 0 .8 5 " 0.52^ 022** 1.00
SEED 0 .8 3 " 0 .5 5 " 0.21* 0.98** 1.00
AERATORS 0.4 7 " 0.37* 0.36** 0.40** 0.58** 1.00
♦denotes statistically significant at 5 percent ^♦denotes statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Source: calculations based on Patil & KAA Database, 1997
Generally, there is a positive relationship between average output per 
water spread hectare and farm size in shrimp farming (NACA, 1996). This 
relationship holds for Kandaleru farms too. The positive and significant Pearson 
correlation of 0.25 suggests that as farm size increases, the average output per 
hectare increases. The same relationship holds for seed and feed use per water 
spread hectare. More specifically, however, in addition to the amount and 
combination of inputs used shrimp yields can rise or fall depending on farm 
management practices. The relative importance of input quantities and their 
combination, and farm management practices on shrimp output per hectare for a 
sub-sample of 82 Kandaleru farms is examined in the next chapter.18
3.1.4 Partial Productivity Ratios
Partial productivity ratios are often used by agricultural economists to 
compare the productivity of various agricultural production systems. The 
observed static differences in the partial productivity ratios are generally
18 In December 1996 the Indian Supreme Court banned all shrimp farms using non-traditional 
methods o f  production (i.e. intensive production). Many Kandaleru shrimp farmers produce with 
non-traditional methods o f production and therefore feared exposure. Due to their sensitivity and 
subsequent unwillingness to share production data via a formal questionnaire, 82 creek-based 
farmers o f  the 518 in the KAA were individually interviewed. The survey methodology is 
discussed in Chapter 2.
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associated with differences in the use of modem industrial inputs and substitutes 
for land and labour. One notable difference from agriculture production theory 
with respect to shrimp farming is that labour requirements per fixed unit of land 
area increase with capital intensity (i.e. the intensive use of seed, feed and 
aerators).19
As very little farm survey data is available on Indian shrimp farming, few 
comparisons can be made against the KAA survey data. The partial productivity 
ratio for feed use, however, roughly follows the conventional wisdom of the 
sector. Sukumaran and Devraj (1995:318) suggest that extensive, modified 
extensive and intensive farms use on average, 495 kilograms, 701 kilograms and 
13,376 kilograms of feed per water spread hectare respectively. This is roughly 
equivalent to that of the Kandaleru sample. Partial productivity ratios for five 
primary inputs used in culturing shrimp along the Kandaleru creek are presented 
in Table 3.5 below.
19 This result is not consistent with preliminary ADB-NACA results on labour use in Indian 
shrimp farm production. The ADB-NACA study quoted in Leung and Lokugam 
(December, 1996) suggests that extensive shrimp farmers require 642 person-days per hectare 
while semi-intensive farms require only 472 person-days per hectare. This clearly suggests that 
more capital intensive production is less labour intensive. However, these data may not be 
reliable for several reasons. First, the published preliminary statistics do not distinguish between 
annual and seasonal labour inputs. Therefore, the per hectare averages are most likely incorrect. 
Secondly, it is clear from data presented on other countries, that there is little conclusive evidence 
to support the notion that labour inputs decrease with intensity. For example, data from 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, and Viet Nam indicate the opposite result. Once the ADB- 
NACA data is made publicly available, the labour-capital trade-off can be examined more 
carefully.
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Table 3.5 
Partial Productivity Ratios
(average input quantities measured per water spread hectare)
culture intensity output land labour seed feed fcr aerators
Extensive 510 0.803 138 46,562 523 1.06 1.4
Modified Extensive 686 0.816 147 67,964 859 1.41 1.6
Semi-Intensive 1,223 0.826 154 129,166 6,173 6.86 4.4
Intensive 2,188 0.783 196 262,500 14,190 8.94 6.2
Farm Average 793 0.807 149 84,444 2,831 2.84 2.5
output is measured in kilograms per water spread hectare; land is the proportion o f total farm area 
used for culture; labour requirements are measured in person-days per water spread hectare for one 
crop cycle in a two crop cycle year; seed inputs are the number stocked per water spread hectare; 
feed inputs are measured in kilograms per water spread hectares; fcr (food conversion ratio) is a 
special measure o f feed efficiency and measured as the ratio between feed use and output; aerators 
are the number o f  oxygenating paddle wheels used per water spread hectare; All partial productivity 
ratios are measured for a single crop cycle lasting on average, approximately 144 days in duration, 
in a two crop cycle year; 82 farms in the sample.
Source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b
3.1,5 Capital - Labor Input Relationships
An important indicator for assessing the production relationship between 
farms culturing at different intensities is the capital input-labour ratio. The 
capital-labour input ratios for each capital input, namely, seed, feed and aerators, 
increase with intensity of production (see Figure 3.0). However, the ratios of 
aerators to labour and feed to labour both increase at an increasing rate between 
extensive and semi-intensive culture, after which they increase at a decreasing 
rate; the ratio of seed to labour increases at an increasing rate. The land-labour 
ratio increases at a decreasing rate between extensive and intensive culture after 
which it increases at an increasing rate. However, unlike the capital-labour 
ratios, it is relatively constant. This is not surprising since land is fixed across all 
inputs.
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Figure 3.0
Relationship between Capital-Labour Input 
Proportions & Culture Intensity
land/labour
/  /  , ' aerator/labour
seed/labour
feed/labour
Extensive Modified Semi- Intensive
Extensive Intensive
Shrimp Farm Production Intensity
The above figure illustrates clearly that shrimp farming becomes more 
capital intensive as production intensity increases. The steep rise in the capital- 
labour ratios after modified extensive shrimp farming practices suggest that the 
amount of capital input per water spread hectare is increasing at a faster rate than 
labour requirements per water spread hectare. The relationship is more constant 
at lower levels of production intensity (i.e. extensive and modified extensive 
farming).
3.1.6 Production Intensity & Operational Cost
Operational costs are also known to vary with production intensity. It is 
unclear, however, whether larger farms are more cost efficient overall than 
smaller farms. Due to a lack of price data available for Kandaleru farms, this 
area of research is not explored in detail. However, some common relationships 
are found to exist with other studies based on average input prices.
A study by New et al (1990) of Thai shrimp farms suggest that the total 
operational costs per kilogram of shrimp output rise at an increasing rate with 
production intensity, ranging from extensive to semi-intensive culture and falls 
thereafter for farms engaged in intensive culture practices. While Indian farms 
operate using far less capital intensive technology than those in Thailand, a
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similar relationship may exist.20 The ADB-NACA study for India suggests that 
the average cost of daily labour inputs per hectare on extensive farms amounts to 
approximately $9.4. Labour costs for semi-intensive farms amounts to $25.5 per 
hectare per day. Similarly, per hectare feed costs for extensive and semi- 
intensive farms amount to $5.9 and $4.9 respectively. Seed costs per thousand 
fry per hectare amount to $12.8 and $11.4 for extensive and semi-intensive 
farms, respectively. This is roughly consistent with the average price per 
thousand fry facing Kandaleru shrimp farmers.21
3.1.7 Summary
The summary of Kandaleru shrimp farm statistics presented in this 
section reveal several important findings. While almost 50 percent of all 
Kandaleru shrimp farms are owned and operated by small and marginal farmers, 
they control only 14 percent of the land area used to culture shrimp. Large and 
corporate farms, in contrast own or lease 54 percent of the land. The remaining 
32 percent of total water spread area used to farm shrimp is occupied by medium 
size farms. Second, the more intensive methods of production produce higher per 
hectare shrimp yields. However, not without concerns for the environment. 
Feed efficiency (as defined by the feed conversion ratio in Table 3.5), for 
example, declines with production intensity. This necessarily means that uneaten 
feed settles to the pond bottom where it can degrade the quality of the pond. The 
final consequence is pollution of both the on-farm and off-farm aquatic 
environment. Finally, capital-labour input ratios increase over farm intensity
20 This is determined by comparing production data o f Kandaleru shrimp farms with the general 
production data o f  Thai farms presented in Leung and Lokugam (1996) overview o f the ADB- 
NACA study.
21 This amounts to roughly 0.38 Indian Rupees per seed using the average 1996 Dollar-Indian 
Rupee exchange rate. Input price data were not collected in the KAA sample farm survey. 
However, average input price data shared informally by shrimp farmers suggest that the price per 
individual seed is approximately 0.35 Indian Rupees.
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levels. This clearly indicates that shrimp farming becomes more capital intensive 
as farm size increases. In the next section, the pattern of growth and 
development of the shrimp farming sector in Nellore district between 1993 and 
1997 is examined.
3.2 Growth & Development of Kandaleru Shrimp Farming
Brackishwater shrimp aquaculture has rapidly grown along the Kandaleru 
creek since the first farm began operation in 1987.22 Encouraged by the 
possibility of high economic returns, farmers rapidly entered this rural based 
sector. Since the 1992-1993 season, the total number of shrimp farms operating 
in this region increased from 254 to approximately 530 in the 1996-1997 
season.23 This corresponds to a cumulative average annual growth of 
approximately 19.5 percent over four years. Similarly, the total area used to 
culture shrimp almost doubled from 1,242 hectares to 2,166 hectares over the 
same period. This amounts to a healthy 13 percent annual rate of growth. The 
number of corporate farms grew at a cumulative average annual rate of 50 
percent, from six in 1993 to thirty-one in 1996.
3,2.1 Output Growth
Although shrimp farmers have enjoyed healthy profit and a positive 
average annual growth since 1987, the Kandaleru shrimp industry suffered a 
serious setback in 1993-1994 when average output per hectare dropped from 
approximately 400 kilograms in 1992 to 165 kilograms in 1993 as a result of 
crop disease.24 At the end of this season, at least four corporate shrimp farms 
declared bankruptcy as a result (BFDA, 1996).
22 1987 is reported by the BFDA as the year when shrimp farming first became popular along the 
Kandaleru river.
23 1993 statistics are based on a 1994 BFDA survey (see BFDA, 1994); 1997 statistics are based 
on primary KAA survey data (see Patil & KAA Database, 1997).
24 There is much debate as to the source o f the “White Spot” disease which destroyed a majority 
o f the 1992-1993 season’s harvest. Interviews of farmers suggest that the disease was a result o f  
contaminated seed purchased in bulk from Thailand that year. Industry experts, however, claim
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Farms of all sizes posted financial losses, forcing the less financially 
secure to exit the sector. Although data on the specific number of farms that 
exited the industry by size of land holding is unavailable, primary survey data 
does enable analysis of the characteristics of new entrants after 1994. Overall, 
the share of larger farms dropped while the share of marginal farms rose over the 
period (see Table 3.7).25
Table 3.6
Average Output by Farm Size during 1993/4 & 1996/7 Season
Size, S (HA) 
Output (Kg/HA)
S<1
marginal
1<S<2
small
2 <S<5  
medium
5<S<10
large
10 <S  
corporate
ALL
1992 Average Output(a) NA NA NA NA NA 400*
1993 Average Outputfo) 110.9 64.8 86.5 465 515 165
1997 Average Output(c) 333.3 404.7 537.0 821 1,474 558
avg. annual growth rate 32% 59% 57% 15% 27% 36%
source:(t) 1992 BFDA estimates; ^  BFDA Database, 1996; (c)Patil & KAA Database, 1997
Output growth per water spread hectare rebounded from its 59 percent 
drop between 1992 and 1993. Between 1993 and 1997, shrimp output (in 
kilograms per water spread hectare) grew at approximately 36 percent annually. 
The average annual output growth rate is largest for small and medium size farms 
at an average of approximately 56 percent, and smallest for large and corporate 
farms. This suggests perhaps (i) a steep learning curve for the smallest farms, 
enabling them to culture shrimp more efficiently; (ii) smaller farms generally 
boosted production intensity over the period to yield higher per hectare output; or 
(iii) a combination of both factors. As production data for both years in not 
available, it is not possible to explore this further. However, results presented 
later this thesis suggest that it is most likely a combination of both factors. Small 
and marginal farmers with more years of experience were not found to be any 
more efficient than less experienced farmers of the same size (see Chapter 5).
that the disease was most likely due to poor pond management (CIBA, 1996). The White Spot 
disease spread rapidly as the Kandaleru Creek serves as both the source o f clean water intake and 
effluent discharge.
25 Farm size is a good proxy for production intensity. This conclusion is based on the significant 
positive correlation between farm size and quantities of capital inputs (i.e. seed, feed, etc.) used 
in production (see Section 3.1.3 presented earlier in this chapter).
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3.2.2 Farm Size & Growth
Table 3.7 illustrates that since 1993, the share of marginal farmers, those 
farmers operating on less than one hectare of land increased; the share of small 
farmers, those farmers operating on land holdings between one and two hectares 
dropped significantly; the share of medium scale farmers, those farmers operating 
on land holdings between two and five hectares stayed relatively constant; while 
the share of large private and corporate farmers, those holding greater or equal to 
five hectares of land dropped. The number of shrimp farms grew at an 
cumulative annual rate of approximately 19.5 percent over the period with 
marginal, medium, large and corporate farms growing at an annual rate of 47 
percent, 18 percent, 8 percent, and 9 percent, respectively. The growth rate of 
small farms was negative 2 percent over the period.
Table 3.7
Kandaleru Shrimp Farms & Share of Total by Size of Land Holding
Size, S (HA) S<1
marginal
1<S<2
small
2 <S<5  
medium
5<S<10
large
10 <S  
corporate
ALL
1997 Shrimp Farms 202 51 156 65 43 518
1993 Shrimp Farms 43 56 78 47 30 254
1997 Share (%) 39 10 30 13 8 100
1993 Share (%) 17 22 31 18 12 100
% Change in Share +22 -11 -1 -5 -4
avg. annual growth rate 47% -2% 19% 8% 9% 19.5%
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997
Overall, average farm size and average water spread area fell while the 
land utilisation rate rose over the period (see Table 3.8). In 1993 the average size 
of all 254 farms was 4.92 hectares of which 73.9 percent or 3.54 hectares were 
water spread. In 1997 there were 518 farms with an average size of 4.17 
hectares. 77.5 percent or 3.23 hectares were water spread.26 Thus, the land 
utilisation rate grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 percent over four years.
26 Average farm size and average water spread area fell over the period because the majority o f  
the new entrants to the industry were small and marginal fanners.
Table 3.8
Average Farm Size, Water Spread Area & Land Utilisation Rate; 1993 & 1997
Size, S (HA) S<1
marginal
1<S<2
small
2 <S<5 
medium
5<S<10
large
10 <S 
corporate
ALL
1997 Averages
Farm Size 0.456 1.384 3.107 7.045 24.65 4.18
Water Spread Area 0.440 1.212 2.498 5.659 17.81 3.23
Utilisation Rate (%) 97.5 88.5 80.5 80.4 80.2 77.5
1993 Averages
Farm Size 0.524 1.205 3.06 6.56 17.0 4.92
Water Spread Area 0.386 .916 2.47 4.89 12.20 3.64
Utilisation Rate (%) 73.4 76.7 80.7 75.1 70.5 73.9
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997
3.2.3 Conclusions
The results presented in this section yield four important findings. First, 
the rise in the number of marginal farm holdings between 1993 and 1997 
suggests that shrimp farming has low barriers to entry for marginal farmers (see 
Table 3.7). This is most likely due to the less capital intensive nature of small 
farm production, the local availability of key inputs such as feed and seed which 
keep variable costs relatively low and perhaps most important, access to land and 
the availability of credit via government land transfer and subsidy schemes.27
Second, the net drop in the number of small farms over the period 
suggests that either a proportion of small farms exited the industry or increased 
their land holding and moved to the medium size farm category (see Table 3.7). 
This first possibility is particularly plausible since this farm size group suffered 
from the lowest average output during the 1993-1994 season (see Table 3.6). 
However, the same result taken with the relatively constant proportion of 
medium size farms over the period suggest that the most successful small farms 
could have increased their land holding over the period. This seems particularly 
plausible since of the 56 small farms, 31 reported no harvest for that crop season
27 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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while the remaining 25 farms reported an average yield of 145.2 kilograms per 
hectare.28 The most likely explanation, however, is a combination of both factors.
Third, there have been many attacks on the shrimp farming sector by 
social activists, alleging that it does not benefit the local community and 
especially the poor. Survey data suggests that shrimp farms operating on the 
smallest land holdings (less than one hectare) are owned and operated by 
inhabitants of local villages. In fact, of the 202 farms less than one hectare in 
size, 150 of them, or 29 percent of all KAA shrimp farms were operated by 
members of the SCST community who are considered the poorest among those 
inhabiting the Kandaleru region (Patil & KAA database, 1997; BFDA, 1997). It 
is clear that the poor and socially excluded members of society are not restricted 
from fanning shrimp. It is less clear, however, to what extent they are able to 
compete with their richer neighbours.
Finally, the growing land utilisation rate in each category over the period 
(with the exception of medium size farms which are relatively constant) suggests 
that farmers of all sizes are perhaps becoming more comfortable with existing 
production technology and thus use land inputs more fully (see Table 3.8). This 
suggests profit maximising behaviour. It may also suggest a greater knowledge 
stock available on shrimp culture which enable farmers to culture with a greater 
degree of control over disease.
3.3 A Survey o f Ancillary Services in 1997
Since the advent of shrimp farming in the late 1980s, ancillary services 
have rapidly developed as essential support services to the shrimp farming sector. 
However, very little research concerning the growth and development of 
ancillary services is available. Characteristics of firms providing supplementary 
services to the shrimp farming sector have not been formally analysed to date. 
This research, therefore, provides the first attempt at explaining the significant 
role that they play.
28 The standard deviation is 0.10
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Although it appears that the growth and competitiveness of support 
services may benefit local shrimp farmers by lowering overall production costs, it 
is less clear what overall impact ancillary services are having on the rural 
economy and on rural inhabitants in particular. This is particularly true with 
respect to employment. The analysis presented in the next two sections trace the 
growth and development of ancillary services in context of the district’s 
estimated demand for these services. Section 3.3 surveys the characteristics of 
ancillary services in operation as of January 1, 1997. Sub-section 3.3.1 surveys 
the number of firms and total productive capacity available in each of the four 
supporting industries. In Sub-section 3.3.2, the total district demand for seed and 
feed are assessed. This assessment is based on proportionally scaled estimates of 
sample survey data to the district level. Thus, the input requirements of 1,258 
farms operating in the district are in the same proportion as the input 
requirements found to characterise the 518 KAA farms by size category. Sub­
section 3.3.3. examines the demand for labour in ancillary services.
The final section of this chapter, Section 3.4 surveys the growth and 
development of ancillary services between 1990 and 1997. Sub-section 3.4.1 and 
Sub-section 3.4.2 trace the pattern of growth before and after the 1994 disease 
outbreak, respectively. Finally, Sub-section 3.4.3 offers some concluding 
remarks.
3.3.1 Productive Capacity of Ancillary Services
The major ancillary services that developed in Nellore district to support 
the shrimp farming sector include seed hatcheries, feed mills, processing plants 
and ice factories. Brackishwater shrimp farming requires three principle variable 
inputs for production, namely, shrimp seed, feed and labour. Processing plants 
are needed to sort shrimp by size and package them in post-harvest activities. 
Flaked ice is needed for safe storage and transportation of shrimp from the farm 
gate to processing plants where they are block frozen for export.
According to unpublished BFDA survey data, in 1996, 33 seed 
hatcheries, 14 feed mills, 8 processing plants and 24 ice factories were providing
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essential inputs and services to Nellore district’s shrimp farming sector (see 
Table 3.9). The total annual productive capacity for seed hatcheries was 2,380 
million seed. The 14 feed mills, offering foreign and domestic brand feed, were 
aggregately capable of producing 78,000 metric tonnes of feed per year. The 24 
ice factories could produce 285 metric tonnes of block and flaked ice annually, if 
needed. The 8 processing plants had the capacity to process and package 24,000 
metric tonnes of shrimp.
Similar to other agri-businesses, there are several ancillary services that 
have common corporate owners. In Nellore district, there are 6 integrated units 
selling both major inputs such as seed and feed and post-harvest support services, 
ice and processing. Each company owning and operating integrated units were 
also involved in corporate style intensive shrimp farming. On average, integrated 
units had higher average productive capacity than non-integrated units for seed 
hatcheries and feed mills. The productive capacity of processing plants for 
integrated units was slightly smaller than non-integrated firms.
Table 3.9
Capacity of Ancillary Services in Nellore District
Ancillary Services Firms Mean Capacity S.D. Min Max
Seed Hatcheries 33 72 42.9 30 200
Integrated Units 18 percent 103 65.3 40 200
Feed Mills 14 5,571 2,680 2,000 10,000
Integrated Units 43 percent 7,666 2,065 5,000 10,000
Processing Plants 8 3,000 963 2,500 5,000
Integrated Units 75 percent 2,750 612 2,400 4,000
Ice Plants 24 11.8 2.9 10 20
Integrated Units 25 percent NC NC NC NC
source: Patil & BFDA Database, 1997; note: NC denotes not calculated due to poor data
The question remains, what proportion of the productive capacity of these 
services were required by shrimp farmers during the 1996-1997 production 
cycle? This is discussed next.
3,3.2 Seed and Feed Requirements in Nellore
According to the latest official statistics, there were approximately 1,258 
shrimp farms operating in Nellore district in 1996 (CIBA, 1997) of which
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approximately 39 percent or 491 were marginal farms, 10 percent or 126 were 
small farms, 30 percent or 377 were medium farms, 13 percent or 163 were large 
farms, and 8 percent or 101 were corporate type farms (see Table 3.10).29 
Simulation experiments suggest a total seed input requirement of approximately 
763 million seed during the second crop cycle in 1996.30 The yearly district-wide 
seed requirement is estimated to be approximately 1,526 million seed.
Assuming that each farm purchased seed from one of the 33 seed 
hatcheries operating in the district, Nellore district’s seed hatcheries operated at 
approximately 64.1 percent of the annual production capacity of 2,380 million 
seed. Following the realistic assumption that marginal farmers purchased natural 
seed from local fishers and not from seed hatcheries we conclude that 1996 
hatchery seed demand in Nellore district was 1,524 million seed which implies 
district hatchery production at 64.0 percent of annual production capacity. 
However, since farmers from adjacent districts most likely purchase seed from 
one of the Nellore based hatcheries, this figure is most likely an underestimate.
Table 3.10
Average Seed & Feed In])uts per crop by Size, S in Nellore district
Farm Size, S (HA) # Farms* Avg. number of seed inputs 
per farm o f size, S
Avg. feed inputs (kgs) per 
farm o f size, S
S<1 491 1,500 120.0
1< S< 2 126 48,600 472.5
2 £ S < 5 377 141,820 2,036.4
5< S<10 163 381,439 9,108.7
10 <s 101 6,342,833 329,163.4
District Total 1,258 Seed Inputs: 763,126,930 Feed Inputs: 35,616,399.3
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b; Patil & BFDA Database, 1997; *determined by scaling 
the total number o f farms in Nellore district by the percentage o f farms o f each size for our 518 
KAA shrimp farm sample.
According to both large and small scale shrimp farmers, the 1994 viral 
outbreak was a result of diseased seed inputs imported from Thailand.31 Besides 
small and marginal farmers who purchased natural seed collected locally, the 
majority of the hatchery seed inputs were purchased and imported from
29 Percentages are based on farm size breakdown for the 518 shrimp farms in the KAA.
30 Estimates are based on KAA Data scaled appropriately.
31 Semi-structured interviews o f  KAA shrimp farmers o f all sizes suggest this to be the case.
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Thailand.32 In 1996, with seed readily available domestically, shrimp farmers 
purchased locally produced hatchery seed as a result of cheaper prices and the 
possibility of testing shrimp seed for contamination before purchase. While 
farmers were wary of imported foreign shrimp seed as a result of the 1994 viral 
outbreak, seed produced domestically by foreign firms was acceptable.
Feed is the second most important variable input after seed but the most 
expensive variable input. Despite the lower price for domestic feed, feed 
produced by foreign firms was considered superior because of its alleged higher 
quality. Approximately 71.1 percent of KAA sub-sample farmers purchased 
foreign brands for 1996 production (Patil & KAA Database, 1997b). In 1996 the 
district’s feed mills had a joint annual capacity of 76,000 metric tonnes. The 
demand for feed among the district’s shrimp farms in 1996 is estimated at 71,232 
metric tonnes.33 Assuming that all feed requirements were purchased from one of 
the district’s fourteen feed mills, Nellore district farms consumed 93 percent of 
the total productive capacity of feed mills in the second crop cycle of 1996.34
3.3.3 Labour Demand & Off-farm Employment
For the Kandaleru region, ancillary services have provided employment 
opportunities for both skilled and unskilled workers. It is estimated that the 
thirty-three seed hatcheries employ approximately 1,650 workers; the fourteen 
feed mills employ approximately 840 workers; the eight processing plants 
employ approximately 1,200 workers; and the sixteen new ice plants employ 
approximately 400 workers.35 In total, over 4,000 jobs were created from the 
development of ancillary services in Nellore district alone. While it is clear that 
there are strong direct employment opportunities associated with the
32 Prior to 1994 there were only four seed hatcheries operating in Nellore with a total overall 
capacity o f 240 million seed which was exhausted given the 600 plus farms in the district at that 
time.
33 The total feed input requirement for all Nellore district shrimp farms during the second crop 
cycle in 1996 was approximately 35,616,400 kilograms. Assuming that farmers used similar 
combination o f inputs for the previous crop cycle, annual district demand for feed was most 
likely around 71,232,800 kilograms or 71,232 metric tonnes.
34 This figure is perhaps slightly higher when considering that adjacent coastal district farms 
purchased feed from these mills too. However, because o f the strong preference for foreign feed, 
we believe that mills were operating on average at less than 50 percent of capacity.
35 Data on employment levels was collected by interviewing managers o f different ancillary units 
in Nellore, the capital o f Nellore district.
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development of ancillary services, it is less clear as to whether these supporting 
industries are of any benefit to the local village economy. Further research not 
attempted in this thesis is required to answer this question.
Off-farm employment opportunities are not only available for those 
individuals engaged by one of the district’s supporting industries. Local coastal 
villagers, especially women and children have supplemented family income by 
collecting shrimp seed from near-shore coastal waters and by selling them to 
shrimp farmers through a well organised distribution network.36 Group interviews 
revealed that women were the primary agents in this economic activity, serving 
as wild seed collectors and as middle-agents for shrimp farms. Women and 
children of sea-based villages collected shrimp seed from near shore waters in 
season. According to the local school teachers in Krishnapatnam village, during 
the peak season, most school age girls missed school in order to collect shrimp 
fry.37
Once collected, the fry were sold on a per piece basis to a village agent, 
also female, who sorts the fry by variety.38 The fry were separated and stored in 
earthen pots. Each day the village agent sold the shrimp seed to local shrimp 
farmers at a previously negotiated price. From the interviews it became clear that 
the particular village middle-agent operating in Krishnapattnam also served 
several other nearby villages in the area. This was true of other middle-agents 
operating in different villages in the Kandaleru region. These findings are also 
supported by FAO studies in Bangladesh and West Bengal, India (see BOBP, 
1994; BOBP, 1993).
After the first crop cycle in 1996, village seed collectors complained of a 
lack of employment opportunity. There appeared to be a low demand for natural 
seed. This was most likely a direct result of the greater demand for hatchery seed
36 It was observed that almost every household in sea-based villages owned a shrimp fry net. The 
nets were visible leaning against the sides o f huts throughout the village.
37 Based on discussions with village school teachers in Krishnapattanam village.
38 Both White shrimp fry and the highly demanded Black Tiger variety are collected from coastal 
waters. The agent is known to be skilled in determining the variety o f the shrimp fry collected on 
inspection.
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by shrimp farmers and the declining availability of natural seed as a result of over 
fishing.39
3.4 Growth & Development of Ancillary Services (1990-1997)
Prior to 1990 most small and marginal scale Kandaleru shrimp farmers 
purchased seed collected by the region’s fisher community. They also prepared 
their own shrimp feed from indigenous materials. Medium, large and corporate 
farms imported seed and pellet feed from Thailand and Taiwan. In 1992-1993, 
this balance began to shift slightly as corporate farms began purchasing seed and 
feed produced locally by multinationals who built and operated seed hatcheries 
and feed mills. By the 1996 season almost all farmers operating on land areas 
over two hectares were purchasing seed produced locally from seed hatcheries 
(Patil & KAA Database, 1997b). Only the smallest farmers continued to 
purchase seed from local fishers who collected shrimp fry from the near shore 
coastal waters of estuaries and made their own feed from village resources.40
Between 1990 and 1997, the region had witnessed rapid growth and 
development of supporting services to the shrimp farming sector.41 Aside from 
eight ice plants which operated in the region as a support to the local fishing port 
at Krishnapatnam in 1990, the remaining 16 of 24 ice plants, 8 processing plants, 
14 feed mills and 33 seed hatcheries were built since 1993 to supply shrimp 
farms with necessary inputs. According to unpublished BFDA data collected 
from the region, 4 seed hatcheries, 13 feed mills, 3 processing facilities and 6 ice 
plants were first constructed and ready for operation by 1993 (see Table 3.11). 
Between 1993 and 1997, seed hatcheries grew at an average annual rate of 69
39 There is growing concern over the wild stock population o f shrimp. The FAO’s Bay of Bengal 
Program in conjunction with environmental NGOs have implemented outreach programs to 
educate fisher-folks to the dangers o f over fishing shrimp fry from coastal waters. FAO BOBP 
suggest that while supplemental income is earned by women and children from fry collection 
activities, fewer mid to large size shrimp are ultimately being caught by the men-folk because 
less fry are able to grow to maturity in the wild. Overall, shrimp caught in the wild at a larger 
size are more valuable than the per piece price earned by catching fry. In addition, 
environmental NGOs fear exploitation of this resource.
40 Based on semi-structured interviews o f shrimp farmers o f all sizes.
41 The shrimp farming sector in conjunction with the supporting services define the shrimp farm 
industry.
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percent; the number of processing plants and ice factories both grew at an 
average annual rate of 28 percent; while feed mills only grew at 2 percent per 
year over the period. While the average annual cumulative growth of all 
supporting services over the period was a healthy 31 percent, annual growth rates 
seem to follow the successes and failures of the shrimp farming sector.
Table 3.11
_________ Growth Pattern of Ancillary Industries in Nellore district
Ancillary Industries 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997
Total Seed hatcheries 0 4 30 33
New Additions 0 4 26 3
Total Capacity' 0 500 2,250 2,380
Total Feed Mills 0 13 14 14
New Additions 0 13 1 0
Total Capacity2 0 76,000 78,000 78,000
Total Processing Plants 0 3 6 8
New Additions 0 3 3 2
Total Capacity2 0 10,000 19,000 24,000
Total Ice Factories 
New Additions 
Total Capacity3
8
0
NC
14
6
80
22
8
180
24
2
285
source: CIBA (1997); notes: years in parenthesis indicate the year o f completion; ‘million of  
PL20 seed; Metric tonnes; 3metric tonnes, capacity is calculated for only those factories built 
primarily as a result o f shrimp farming.
3.4,1 1994 Shrimp Disease & Its Impact
The 1994 shrimp disease that wiped out that season’s harvest affected the 
healthy growth pattern of ancillary industries in Nellore district, especially seed 
hatcheries, ice plants and processing plants. Construction of new seed hatcheries 
and construction on existing half completed hatcheries post December 1994 
slowed significantly. There were no additional feed mills constructed and only 
two additional processing plants and ice plants constructed post December 1994. 
Those plants in operation prior to the second crop culture period in July/August 
1994 provided necessary seed inputs and were operating at near capacity. 
Because of the dramatic decline in shrimp output that year, ice and processing 
plants (post-harvest supporting services) operated far below maximum capacity.42
42 These claims are supported by semi-formal interviews o f  managers engaged in post-harvest 
activities.
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The growth rates of supporting services pre and post 1994 season’s 
disease are presented in Table 3.12. The results suggest that prior to the 1994- 
1995 season, each supporting service was growing rapidly.43 After the disease, 
growth slowed considerable across all ancillary industries.
Table 3.12
Average Annual Growth Rates of Firms by Type & Capacity
Ancillary Industries 1993-1995 1995-1997 1993-1997
pre-disease post-disease
Seed Hatchery growth rate, % 174 5 69
Hatchery Capacity growth rate, % 112 3 48
Feed Mill growth rate, % 89 0 55
Mill Capacity growth rate, % 425 0 203
Processing Plant growth rate, % 41 15 28
Plant Capacity growth rate, % 38 12 24
Ice Factory growth rate, % 53 7 28
Factory Capacity growth rate, % 50 5 26
source: Patil & BFDA Database, 1997
One well known example, Waterbase Ltd (TWL) a unit of the Thapur 
Group, faced severe set backs between 1994-1995. Hatchery and feed sales 
plummeted due to negligible demand and its processing facilities remained 
closed for most of the year. The company sold only 62.03 million seed against a 
projected target of 100 million for the year. This was a result of limited stocking 
during the year. TWL’s feed sales of 6,150.31 tonnes were approximately 45 
percent of the projected target for the year. This decline was a result of reduced 
demand in the market as a result of the truncated period of culture throughout the 
country and the continual failure of crops. Against a projected shrimp output of 
640 metric tonnes the company produced only 56.75 metric tonnes. The 
company’s processing plant operated for only a small portion of the year and 
processed only 249 metric tonnes against a 1,625 metric tonne capacity. In total 
TWL incurred a total loss of Rs. 13.35 crores. Of this total amount, operating 
losses accounted for Rs. 5.34 crores, interest and financing charges accounted for 
Rs. 5.5 Crore and depreciation accounted for Rs. 2.51 Crore (Reddy, 1996).
43 The low growth rate for feed is explained by the fact that 13 of the 14 feed mills were in 
operation since 1992.
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3.4.2 1996 Boom
In sync with the region’s most successful culture period (1996-1997) and 
bumper harvest in October 1996, each ancillary services (with the exception of 
feed mills) operated at near capacity levels during this year providing a boost to 
the local economy. Input data collected from an 82 KAA shrimp farm sample 
suggest that average seed input requirements for marginal, small, medium, large 
and corporate farms per crop cycle were 15,000; 48,600; 141,820; 381,439; and 
6,342,833 pieces respectively. Average feed input requirements for each 
marginal, small, medium, large and corporate farm per crop cycle were 120; 473; 
2,7036; 9,109; and 329,163 kilograms respectively (see Table 3.10).
3.4.3 Summary
It is clear that a flourishing industry of supporting services to the shrimp 
farming sector has developed in Nellore district over the past decade. The 
abundance of firms providing necessary inputs enables farms of all sizes the 
opportunity to purchase inputs at the given price. Competition between firms in 
each supporting sector ensures competitive prices. Support services, however, 
are undoubtedly at the mercy of successful harvests. Ice factories and processing 
units support harvest and post-harvest activities, respectively. Feed mills and 
seed hatcheries must maintain a minimum standard of quality. With healthy 
competition between firms, it is imperative that farmers do not equate an 
unsuccessful season to bad feed or weak seed. Nonetheless, as firms differentiate 
themselves in terms of brands, etc. a competitive sector of supporting services 
will undoubtedly thrive. Moreover, the spin-off effects of the growth and 
development of a new series of firms in an economy are large. In this respect, 
jobs are created and tax revenues are secured.
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Chapter 4
Shrimp Farming & The Impact of Changing 
Land Use Patterns on Agricultural Labour
4.0 Introduction
There is much debate as to how the growth of shrimp farming in the 
Kandaleru region has affected the pattern of land use and consequently the 
structure of the rural labour market. Land previously regarded as agriculturally 
unproductive by the government and therefore classified as “wasteland” is now 
put to use for the purpose of shrimp aquaculture. Simultaneously, fertile 
agricultural land is indiscriminately converted to shrimp farms as traditional 
paddy, jowar and groundnut farmers realise the potential for greater profits by 
farming shrimp. Similarly, salt pans are being converted to shrimp ponds. 
Moreover, there is growing concern by local and international NGOs over more 
frequently reported incidents of ground water salinity, agricultural land salinity 
and other environmental externalities believed to be caused by shrimp 
aquaculture development. In addition, the impact of both agricultural and non- 
agricultural land conversion on the local labour market is of concern. Overall, 
there are many questions, but few answers with respect to shrimp farming and the 
impact of changing land use patterns on agricultural labour.
This chapter explores the changing pattern of land use and employment in 
the Kandaleru region since the advent of shrimp farming. Section 4.1 examines 
the land purchase and leasing schemes which enabled shrimp entrepreneurs to 
enter the sector. Section 4.2 examines the magnitude of land conversion for 
shrimp farming. Section 4.3 examines the evolving pattern of land use at the 
district, mandal and local level. Specifically, this section discusses the degree to 
which public and private criticism of the shrimp farming sector is justified with 
respect to employment opportunities gained or lost as a result of it’s growth and 
development. It explores the hypothesis that traditional agriculture and 
agricultural labour have been displaced since the advent of shrimp farming. 
Section 4.4 explores the on-farm labour requirements of farms of all sizes.
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Specifically, it analyses the degree to which on-farm employment opportunities 
are available to local inhabitants. Finally, labour requirements needed in 
traditional agriculture are compared against those needed in shrimp farming.
4.1 Land Purchase & Leasing Schemes
The previous chapter characterised the growth and development of shrimp 
farms in Nellore district. Survey data suggest that farm ownership status varies 
by farm size. Eighty-two percent of small farmers surveyed claimed to own their 
land, while the remaining 18 percent leased land. Similarly, 91 percent of 
corporate farmers owned their farm land whereas only 9 percent of them leased 
land. Finally, a more even split was found to exist for medium size farms. Fifty - 
six percent declared ownership rights to land while 44 percent claimed to lease 
their land. Although data were not collected regarding the pre-shrimp culture 
origin of shrimp farmers, many are thought to have come from outside the 
region. Of interest, therefore are the arrangements used by non-natives to 
purchase and lease prime shrimp farming land. In fact, non-native farmers had 
only three ways of accessing land to farm shrimp: private land sales which 
shifted ownership rights from traditional owners to the purchaser; private lease 
arrangements which enabled the lease of land under specific conditions; and 
government leasing and transfer schemes, which allocated public land for the 
purpose of farming shrimp. In this section, each arrangement is discussed in 
turn.
4.1.1 Private Sale of Land
The rental price for privately owned land located adjacent to the 
Kandaleru river rose steeply over ten years between 1987 and 1997.1 Prior to 
1987 privately owned and government public access land adjacent to the
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Kandaleru was left barren and uncultivated. Before the advent of shrimp 
farming, this land was unpopular for essentially three reasons. First, it was 
unsuitable for most agricultural crops. Besides being used for small scale 
charcoal making and cultivation of small scale seasonal cash crops such as 
Coriander, this land was generally considered unproductive by local owners.2 
Second, land adjacent to the Kandaleru creek serves as a perennial drain for the 
monsoon flood waters (Land Records Office, 1997). Historically, during 
particularly heavy monsoons, the creek overflows its banks and causes flash 
flooding.3 Therefore, very few inland villages are found closer than a few 
kilometres away from the river. Third, the variable salinity of the creek as far up 
as 40 kilometers upstream from the Bay of Bengal make it useless as a source of 
portable water. In addition, most communities along the upper stretches of the 
Kandaleru are primarily engaged in agricultural activities and find little use for 
the brackishwater creek.
Records obtained from the district’s Land Records Office (LRO) in 
Gudur indicate that prior to 1987 very few private transactions occurred with 
respect to land adjacent to the Kandaleru river. With the introduction of 
brackishwater shrimp aquaculture to the region in 1987, demand for this 
wasteland began to rise steeply. Initially, this land commanded an average price 
of approximately Rs. 2,469 per hectare,4 With recognition of shrimp farming’s 
commercial possibilities, land prices jumped to Rs. 86,415 per hectare in 1991. 
By 1993, the same land commanded an average per hectare sale price of Rs.
1 Privately owned land is regionally referred to as Patta land. These two terms are used 
interchangeably throughout this section.
2 Informal discussions with local inhabitants suggest that government classified “wasteland” does 
have productive capacity. Previous to shrimp farming, the thorny bushes growing on the 
“wasteland” were used to produce charcoal. In addition crops requiring very few nutrients from 
the soil were grown and sold in the local market. Charcoal making and secondary dryland crops 
were farmed usually by landless labourers who gained permission of the owner or encroached on 
government owned land. It is unclear, however, how many poor local inhabitants are currently 
restricted from this income generating activity. It is unclear as to the value o f this loss of 
economic activity.
3 The most recent flash flooding occurred in 1995. Entire shrimp farms were washed away and 
the entire Kandaleru region was under water for several weeks.
4 All land purchase prices were provided by Land Records Office in Indian Rupees per acre. 
Lease prices were obtained from interviewing land lords and leasees. All land prices are 
converted to per hectare prices in order to provide some degree o f consistency throughout the
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92,587 for land located at a distance from Kandaleru creek but connected to it by 
a feeder canal, and Rs. 123,440 for each hectare of land located directly adjacent 
to the creek. By October 1996, per hectare land prices were in excess of 197,520 
Indian Rupees. This suggests an annual average land price inflation of 73 
percent since 1989.5
In 1997 and 1998 land prices have remained high, but demand has 
slumped due to the uncertainty faced by the industry as a result of the December 
1996 Supreme Court order banning shrimp farming (see Table 4.0).6 Whereas 
annual average price inflation was in excess of 88 percent before the shrimp virus 
outbreak in 1994, average annual inflation was a modest 21 percent over the 
post-disease years, 1995 to 1997. Shrimp farming is undoubtedly responsible for 
the sharp rise in land rents in coastal Nellore.7
Table 4.0
Private per hectare Land Purchase & Lease Prices (1989-1997)
Year Average Purchase Price (Rs/Hectare) Average Private Lease Price (Rs/Hectare/Year) *
1989 2,469 no recorded transactions
1990 12,345 no recorded transactions
1991 86,415 no recorded transactions
1992 92,587 no recorded transactions
1993 92,587 14,814
1994 111,105 17,283
1995 123,440 19,752
1996 197,520 44,442
1997 no recorded transactions no recorded transactions
sources: Gudur Land Records Office, 1997; *Based on personal interviews o f land lords & 
renters; prices are nominal and not adjusted for inflation.
4.1.2 Private Lease Arrangements
In late 1993 there was a shift from outright sale of wasteland recognised 
to be suitable for shrimp cultivation to leasing arrangements. Land owners saw
thesis. For comparison purposes only, prime agricultural wet land commanded an average renal 
price o f 4,722 Rupees per hectare in Andhra Pradesh between 1980-1990 and at 1980 prices.
5 Similar events have been observed in Tamil Nadu where coastal land prices shot up from Rs. 
17,500 a hectare in 1992 to over Rs. 200,000 per hectare in 1994 as a result o f high demand for 
prime shrimp farming land (Viswanathan, 1994:78). This amounts to an average annual growth 
rate o f 124 percent between 1992 and the end o f the 1994 season.
6 Personal communication with the President o f the KAA, March 1998.
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opportunities to capture economic rent while maintaining ownership rights. A 
significant proportion of smaller land owners interviewed, claimed that they did 
not have either the means or the desire to develop shrimp ponds themselves, and 
therefore opted to lease their land instead. This group includes small paddy, 
jo war, casuarian and groundnut farmers with land ownership rights through 
bequests.8 Based on semi-structured interviews of land owners and renters, land 
for shrimp cultivation commanded an average annual per hectare lease price of 
approximately Rs. 14,814 in 1993, Rs. 17,283 in 1994, Rs. 19,752 in 1995 and 
Rs. 44,442 in December 1996.9 This suggests an inflation adjusted average 
annual growth rate of approximately 25.6 percent.
In the 1994-1995 culture season there was an even greater shift from 
direct purchases to leasing arrangements. During this season, average shrimp 
yields dropped by 60 percent from the previous year due to a region wide shrimp 
disease outbreak.10 The impact of 1994 disease and 1995 flood on land lease 
schemes was two-fold. First, larger land owners saw (perhaps for the first time) 
the significant risk involved in farming shrimp. Those owning land adjacent to 
the Kandaleru and who previously had plans to enter the industry shied away 
from it instead. Despite decreased demand for land by local inhabitants of the 
Kandaleru region, demand for land by outsiders most likely rose and rental prices 
continued to rise. The Kandaleru regions’ 1996-1997 bumper shrimp harvest 
helped drive up the price of land significantly. Yearly lease prices per hectare 
also jumped 44 percent from Rs. 19,752 to Rs. 44,442 (see Table 4.0).
Overall, the lease price per hectare as a proportion of the sale price per 
hectare was relatively constant at approximately 16 percent between 1993 and 
1995.11 This was a steady ten percent above average annual inflation for the 
period. However, in 1996, the lease/sale price ratio per hectare rose by 6.5
7 The discussion o f land transactions and contracts is based on semi-structured interviews of land 
lords, their clients and government officials o f the land records office, Gudur. Transaction prices 
are supplied by the same.
8 See Center for Development Studies (1991) for a good discussion o f A.P. village land bequests.
9 This was before the Indian Supreme Court verdict announced December 15, 1996 banning 
shrimp farming in the country.
10 see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.
11 This is calculated by taking the ratio o f the per hectare lease price to the per hectare sale price 
for each year between 1993 and 1996 (see Table 4.0).
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percent to 22.5 percent, on average. This suggests that land lords took advantage 
of the fact that demand for land purchase fell, while demand for rental property 
rose. At the same time, the willingness of land owners to sell their land declined. 
Both factors are likely to have contributed to the jump in the land lease price.
Land Lease Contracts
Contracts for private land lease vary slightly across the different shrimp 
farming clusters of the Kandaleru region. Lease periods were fixed for a 
minimum of two years and maximum of four years after which the contract could 
be re-negotiated. In almost all cases rental contracts were adjusted for inflation.12 
In several cases, the current owner of wasteland was not the historical owner, but 
an individual who purchased large tracts of land from the family or clan with 
historical ownership rights. Land was usually purchased as an investment by 
those with intentions of farming shrimp.13 However, several property owners 
revealed that as a result of generating a steady income from rent, they did not 
engage in shrimp farming themselves. Other land owners leased a proportion of 
their land to other shrimp farmers and also chose to culture shrimp themselves.
Both purchase and lease prices vary according to the property’s distance 
from the creek. Land prices fall as the property’s distance from the creek 
increases. This may be a function of a farmer assuming greater risk when 
farming on land further away from the brackishwater source. Shrimp farmers 
operating on land adjacent to the brackishwater source have a greater control over 
water intake and effluent discharge and therefore greater control over risk. 
Shrimp farms located further away from the brackish water source rely on shared 
canals for water intake and effluent discharge. Interviews of shrimp farmers 
suggest that there is a greater risk of pond contamination when the intake waters 
are shared via a common canal. As the chance of contaminated intake water 
increases, the greater is the possibility of crop disease and economic losses faced
12 The constant per hectare land sale/lease price ratio bewteen 1993 and 1996 suggest this to be 
the case.
13 This is not unlike arrangements in Bangladesh witnessed by Guimaraes (1989).
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by shrimp farmers. However, as there is only a finite amount of land located 
directly adjacent to the water body, most farmers share common canals, and 
therefore assume this risk.
4.1.3 Government Schemes
In March 1991, Government Order MS. 199(Fish II) officially set up the 
government land allotment, subsidy and leasing scheme in Andhra Pradesh. In 
1991, government owned land was allotted to aquaculture entrepreneurs 
according to the following annual per hectare guidelines: (1) fishermen co­
operatives were eligible for up to a maximum of 2 hectares per member at Rs. 10; 
(2) self-employed technocrats were eligible for up to 4 hectares at Rs. 20; (3) 
progressive entrepreneurs and both privately and publicly financed companies 
were eligible for up to 40 hectares at Rs. 50.14 By 1993, however, the annual 
government lease arrangements were revised to reflect the success of government 
initiatives promoting shrimp farming and to generate greater government income. 
The new arrangements were revised as a result of strong profits realised by 
shrimp farmers. As of December 1996, the new per hectare annual rates were as 
follows: (1) fishermen co-operative quotas were reduced to 1 hectare per family 
at Rs. 500; (2) self-employed technocrats were eligible for up to 10 hectares at 
Rs. 5,000; (3) private and public corporations were eligible for up to 100 hectares 
at a minimum of Rs. 5,000.
As of November 1994, the government land allotment and subsidy 
scheme had benefited a minority 164 shrimp farmers for a total of 2,359 hectares 
of government land in Andhra Pradesh. In Nellore district alone, 153.5 hectares 
had been allotted to fishermen co-operatives; 172 hectares to technocrats and 640 
hectares to corporate entrepreneurs or 965.5 hectares in total (Rastogi, 1995). 
This amounted to 41 percent of the total land area allotted in Andhra Pradesh. In 
this respect, Nellore was by far, the most well endowed district in the state.
14 Progressive entrepreneurs are defined as those farmers who would bring “scientific” farming 
methods to the region by the BFDA.
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4.2 Land Conversion & Shrimp Farming
There is much debate over the impact of changing land use patterns on 
agricultural labour. Aquaculture Associations and organisations supporting the 
industry claim that mostly government classified wasteland is converted. They 
argue that wasteland is often left barren and is essentially unproductive for 
agriculture. Moreover, they argue that no labour is displaced since uncultivated 
land is primarily converted to shrimp farms. In contrast, NGOs claim that it is 
not wasteland, but agricultural land that is most often converted to shrimp ponds. 
They point out, and perhaps correctly, that once converted to shrimp ponds, 
former agricultural lands (even if converted back to agriculture) cease to be 
productive for agricultural crops as a result of high salinity. However, the 
literature is devoid of any rigorous attempt to discover the extent of land 
conversion, yet alone its implications. The next two sections attempt to do so by 
drawing on previously unpublished government data collected from government 
agencies located in Nellore city.
4,2.1 Extent of Land Conversion
Analysis of the Chief Planning Office’s (CPO) Agricultural Census data 
suggest that between 1991 and 1995, a combination of barren and uncultivable 
wasteland, agricultural land and pasture lands may have been converted to 
shrimp farms. Previous to 1991, the amount of barren and uncultivable 
wasteland in Nellore remained essentially constant at 60,122 hectares. The 1995 
census figure suggests that there was a drop of 2,063 hectares of wasteland or 
3.43 percent since 1991. Total agricultural land area fell 3.52 percent over the 
period and total pasture land area fell 13.51 percent. According to this census 
data, shrimp farms occupied approximately 2,745 hectares of district land in 
1995 or 2.08 percent of the district’s total land area.15 However, it is speculative
15 Kandaleru farms alone occupied 2,166 hectares o f land in 1997 (Patil & KAA Database, 1997).
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as to the proportion of wasteland, agricultural land, and pasture land converted to 
shrimp farms. More location-specific data is needed to accomplish this task.
Table 4.1 presents official statistics collected by the District Collector’s 
Office (DCO). The DCO survey identifies the number of shrimp farms in 
Nellore district by mandal, the amount of private agricultural dry-land and 
wetland, government owned land, forest area and salt pans converted to shrimp 
farms between 1990 and 1996. However, based on the total area under shrimp 
culture of just the 518 KAA farms and other official government statistics, it is 
clear that the DCO statistics reported below are most likely underestimates.16 
Nonetheless, these data give some indication of the trend and magnitude of land 
conversion in the district prior to 1996.
As per the records of the local DCO, 2,835 hectares of agricultural land 
and 65.7 hectares of salt pans have been converted to brackishwater shrimp 
ponds since 1990 (DCO, 1996). Of the 2,835 hectares of converted agricultural 
land, 74 percent (2,099.5 hectares) was contributed by dry-land where agriculture 
requires far less labour inputs (Acharya, 1992:170) and is allegedly less 
profitable (Krishnan et al., 1996). The conversion of 735 hectares of fertile 
agricultural wetland or 26 percent of all agricultural land converted is of some 
concern as this land has significant productive capacity. As a percentage of the 
total amount of land area in Nellore district, agricultural wet-land conversion is 
minimal at 0.2 percent. In order to protect India’s fertile agricultural land from 
conversion to shrimp ponds and as a result of mounting pressure from 
environmental NGOs, the Indian Supreme Court in 1994 passed a law to make 
this practice illegal.17
16 According to AD Fisheries and BFDA data, as o f 1995 approximately 5,424 hectares o f land 
are under shrimp farming. A total o f 3,755 hectares o f agricultural and government lands were 
converted. This leaves 1,669 hectares unaccounted for. We suggest that much o f this 
unaccounted land is most likely government classified wasteland.
17 Ministry o f Forestry & Fisheries Order XIV; April 1994.
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Table 4.1
Extent of Land Converted (by type) to Shrimp Farms (Hectares)
Mandal #
Shrimp
Farms*
Agricultural & Patta 
Lands Converted
Government Lands Converted Forest
Land
Salt Pans Total Land 
Converted
Wetland Dryland Unauthorised Authorised Total
Kavali 78 0 163.7 16.5 12.2 27.8 0 0 192.4
Bogulu 26 177.0 159.3 0 0 0 0 0 336.3
Allur 71 0 496.3 68.7 29.5 98.2 0 53.2 647.7
Vidavalur 66 22.7 16.6 0 0 0 0 12.6 51.8
Idukurapet 356 179.3 126.4 27.7 19.1 46.8 0 0 352.5
TP Gudur 22 0 365.8 0 6.1 6.1 0 0 371.9
Muthukur 276 27.1 175.3 71.2 0 71.2 0 0 273.6
Chillakur 189 3.1 0 73.8 3.2 77.0 0 0 80.1
Venkatach. 51 22.1 164.4 11.5 7.9 19.3 0 0 205.9
Manubolu 13 0 24.2 0 1.3 1.3 0 0 25.6
Kota 32 8.4 39.0 230.6 0 230.6 0 0 278.0
Chittamur 25 71.8 22.4 16.5 6.6 23.1 0 0 117.4
Vakadu 46 234.3 324.5 241.1 0 241.1 0 0 800.0
Tada 7 0 22.2 0 0 0 0 0 22.2
TOTAL 1,258 745.8 2100.2 757.6 85.9 843.5 0 65.7 3,755.3
source: 1996 District Collector Revenue Records, Nellore; *AD Fisheries, Nellore
By 1995, 844 hectares of government owned land had been converted to 
shrimp farms.18 However, almost 90 percent of it was unauthorised. This means 
that coastal land was encroached upon by entrepreneurs interested in cultivating 
shrimp. The type of land included in government owned land include wasteland, 
public access land, and pasture land. While almost 86 hectares of government 
owned wasteland was authorised for conversion, it is unclear as to how much of 
the unauthorised 844 hectares of government owned land was classified as 
wasteland. It is likely that a majority of the unauthorised government owned 
land came from public access, public pasture land and not agricultural land. This 
is simply because the government owns very little agricultural land along the 
coast.
Finally, the available data do not reveal the total amount of non­
agricultured private land converted to shrimp farms. This is hypothesised as 
making up the bulk of the land conversions taking place in the district.19
18 According to Rastogi (1996), 965 hectares of government owned wasteland was authorised for 
conversion in Nellore district by 1996. See section 4.1.3 for greater detail and discussion.
19 This hypothesis is offered based on the changing pattern of land use along the Kandaleru 
observed during field research. In addition, topographical maps made available by the LRO 
indicate that land located next to the Kandaleru river is classified as either wasteland (i.e. barren 
and uncultivable) or pasture land. Very little land located adjacent to any o f the district’s 
brackishwater rivers appear to be agricultural land. Global Information Systems (GIS) data, 
however may prove otherwise. Indian GIS data, however is classified. Repeated attempts to
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However, in absence of more refined and reliable data, it is not possible to 
explore this any further.
The DCO data while providing a detailed breakdown on the amount of 
productive lands converted in Nellore district does not in itself reveal whether a 
rural crisis exists as a result of conversion. Economic theory suggests that 
rational agents will convert agricultural land when the expected returns of shrimp 
farming outweigh the current returns of farming agricultural produce. In itself, 
conversion may not be a serious problem as long as farmers fully engaged in 
agriculture fill any slack in agricultural output as a result of those exiting 
agriculture and entering shrimp farming. However, in a poor country like India, 
converting prime agricultural land is tragic. Leaving aside the possible 
environmental consequences of a massive shift to shrimp farming, activists claim 
that the conversion of both agricultural and non-agricultural lands to shrimp 
farms will reduce employment opportunities for local populations.20 In the next 
section, the hypothesis, that traditional agriculture and agricultural labour have 
been displaced since the advent of shrimp farming, is examined with respect to 
district, mandal and local level data.
4.3 Land Use & Employment in Nellore
It is well known that a shift in land use patterns could involve a change in 
direct and indirect employment opportunities (Pal, 1995). Several studies 
conducted by Indian NGOs have alleged that shifts from primary agricultural 
activities to shrimp farming reduce the output of primary crops such as rice, ragi 
and salt and ultimately adversely affect poor rural populations through job loss 
and even starvation (PREPARE, 1996).21 The Indian Supreme Court agrees to 
some degree (Supreme Court Notification, 1996:20). This research, however,
attain satellite topographical imagery from the National Remote Sensing Agency was denied for 
this reason.
20 A review o f the available literature is presented and discussed in Chapter One.
21 These studies are simulations and not case studies based on field data.
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scrutinises this claim. Although many authors have argued that both direct and 
indirect local labour would be displaced from the agricultural sector if shrimp 
cultivation replaced primary crop production, no empirical study to date has 
rigorously addressed this assertion for India.
Direct employment levels in agriculture can be measured by the number 
of cultivators (owner cultivators and tenant farmers) operating in the district. 
Indirect employment can be measured by the amount of additional labour hired 
by owner cultivators. Overall, direct and indirect employment and output yields 
would be affected if the district-wide number of cultivators and net sown area 
declined over the period (1991-1996). Generally, a decline in the net sown area 
would indicate that fewer labourers were needed for on-farm agricultural 
activities. If this were found to be true, the results could support two plausible 
conclusions: (i) that local agriculture became increasingly capital intensive over 
the period and thus displaced labour, or (ii) to some extent, shrimp farming (in 
conjunction with other recently introduced activities, or alone) is actually 
displacing traditional agricultural land and labour. This research seeks a 
reasonable answer to the question whether coastal communities are indeed facing 
a significant exodus away from agricultural production to shrimp culture as 
NGOs fear. Moreover, this research examine whether there is any evidence of 
significant declines in agricultural land use and on-farm employment between 
1990 and 1995.22
4.3.1 Analysis o f District Level Data
Examination of the CPO’s Agricultural Census data (1990-1995) reveals 
that the overall negative impacts on employment of agriculture land conversion 
to ponds is perhaps overstated in the literature. Table 4.2 presents the total 
number of cultivators and the area they cultivated from 1991 to 1995 in Nellore 
district. These data suggest that since 1990 the overall net sown area for Nellore 
district has remained relatively constant over the period. Overall, the net sown
22 These two indices are strictly comparable as the net sown area was almost identical in 1990 as 
to that area sown in 1995 (see Table 4.2).
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area in 1995-1996 is marginally lower than in 1993-1994 which is the maximum 
for the period under consideration. Any fluctuation over the period follows the 
current and other fallow trend suggesting no deviation from historical cropping 
patterns over the five years.23 In fact, the number of owner-cultivators and tenant 
farmers increased by 5,503 over the period. This is most likely due to division of 
private family owned land through bequests. This well known pattern in Andhra 
Pradesh is documented in case studies presented in the Indian Journal of 
Agriculture (1996) and in an in depth analysis of several agricultural 
communities reported in CDS (1993).
An index of total cultivators operating per hectare of sown area (see Table 
4.2) suggests that the number of workers per cultivated hectare has shown an 
overall net increase from 0.425 to 0.445 between 1990 and 1995. This increasing 
trend suggests that more primary labour inputs are utilised for the same unit area 
of cultivated land in the district. Overall, at the district level, the CPO data 
suggest that during its boom, shrimp aquaculture development has had little 
impact on agricultural land and labour use at a district level of analysis. But, 
does the same relationship hold true for those mandals most intensively involved 
in shrimp farming? This is explored next.
Table 4.2
Net Sown Area (HA) & Total Number of Cultivators in Nellore (1990-1995)
District Wide 
Analysis
1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995
T o t a l
C u l t iv a t o r s
48,421 54,448 54,617 54,617 50,650
N e t  S o w n  
A r e a  (HA)
113,845.5 115,026.5 116,184.8 112,171.6 113,851.6
*  IN D EX 0.425 0.473 0.470 0.487 0.445
source: CPO (1996); Author’s calculations
♦Total cultivators per net sown hectare o f agricultural land; the index is essentially normalised by 
land since the net sown area was essentially constant between 1990-1991 and 1994-1995 seasons.
23 The net sown area, current and other fallow land variables in the CPO time series are 
negatively correlated for each year but not significant. This is supported by the historical 
relationship between area sown and fallow area in any given year which follows the same pattern 
(see Acharya, 1992).
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4.3.2 Analysis of Mandal Level Data
CPO data suggest that shrimp farms occupy approximately 2.08 percent 
of the total land area in Nellore district. However, the proportion of total land 
area occupied by shrimp farms significantly varies by mandal. Indukurpet is by 
far, the district’s largest shrimp farming mandal. According to BFDA estimates, 
Indukurpet shrimp farms occupy 1,326 hectares of land, amounting to 7.3 percent 
of that mandal’s total land area. It is also the mandal most intensively farming 
shrimp since it is the mandal with the highest proportion of total land area 
engaged in shrimp cultivation. Basic statistical tests suggest that mandals more 
intensively farming shrimp (i.e. those mandals with a higher percent of the total 
area under shrimp culture) have positive and significant correlation with the total 
area under shrimp culture.24 The question remains, are the mandals most 
intensively farming shrimp likely to be equated with low labour use per net sown 
area? This research suggests not.
An index of total cultivators operating per hectare of sown area for each 
mandal between 1990 and 1995 is presented in Table 4.3. The district wide 
analysis described earlier reveals that the number of workers per cultivated 
hectare has shown an overall net increase over the period. Next, it is possible to 
examine whether a similar pattern exists at the mandal level. All Nellore district 
mandals engaged in shrimp farming are divided into two categories, those most 
intensively farming shrimp (i.e. those six mandals with shrimp farms occupying 
greater than 2.0 percent of the available land area) and mandals least intensively 
farming shrimp (i.e. those six mandals with shrimp farms occupying less than 2.0 
percent of the available land area) and compared.
24 The correlation coefficient is 0.97 and significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level.
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Table 4.3
Area Under Shrimp Farming in Nellore District Mandals (1995)
Mandals Area Under 
Shrimp Culture (HA)
% o f total land area 
under shrimp culture
m andals most
intensively engaged in
shrim p farm ing
Kavali NC NC
Bogolu 332.1 2.02
Allur 632.2 3.21
Vidavalur 503.8 3.18
Indukurpet 1,326.4 7.30
T.P.Gudur 794.6 4.33
Muthukur 450.4 2.62
m andals least
intensively engaged in
shrim p farm ing
Venkatachalam 152.3 0.52
Manubolu 135.7 0.56
Chillakur 547.6 1.65
Kota 47.0 0.25
Vakadu 396.1 1.78
Chittamur 106.5 0.38
D.V.Satram NC NC
Tada NC NC
Patil & BFDA Database, 1996; NC means not calculated due to a lack o f data
Three of the six most intensive shrimp farming mandals, Bogolu, Allur 
and Indukurpet mandals show an average index decline of 0.072 between 1990 
and 1995 (see Table 4.4). The indices of the three remaining intensive shrimp 
farming mandals rose an average of 0.092 over the same period. Overall, the 
relationship between the overall change in the index and the percentage of land 
area in each of these six mandals wets not found to be significantly different from 
zero at the ten percent level.25 An almost identical pattern is found for the six 
least land intensive shrimp farming mandals in the district.26 In fact, taking the 
top four most land intensive mandals under shrimp farming, the relationship 
between the percentage area under culture and labour use intensity index is 
slightly positive and significant.27 Therefore, based on mandal level data, it is
25 The correlation coefficient is r= 0.086 with p= 0.86
26 The correlation coefficient is r= 0.085 with p= 0.87
27 The correlation coefficient is r= 0.04;with p= 0.95
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possible to conclude that the amount of agricultural land and labour being 
displaced by shrimp farming is not significantly different from zero. In fact, the 
data supports the finding that in the most intensive shrimp farming mandals, the 
labour use per net sown area between 1990 and 1995 has actually significantly 
increased.
Table 4.4
Labour Use Intensity Index*
mandal 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 change
Kavali 0.397 0.487 0.465 0.510 0.500 0.103
Bogolu 0.559 0.502 0.481 0.523 0.547 -0.013
Allur 0.665 0.447 0.358 0.481 0.480 -0.185
Vidavalur 0.322 0.357 0.459 0.461 0.410 0.088
Indukurpet 0.478 0.448 0.423 0.459 0.459 -0.019
T.P.Gudur 0.282 0.418 0.539 0.431 0.460 0.179
Muthukur 0.444 0.543 0.603 0.529 0.453 0.009
Venkatachalam 0.473 0.600 0.420 0.599 0.649 0.176
Manubolu 0.126 0.433 0.531 0.426 0.418 0.292
Chillakur 0.321 0.593 0.497 0.540 0.687 0.366
Kota 0.479 0.517 0.390 0.487 0.456 -0.023
Vekadu 0.586 0.405 0.504 0.451 0.410 -0.175
Chittamur 0.486 0.456 0.424 0.446 0.340 -0.146
D.V.Satram 0.529 0.448 0.525 0.442 0.449 -0.080
Tada 0.347 0.531 0.525 0.508 0.509 0.163
♦total cultivators per net sown hectare o f agricultural land 
source: BFDA Data, 1996
4.4 On-Farm Employment
There is a large empirical literature on the Indian rural labour market. It 
is characterised by the prevalence of personal ties between employers and 
employees and distinctive in its characteristics between permanent (regular) and 
temporary (casual) employment, duration of both types of employment and with 
respect to wage and non-wage benefits (Rudra, 1982; Bardhan, 1984; 
Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1984; Reddy, 1985; Dreze & Mukherjee, 1987). 
These relationships, however, are entirely based on agricultural studies. Much 
less is known, yet alone documented regarding the labour requirements, 
characteristics and contracts of shrimp farms. This section discusses each of 
these in turn with respect to primary farm level survey data collected from a 
sample of 82 Kandaleru shrimp farmers. Specifically, the hypothesis that fewer
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labour inputs are required in cultivating one sown hectare of rice as opposed to 
culturing one water spread hectare of shrimp is examined.
The structure of this investigation of on-farm employment in the 
aquaculture sector is as follows: Section 4.4.1 presents some stylised facts 
characterising the traditional seasonal rural labour market in India. These 
characteristics are compared with lesser known employment patterns in the 
emerging shrimp farming sector. Section 4.4.2 presents an overview of the 
production cycle in shrimp farming. This includes the pond preparation phase, 
culture period, and harvest season. The duration of each phase is examined. 
Section 4.4.3 examines the characteristics of labour use in the production cycle. 
It illustrates that each phase in the production cycle requires a different mix of 
labour inputs and labour requirements also vary by farm size and culture 
intensity. Section 4.4.4. briefly discusses female-male participation rates for 
each phase of the production cycle. Section 4.4.5 surveys the labour 
requirements of shrimp farms. Specifically, the use of temporary labour inputs 
are distinguished from the amount of permanent labour hired. Similarly, a 
distinction is made between hired and family labour employed. Finally, section 
4.4.6 compares the amount of unskilled labour employed in six primary 
agricultural crops with the estimated labour requirements of shrimp aquaculture.
4.4.1 Characterising the Indian Rural Labour Market
According to the vast literature comprised of case studies, large Indian 
agricultural farms hire permanent workers for the duration of the production year, 
especially in paddy and cotton cultivation. They tend to be involved in activities 
such as soil preparation, fertilisation and irrigation (Agarwal, 1981; Reddy, 
1995). Casual or temporary workers are usually hired for activities such as 
transplanting, weeding and harvesting (Reddy, 1995). In addition, temporary 
casual workers tend to work for fewer hours per day than permanent workers and 
are rarely asked to perform non-agricultural tasks, unlike permanent workers. 
The daily wage for permanent workers is usually less than the daily casual 
workers’ wage. However, due to the nature of each contract, the annual
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permanent workers’ wage may be higher than the annual wage of a casual worker 
(Sanghvi, 1969; Ghose, 1980; Basant, 1984).
The seasonal nature of agricultural production plays an important role in 
the choice of rural labour contracts. Several studies find that employers offer 
some regular labour contracts at the beginning of the agricultural year in order to 
ensure a ready supply of labour at the needed times. In addition, recruitment 
costs are reduced and wage fluctuations are minimised over the slack and peak 
periods (Bardhan, 1984; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1985a; Guha, 1989; Dasgupta, 
1993). Similar contracts are thought to be made in the shrimp farming sector too.
Based on the vast literature characterising rural labour contracts, Pal 
(1995:4) suggests three stylised facts. First, agricultural labour can be 
characterised by the seasonal nature o f production and employment. Given the 
seasonal fluctuations of agricultural production over the peak and slack periods 
(Bardhan, 1984; Mukherjee, 1991), labour demand is low in the slack season so 
that seasonal idleness of regular labour is an important consideration for farms 
(Guha, 1989). Second, given a high degree of inequality in the distribution of 
land and non-land resources, only a few farms are large while a majority of the 
farms are small or medium. Usually larger farms hire permanent workers while 
smaller farms primarily rely on casual labourers (Basant, 1984; Walker & Ryan, 
1990). Thus there is some degree of heterogeneity o f farms. Third, the daily 
wage bill of permanent workers is lower than that of temporary workers 
(Sanghvi, 1969; Ghose, 1980; Basant, 1984). However, permanent labour also 
receives non-wage benefits such as access to credit, homestead land and bonuses 
(Binswanger et. al., 1984; Alexander, 1973). Therefore, there exist permanent- 
temporary wage and non-wage differentials.
Little is known about the employment patterns in shrimp farming. 
Against the backdrop of the stylised facts for agriculture, the on-farm labour 
requirements of shrimp farming are examined. The empirical investigation 
begins with an examination of labour use over the shrimp farm production cycle. 
Throughout this analysis, labour use is categorised primarily by the size of land 
holding as opposed to the culture technology adopted. This is a result of earlier 
analysis which suggests that the correlation coefficient between farm size and
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stocking density (a proxy for capital intensive technology) is strongly positive 
and significant.
4.4.2 The Production Cycle
There are three important phases in the shrimp production cycle, namely, 
pond preparation, the culture period and pond harvest period. In the pond 
preparation phase (phase 1), bunds are repaired, the pond floor is weeded and 
cleaned and brackish water is pumped into the pond. In the culture period (phase 
2), each pond is stocked with seed and the daily feeding process begins until the 
shrimp fry grow to maturity.28 In the harvest period (phase 3), ponds are drained 
and the shrimp are either scooped into nets or picked up off the pond floor and 
placed directly into baskets of flaked ice. The baskets are loaded onto 
refrigerated trucks which transport the harvest to peeling sheds for packaging, 
freezing and export. The pond preparation phase, culture period and harvesting 
period in shrimp farming is not dissimilar to the soil preparation, growing period, 
and harvesting season corresponding to agriculture.
In the Kandaleru region, the culture cycle occurs between two to three 
times each year. The number of annual crops depends on a mix of geographic 
factors and the type of production technology adopted. For example, more 
capital intensive shrimp farms tend to produce three crops per year while less 
capital intensive farms may culture twice (Patil & KAA Database, 1997b). Farm 
location can also restrict the number of annual crops cultured since shrimp farms 
depend on relatively constant water salinity concentrations. Fluctuations in water 
salinity are often fatal to the crop. Sea-based shrimp farms have steady access to 
a water supply with a relatively constant salt concentration. On the other hand, 
inland creek-based farms are more susceptible to fluctuations in the salt content 
of the creek as a result of seasonal tidal fluctuations. Location along the creek is 
therefore important.
28 Seed in shrimp farming refers to shrimp fiy; the harvest weight o f mature shrimp is 
approximately thirty-five grams.
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Farms located further upstream (further from the sea) are also found to 
culture fewer times per year than their downstream counterparts. In fact, a clear 
majority of creek-based farms operating further than twenty kilometres from the 
Bay of Bengal operate on a two crop per year cycle.29 In these areas, the first 
production cycle begins in mid-January and ends in early June. The second 
production cycle begins in July and ends prior to the annual monsoon in 
November.
Duration o f Production Phases
The reported duration of each phase in the production cycle also varies 
with farm size and production intensity. Overall, mean duration of each 
production phase increases with farm size.30 Both duration and farm size are 
significantly and positively correlated with the number of ponds per farm with 
the exception of duration of phase 2 and farm size which is not significant. This 
suggests that on average larger farms require a greater number of days for pond 
preparation and harvest activities, despite greater per hectare labour inputs 
employed.
However, the reported duration of the culture phase increases with farm 
size and total number of ponds only because at most, two ponds are harvested 
daily in larger farms.31 Although ponds are ready to be harvested, they must 
continue to be maintained as required by the culture process until management 
decides to harvest them. This translates into a longer reported culture duration 
for larger farms. To obtain a more accurate estimate of the mean duration of the 
culture phase in isolation, the number of days required for the harvest period is 
subtracted from the number of days required for the culture period. The revised 
mean duration of each of the three phases is presented in Table 4.5 below.
29 Patil & KAA Database, 1997
30 Patil & KAA Database, 1997
31 Results are based on data provided by 38 large and corporate shrimp farms surveyed in the 82 
farm sample.
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Table 4.5
Duration of Shrimp Production Phases (in days)
PHASE 1 
Pond Preparation Phase
PHASE 2 
Culture Period
PHASE 3 
Harvest Period
Size, S 
(WSA) Mean, SD, Min, Max Mean, SD, Min, Max Mean, SD, Min, Max
marginal
S<1
7 0 7 7 127.5 17.7 105 130 1.5 0.71 1 2
small 
1< S< 2
7 0 7 7 127.2 10 110 140 3.1 0.78 2 4
medium 
2 < S< 5
7 0.2 6.5 7.5 121.0 12.4 105 150 5.1 1.9 2 10
large 
5< S<10
7.1 0.4 6 8 118.2 19.8 90 185 7.7 1.8 5 11
corporate 
10 < S
8.1 1.1 7 9.9 107.1 26.7 90 165 16.9 8.8 6.7 32
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b
The duration in days of the preparation and harvest phases is therefore 
positive and significantly correlated with farm size and technology at the one 
percent level. The mean revised duration of the culture phase is now negatively 
correlated with both farm size and technology and significant at the five percent 
level. These results yield more accurate approximations and correspond to the 
conventional wisdom of the sector.32
4.4.3 Characteristics of Labour Use in the Production Cycle
Each phase in the production cycle requires labour to engage in different 
tasks. The pond preparation phase can require both manual and machine labour. 
The culture phase can require manual, semi-skilled, and skilled labour. However, 
this depends on the productive intensity employed by the farmer. The harvest 
period requires manual and semi-skilled labour. The characteristics of labour use 
in each phase of the production cycle are discussed next.
The pond preparation phase, requires manual labour inputs and begins 
after each season’s monsoon. The bi-annual monsoon season washes away 
bunds and reduces the effectiveness of shared canals. Farms require unskilled
32 The conventional wisdom in the shrimp farming sector is based on findings from the 1995 
Asian Productivity Organisation conference on shrimp culture and the more recent FAO/World 
Bank technical meeting which brought experts from all over the world to discuss issues facing 
Asian shrimp farming.
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manual labour for general earthworks and bund preparation during this phase 
which begins after the last rains. First, the pond is left to naturally dry out in the 
sun. Next, it is cleaned of any residue from the previous culture period. This 
means that any unconsumed feed that settled to the pond bottom during the 
previous culture period is removed. Bunds are repaired and drainage canals are 
strengthened. In larger farms, tractor time is often hired to mechanically prepare 
the ponds for culture.33 In the smallest farms, only manual labour is employed. 
Finally, the sluice gates are opened and water is allowed to fill the pond. After 
one day under observation, the pond is ready for shrimp culture.
The culture phase requires a mix of both skilled and unskilled labour. In 
larger farms, skilled technicians such as biologists, chemists and lab technicians 
are employed to test pond water quality and to ensure a clean aquatic 
environment with minimal bacterial infections. The bulk of the unskilled labour 
inputs required are feed boys responsible for feeding the shrimp three to eight 
times a day.34 A few unskilled workers from the pond preparation phase are 
retained for additional earthworks. Semi-skilled guards are hired to protect the 
crop from bird and human intrusion. Usually they are hired from outside the 
local community.35 However, only one third of those employed on farms greater 
than five hectares in size are hired from the local labour force.36 Farms over 5 
hectares tend to be public or private limited companies run by entrepreneurs from 
outside the local region. They tend to contract work for different phases from the 
pre-existing company work force. Small and marginal owner-operated farms 
tend to use own and family labour for many of these tasks. These farmers do not 
tend to employ capital intensive culture practices. Outside of feeding the crop 
several times daily and guarding, there is not much physical labour required. 
Medium size farms tend to hire local workers on an annual contract basis.37
33 Large and medium size farms always use hired tractor labour. Owners o f small size farms 
adjacent to each other will often band together and contract tractor time.
34 This is consistent with feeding practices in other shrimp farming districts in India (see APO, 
1995).
35 This became clear as a result o f informal discussions with farm hands.
36 Based on discussions with managers o f large and corporate farms and farm hands.
37 This is discussed in detail in Section 4.4.5.
134
The harvest period requires mostly semi-skilled labour to drain each 
pond, capture and collect the shrimp, and pack the harvest in ice. This research 
finds that small and marginal farmers rely on household labour for additional 
hands. Larger farms hire temporary workers to engage in harvest activities.38
4,4.4 Gender
Quite a lot is known about the gender composition of labour used in 
intensive shrimp farming and ancillary services as a result of three key studies. 
In a study of eight intensive shrimp farms, Hoon (1995) concludes that 
employment opportunities throughout the production cycle disproportionately 
favour men. This is a result of (i) corporate farms contracting labour from 
outside the region, and (ii) requiring labour to live on the farm for the duration of 
the season. Similar observations are made with respect to intensive Kandaleru 
farm labour. In contrast, studies conducted by Banerjee (1992), Baud (1992) and 
Hoon (1995) report that female participation is greater than male participation in 
pre-pond preparation and post-harvest phases (see Table 4.6). The pre-pond 
preparation stage includes collection of wild seed and sale to local shrimp 
farmers. Post-harvesting activities include peeling, processing and packaging 
shrimp for export.
Table 4.6
Gender Divisions in Shrimp Aquaculture Production Cycle
Phases in the Production Cycle Male, % Female, %
Pre-Production Stage: Collection of Wild Seed 18 82
Phase 1: Pond Preparation 74 26
Phase 2: Culture 85 15
Phase 3: Harvest 87 13
Post-Harvest Activities: Processing* 20 80
source: Hoon (1995); *Banerjee (1992); *Baud (1992)
38 Patil & KAA Database, 1997b; See Section 4.4.5 for discussion.
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Data on participation by gender for smaller farms using less intensive 
technology was not collected in any of the three published studies, nor this one. 
However, according to discussions with small and marginal farmers, it is clear 
that female participation is required during the pond preparation and harvest 
periods. Small and marginal farmers rely almost exclusively on household 
labour during these periods.39 This means that small and marginal farmers require 
females in the household to help repair bunds and at the end of the season, 
harvest the crop. It is likely, therefore, that non-corporate and smaller farms 
engage a higher proportion of women in each of the production cycles than the 
large and corporate farms. However, male workers as a percentage of the total 
work-force most likely dominate female participation rates.
4.4.5 A Survey of Labour Requirements
The average daily labour requirements needed for each production phase 
rise with farm size and production intensity (see Table 4.7). Larger farms are 
found to require greater daily labour inputs and therefore greater overall labour 
inputs (in person-days) across all three production phases (see Table 4.8).
Table 4.7
Average Daily Farm Labour Requirements (number of workers)
Size, S (WSA)
PHASE 1 
Pond Preparation Phase 
no tractor* 
tractor aided
PHASE 2 
Culture Period
PHASE 3 
Harvest Period
marginal
S<1
*2.0 1.0 3.0
small
1<S<2
*3.0
1.0
1.0 3.0
medium 
2 <S<5
2.3 3.2 4.1
large
5<S<10
4.6 7.3 6.7
corporate 
10 <S
14.5 25.6 9.9
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b
39 More detail regarding participation by gender is unavailable and therefore beyond the scope of 
this research.
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Table 4.8
Average Total Labour Inputs Required (person-days) 
per Farm in Each Production Phase
Size, S 
(WSA)
# Farms PHASE 1: pond prep 
no tractor* 
tractor aided
PHASE 2: culture PHASE 3:harvest
marginal
S<1
4 *14.0 117.5 4.5
small 6 *21.0 125.0 9.0
1<S<2 4 7.0 123.8 9.8
medium 
2 <S<5
34 16.3 400.1 21.6
large
5<S<10
21 32.7 965.5 52.3
corporate 
10 <S
13 116 3,760.0 211
source: Pati & KAA Database, 1997b
The average daily labour requirements are progressively larger for larger 
farms in each phase with the exception of the pond preparation phase with no 
tractor support. When tractors are used to aid small and marginal farmers in 
earthworks, fewer daily labour inputs are required. The fact that only farms of 
the smallest size forgo tractor support suggests that marginal farmers who cannot 
afford to hire a tractor substitute it for family labour. However, small and 
marginal farmers that did use tractor inputs often jointly hired tractor inputs. 
Similar behaviour was noted for medium size farmers.40 Unlike in agriculture, 
Bullock labour is not engaged in preparing the shrimp pond since ploughing is 
not required. Shrimp farming does not require ploughing of any kind. General 
earthworks and bund preparation can only be accomplished using manual labour 
or tractor inputs. Shrimp farming is unique in this respect.
Intensity o f Labour Use
To construct partial productivity ratios for labour use in each phase, the 
average total labour requirements in person-days for each farm is divided by the
40 The average work gained from one tractor is equivalent to between seven to fourteen person- 
days o f human labour in this sector. Chapter 5 points out that farms using tractor inputs are 
more technically efficient than those that do not.
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farm’s water spread area in hectares. Labour input requirements (in person-days) 
per common unit farm area are thus determined without the farm size influencing 
the outcome. The results are presented in Figure 4.0 and suggest that excluding 
marginal farmers without access to tractor inputs and the largest farms most 
intensively producing shrimp, total farm labour requirements increase with farm 
size and production intensity, keeping land size constant.
Capital intensive farms are generally found to be overall more labour 
intensive too per unit cropping area. However, the largest farms in the sample 
are found to use on average the same amount of labour in person-days per hectare 
than medium size farms. This suggests that the most capital intensive shrimp 
farms are moderately labour intensive. The mean trend is depicted by the black 
line in the diagram below.
Figure 4.0
Total Labour Requirements (person-days per water 
spread hectare) for 83 KAA Sample Shrimp Farms
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The generally increasing trend of total labour inputs in person-days per 
hectare of culture area is influenced predominantly by labour requirements 
needed during the culture period. Labour inputs needed during this phase are 
approximately 88 percent of the average total labour requirements while pond
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preparation and harvest periods require only 6.5 percent and 5.5 percent of the 
average total labour requirements respectively. Labour requirements for pond 
preparation fall from 20.8 person-days per hectare for marginal farmers to 
roughly 5 person-days per hectare for farms greater than two water spread 
hectares.
Average labour requirements for the harvest period clearly increase with 
farm size and intensity. This is most likely a result of the fact that shrimp are a 
perishable good that need to be harvested quickly and packed in flaked ice to 
ensure high quality. Since the actual harvest is not automated, larger farmers 
tend to hire additional labour for this phase. A detailed breakdown of labour 
requirements is presented in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9 
Total Labour Requirements 
(person-days per water spread hectare)
Size, S 
(WSA) N
PHASE 1: pond prep 
no tractor* 
tractor aided
PHASE 2: culture PHASE 3: harvest
S<1 4 20.8* 167.7 6.2
1<S<2 6 14.4* 85.7 6.1
4 3.8 66.3 5.2
2 <S<5 33 5.0 119.7 6.7
5<S<10 21 5.1 148.2 8.2
10 <S 15 5.4 161.9 9.6
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b; N is the number o f observations per category
Returns on Labour
Output per person-day is found to increase with technology intensity and 
farm size despite the fact that person-days per water spread hectare increases with 
farm size and intensity (Table 4.10).41 Extensive farms produce approximately
4.1 kilograms per person-day of labour whereas intensive farms produce more 
than 3.5 times more at 14.6 kilograms per person-day.
41 In Chapter 3 it was shown that labour use per water spread hectare increases at a decreasing 
rate between small and large farms after which it increases at an increasing rate.
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Table 4.10
Returns to Labour (y kgs/wsha/person-day)
Technology N Average Farm Size (wsa) Output in kilograms per person-day
Extensive 38 3.37 4.10
Modified Extensive 22 5.09 5.19
Semi-Intensive 13 8.06 9.14
Intensive 9 38.6 14.60
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b
Permanent vs Temporary Employment
The labour contracts used in shrimp farming are not dissimilar to those 
used in agriculture. In this section the labour demand and supply mix for the 
KAA sample is discussed. On the demand side, the quantity of permanent and 
temporary employment needed by shrimp farms is estimated. On the supply 
side, the proportion of labour provided by family versus hired inputs from the 
local work force is estimated.
The demand for permanent and temporary workers for the 82 KAA farm 
sample varies by farm size. In total, approximately 438 unskilled workers from 
the local work force were employed or self-employed for approximately 7.2 days 
each in the pond preparation phase of the production cycle; 214 workers from 
the local work force were employed or self-employed for an average of 129 days 
in the culture period42; while for the harvest season, 478 semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers from the local work force were employed for an average of
8.02 days.
Permanent employment is available to approximately 214 individuals for 
an average of 144 days per crop cycle or 288 days per year for the 82 KAA farm 
sample. Of the 214 permanent workers, twelve are estimated to be self-employed 
small or marginal farmers (owner-operators) using mostly their own and family 
labour. Thus, approximately 202 permanent workers are hired from the local
42 O f the total 668 workers employed during this phase, only one third o f the workers employed 
on farms o f size five hectares or greater are from the local work force. Thus, the total estimated 
number o f local workers employed from the rural labour market during this phase is 214.
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work force. This is approximately 2.43 permanent workers per farm employed 
from the local work force in the sample.43
Temporary seven day employment per crop cycle or fourteen days 
annually is available for 224 workers during pond preparation and 264 workers 
for an average duration of eight days during harvest periods or sixteen days per 
year. This is temporary employment for 2.7 local workers per farm during the 
preparation phase and 3.18 local temporary workers per farm during the harvest 
period.
Hired vs Family Labour
The primary survey of 82 shrimp farms was not designed to isolate the 
actual amount of labour inputs hired from the local work force. Moreover, the 
responses to the survey questions do not distinguish whether additional workers 
are hired for a wage or are a member of the farmer’s household, and therefore not 
paid a wage. It is possible to approximate the amount of hired labour, however, 
using some well known assumptions about the rural labour market and the results 
of semi-structured interviews of shrimp farmers. In this analysis, the following 
assumptions are therefore made. First, this analysis assumes that incremental 
labour used in small and marginal farms is provided by raising the labour 
participation within the cultivating household. With larger farms using more 
intensive technology, the incremental labour is provided by hired hands.44 This is 
not unlike traditional Indian agricultural crops which follow this pattern 
(Acharya, 1992: 169).
Survey data suggest that 49 percent of KAA farms are less than two 
hectares of water spread area in size and owned and operated by small and 
marginal shrimp farmers. The assumption that self-employed owner-operators 
that predominantly use extensive culture technology almost always use family 
labour for pond preparation and harvest phases of the production cycle, is not
43 Since 214 permanent workers are needed for the culture phase which is o f largest duration, it 
is assumed that these workers are hired in the first and third phases too.
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unreasonable.45 Moreover, larger farms greater than two water spread hectares by 
contrast are assumed to rely on hired temporary and permanent hands for all three 
phases of the production cycle (see Table 4A.1 in the Appendix).
Based on the above mentioned set of assumptions and extrapolation, the 
following labour inputs were needed by the 518 KAA shrimp farms during the 
second crop cycle of 1996. The 518 KAA farms offered permanent employment 
for 1,162 workers from the local work force. Of the 1,162 permanent jobs, 290 
or twenty-five percent are estimated as self-employed owner-operators. Thus, 
872 individuals or seventy-five percent were hired directly from the local labour 
force for permanent annual employment.46 This amounts to approximately 2.24 
total permanent workers per KAA farm employed from the local work force of 
which 1.68 were permanent hired workers.
4.4.6 Employment in Agriculture vs Aquaculture
In Table 4.11 we compare the amount of unskilled labour employed in six 
primary crops grown in Andhra Pradesh with the estimated labour requirements 
of shrimp aquaculture. Crop specific figures show that sugarcane, paddy and 
shrimp employ more labour inputs per hectare cropping area than groundnut, 
jowar, moong and urad in Andhra Pradesh. The high labour use in certain crops 
is highly correlated with the fact that these crops are grown under irrigated or 
high rainfall conditions; crops requiring fewer labour inputs per sown hectare are 
grown under relatively dry conditions (Acharya, 1992:170).
44 Based on discussions with farmers of all sizes in Bestapalem and Tikkavaram shrimp farming 
region.
45 Based on informal interviews with small and marginal farmers.
46 This assumption is based on the answer to the question: how many individuals work on your 
farm during the culture period (include yourself)? Each of the farmers operating on areas less 
than two water spread hectares in size answered “ 1” suggesting that they are the farm’s sole 
permanent employee.
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Table 4.11
A Comparison of TOTAL and HIRED Labour Inputs per Crop 
_______ for Seven Crops Cultivated in Andhra Pradesh
Agricultural Total Unskilled Labour Inputs Hired Unskilled Labour Inputs
Crop (person-days per sown hectare) (person-days per sown hectare)
Paddy 173.56 142.95
Jo war 57.73 38.9
Sugarcane 359.63 320.81
Moong 62.39 44.59
Urad 47.52 38.49
Groundnut 98.59 76.14
♦Shrimp 149.5947 134.0948
*Patil & KAA Database, 1997b; 1980-1990 Cost o f Cultivation Survey data o f 9,000 farms
compiled by Acharya (1992).
According to survey data, Shrimp culture utilises on average, 149.59 total 
person-days per hectare per season of which 134.09 person-days are hired labour 
inputs.49 This is a close third to paddy cultivation which requires on average 
173.63 total person-days per season of which 142.95 person-days are locally 
hired labour inputs. Labour inputs for paddy and shrimp can be directly 
compared as both are bi-annual crops. Our estimate suggests that there is a 
difference of 23.56 person-days per hectare per crop or 47 person-days per 
hectare per year labour use difference between paddy and rice farming. This 
further suggests that converted paddy land to shrimp farming does indeed imply a 
loss of employment per sown hectare in Andhra Pradesh. However, the same 
may not be said about other agricultural crops or agriculture in general.
47 Calculated from summing total person-days per water spread area for each o f the farms in our 
sample and dividing by 82, the number of shrimp farms in the KAA sample. This figure is the 
average total labour-days o f input required per water spread hectare.
48 This figure is calculated by summing total person-days per water spread hectare for all farms 
greater or equal to 2 hectares o f water spread area and dividing by 82, the total shrimp farms in 
the sample. Based on semi-structured interviews o f the KAA sample and well known 
assumptions about the rural labour force, the following assumptions can be made: All farms 
greater than two water spread hectares in size use hired labour only. Owners o f these farms serve 
as managers and not labourers. This is in contrast to farms under two water spread hectares in 
size where owner-operators serve as workers.
49 This is based on shrimp farms culturing two times per year and amounts to 80 percent o f the 
total labour inputs required by all farms, on average.
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4.5 Conclusion
It is clear that shrimp farming has made some impact on the pattern of 
land use and consequently, employment opportunities for coastal inhabitants in 
the rural labour market. Fertile agricultural land, pasture and grazing areas and 
wasteland have each been converted to some degree for the purpose of shrimp 
farming. Land located directly adjacent to brackishwater rivers have in most 
cases been leased and sold by private agents or the government. In some cases, 
these areas have been encroached upon by shrimp entrepreneurs. Given the 
several thousand kilometers of coastal land, government enforcement has been 
difficult (BFDA, 1997). It is less clear, however, what direct impact shrimp 
farming has had on the number of owner-cultivators and tenant farmers engaged 
in agriculture at the district and mandal levels.
Primary data collected from a sample of Kandaleru shrimp farms suggest 
that shrimp farming requires fewer person-days of labour per year than rice 
farming. This finding supports the allegations made by NGOs and underscores 
the documentation presented before the Indian Supreme Court. However, since a 
minority of the total land area converted to shrimp farms is fertile agricultural 
land, the loss of employment to rural inhabitants may not be of little 
consequence. This is further supported by the fact that thousands of shrimp 
farms operating in the district have created rural employment opportunities 
available to local people where previously there were none.
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Appendix 4A
Table 4A.1
Total & Hired Unskilled/Semi-skilled Workers Employed 
from Local Workforce
PHASE I PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Production
Intensity
Mean
Size
(wsa)
Total Hired Total Hired Total Hired
Extensive* .6 23.3 0 175 0 5.0 0
Extensive5 3.45 6.8 0 123.1 0 7.2 0
Modified
Extensive
5.09 5.39 5.39 133.8 133.8 7.8 7.8
Semi-Intensive 8.06 5.11 5.11 141.6 141.6 6.9 6.9
Intensive 38.6 5.48 5.48 174.2 174.2 11.7 11.7
AVG 8.39 6.2 5.32 135.1 144.3 7.78 8.3
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997b; estimates based on KAA Survey responses and 
weighted by the number o f farms per category. Notes:a smallest two extensive farms; 
b all remaining extensive farms.
Table 4A.2
Total & Hired Unskilled and Semi-skilled Workers Employed from the 
Local Workforce & Average Duration of Phases
PHASE I PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Size, S N Total Hired Avg.
days
Total Hired Avg.
days
Total Hired Avg.
days
S<1 210 420 0 7 210 0 118 630 0 1.5
1<S<2 80 160 0 7 80 0 123 240 0 3.1
2 <S<5 139 323 0 7 442 0 124 570 0 5.1
5<S<10 54 251 251 7.1 131 131 129 362 362 7.7
10 <S 35 508 508 8.1 299 299 136 346 346 16.9
KAA 518 1,662 759 7.32 1,162 430 128 2,148 1,008 9.1
source: Patil & KAA Database, 1997a,b; N=number of farms ; workers for phases 1 & 
3 calculated by multiplying average daily labour requirements in number o f workers 
per phase for the 82 farm sample by N in each category. Phase 2 is calculated 
similarly except for categories of farm size greater or equal to five hectares. In this 
case, we took one third o f the total because large and corporate farms utilise 66 percent 
o f their own permanent labour who are brought in from outside the region.
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Part II
Evaluating Indian Shrimp Farm Performance
Introduction
The lack of information on productive efficiency and the environmental 
impacts of shrimp farms in India has become of major national importance as a 
result of the Indian Supreme Court’s December 1996 decision to ban the shrimp 
farming sector. The ban was a direct result of concerns raised over the impact of 
shrimp farming—in terms of its degradation of the environment and 
marginalization of local people from coastal resources. Subsequent to the 
Supreme Court ruling, the Indian parliament raised the issue of devising 
appropriate regulation of the sector to ensure its overall sustainable development. 
In this context, the 1997 Aquaculture Authority Act which calls for a special 
committee to devise guidelines for sustainable shrimp farming was approved by 
Parliament in March 1997.
In addition to questions raised regarding the nature and extent of 
environmental and socio-economic externalities of this sector, the recent 
parliamentary debate has raised equally important questions regarding the 
sustainability of shrimp farms under a variety of production methods. India’s 
coastal inhabitants have engaged in traditional paddy cum shrimp farming for 
centuries, unblemished by negative environmental or social consequences. 
Traditional shrimp farming methods are exempt from the ban. Extensive, 
modified extensive, semi-intensive and intensive farming practices are currently 
under review. The current belief is that more intensive methods of production 
are more likely to result in ecological disasters similar to those exhibited in other 
parts of the world. This is primarily because of over-stocking and consequently 
over-feeding.
It is simple to pollute the environment. Farmers push up intensity levels 
by raising stocking densities and feed inputs per unit pond area. Over-feeding in 
conjunction with high stocking densities can result in pollution of the delicate 
pond environment which ultimately leads to shrimp disease. A farmer facing 
disease is forced to either harvest early (if there is early enough detection of the
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disease) or ends up losing the entire crop. Either way, the polluted pond water is 
then discharged from the farm into a common waterway shared by all shrimp 
farmers in that location. This has two major consequences. First, polluted pond 
water is discharged into the “commons” and is used as fresh intake water by 
downstream shrimp farmers. This infects the downstream farmer’s crop. It is a 
classic upstream-downstream externality problem. Second, polluted discharge 
water pollutes the common waterway with dire consequences to plant and fish 
species and other marine biodiversity. In addition, there are spill-over effects to 
the local inhabitants who rely on these species as a source of food or income 
generating activities. Naturally, the Indian government is concerned. These 
concerns, however, are wanting in representative data and methodologically 
sound economic analysis.
By exploring the production methods of shrimp farmers it is possible to 
determine characteristics common to efficient farms. That is to say, which farms 
use the minimum combination of inputs to maximise output. Using a parametric 
approach to measure t farm efficiency, it is possible to determine which 
managerial practices may improve efficiency and those that may reduce it. 
However, in absence of panel data, it is only really possible to say what are the 
characteristics of efficient and inefficient farms at one snap-shot in time. 
Identification of the best practice farm size and issues of scale economies in the 
shrimp farming sector are equally important. For example, are larger farms 
generally more efficient than smaller farms, or do smaller farms have the 
advantage with respect to overall efficiency, and why? Finally, with non- 
parametric analysis it is possible to estimate which farms are over-stocking and 
over-feeding and by what quantity.1 This begs an answer to the following 
questions raised by policy makers: (i) Are farms which adopt less intensive 
culture methods more or less efficient than those engaged in more intensive 
practices? (ii) What is ultimately the relationship between efficiency and 
environmental sustainability? With respect to the current regulatory debates on 
brackishwater shrimp farming, answers to these questions are imperative if 
shrimp aquaculture is to develop along a sustainable path.
1 This is in relation to the theoretically most efficient combination o f the inputs.
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General Methodology, Model Estimation & Efficiency Measures
Technical efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to produce the maximum 
possible output from a given combination of inputs and technology—regardless of 
market demand and prices-with the production environment taken as given. The 
efficiency index is measured as the ratio of the observed output of a farm to the 
maximal potential output or frontier output by that farm given its cultivating 
environment. The reliability of this index therefore depends on accurately 
estimating the maximal potential output of a farm or the minimum input 
combination needed to produce a given level of farm output.
There are two primary methods used to estimate the efficiency of farms: a 
non-parametric approach called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA); and a 
parametric Frontier Production Function (FPF) approach (see Figure II). The 
choice of parametric or non-parametric models to measure farm efficiency depends 
on economic behavioural assumptions of both methods and data constraints. The 
efficiency indices generated by the parametric production frontier approach are 
obtained by estimating the best practice frontier using maximum likelihood 
techniques. The parametric approach has several advantages, including its capacity 
to provide significance tests for inputs and an overall goodness of fit for the model. 
One disadvantage of this approach is that the functional form may be incorrectly 
specified and therefore yield inappropriate efficiency indices.
The non-parametric frontier is deterministic in nature and constructed from 
a linear programming model. The model is capable of handling zeros in the input 
mix and does not include a disturbance term to capture noise. The efficient 
frontier is constructed from the solutions of each linear programming problem 
which minimises inputs in the production process for a given output level. The 
efficiency level of each farm is calculated relative to this frontier as the ratio of 
actual to potential performance. One clear advantage of the non-parametric model 
is its ability to separate scale effects from total efficiency. It also does not impose 
an arbitrary functional form. DEA results are however swayed by outliers and 
there are no significance tests for inputs or an overall measure for goodness of fit. 
Nonetheless, the model’s overall appeal is simply that it allows the comparison of 
each firm with a given input-output combination with others in the sector in 
different proportions. Given each method’s own restrictive assumptions, in this
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analysis of the efficiency of the Kandaleru region’s brackishwater shrimp farms, 
both methods are employed to fully explore the issue of efficiency.
First, a well navigated parametric approach to measuring technical 
inefficiency is discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, technical efficiency in 
Indian shrimp farm production is modelled, measured and explained by 
estimating a restricted Translog stochastic frontier production function on cross 
sectional data from 82 farms operating along the Kandaleru river during the 
second crop cycle of 1996. Maximum-likelihood methods are employed for the 
estimation of Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions and the 
prediction of technical efficiency. Results of the generalised likelihood ratio test 
suggest that the stochastic Translog specification is preferred to the nested Cobb- 
Douglas frontier. This conclusion is found to hold for both two-stage and single- 
stage modelling approaches presented in this paper.
The variation of technical efficiency indices across the 82 shrimp farm 
sample is explained using farm specific characteristics and managerial variables. 
The results suggest that the use of tractor inputs in pond preparation and daily 
water exchange practices during the culture period is found to increase 
efficiency. A large average pond size and a greater number of ponds per farm 
(i.e. big farms) are found to be determinants of inefficiency. Additionally, 
location (a proxy for water quality) is found to be an important variable in 
explaining technical inefficiency.
Next, in Chapter 5, Data Envelopment Analysis confirms that the scale of 
operation and technical competence are crucial factors in explaining Kandaleru 
shrimp farm efficiency. Following Fare et al. (1985) pure technical and scale 
efficiency are extracted from the Farrell (1957) total efficiency index. An inverse 
relationship is found to exist between farm size and efficiency in South Asian 
shrimp farming. The results suggest that while small and medium size farms are 
on average technically efficient, they remain largely scale inefficient. Scale 
inefficiency means that farms are not culturing at an optimal size of operation to 
ensure maximum total efficiency. This further suggests that if farms were size- 
adjusted, overall efficiency could increase. While large and corporate size farms 
are on average scale efficient, they remain largely technically inefficient. The 
policy direction is clear: generally, larger scale farmers must reduce the overall 
intensity of culture operations to maximise efficiency, minimise input slacks and
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reduce environmental degradation both within the aquatic culture environment 
and the natural ecosystem. The smallest farms could increase efficiency by 
enlarging their farm size and increasing the combination of inputs in the same 
proportion as their current culturing operations.
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Chapter 5
Modelling, Measuring & Explaining the Inefficiency of 
Brackishwater Shrimp Farms in South-eastern India
-A Parametric (Stochastic Frontier Production Function) Approach-
5.0 Introduction
The stochastic frontier production function approach (PFA) is used to 
model productive efficiency in the shrimp farming sector. This approach models 
the production technology used to culture shrimp, measures the technical 
inefficiency of 82 shrimp farms operating along the Kandaleru river and explains 
their inefficiency.
The stochastic approach to estimating the technical efficiency of farms 
was independently proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen 
and Van den Broeck (1977). The method assumes a parametric technology and 
uses statistical techniques to estimate the maximum potential output from a given 
combination of inputs for each farm in a given sample. The greater the amount 
by which the realised output falls short of this stochastic frontier, the greater the 
level of inefficiency attributed to each farm. Following the development of the 
theoretical model, a large empirical literature has developed. Widespread 
empirical prediction of the technical efficiencies of individual firms became 
possible as a result of Jondrow et al. (1982).
Inefficiency effects can be empirically modelled using either a two-stage 
or single-stage approach. In this chapter, both methods are explored. First, the 
theoretical stochastic production frontier model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and modified by Stevenson (1980) is discussed using a two-stage approach. In 
the first stage, the stochastic production function is estimated with a composed 
error structure. In the second stage, farm-specific variables are regressed on the 
predicted efficiency measures. Next, the single stage approach—based on 
Aigner et al. (1977) but further developed by Battese and Coelli (1988)—is 
followed. In this approach, the inefficiency effects are modelled as an explicit 
function of farm-specific variables that are believed to influence the level of
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technical inefficiency. The differences between these two approaches are further 
discussed throughout this chapter.
This chapter consists of ten sections. In Section 5.1 the empirical 
applications of stochastic frontier production methods as a parametric approach 
to measuring technical efficiency in cross sectional data are surveyed. Sections
5.2 to 5.5 present the overall methodology used in this investigation of shrimp 
farm production and technical efficiency. First, the two different parametric 
approaches to model stochastic frontiers and estimate the technical inefficiency 
of shrimp farms are described. Next, the hypothesis testing methodology 
employed to test between various specifications of the general stochastic frontier 
considered (i.e. Cobb-Douglas and Translog frontiers) is presented. Section 5.6 
presents a brief overview of the data. Section 5.7 presents the model 
specifications and estimation results for the two-stage method. Section 5.8 
presents the single-stage estimation results. Section 5.9 outlines policy 
implications of the results that may help guide the current Indian regulatory 
debates. Section 5.10 concludes and suggests areas for further research.
5.1 An Overview of the Literature
Stochastic frontier production function models have been employed in a 
number of empirical studies in an agricultural context. Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) are accredited with 
first applying stochastic frontier production functions to aggregate data on US 
agriculture and French manufacturing industries, respectively. Both papers 
conclude that the stochastic frontier was not significantly different from the 
average response function, OLS. Battese and Corra (1977) presented the first 
application of the stochastic frontier model to farm level data. They estimated 
deterministic and stochastic Cobb-Douglas production frontiers on data from the 
1973-74 Australian Grazing Industry Survey and found that the stochastic 
specification was significantly different from the corresponding deterministic 
frontier. They did not address the issue of technical efficiency in this paper.
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Many of the pioneering initial studies that addressed the issue of technical 
efficiency have employed a two-stage modelling approach to estimate the 
stochastic frontier model and predict technical efficiency measures in the first 
stage and explain technical inefficiencies in the second. The first stage involves 
the specification and estimation of the stochastic frontier model and the 
prediction of technical efficiency effects. The second stage involves specifying a 
regression model for the level of technical efficiency of farms/firms in terms of 
various explanatory variables and a random error. The parameters of the second 
stage inefficiency model have generally been estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions.1 More recently, however, empirical studies 
specifying a stochastic frontier are adopting the single-stage estimation 
procedure.2 In this overview of the literature we summarise only the most 
important empirical studies that have built upon the Aigner et al. (1977) 
foundation for the empirical estimation of stochastic frontiers to predict technical 
efficiency and explain inefficiencies. These studies serve as the foundation for 
our empirical investigation of Kandaleru shrimp farms.
Early empirical studies addressing the issue of technical efficiency 
measurement and its explanation adopted the two-stage modelling approach. 
Using data collected from 70 rice farmers in India, Kalirajan (1981) estimated a 
stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function. This study found that the variance 
of farm effects were highly significant in describing the variability of rice yields 
in the sample. The difference between the estimated ‘maximum yield function’ 
and the observed rice yields by examining variables such as farmer’s experience, 
educational level, number of visits by extension workers, etc. were then 
investigated in a second stage model. This paper concludes by suggesting policy 
changes directed at improving farmers’ crop yields.
1 A notable exception is found in Kalirajan (1981) who specifies that the random errors in the 
second stage inefficiency model as having a half-normal distribution.
2 Several recent papers, however, still use the two-stage approach due to the relative ease in 
which the first stage stochastic frontier model and second stage inefficiency model can be 
estimated. Single-stage estimation techniques have required the investigator to employ linear 
programming techniques which are cumbersome and time consuming. However, the recent 
development o f computer software and specialized programs to estimate stochastic frontiers and 
the inefficiency effects in a single framework has made the task less daunting.
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Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) specified a Translog stochastic frontier 
production function in their analysis of the technical efficiency of 79 rice farmers 
in the Philippines and estimated the parameters of the model using the maximum 
likelihood method. The nested Cobb-Douglas specification was found to be an 
inadequate representation of the farm level data. In the second modelling stage, 
the predicted technical efficiency measures were regressed on farm level 
variables and farmer characteristics and found that the practice of transplanting 
rice seedlings, the incidence of fertilisation and the number of years of farming 
experience were all significant in influencing technical efficiency.
Huang and Bagi (1984) estimated a Translog stochastic frontier 
production function using the data set from Bagi (1982).3 They concluded that 
the stochastic Cobb-Douglas specification did not adequately represent the data 
as the Translog specification was tested and preferred. Next, they predicted the 
individual farm technical efficiencies using the technique presented in Jondrow et 
al. (1982).
Kalirajan and Shand (1986) investigated the technical efficiencies of rice 
farmers producing in Malaysia within the Kemubu Irrigation Project boundaries 
and outside of it. The stochastic Cobb-Douglas model was rejected in favour of 
the more flexible Translog specification which seemed to represent the data more 
adequately. Using maximum likelihood estimation methods, the estimated 
parameters were found to be significantly different between both groups of 
farmers and that those farmers outside the project area had more narrowly 
distributed efficiency measures. They concluded that improved technology does 
not necessarily result in improved technical efficiency.
Kalirajan (1989) used the two-stage estimation method to predict 
technical efficiencies of individual rice farmers in two different regions in the 
Philippines. The two-stage estimation technique was used to discover what farm 
specific characteristics had significant effects on the variation in the technical 
efficiencies. The stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier was assumed appropriate in 
their analysis of the first estimation stage.
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Baily, Biswas, Kumbhakar and Schulthies (1989) estimated a stochastic 
model involving technical, allocative and scale inefficiencies for cross-sectional 
data on 68 Ecuadorian dairy farms. They discovered that although technical 
inefficiencies between farmers was only twelve percent, the loss in profits due to 
the inefficiencies ranged from twenty to twenty-five percent.
More recent empirical studies that estimate a specified stochastic frontier 
model and predict the technical inefficiency of farms do so using the single-stage 
estimation procedure. This is a result of a fundamental contradiction of 
assumptions necessary to estimate production functions using the two-stage 
technique (Battese and Coelli,1995). In the first stage, technical efficiency is 
assumed to be identically distributed. In the second stage, however, technical 
efficiency is specified as a function of several explanatory variables. This 
contradicts the first stage assumption suggesting that the technical efficiency is 
identically distributed. Battese and Coelli (1995) overcome this contradiction by 
suggesting a method to estimate the parameters of the stochastic production 
frontier and the inefficiency model—given that the technical inefficiency effects 
are stochastic—in one-stage.
Early empirical studies that estimate stochastic frontier models, predict 
technical efficiency and explain inefficiencies in the single-stage framework 
include Reifschneider and Stevenson’s (1991) study of electricity generation in 
the United States and Huang and Liu’s (1992) investigation of the electronics 
industry in Taiwan. Both studies were based on cross sectional data. Battese 
and Coelli (1992, 1995) extend Huang and Liu’s (1992) model and define a 
stochastic frontier production function for a panel of Indian paddy farmers and 
are thus able to examine changes in efficiency over time. Battese et al. (1996) 
examine the efficiency of Pakistani wheat farmers in four districts.
Although the empirical literature on measuring and explaining technical 
efficiency covers a wide variety of applications on farming and manufacturing 
data (both aggregated and farm/firm specific), there has been no application to 
brackishwater shrimp farming to date. Our empirical examination of Kandaleru
3 Bagi (1982) specified the stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function model to determine the 
average technical efficiency o f small and large crop farms and mixed-enterprise farms in the
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shrimp farms is therefore a first in modelling shrimp farm production, in 
predicting technical efficiency measures and in explaining the inefficiencies 
existing in Kandaleru shrimp production.
5.2 General Production Frontier Models
5,2.1 A Stochastic Frontier Model
The general stochastic frontier production function is defined by,
(1) Yi= f(xi\P)exp(V i-U j) i=l, 2,...,N.
where is the level of output of the ith firm, x; is a kxl vector or 
transformations of the input quantities of the ith firm; p is a vector of unknown 
parameters; N  is the number of observations in the sample; the V, is a random 
error assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) N(0,crv2) and 
which include measurement errors in production, weather and other random 
factors not under the control of the firm. It is independent of the Uj which are 
assumed to account for technical inefficiency in production and are assumed to 
be non-negative truncations of the iid N(// ,au2) distribution. Taking the natural 
log of both sides of equation (1) yields,
(la) ln(Yi ) =f(xi ;P) + (Vi -U i)
with all variables as previously defined.
In the Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) specification, the U; are 
assumed to be distributed |N(0,cju2)|, the half-normal distribution. Stevenson’s 
(1980) specification of the distribution of the Uj includes cases in which there 
may be a low probability of obtaining Uj close to zero (i.e. the case where their is 
severe technical inefficiency present in the sample firms) such that p  * 0. The 7/
Western Tennessee, USA and found no significance differences between them.
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are bounded above by the stochastic quantity f ( x j ; P) exp (Vi) which gives the 
stochastic frontier model its name. The general specification of f ( )  in (1) 
requires a particular choice of functional form such as the Cobb-Douglas or 
Translog. Both of these stochastic frontier models are considered in this 
empirical investigation of efficiency in the shrimp farming sector.
5.2,2. A Deterministic Frontier Model
The general deterministic frontier model is defined by,
(2) Yi =f(xi ;P )exp(-U i)
where jt/, p  are as earlier defined. The presence of the non-negative random 
error U\ is associated with the firm specific factors which contribute to the ith 
firm not attaining maximum efficiency of production. U\ is associated with the 
technical inefficiency of farm i and implies that the value of the random variable, 
exp (- Uj) is bounded between zero and one. This implies that the possible 
production Yj is bounded by a non-stochastic or deterministic quantity, f(x[\P). 
The technical efficiency for deterministic models is defined as the factor by 
which the observed level of production of the firm is less than its frontier output.
The central difference between the stochastic and non-stochastic frontier 
models rests in the construction and interpretation of the error term. In stochastic 
models, the error term is constructed to have a random component, V/ associated 
with random factors such as weather and an independent Ui which is assumed to 
be non-negative truncations of the N (//, a 2) and associated with farm 
inefficiency. In non-stochastic or deterministic frontier models, the random 
error term t// defined above is not decomposed further. Additionally, inference 
of the P  parameters in the deterministic model cannot be obtained from the 
maximum likelihood estimators because the regularity conditions are not 
satisfied in this model (see Theil, 1971:392). For a given set of data, the 
estimated technical efficiency measures obtained by fitting a deterministic 
frontier are less than those obtained by estimating the stochastic frontier since the
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deterministic frontier is estimated such that no output values exceed it (see 
Battese, 1992:188).
5.2.3 Inefficiency Effects
Following Battese (1992), the basic structure of the stochastic frontier 
model (1) in which the productive activity of two farms represented by i and j  
is considered. In Figure 5.0, farm i uses a combination of inputs described by 
vector Xi and obtains output Y\ . The maximum possible output or frontier output 
given its inputs is Yj*. In this case, farm i exceeds the output value associated 
with the deterministic frontier f(xj;J3) and the random error Vj is positive. This is 
a result of the favourable conditions associated with the productive activity of 
farm / not directly under the farm’s control. Similarly, farm j  uses a 
combination of inputs described by vector xj and obtains output Yj which has a 
corresponding frontier value Y f.  In this case, farm j  falls below the output value 
associated with the deterministic frontier f(xi;j3) and the random error Vj is 
negative. This is a result of the unfavourable conditions associated with the 
productive activity of farm j  not directly under the control of the farm In both 
cases, the production values for both farm i and farm j  are less than the 
corresponding stochastic frontier value.4 The level of inefficiency for farm i can 
therefore be pictorially represented by the distance between the stochastic output 
Yj* and the realised output Y ,. The same applies for farm j.
Given the assumptions of the stochastic frontier model (1), inference on 
the model’s parameters are based on maximum likelihood estimation since the 
standard regularity conditions hold.5 Aigner et al. (1977) suggest that the 
maximum likelihood estimates of p  could be obtained using the 
parameterization, <t2=ctv2+ctu2 and X , where X =au / a v , the ratio of the two 
standard errors. Battese and Corra (1977) innovate on X and suggest,
4 The case where both the observed (Yj) and frontier production (T/*) values fall above the
corresponding value o f the deterministic production function is possible but is not illustrated in 
our example for simplicity.
158
(3 )  Y =  cru2/ ( a v2+CTu2)
such that 0 <y< 1. The parameter y is defined as the total variation in output from 
the frontier which is attributable to technical inefficiency. This parameterisation 
is used in our estimation of technical efficiency.6
Figure 5.0
stochastic frontier 
output Y|* if  Vj>0. The Deterministic 
Production Function,
Y =A*»P)
OUTPUT, Y
stochastic frontier 
output Yj * if Vj <0
0 Xi\i
Inputs, X
Note: For a given set o f data, the estimated technical efficiencies obtained by fitting the 
deterministic frontier will be less than those obtained by fitting a stochastic frontier since the 
deterministic frontier is estimated such that no output values exceed it.
5 See Theil (1971) for a detailed discussion o f the necessary properties needed to conduct 
maximum likelihood estimation.
6 The parameters o f the model described above may be estimated by the method o f maximum 
likelihood.
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5.3 Measuring Technical Efficiency (Stochastic Frontier Models)
This section describes the development of technical efficiency measures 
in stochastic frontier models, describes how the measures are calculated 
empirically and suggests possible model specifications for Kandaleru shrimp 
production. Generally, the technical efficiency of any given farm can be defined 
by the ratio of the observed output, Yj to the corresponding frontier output, 7/*, 
conditional on the level of inputs used by the farm. Thus, the technical efficiency 
of farm i is generally described by,
(4) TEi = Yj / Yj*
=f(xi; P) exp (Vi - Uj)/f(xi; P) exp (VO 
= exp (-Uj)
where each variable is as previously defined in Section 5.2. Jondrow et al. 
(1982) is credited with first obtaining empirical predictions of technical 
efficiency measures at the individual firm level for a defined stochastic 
production function. Assuming that the f// have a half-normal and exponential 
distribution, Jondrow et al. (1982) predicted the technical efficiency of the ith 
firm by taking the expected value of Uj conditional on the stochastic error term 
(Vi - Ui). These authors devised the following formulae, 1 -  E(U; | V /  -  U/) to 
predict the level of technical inefficiency of the ith firm. However, Battese and 
Coelli (1988) suggest that technical efficiency of the ith firm, TE; = exp {-Ui) is 
perhaps best predicted by using the conditional expectation of technical 
efficiency, exp {-Ui), given the value of the random variable, E/= F/ - Ui when 
the functional form is in logs.7 They suggest,
(5) TEi = E{Yi* | Ui, X/) / E(T/* | Ut = 0, X/)
where, Yi*=exp{Yi) when the dependent variable is logged. The Technical 
Efficiency Index (TEj) is bounded by zero and one such that 0 < TEj < 1. In this
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investigation, the Battese and Coelli (1988) method is adapted to include 
Stevenson’s (1980) model for the U,. This specification is then used to calculate 
predictions of each shrimp farm’s technical efficiency.8
5.4 Model Specification & Estimation Procedure
As discussed earlier, there are two methods with which to theoretically 
and empirically model inefficiency effects defined by our general stochastic 
production frontier model presented in (1). This section presents formal models 
for each approach. Section 5.4.1 discusses the two-stage estimation procedure 
while Section 5.4.2. models the single-stage estimation procedure. Both methods 
are developed with respect to cross sectional data.
5.4.1 Two-Stage Estimation Procedure
Following Pitt and Lee (1991) it is possible to identify and explain 
predicted farm inefficiency measures for an 82 shrimp farm cross section using a 
two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the stochastic 
frontier production with a composed error structure defined in (1) and predict 
farm level efficiencies using the estimated functions discussed in the previous 
section. The one-sided component, Uj>0 reflects technical inefficiency relative 
to the stochastic frontier Yj = Tfo 5 P)exP(Si)* Theoretically, Uj=0 for any 
production unit whose output lies on the frontier (i.e. the case where there is no 
technical inefficiency) and U, >0 for any realised output lying below the frontier.
In the second stage farm-specific explanatory variables such as 
managerial and farm characteristics are regressed on the predicted efficiency 
measures. The efficiency effects can therefore be defined by,
(6) TEi= zi8 + ei ; i= l,2 ,...«
7 This distinction arises as a result o f estimating multiplicative production frontier models (see 
Battese and Coelli, 1992).
8 This formulation relies on the value of the unobservable £// being predicted.
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where TE{ is the technical efficiency index of the ith farm predicted in the first 
stage estimation procedure, zx is a (lxm) vector of farm and managerial specific 
variables (i.e. socio-economic and demographic variables); £ is an (mxl) vector 
of unknown coefficients of the farm and managerial specific variables; and the e, 
are independently distributed random errors which are assumed to be non­
negative truncations of the iid. N( /j. , a e2). From this second stage regression, it 
is possible to determine which farm specific variables are statistically significant 
in explaining technical inefficiency. This two-stage estimation procedure differs 
from the single-stage approach where both the Pi and 8/ are estimated in a single 
equation estimation procedure. This is discussed next.
5.4.2 Single-Stage Estimation Procedure
The two-stage estimation technique is recognised as a procedure which is 
inconsistent in it’s assumptions regarding the independence of the inefficiency 
effects in the two estimation stages. Battese and Coelli (1995) point out that the 
first stage technical efficiency indices are assumed to be identically distributed, 
while the second stage specifies the indices as a function of farm-specific 
variables. The identical distribution assumption of the first stage is therefore 
contradicted. Thus, the two stage procedure is unlikely to provide estimates that 
are as efficient as those that are obtained using a single-stage estimation 
procedure (Kumbhakar et al., 1991). Nonetheless, the two stage method 
continues to be applied in the empirical literature.9
Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang 
and Liu (1992) propose stochastic frontier models in which the inefficiency 
effects {U j) are expressed as an explicit function of a vector of firm specific 
variables and a random error. The single stage model proposed below is a 
straightforward extension of Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin (1991) and Huang 
and Liu (1992) specifications utilising the y paramaterisation from Battese and 
Corra (1977) described earlier. This approach is based on the previously defined
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general stochastic frontier production function defined in (1). The composition of 
the Ui are now defined more specifically as,
(7) Uj = Zj8 + W,
The Vj in the composed error term of (1) are random variables which are 
assumed to be iid. N(0,av2), and independent of the Uj which are non-negative 
random variables which are assumed to account for the technical inefficiency in 
production; and 8  are as defined above in (6). The Wj are independently 
distributed random errors which follow a truncated normal distribution, 
N (//,a w2). Joining (1) and (7) in a single formulation yields the single-stage 
stochastic frontier production function,
(8) Yi = XiPexp {(Vi - (zfi + W ))}
Just as in the two-stage approach, different functional forms for the 
general model (8), such as Cobb-Douglas and Translog frontiers can be 
employed. Since the Cobb-Douglas is a restricted form of the translog, the 
preferred choice of functional forms is based on statistical tests. Equation (7) 
models the inefficiency effects, the Ui associated with the technical inefficiency 
of production in terms of farm and managerial specific variables, the zx and the 
stochastic error terms, the Wj .10
The zx should include any variables that help explain why production 
observations fall short of their corresponding stochastic frontier production 
values, exp(x\P + F/). In our model, the random variables W; could be negative 
if Zj8 > 0 , (i.e. Wj > -Zj5).n The distributions of the W; are therefore truncations
9 This is rapidly going to change as a result o f statistical software developments that enable 
estimation o f models with a degree o f convenience, unknown before.
10 The likelihood function is presented in Battese and Coelli (1993) and is expressed in terms of  
the variance ratio as defined in equation (3).
11 Our model differs from Reifschneider and Stevenson (1981) who assume that the non-negative 
Wj are random variables independently and identically distributed N(0, a w2) and have a half­
normal, gamma or exponential distribution. The assumption that the Wj are independently 
distributed (i.e. random noise) for all i = 1,2,...N, is a restrictive and simplifying condition and 
implies that the £// ’s are independently distributed.
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of the N( ju ,aw2) distribution which correspond to the non-negativity of the Uj. 
The truncation points of the Wj depend on the values of the z; and on the 
unknown 8 parameters. Thus the truncation points may vary for different 
observations on different firms.
The technical efficiency of production for the ith firm is therefore an 
extension of (4) where Uj = Zj8 - W; such that,
(9) T E  = exp{-Uj) = exp[- (zj8 - Wj)] = exp(-Zj5 + Wj)
Few empirical investigations apply both the two-stage estimation procedure 
defined by (5) and (6) and the single-stage estimation procedure described by (8). 
This investigation investigates both methods and compares the results. In 
addition, nested functional specifications of the frontier are tested. The idea is to 
identify the best specification for shrimp aquaculture technology. Both the 
theoretical and empirical investigation of shrimp farm efficiency is based on 
methods employed to analyse cross sectional data.
The general stochastic frontier model has been extended to consider panel 
data and time-varying technical efficiencies. In addition, the methodology has 
been applied to cost functions and also to the estimation of systems of equations. 
However, as this primary shrimp farm data set is cross sectional, the other 
applications are not discussed and detailed discussion of these can be found 
elsewhere.12
5.5 Frontier Selection & Tests of Hypotheses
It is of interest to (i) test which model specification of the frontier 
(Translog, Cobb-Douglas or OLS) best estimates the parameters in both the two- 
stage and single stage estimation procedures, and (ii) test hypotheses regarding 
the distribution of the random variables associated with the existence of technical 
inefficiency and residual error. In the first case, well-known statistical selection
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criteria are used to determine the most suitable specification of the production 
frontier model. The second part is to determine whether technical inefficiency 
does exist amongst shrimp farms in the sample. Finally, in the case of single- 
stage estimation only, we test whether the variables in the inefficiency effects 
model (see equation (9)) have any significant effect on the level of technical 
inefficiency. The statistically selected model- regardless of whether the two- 
stage or single-stage method is employed-provides the preferred estimates of the 
pi and of technical efficiency (if technical inefficiencies among sample farms are 
determined to exist). The flow diagram in Figure 5.1 traces the method used.
In this analysis the nested stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier is specified 
and tested even when the more general flexible Translog production function is 
initially found to be an acceptable specification. Thus, there is a slight deviation 
from the pure “general to specific” investigative methodology popularised by 
David Hendry (see Gilbert, 1986 for a detailed account of Hendry’s 
methodology) for several reasons: First, to underscore the possible ramifications 
of incorrectly identifying a reduced model (i.e. the Cobb-Douglas model) as the 
preferred specification. Several seminal empirical studies (see Section 5.1: 
Overview of the Literature) specify and draw policy conclusions based on the 
inefficiency measures of the Cobb-Douglas model. These studies do not go on to 
specify the Translog frontier and use statistical tests to select the preferred model. 
As a result, policy recommendations are drawn from analysis of estimated 
technical efficiency measures from perhaps a second best model.13 Second, this 
approach is used to underscore the strength of this method over other techniques. 
By using this method in model estimation and selection, a flexible and well 
specified stochastic model that yields efficient estimates and the preferred 
technical efficiency measures is ultimately chosen.
12 A comprehensive review o f this literature is available in Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), 
Schmidt (1986), Bauer (1990) and Greene (1993). For recent applications to panel data, see 
Piesse (1998), Thirtle et al. (1996) and Batesse and Coelli (1995).
13 Some early examples include Kalirajan (1981), Battese and Corra (1977).
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5.5.1 Selecting the Appropriate Frontier
First, the specification of the general and flexible Translog stochastic 
frontier production function is tested for both FPF approaches. The stochastic 
frontier production function is equivalent to the traditional response function 
(OLS) if the parameters y and p  in (3) and (1), respectively are simultaneously 
equal to zero. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, H0: y= ju = 0, then it is 
possible to conclude that the given frontier is not significantly different from the 
traditional response function (OLS) for the shrimp farming sector and that 
technical inefficiency is not evident for the sample farmers (i.e. the Uj are not 
present in the model). However, the question remains, is the Translog 
specification of the frontier more suitable than the Cobb-Douglas specification? 
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (see 5.5.3) provides the method to chose between 
model specifications.
Second, it is important to test the significance of the y parameter (i.e. by 
testing H0: y = 0) to see if any form of the stochastic frontier production function 
is required at all. If the null is rejected, then the frontier is said to be stochastic. 
However, this test is a weaker version of H0: y = fj, = 0 and is only used if we fail 
to reject this more powerful hypothesis.14
The opposite side of the flow diagram in Figure 5.1 suggests that if the 
null hypothesis (H0: y=ju= 0) is rejected, it is possible to conclude that (1) 
inefficiency does exist among the sample farms and (2) the stochastic frontier 
model involved in estimating the parameters is something other than the 
traditional response function. In the single-stage estimation technique defined by
(8), rejection of H0: y = // = 0  suggests that the W; are present in the model. 
Once again, the question remains, is the Translog more suitable than the Cobb- 
Douglas specification? The answer to this question is determined by specifying
14 There is one important caveat worth mentioning. Any likelihood ratio test statistic involving a 
null hypothesis which includes the restriction that y = 0 is not distributed Chi-square because the 
restriction defines a point on the boundary o f the parameter space (see Lee, 1993). In this case, 
the likelihood ratio statistic has been shown to have a mixed Chi-square distribution (see Coelli 
(1993) and Coelli (1994) for a more detailed theoretical exposition o f the mixed chi-square 
distribution). We may, however, follow the literature due to a lack of a more appropriate 
methodology and use the LR test while assuming a Chi-square distribution as an approximation 
for the mixed chi-square distribution.
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the nested version of the stochastic Translog (i.e. the stochastic Cobb-Douglas) 
and employing the LR test to determine which specification is ultimately 
preferred.
5.5.2 Specifying the distribution of the errors
Once the preferred frontier is determined, the next task is to specify the 
distribution of the residuals (the inefficiency effects). The hypothesis that the 
inefficiency effects arise from the truncation of a half-normal distribution is 
tested by comparing the null hypothesis, H0: p  = 0 against its alternative. If we 
fail to reject this restriction, then it is possible to conclude that the Us are 
distributed |N(0, ay2)!, the half-normal distribution. If this restriction is rejected, 
then it is possible to conclude that the inefficiency effects may have a distribution 
other than half-normal (i.e. the Uj are distributed N( p , c^2)), a distinction which 
implies that some farms may be plagued with severe technical inefficiency 
(Battese and Coelli, 1993). This study also explores the distribution of the 
inefficiency effects.
5.5.3 Model Selection
Generalised Likelihood Ratio tests are conducted to chose the preferred 
frontier specification. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) has a Chi-squared distribution 
and is defined by,
(10) LR = N ln( ct,2 / cru2) ~ x  2(?)
where a r2 is the variance of the estimated restricted model; a u2 is the variance of 
the estimated unrestricted model and N is the number of observations in the 
sample. The critical value is defined b y x \q ) ,  where q is the number of 
restrictions imposed. The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the unrestricted 
model if LR > x  \<l)-
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5.6 Data
Primary cross sectional data was collected from 82 shrimp farms located 
adjacent to Tikkavaram and Bestapalem, two coastal villages in Nellore District, 
Andhra Pradesh, India. Technical efficiency and its determinants are 
investigated using the models described earlier. These data were collected by the 
author and his assistants as a more specific component of a 530 shrimp farm 
survey conducted between November 1996 and March 1997 and are generally 
considered to be a good representative sample for statistical analysis (see Chapter 
2). In addition to obtaining data on primary inputs used in brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture production, this particular cross section also includes data on farm 
characteristics and managerial practices. These data enable investigation into the 
reasons why technical inefficiency may exist.
The data were collected for each of the 82 farm sample either at the farm 
itself or at the household of the farmer. Generally, larger farms had a paid 
manager who provided the necessary production figures at the farm itself where 
there was usually a records keeping office. Smaller farms tend to be operated by 
the owner who usually kept no written records. Data were collected from them 
based on their recollection.15 Each of the 82 fanners provided information on five 
major production inputs and several farm characteristics.
In this analysis, shrimp production is assumed to be a function of five 
measurable inputs. Land is the total water spread area of the farm (in hectares); 
Labour is the total amount of family and hired labour inputs for all three stages 
of the production cycle (in person-days); Seed is the total number of seed inputs 
used per farm (in number of pieces); Feed is the amount of feed used per farm 
(in kilograms); Aerators are the number of aerators used per farm. Total 
production of shrimp per farm is measured in kilograms.
15 Chapter 2 discusses the possible bias in data collected from farmers’ recollections.
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Farm specific and managerial characteristics include the following:
• DLOC is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the farm is located 
adjacent to Tikkavaram village and zero if the farm is located adjacent to 
Bestapalem village;
• dsmf is a farm size dummy variable that has a value of one if the farm is less 
that 5 hectares in total area, zero otherwise;
•  DEXT is a technology dummy variable that has a value of one if the farmer 
practices extensive culture (i.e. where the stocking density is below 60,000 
seed per water spread hectare) and zero if more intensive stocking densities 
are used;
• DTRACT is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the farm 
manager/owner uses tractor inputs and zero, otherwise;
• DCHEM is a dummy variable which has a value of one if the farm manager 
uses chemical inputs such as lime and chlorine to keep the pond water clean 
and zero, otherwise;
• dfeed is a dummy variable that takes the value one if foreign feed input is 
used and zero if domestic feed is used;
• DCORP is a dummy variable that is given the value one if the farm is 
classified as a corporate or private limited farm and zero, otherwise;
• DOWN is a dummy variable that has the value one if the farm is owned by the 
operator or zero if leased;
• yrsop is the number o f years the farm has been in operation;
• watex is the percent of pond water exchanged daily;
• fedtm s is the number of times per day that the shrimp fry are fed;
• AVPDSZ is the average size of a particular farm’s shrimp ponds (in hectares);
• NOPNDS is the number of shrimp ponds operating on a particular farm.
The summary statistics are presented in Table 5.0.
170
Table 5.0
Summary Statistics for 82 Kandaleru Shrimp Farms
Variable Units Mean S.D. Min Max
output, Y kilograms 10936.70 26797.71 202.5 164500
land hectares 8.37 17.61 0.6 150
labour person-days 1234.14 1728.61 122.0 9846
seed number 1556793.00 5408663.00 15000.0 4500000000
feed kilograms 75115.41 269411.00 120.0 2137500
aerators number 34.84 78.51 0.0 450
DLOC - 0.426 0.497 0 1
DSMF - 0.475 0.502 0 1
DEXT - 0.597 0.493 0 1
DTRACT - 0.902 0.298 0 1
DCHEM - 0.390 0.490 0 1
DFEED - 0.707 0.457 0 1
DCORP - 0.183 0.388 0 1
DOWN - 0.207 0.407 0 1
YRSOP number 2.829 1.293 1 6
WATEX percentage 6.806 4.691 0 20
FEDTMS number 2.975 1.285 2 8
AVPNDZ hectares 0.665 0.200 0.33 1.215
NOPNDS number 11.817 18.972 1 150
A unique characteristic of these data, well worth noting is that it 
corresponds to the second crop cycle for the 1996 year, which was the first 
bumper harvest experienced by this region. Previous years had seen widespread 
crop failure throughout the Kandaleru shrimp farming region as a result of 
disease attributed to environmental pollution and diseased seed. Therefore the 
results obtained from this analysis can be assumed as an example of a “best case” 
situation to date. Of the 82 shrimp farms surveyed, three farms revealed that they 
were forced to harvest early as a result of a recurring disease problem affecting 
the crop. Nonetheless, these farms were included in the sample in order to 
compare their level of inefficiency with the other sample farms.16
16 For a detailed discussion on the survey methodology and on the potential bias o f the data, see 
Chapter 2.
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5.7 Model Specification, Estimation & Results
Two specifications of the general stochastic production frontier model, 
namely, the Translog and Cobb-Douglas specifications are proposed. Many 
earlier studies restricted their specification to Cobb-Douglas only. However, the 
Cobb-Douglas specification imposes severe a priori restrictions on farm 
technology by retracting the elasticities of input substitution to one and 
production elasticities to be constant. Flexible functional forms, such as the 
translog function are not restricted in this way.
The stochastic translog model with symmetry imposed is generally 
specified as follows,
where In denotes natural logarithms, k and j  index the five inputs and i indexes 
each of the 82 farms, y  is the output for each farm in the sample; xki represents 
input k for farm i; xp represents input j  for farm i; (30 and pkj are unknown 
parameters. The stochastic error, e, is defined as e = V + U where U>0 and 
represents the inefficiency effects. V is a random error. The equality of pkj and 
Pjk for k ^ j  is assumed throughout which implies that this specification has 
imposed symmetry.17 The stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier is a nested version of 
the translog where all pkj =0.
5.7.1 Two-Stage Estimation Procedure
Stage One
Given the variables specific to the shrimp farming sector, the specification of the 
stochastic Translog frontier with imposed symmetry can be defined as,
17 Stating that Pkj = Pjk is necessary to maintain consistency with Young’s theorem which says that 
the second cross partial derivative o f the function with respect to k, then j ,  is equal to the second 
cross partial with respect to j ,  then k ( Bemdt and Christiansen, 1973).
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(12) ln(Yj) = po + P ^ L a n d i)  + p2ln(Laborj) + p3ln(Seedi) + p4ln(Feed ) + 
p5ln(Aeratorsi) + p6 ln(Land;)2 + P7ln(Laborj)2 + p8ln(Seedj)2 + p9ln(Feedi)2 + 
p10ln(AeratorSi)2 + pilln(Landi)ln(Labouri) + p]2ln(Landi)ln(Seedi) + 
P13ln(Landi)ln(Feedi) + pi4ln(Landi)ln(Aeratorsi) + pi5ln(Labouri)ln(Seedi) + 
p j 6ln(Labouri)ln(F eed;) + pi7ln(Labouri)ln(Aeratorsi) + p j8ln(Seedi)ln(Feedi) + 
P19ln(Seedi)ln(Aeratorsi) + p20ln(Feedi)ln(Aeratorsi) + (Vj + Uj ) ,
where i indexes each of the 82 sample shrimp farms. All other variables are as 
previously defined. The data specific stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier model 
estimated is simply a nested version of (12) with the squared terms and cross 
product terms eliminated from the model (i.e. P6? P7,-..,P2o 0)-
By estimating each specification and conducting model selection tests 
(see flowchart, Figure 5.1), it is possible to determine which specification is 
preferred, and thus which technical efficiency measures to use in the second 
modelling stage. The maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters for each 
stochastic frontier model outlined above are obtained using the Frontier 4.1 
computer software package (Coelli, 1994) and are presented in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Parameters 
of Two Selected Stochastic Frontiers
Cobb-Douglas Translog
variable coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
Constant Po -2.3874 -1.7302 -79.0227 -85.1648
ln(land) p, 0.1374 0.7353 -18.6139 -22.5784
ln(labour) P2 0.1033 1.0362 7.6015 8.5968
ln(seed) P3 0.7606 4.5243 18.2383 51.7502
ln(feed) P4 0.0199 0.2078 -9.7514 -37.9685
ln(aerators) Ps -0.0016 -0.0483 -1.8263 -2.1139
ln(land)2 P6 -0.8351 -4.3759
ln(labour)2 P, -0.2888 -0.6468
ln(seed)2 Ps -1.0549 -5.8835
ln(feed)2 P, -0.2167 -0.7091
ln(aerators)2 PlO 0.0078 0.3773
ln(land) * ln(labour) Pi, 1.5660 3.1256
ln(land) * ln(seed) P l 2 1.9559 10.5766
ln(land) * ln(feed) P l 3 -1.5498 -4.3597
ln(land) * ln(aerat) P l 4 -0.2305 -1.5587
ln(labour) * ln(seed) P l 5 -0.6113 -1.2068
ln(labour) * ln(feed) P 16 0.2150 0.7623
ln(labour) * ln(aerat) P 17 -0.0335 -0.2337
ln(seed) * ln(feed) P 18 1.1373 2.4786
ln(seed) * ln(aerat) P 19 0.1727 1.2142
ln(feed) * ln(aerat) P 20 0.0240 0.2933
mu -1.44 -1.3137 0.04341 0.1577
sigma-squared 0.5839 1.8886 0.17524 13.1379
gamma 0.8916 10.1443 0.98328 7.4834
Loglikelihood -29.36 -7.06
Chi2 Statistic 2.09 11.79
Average TE 0.788 0.719
Number of Iterations 21 56
Degrees of Freedom 76 61
Note: The t-value and cut-off point for H0 is 2.39 at one percent, 2.0 at five percent, and 1.67 at 
ten percent.
5.7.2 Model Selection
Following the general to specific hypothesis testing procedure described 
in the flow diagram (Figure 5.1), the analysis in this sub-section concludes that 
the stochastic Translog frontier is found to be the preferred specification of the 
production frontier. Moreover, tests on the inefficiency effects suggest that there
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may be severe technical inefficiency amongst sample shrimp farms. Finally, we 
demonstrate how an inappropriate specification of the frontier could 
inadvertently be supported if a more specific to general methodology were 
adopted.
The analysis begins by testing whether the general and flexible stochastic 
Translog frontier production function with imposed symmetry can be statistically 
differentiated from the traditional response function (i.e. to determine whether 
there is any need to specify a model with a stochastic frontier). Table 5.2 
illustrates that the null hypotheses (H0: y = fi = 0) is rejected for the stochastic 
Translog specification since the Chi-square test statistic (11.79) exceeds the 
critical value (5.99). This suggests that (i) the stochastic Translog frontier model 
is preferred to the traditional response function, and (ii) inefficiency does exist 
amongst shrimp farms in the sample. Moreover, the fact that the inefficiency 
effect has a distribution other than N(0,au2) suggests that there may be severe 
technical inefficiency amongst our sample farmers.
Next, we demonstrate how an inappropriate specification of the frontier 
could inadvertently be supported if a more specific to general methodology were 
adopted. The stochastic Translog function is trimmed to its more restrictive 
(nested) Cobb-Douglas specification. This specification fails to reject the null 
hypothesis (H0: y=n  = 0) since the Chi-squared critical value (5.99) exceeds the 
test statistic (2.09) in the Cobb-Douglas model. This result suggests that this 
stochastic Cobb-Douglas specification is not significantly different from the 
traditional response function and that technical inefficiency is not evident in the 
sample farms.
Given that the Uj may be normally distributed, the following restriction, 
fj, = 0 is applied to the specification of the Cobb-Douglas model. The model is 
then re-estimated. Next, we test the null hypothesis, H0: y= 0. This hypothesis 
suggests that the parameters are best estimated using the traditional response 
function. Once again, the Cobb-Douglas specification fails to reject the null 
hypothesis. This reaffirms that the Cobb-Douglas model is not significantly 
different from the traditional response function.
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Table 5.2
Tests of Hypotheses for Parameters of the Distribution of the Farm Effects, U j , 
Associated with the Stochastic Production Function for 82 Kandaleru Shrimp
Farms
Null Hypotheses Loglikelihood X  test statistic Decision
EG o II •fc II O X 2 (2, 0.95) = 5.99*
Translog -7.06 11.79 Reject H0
Cobb-Douglas -29.36 2.09 Accept H0
Given that// =0; *2  (1,0.95) = 3.84*
EG o II O
Cobb-Douglas -30.22 0.38 Accept H0
Note: * Chi-squared critical values
The conclusion that the data is best estimated by the traditional response 
function and that there is no technical inefficiency amongst the sample farms 
would be supported had the investigation been discontinued after testing the 
Cobb-Douglas specification only. However, this conclusion is clearly false and 
suggests the appropriateness of using Hendry (1983) general to specific model 
selection approach. For completeness, a model selection LR test is conducted to 
determine which of the two specifications is preferred (see Table 5.3). The 
nested Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected in favour of the stochastic 
Translog frontier as the likelihood ratio statistic (98.6) exceeds the Chi-square 
critical value (22.4).
Table 5.3
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection
Null Hypotheses Likelihood X 2 critical value Decision
Ratio Statistic
H0: Cobb-Douglas 
Hp Translog
98.6 X 2 (13, 0.95) = 22.36 Reject H0
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Distribution o f  Technical Inefficiency
The above result suggests that the parameter estimates and technical 
efficiency measures from the estimation of the stochastic Translog production 
frontier model (13) are preferred to those obtained by the (nested) Cobb-Douglas 
specification. The efficiency measures derived from the stochastic Translog 
specification are therefore used to examine the determinants of technical 
inefficiency in the second stage model. First, however, the distribution of 
technical efficiency measures for the sample shrimp farms are discussed.
Table 5.4 presents the distribution of technical efficiency among sample 
Kandaleru shrimp farms. Figure 5.3 presents a histogram of the frequency 
distribution of each shrimp farming unit in the sample. The minimum estimated 
efficiency is approximately 22 percent, the maximum is 99 percent and the mean 
is approximately 72 percent.
Table 5.4
The Distribution of Farm Specific Technical Efficiency Measures Obtained 
from the Stochastic Translog Production Frontier
Efficiency Index Number of Shrimp Farms Percentage of Farms
100 to 95.01 6 7.3
95 to 90.01 8 9.8
90 to 85.01 7 8.5
85 to 80.01 10 12.2
80 to 75.01 9 11.0
75 to 70.01 9 11.0
70 to 65.01 6 7.3
65 to 60.01 6 7.3
60 to 55.01 13 15.9
55 to 50.01 4 4.9
50 to 45.01 2 2.4
45 to 40.01 0 0.0
40 to 35.01 1 1.2
35 to 30.01 0 0.0
30 to 25.01 1 1.2
25 to 20.01 1 1.2
under 20
N=82; Mean TE = 0.719
0 0.0
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The Determinants of Technical Efficiency 
Second Stage
With a given technology to transform physical inputs into outputs the 
technical efficiency of farmers in a given sample can vary significantly. Some 
farmers are able to achieve a high degree of technical efficiency while others are 
considered technically inefficient. The question remains, why? The large 
distribution of the technical efficiency indices of shrimp farms suggest that 
efficient farms may have more adequate technical knowledge than less efficient 
farms. On the other hand, the variance of technical efficiency measures in the 
sample may be attributable to other factors such as socio-economic and 
demographic factors as suggested by Timmer (1971), Muller (1974) and 
Kalirajan and Shand (1989) in agriculture based studies. The possible reasons 
for the significant distribution of inefficiency amongst Kandaleru shrimp farms is 
explored by modelling and estimated a model for the inefficiency effects.
The second-stage investigation postulates the following relationship for 
the general inefficiency model of equation (6),
(14) T E j=  S0 +  8  j DLOCj +  8 2 DSMFj + £ 3 DEXTj +8 4 DTRACTj + 8 S DCHEMj +
8 6 DFEEDj + 8 7 DCORPj + 8 S DOWN; + 8 9 YRSOP; + 8 ]0 WATEXj + 8 U
FEDTMSj + 8 n AVPDSZj +  £ 13NOPNDS; +  WK
where, TE; = technical efficiency index of the i* farm derived from estimation of 
the stochastic Translog specification and is a random error assumed to be iid. 
N(0,aw2).
The estimated parameters, t-ratios and other important statistics for (14) 
are presented in the first column of Table 5.5. Specification 1 yields only one 
coefficient that is statistically significant at 10 percent or less (i.e. dtract). 
Although the R-squared value is reasonable for the second stage regression at 
0.1330, the adjusted R-square statistic-which takes into account degrees of 
freedom-is not sensible at -0.0328. The model (14) is therefore reduced by 
imposing zero restrictions on parameters with low t-ratios.18 This yields 
Specification 2 and the more preferred Specification 3 (see table 4.5).
18 We follow an entirely ad hoc general to specific modelling approach, eliminating variables 
with low t-ratios in order to define a parsimonious and meaningful efficiency model.
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Specification 3 yields an R-squared of 0.113 and an adjusted R-squared of 0.067 
implying that this specification of the inefficiency model is sensible.19
The OLS regression result for Specification 3 indicates that location, the 
use of a tractor during pond preparation and that chemical use are significant 
influences in explaining technical efficiency amongst Kandaleru shrimp farms. 
The positive coefficient on the dtract dummy suggests that farms that use tractor 
inputs have higher efficiency levels. The negative coefficient on dchem suggests 
that farms using chemical inputs to keep the pond water clean are less efficient. 
This is a particularly perplexing result but not without explanation. Chemical 
inputs are not included as a primary input in our stochastic frontier model. 
Instead, the dummy variable is used to help explain inefficiencies in the second 
stage. Including the level of chemical inputs in the model would increase the 
number of total inputs and most likely decrease the estimated inefficiency 
measure. Including this variable in the second stage therefore illustrates the 
trade-off between efficiency and expected yield.
Particularly noteworthy is the result that the number of years the farm has 
been in operation is not statistically significant. This suggests that there is equal 
advantage for all farmers regardless of managerial experience. In addition, the 
farm size dummy, dsmf and technology dummy dext are not significant in the 
unrestricted model. This result suggests that small farms fare no better nor worse 
in terms of their efficiency than larger farms and generally, farms using more 
intensive methods of production are no more efficient than farms using less 
intensive farming practices.
The positive and significant coefficient on the dloc dummy suggests that 
farm location plays an important role in explaining technical efficiency. 
Tikkavaram farms are found to be more efficient than those located in 
Bestapalem. This is an important finding as it suggests that production 
environment is an important factor in explaining the variation of technical 
efficiency in shrimp farm production. We discuss these results in greater detail 
in the final section of this chapter.
19 Low R-squared and adjusted-R-squared measures are not unusual for the second stage 
regression (see Parikh and Shah, 1994; Kalirajan and Shand, 1989 for other examples).
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Table 5.5
Second Stage Regression Results Explaining Technical Efficiency
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
const. .5188203 1.258 0.547715 7.988 0.546647 8.006
DLOC .0589479 1.258 0.070467 1.812 0.067309 1.752
DSMF .0156292 0.258
DEXT .0588416 0.508
DTRACT .1540552 2.076 0.145353 2.198 0.143312 2.178
DCHEM -.0120886 -0.106 -0.054866 -1.229 -0.064838 -1.558
DFEED .0487705 1.044 0.051837 1.216
DCORP -.0074173 -0.096
DOWN -.0319447 -0.525
YRSOP -.0097969 -0.574
WATEX .0006887 0.102
FEDTMS .0125437 0.495
AVPDSZ -.053448 -0.479
NOPNDS -.0008225 -0.613 0.547715 -0.635
F = 0.80 2.03 2.45
Prob > F 0.655 0.084 0.053
R2 0.133 0.118 0.113
Adj R2 -0.328 0.060 0.067
Note: All non-dummy variables are in levels; a blank cell marks variables that were excluded 
from the specification o f the inefficiency model.
5.8 The Single-Stage Estimation Procedure
5.8.1 The Model
Two specifications for the general stochastic production frontier model 
(8) examined in this section are the Cobb-Douglas and Translog with imposed 
symmetry. Just as in the first stage of the two-stage estimation procedure, each 
stochastic specification is estimated and several model selection tests are 
conducted to determine which frontier specification is preferred. However, 
unlike in the two-stage approach, the single-stage approach estimates the beta 
and delta parameters and predicts the technical efficiency measures
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simultaneously in one stage. For each of the specifications of (8), the 
inefficiency effects are modelled as,
(15) Uj = 8 o + 8 1DLOCi+ 8 2DSMFj+ 8 jDEXTj + S 4 DTRACT; + £ 5DCHEM;
+  £ 6DFEED; + 8 n DCORPj + 8 % DOWN;+£9 YRSOP; + £ 10 WATEXi + 8 u FEDTMS;
+ ^ , 2AVPDSZi + 8 n NOPNDSj +  W;
All variables are as previously defined. The stochastic frontier production 
function defined in (8) and (15) is estimated using the maximum likelihood 
procedure in the computer software package, Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1994). Table 
5.6 summarises the estimations of the stochastic Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
specifications.
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Table 5.6
Single-Stage Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of
Two Selected Stochastic Frontier Models
Cobb-Douglas Translog
variable param coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
Constant Po -2.074 -1.78 -78.53 -78.40
ln(land) Pi 0.353 1.89 -14.42 -5.90
ln(labour) P2 -0.013 -0.13 -1.41 -0.74
ln(seed) P3 0.719 4.69 21.60 16.10
ln(feed) P4 0.085 0.84 -9.34 -7.91
ln(aerators) P5 0.004 0.14 -0.58 -0.60
ln(land)^ P6 0.29 0.74
ln(labour)^ P7 0.01 0.61
ln(seed)^ P8 -0.13 -9.42
ln(feed)^ P9 -0.29 -2.41
ln(aerators)^ PlO -0.01 -0.34
ln(land) * ln(labour) P ll -0.54 - 0.10
ln(land) * ln(seed) P l2 2.22 6.31
ln(land) * ln(feed) Pl3 -1.62 -5.85
ln(land) * ln(aerators) Pl4 0.01 0.01
ln(labour) * ln(seed) Pi 5 -0.06 -0.21
ln(labour) * ln(feed) P l6 0.29 1.57
ln(labour) * ln(aerators) Pl7 -0.09 - 1.01
ln(seed) * ln(feed) Pi 8 1.18 5.17
ln(seed) * ln(aerators) Pl9 0.06 0.53
ln(feed) * ln(aerators) P20 0.05 0.88
const <?0 0.23 0.27 1.28 0.95
DLOC <?1 0.29 1.31 0.42 1.62
DSMF -1.09 -1.99 -0.80 -1.35
DEXT &3 -0.64 - 1.02 -2.20 -2.73
DTRACT 8  4 - 1.11 -1.59 -3.67 -4.03
DCHEM 3  5 0.47 0.89 -0.11 -0.19
DFEED -0.06 -0.27 -0.05 -0.16
DCORP S i 0.18 0.44 -0.42 -0.96
DOWN 0.14 0.52 -0.33 -0.73
YRSOP 8  9 0.05 0.68 0.08 0.86
WATEX ^10 -0.02 -0.97 -0.02 -0.56
FEDTMS <?11 -0.18 -1.92 0.22 1.73
AVPDSZ <?12 1.56 2.68 1.39 1.98
NOPDS <?13 0.02 3.38 0.05 4.70
sigma-squared 
Loglikelihood 
Chi2 Statistic
.140332
-13.593
33.63
.273503
9.647
45.21
Mean TE 0.847 0.759
Degrees of Freedom 76 61
Note: The t-value and cut-off point for H0 is 2.39 at one percent, 2.0 at five percent,
and 1.67 at ten percent.
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5.8.2 Model Selection
Following the “general to specific” model estimation and selection 
procedure discussed in Section 5.5 and outlined in figure 5.1, the first step is to 
determine whether the Translog specification of the stochastic frontier model (8) 
best describes the data. The stochastic Translog frontier production function is 
first tested against the traditional response function (OLS) with the following null 
hypothesis, H0: y =(i =0 . Moreover, this test determines whether there is any 
need to specify a stochastic frontier model at all. The null hypothesis is rejected 
for the stochastic Translog specifications since the value of the test statistic 
(45.21) is greater than the Chi-squared critical value (5.99). This result suggests 
that the stochastic Translog frontier is significantly different from the traditional 
response function and that technical inefficiency is evident amongst the sample 
farms in the data set (see Table 5.7).
For completeness, the stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier is specified and 
tested. The null hypothesis (H0: y =ju = 0) is rejected suggesting that the 
stochastic Cobb-Douglas specification is preferred over the traditional response 
function, OLS. The question remains, which specification is preferred, the 
stochastic Translog or the more restrictive Cobb-Doulas frontier? As the Cobb- 
Douglas is a nested specification of the Translog model, it is possible to identify 
which specification is preferred by conducting a likelihood ratio test between the 
two specifications. The LR test suggests that the stochastic Translog frontier 
model is preferred to the nested stochastic Cobb-Douglas specification since the 
likelihood ratio (54.71) exceeds the Chi-squared critical value (24.99). The 
Cobb-Douglas specification is thus rejected in favour of the stochastic Translog 
production function (see Table 5.8).
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Table 5.7
Tests of Hypotheses for Parameters of the Distribution of the Farm Effects, U j, 
Associated with the Stochastic Production Function for Kandaleru Shrimp Farms
Null Hypotheses Loglikelihood X  2 -  test statistic Decision
o
II II O x 2 (2, 0.95) = 5.99*
Translog 9.65 45.21 Reject H0
Cobb-Douglas -13.59 33.63 Reject H0
Note: * Chi-squared critical value
Table 5.8
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection
Null Hypotheses Likelihood Ratio X 2 -critical value Decision
H0: Cobb-Douglas 
Hp Translog
54.72 X 2 (15, 0.95) = 24.99 Reject H0
The Translog model is found to be the preferred statistical specification. 
Next, the joint explanatory power of the Zj variables in the stochastic Translog 
specification of (15) is examined. This is to determine whether the variables 
included in the inefficiency effects model have any significant effect on the level 
of technical inefficiency. The null hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are not 
a linear function of farm specific characteristics and managerial characteristics 
(H0: S i = 0; /=1,2,..13) is rejected (see Table 5.9). This indicates that the joint 
effect of these thirteen explanatory variables on the level of technical inefficiency 
is significant, although the individual effects of one or more of the variables may 
not be statistically significant. Thus the inclusion of the inefficiency model in 
the specification of the single-stage model is justified.
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Table 5.9
Chi-squared Test of the Inefficiency Effects
Null Hypotheses X 2 -statistics Decision
Assuming Stochastic 
Translog:
X 1 (13,0.95) = 22.36*
H0: S i = Q; <=1,2,..11
45.21 Reject H0
Note: *denotes the Chi-squared critical value
The parameters gamma and sigma squared are associated with the random 
variables F/ and IF/. Generalised likelihood-ratio tests of the hypotheses that the 
random errors in the inefficiency model are absent (i.e. ju * 0) or that they arise 
from the half-normal distribution (i.e. fi =0) are tested. The null hypotheses that 
the inefficiency effects have no random components (that is, the W( are not 
present in the model or H0:y= fj, =0) is rejected. Additionally, the hypothesis that 
the inefficiency effects arise from the truncation of a half-normal distribution 
(H0: n  = 0) is also rejected.
This result would not have been expected had the farm specific and 
managerial variables (i.e. the z variables) explained the inefficiency effects 
adequately. It is possible to conclude, however, that there are other important 
farm specific and managerial characteristics missing from the inefficiency model, 
that if included, would theoretically allow us to “accept” the hypothesis that the 
inefficiency effects arise from the truncation of the half-normal distribution. 
However, this also implies the existence of omitted variables which could bias 
the beta and delta estimates.
5.8,3 The Preferred Model
The stochastic Translog production function is known to exhibit problems 
of multicollinearity as a result of the additional squared and cross product terms 
included as explanatory variables. One potential solution to multicollinearity is 
to selectively remove those squared or cross product terms whose t-ratios are 
below a certain critical value (Boisvert, 1992:30). This strategy has been 
successfully employed in Shih, Hushak and Rask (1977). The key is to remove
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unnecessary explanatory variables without destroying the flexibility in the 
relationships of the inputs, which remains the strength of this model. Several 
parameter estimates of the stochastic Translog function and inefficiency model
(13) estimated above are far from significant (i.e. the asymptotic t-ratios are less 
than 1.3). Following Boisvert (1992) the trimming process begins by removing 
these statistically insignificant explanatory variables.20
In Table 5.10 the parameter estimates, asymptotic t-ratios and other 
significant statistics are presented for the stochastic Translog frontier model in its 
original form and for two reduced frontier models, called Model 1 and Model 2. 
Model 1 omits explanatory variables with low t-ratios, but leaves the inefficiency 
model untouched. Model 2 is a nested version of Model 1 with the explanatory 
variables with low t-ratios in the inefficiency model removed.
20 The same method was used to trim the Translog model presented using the two-stage approach 
discussed earlier. However, since statistical tests suggested that the efficiency indices estimated 
by the full and reduced models were not significantly different from each other, the results were 
not presented. In addition, a priori knowledge suggests that the single-stage model yields 
efficient beta estimates and these estimates are therefore the preferred technical efficiency 
measures. For this reason only the results o f the single-stage estimation procedure are discussed 
in the final assessment o f shrimp farm efficiency and overall technical performance o f the sector.
186
Table 5.10
Single-Stage Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of
Three Selected Inefficiency Stochastic Frontiers
T ranslog F ron tier 
M odel 0
Trim m ed T ranslog  
M odel 1
T rim m ed T ranslog  
M odel 2
variable coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
Constant Po -78.53 -78.40 -83.38 -61.21 -83.14 -64.48
In(land) Pi -14.42 -5.90 -15.99 -8.71 -15.36 -9.68
In(labour) P2 -1.41 -0.74 -1.59 -2.24 -1.35 -2.56
ln(seed) Pa 21.60 16.10 23.24 22.40 23.26 23.21
In(feed) P4 -9.34 -7.91 -10.50 -6.87 -10.85 -6.90
ln(aerators) Ps -0.58 -0.60 0.31 1.25 0.29 1.11
ln(land)2 p 6 0.29 0.74
ln(labour)2 p 7 0.01 0.61
ln(seed)2 Ps -0.13 -9.42 -1.47 -12.31 -1.49 -12.13
ln(feed)2 p 9 -0.29 -2.41 -0.33 -2.87 -0.37 -2.92
ln(aerators)2 P.o -0.01 -0.34
ln(land) * ln(labour) p . , -0.54 - 0.10
ln(land) * In(seed) Pl2 2.22 6.31 2.25 7.43 2.16 8.82
ln(land) * ln(feed) P13 -1.62 -5.85 -1.42 -4.99 -1.36 -5.78
ln(land) * ln(aerators) P .4 0.01 0.01
ln(labour) * ln(seed) P, 5 -0.06 -0.21
In(labour) * ln(feed)
P .6 0.29 1.57 0.21 2.12 0.18 2.37
ln(labour) * 
ln(aerators)
Pl7 -0.09 -1.01 -0.05 -1.26 -0.05 -1.14
ln(seed) * In(feed) P18 1.18 5.17 1.35 5.18 1.42 5.25
ln(seed) * In(aerators) P19 0.06 0.53
ln(feed) * ln(aerators) P20 0.05 0.88
const 1.28 0.95 1.60 0.95 1.70 0.82
DLOC -0.42 -1.62 -0.22 -0.88 -0.33 -1.58
DSMF s2 -0.80 -1.35 -1.07 -1.71 -1.34 -1.87
DEXT s2 -2.20 -2.73 -2.16 -1.72 -1.92 -1.29
DTRACT -3.67 -4.03 -3.55 -2.42 -3.59 -1.91
DCHEM Ss -0.11 -0.19 0.20 0.34 0.50 0.87
DFEED s6 -0.05 -0.16 0.03 0.14
DCORP S2 -0.42 -0.96 -0.45 -0.82
DOWN st -0.33 -0.73 - 0.10 -0.33
YRSOP s9 0.08 0.86 0.09 0.91 0.09 1.03
WATEX sw -0.02 -0.56 -0.04 -1.54 -0.04 -1.51
FEDTMS S 11 0.22 1.73 0.12 0.88
AVPDSZ S 12 1.39 1.98 1.56 2.30 1.56 2.60
NOPDS sa 0.05 4.70 0.05 5.11 0.50 5.38
sigma-sq 
gamma 
loglikelihood 
LR-Test Stat
0.273
0.955
9.647
45.21
4.20
56.00
0.280
0.946
5.44
50.38
3.58
35.8
0.283
0.945
5.01
49.50
4.60
34.1
Note: The t-value and cut-off point for H0 is 2.39 at one percent, 2.0 at five percent and 1.67 at
ten percent.
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Next, LR tests are employed (see Table 5.11) to test the unrestricted stochastic 
Translog production function (Model 0) against the reduced frontier models 
(Model 1 and Model 2).
Table 5.11 
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection
Null Hypotheses Likelihood Ratio X 2 -critical value Decision
H0: Model 1 2.04 X 2 (8, 0.95) =14.06 Accept H0
H,: Model 0
H0: Model 2 0.881 X 2 (4, 0.95) = 7.80 Accept H0
Hj: Model 1
In the first likelihood ratio test between the unrestricted model 0 and 
restricted model 1, the null hypothesis (pk=0; k=6,7,10,11,14,15,19,20) cannot be 
rejected. The preferred specification is therefore model 1. In the second LR test 
between model 1 and model 2, the restrictions imposed on model 1 (Ho:£,=0, 
/=6,7,8,ll;Pk=0; k=6,7,10,11,14,15,19,20) cannot be rejected. The specification of 
model 2 is preferred to model 1 and thus preferred overall.
5.8.4 Discussion
The signs of the beta  estimates are positive and statistically significant for 
se ed  and aerators  and negative and statistically significant for land, labour  and 
f e e d  in the preferred model. The negative coefficient associated with the 
interaction between land and feed, and labour and aerators suggest that these 
interactions all negatively affect output, while the cross effects of land and seed, 
labour and feed, and seed and feed are positive and significant.
There are several well known problems associated with the use of 
Translog production function that make the interpretation of the results less than 
adequate for understanding the direct relationship between inputs and output. 
However, as this analysis is primarily concerned with measuring and explaining 
technical inefficiency amongst Kandaleru shrimp farms, there is little reason to
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be too concerned with the limitations of the stochastic Translog frontier model. 
The specification of the stochastic Translog function does not impede the 
prediction of technical efficiency, nor does it impede any rigorous analysis of the 
efficiency index and its distribution among the sample shrimp farms.
5.8,5 Distribution of Technical Efficiency
The mean predicted technical efficiency obtained for the 82 shrimp farms 
using the single-stage estimation technique from the preferred reduced model is 
0.747. The predicted efficiency measures show considerable variability among 
shrimp farmers (see Table 5.12). A list of each farm’s efficiency index is 
presented in Appendix 5 A, Table 5A.1.
Table 5.12
Farm Specific Technical Efficiency Measures in the Stochastic Translog 
Production Frontier (Single-Stage Model 2)
Efficiency Index Number of Shrimp Farms Percentage of Farms
100 to 95.01 10 12.2
95 to 90.01 28 34.1
90 to 85.01 9 11.0
85 to 80.01 2 2.4
80 to 75.01 6 7.3
75 to 70.01 3 3.7
70 to 65.01 0 0.0
65 to 60.01 3 3.7
60 to 55.01 2 2.4
55 to 50.01 4 4.9
50 to 45.01 1 1.2
45 to 40.01 3 3.7
40 to 35.01 3 3.7
35 to 30.01 1 1.2
30 to 25.01 2 2.4
25 to 20.01 2 2.4
under 20
N=82; Mean TE = 0.747
4 4.9
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5.8.6 Explaining Technical Inefficiency
The coefficients of the explanatory variables in the single-stage stochastic 
inefficiency model presented in Table 5.10 are of particular interest. 
Interpretation of the delta coefficients in the single-stage model are opposite to 
that of the two-stage method’s results. This is a direct result of the construction 
of the error term in (8) which takes the difference between the random variable F/ 
and the inefficiency effect £/j. By contrast, the two-stage approach models the 
error term as the sum of the random variable F, and the inefficiency effect Uj. A 
negative coefficient on delta therefore implies that the variable associated with 
that estimated parameter has efficiency enhancing characteristics (i.e. reduced 
inefficiency).
Following the single-stage results, the negative coefficient on the location 
dummy suggests that farms located in Tikkavaram are more efficient than their 
downstream neighbours. The negative coefficient on small farm size dummy 
suggests that small and marginal farmers are more efficient than medium and 
large size farmers. The estimate for the coefficient associated with tractor use is 
negative, which implies that the farms that use tractor inputs for pond bottom 
clearing and bund preparation are more efficient. The negative coefficient 
associated with the percent of water exchanged daily suggests that farms with 
greater daily water exchange are more efficient than those that exchange their 
pond water less frequently.21 The positive coefficient for the avpnsz and nopnds 
variables suggest that farms with a greater number of total ponds and farms with 
a larger average pond size are less efficient.
Weak relationships of interest are the positive coefficient on the years of 
operation variable and the positive estimate for the coefficient associated with 
chemical use. The first suggests that shrimp farmers with more years of 
experience are less efficient while the second suggests that farm managers that 
employ chemicals to keep the pond water free of bacteria are more efficient. 
However, both relationships are very weak since the coefficients are insignificant
21 This suggests the direct inclusion of a water variable as a normal input in future work.
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(according to an asymptotic t-ratio).22 The policy implications of these findings 
are discussed in the next section.
5.9 Overall Results & Policy Recommendations
The results of both two-stage and single-stage estimation procedures are 
relatively consistent. Both methods reject the specification of the stochastic 
Cobb-Douglas production frontier in favour of the stochastic Translog model for 
shrimp farm data. Each of the significant parameter estimates in both of the two 
inefficiency models are opposite in sign which suggests consistency between 
both estimation methods (see earlier discussion).
Overall, the single-stage method is preferred to the two stage approach 
since it is considered to yield more efficient estimates of the beta parameters and 
therefore more accurate efficiency measures. These results are therefore accepted 
as a more accurate estimation of the farm specific characteristics and managerial 
variables that explain farm efficiency in the sample. The single-stage method also 
identifies several significant variables in the inefficiency model found to be 
statistically insignificant in the second stage of the two-stage approach. This 
investigation, therefore confirms what others often suggest, but rarely 
demonstrate: that the single-stage estimation procedure gives more accurate 
technical efficiency measures and in doing so, allows a fuller explanation of 
technical inefficiency amongst shrimp farms.
The overall results of this study of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture 
indicate that Kandaleru shrimp farms operate below maximum feasible 
production levels and that there is potential to improve technical efficiency 
without additional investments in land, labour and capital. Non-traditional 
brackishwater shrimp farming is relatively new to many of India’s regions where 
it is currently practised. In addition, many farmers adjust their culture methods 
through trial and error.23 However, the number of years of experience a manager
22 Unless otherwise stated, all tests o f hypotheses are conducted at the 5% level o f significance.
23 Personal discussions with Kandaleru shrimp fanners revealed that the method of culture 
operations was learned primarily by watching family relations culture shrimp. Very few o f the 
sample farmers were trained through the BFDA special training program. Unfortunately, the
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or owner-operator has in shrimp culture is found to be statistically insignificant 
in explaining technical efficiency. This suggests that the most obvious ways 
known to managers to improve farm efficiency are not sufficient. In personal 
discussions with Kandaleru shrimp farmers, farm managers themselves conveyed 
that consistent production of shrimp was somewhat of a lottery, despite the 
“scientific” methods employed.24 This analysis, however, seems to contradict this 
belief.
There are a multitude of factors, both direct and indirect, involved in the 
shrimp production mechanism. Direct factors include essential inputs needed to 
culture shrimp. Indirect factors such as managerial practices and farm specific 
characteristics are known to be important determinants of farm efficiency, but are 
seldom examined due to a lack of relevant data on managerial inputs (Dawson, 
1980). In the next several sections, explanations are offered as to the causes and 
consequences of technical inefficiency amongst sample shrimp farms.
5.9,1 A Question of Scale/Size
It is clear that technical efficiency is to some degree related to farm size. 
The positive and statistically significant small farm dummy indicates that shrimp 
culture on the 40 farms less than 4 hectares of waterspread area are on average 25 
percent more efficient than the 42 larger farms.25 Furthermore, a more detailed 
breakdown of the technical efficiency figures illustrates that the largest farms in 
the sample (greater than six water spread hectares) are on average over 35 percent 
less efficient than the smallest size (less than three water spread hectares) and 
mid size (between three and six water spread hectares) farms (see Table 5.13).
survey does not ask farmers to indicate whether they are BFDA educated. Thus, it is not possible 
to compare the efficiency measures o f BFDA trained or funded farmers with the others.
24 Shrimp farmers engaged in relatively similar culture practices year after year complained o f 
severe output fluctuation. Similarly, several farmers mentioned that output levels fluctuate 
across ponds on the same farm, despite the fact that the same combination o f inputs are used in 
each and similar management techniques employed. I noticed, however that there are as many 
dissimilar factors between ponds as similar ones (i.e. irregular pond sizes and location, to 
mention just two).
25 Average technical efficiency is approximately 88 percent for smaller farms and 62.6 percent 
for larger farms.
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Table 5.13
Technical Efficiency by Size of Farm26
Farm Size Mean TE SD MIN MAX # Farms
smallest .85 .135 .43 .97 25
mid size .87 .104 .54 .97 30
largest .49 .298 .01 .96 27
ALL .75 .262 .01 .97 82
This result is also confirmed by the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on nopds (the number of ponds per farm) which suggests that farms 
with a greater number of ponds are less efficient. Together, the negative and 
significant coefficient on the small farm size dummy and the positive and 
significant coefficient on the nopds variable confirm that size is an important 
determinant of technical efficiency. The question remains, however, why are 
larger farms less efficient? Secondly, what proportion of technical inefficiency is 
a result of scale? The production function approach presented in this chapter is 
unable to answer these two crucial questions. This is a result of this method’s 
limitations. The issue of scale is further discussed in Chapter 6, which attempts a 
non-parametric programming approach to efficiency measurement.
5.9.2 Location & Production Environment
Technical efficiency is related to location. In our model, location is 
equivalent to the production environment, which is used as a proxy for water 
quality. The statistically significant coefficient on the location dummy suggests 
that Tikkavaram farms are more efficient than Bestapalem farms. Simple 
summary statistics (see Table 5.14) suggest that Tikkavaram shrimp farms have a 
mean technical efficiency index of 0.789 whereas Bestapalem farms have a mean 
technical efficiency index of 0.715. This result suggests that geographic factors 
and/or environmental differences between the two shrimp farming clusters are 
worth exploring further.
26 Smaller size farms are defined as those less than 3 water spread hectares; mid-size farms are 
between 3 and 6 water spread hectares; the largest size farms are greater than 6 water spread 
hectares.
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Table 5.14
Technical Efficiency & Production Environment
Village Mean TE SD MIN MAX # Farms
Tikkavaram 0.789 0.235 0.11 0.965 35
Bestapalem 0.715 0.278 0.01 0.970 47
Shrimp farms located adjacent to Tikkavaram village appear to have an 
advantage in terms of the quality of their surrounding natural environment. First, 
Tikkavaram shrimp farms operate 42 kilometres upstream from the Bay of 
Bengal. It is the second shrimp farming cluster located along the Kandaleru 
creek which means that there is only one adjacent shrimp farming cluster 
upstream from this group of farms. Bestapalem, by contrast is only 28 
kilometres upstream from the Bay of Bengal and has four large shrimp farming 
clusters and several smaller ones located upstream from it.
Water is one crucial input missing from the original stochastic Translog 
specification described in (13) and again in the technical efficiency model (15). 
It is an essential input in shrimp culture. However, it is not the quantity of water 
that makes a difference to production, but rather the quality of water used to fill 
the pond and used for daily water exchange. Therefore, the quantity of water 
used per farm as a missing input is not cause for as much concern as is the lack of 
a water quality index.
It is possible, however that poor intake water quality is a significant 
reason to why shrimp farms adjacent to Bestapalem village are less efficient than 
those farms adjacent to Tikkavaram. Thus, the possibility of a classic upstream- 
downstream externality problem is possible. The hypothesis that technical 
efficiency is negatively related to poor intake water quality cannot be supported 
as a result of a lack of appropriate data. Moreover, it is impossible to prove this 
causality; that is, that poor intake water is the cause of inefficiency.27
27 The parametric approach enables modelling, measuring and explaining technical inefficiency, 
but does not enable direct discussion of causation. This research does not attempt to discuss 
causation.
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5.9,3 Mechanisation
The use of machines in the shrimp production cycle is found to positively 
influence technical efficiency. Specifically, shrimp farms that used tractors for 
pond preparation and diesel driven pumps for water exchange during the culture 
period were found to be more efficient than those that did not.
The negative coefficient on dtract implies that shrimp farms that use 
tractor inputs for pond bottom clearing and bund preparation are more efficient 
than those that do not. The negative coefficient associated with the percent of 
water exchanged daily suggests that farms with greater daily water exchange are 
more efficient than those that exchange their pond water less frequently. Water 
is pumped into ponds using diesel fuelled pumps which are available in a range 
of sizes. Large farms were found to have three to four big pumps for this 
purpose, which were usually kept in a pump house built to store this machinery. 
Small farms by contrast were found to share a small mobile pump among a group 
of smaller farmers.28
5.9.4 Managerial Factors
Weak relationships of interest include the positive coefficient on the years 
of operation variable which suggests that shrimp farmers with more years of 
experience are less efficient, and the positive estimate for the coefficient 
associated with chemical use which suggests that farm managers that employ 
chemicals to keep the pond water free of bacteria are more efficient. However, 
both relationships are very weak since the coefficient is statistically insignificant 
(by an asymptotic t-test). The number of times the shrimp were fed and whether
28 The specific nature o f water exchange is also important since disease as a result o f polluted 
effluent water is commonly transported via the common water source. Some farms were found 
to store their own reserve o f clean water in a holding pond for the duration o f the culture period. 
These holding tanks were filled at the beginning o f the culture season with water from the 
Kandaleru. Effluent water was almost always pumped into the Kandaleru on a daily basis. 
Unfortunately, we did not include a question in our questionnaire that asked whether farms had 
constructed a clean water holding tank. Smaller farms, by contrast were found to exchange water 
less frequently, but in almost all cases, the intake water was pumped directly from the Kandaleru 
or from a small feeder canal leading to the Kandaleru. Water exchange serves several purposes 
such as replenishing evaporated pond water and replacing dirty pond water with clean water.
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the feed was foreign or domestically produced were not statistically significant in 
explaining farm efficiency.29
Technical efficiency appears to be related to the size of the pond. The 
positive coefficient for avpndz suggests that farms with a larger average pond 
size are less efficient. This suggests that ponds that are larger (and shallower) are 
less efficient than smaller (and deeper) ponds. As the pond size is directly under 
the manager’s control, this result could directly help to improve farm efficiency. 
The question remains, however, what is the optimum pond size for our sample?
5.9.5 Farm Specific Characteristics
The results suggest that ownership and corporate status have no 
statistically significant effect in explaining technical efficiency amongst sample 
farms. The coefficient estimates for the parameters associated with both variables 
are negative which suggest that owner-operators and those farms registered as 
corporate entities are more efficient than those that lease land and that are not 
corporate entities. However, both relationships are statistically insignificant by 
an asymptotic t-test.
5.9.6 Missing Variables
The explanatory variables included in the model of the inefficiency 
effects, while indicating the importance of management factors and farm specific 
characteristics, do not fully capture the extent to which management decisions 
can explain the variation of technical efficiency in brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture. Future studies should be designed to elicit more specific data 
regarding factors affecting managers’ decision making processes. For example, 
education level may be useful in addition to the variable yrsop which marks the
29 It is likely that the dfeed dummy variable may not separate out those farms using high-tech 
feed produced abroad and those using low tech feed produced locally, as was originally intended. 
It is possible that shrimp farmers may have purchased feed manufactured locally by multi­
nationals. This means that feed domestically produced may be high-tech feed, although domestic 
in origin. The variable is included it to identify whether feed produced locally or foreign 
manufactured feed makes any significant difference in the technical efficiency predictions.
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number of years the farm has been culturing shrimp. This variable is used to 
proxy managerial experience.
Another variable that may be useful in explaining technical efficiency and 
not included in the models is whether the manager has received any specialised 
government or private sector training in shrimp culture. Discussions with 
farmers revealed that managers of several large farms went as far as Thailand and 
Indonesia for specialised training. In contrast, owner-operators of smaller farms 
claim to predominantly “learn by doing”.
In addition, many larger farms contained small laboratories to test pond 
water quality. A question asking respondents whether they use scientific 
methods to test water quality may help to explain efficiency variation among 
farms. Obviously, there are many more factors that could be included. Overall, 
more detailed data on managerial and farm specific characteristics allows for 
better explanations on the variation of technical inefficiency in Indian shrimp 
culture systems.
5.10 Conclusions & Areas for Further Research
The Indian Supreme Court decision to ban all forms of non-traditional 
shrimp aquaculture has driven the industry to a stand-still. One well known 
consequence has been a financial crises for rural producers of shrimp. A second 
consequence has been the decline in foreign receipts brought into the country 
from farmed shrimp exports. Current parliamentary debate has focused attention 
on devising a method with which to effectively regulate the industry and thereby 
allow it to continue along clearly defined lines. Specifically, this commission 
has been set up to generate concrete solutions to ensure the sustainable 
development of this industry. To this effect, the first challenge is to assess the 
performance of the industry and secondly, to rigorously examine what types of 
farms are responsible for alleged negative externalities, both environmental and 
socio-economic.
This chapter deals directly with the first issue and provides a rigorous 
methodology in which to model, measure and explain technical efficiency in
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shrimp farms using parametric approaches. The results are based on primary data 
collected at the farm level which enables greater depth in analysis. In addition, a 
good account of what farm specific and managerial characteristics have a positive 
or negative impact on technical efficiency is provided. Scale, production 
environment, and farm mechanisation are important variables in explaining 
technical efficiency. In fact, from summary distributional statistics we see that 
small and medium size farms are on average over thirty percent more efficient 
than large size farms and that water quality may affect shrimp farm productivity. 
Moreover, farm mechanisation is associated with more efficient farms.
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Appendix 5 A 
Efficiency Indices
Table 5A.1
Efficiency Index for Sample Shrimp Farms 
Stochastic Production Frontier (preferred model)
Farm Index Farm Index
1 0.880523 42 0.638567
2 0.437072 43 0.849831
3 0.889835 44 0.851854
4 0.798151 45 0.828577
5 0.796105 46 0.901584
6 0.958702 47 0.943085
7 0.743510 48 0.936154
8 0.926662 49 0.775921
9 0.959009 50 0.792368
10 0.545658 51 0.910577
11 0.712821 52 0.930350
12 0.969191 53 0.907209
13 0.959380 54 0.933428
14 0.927878 55 0.633064
15 0.733268 56 0.853676
16 0.949038 57 0.933383
17 0.953400 58 0.542707
18 0.948741 59 0.789575
19 0.935711 60 0.920836
20 0.886751 61 0.961897
21 0.798016 62 0.866248
22 0.918008 63 0.935710
23 0.947939 64 0.362917
24 0.801861 65 0.545527
25 0.902015 66 0.442005
26 0.859372 67 0.415681
27 0.957901 68 0.581768
28 0.918761 69 0.510038
29 0.898682 70 0.207916
30 0.948073 71 0.471691
31 0.908605 72 0.333264
32 0.934167 73 0.356645
33 0.944162 74 0.106997
34 0.965244 75 0.647221
35 0.965723 76 0.246451
36 0.928504 77 0.233221
37 0.950557 78 0.580003
38 0.934588 79 0.214759
39 0.939287 80 0.079483
40 0.939476 81 0.113309
41 0.908377 82 0.001128
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Chapter 6
Measurement o f Kandaleru Shrimp Farm Productive Efficiency 
-A (Non-Parametric) Data Envelopment Analysis-
6.0 Introduction
In the stochastic production frontier approach (PFA) discussed in the 
previous chapter, small and medium size farms were found to be more efficient 
than large and corporate farms. The econometric results suggest that scale 
economies may exist in the shrimp farming sector. While the parametric 
investigation enables some analysis as to why larger farms are generally less 
efficient, the PFA is unable to determine what proportion of total productive 
efficiency is a result of scale.
Investigation into the importance of farm size and scale of culture operation 
in the efficiency debate is possible using non-parametric data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). DEA requires a linear programming procedure to minimise inputs per unit 
of output in order to determine the frontier of best-practice farms. The efficiency of 
each farm is assessed relative to the best practice frontier. Unlike parametric 
frontier analysis, DEA enables separation of the total efficiency index into scale 
adjusted technical efficiency or pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
Thus, it is possible to examine whether any inefficiencies are a result of the farm 
being an inappropriate size, or whether the farm manager is not combining inputs 
in the most efficient way. This is possible as a result of relaxing the assumption of 
strong disposability and constant returns to scale assumption that constrains most 
parametric models.1
There are also additional strengths of DEA that make it useful to 
practitioners. Unlike the parametric approach which requires some data 
manipulation, DEA uses the available data in its original form. The input levels, 
for example, need not be greater than zero as is required in PFA. Moreover, 
DEA does not include a disturbance term in estimating the frontier nor does it use
1 For a detailed discussion regarding the evolution o f DEA between 1978 and 1995, see Seiford 
(1996).
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any residual in computing the efficiency index. DEA also does not presuppose 
any specific production technology such as Cobb-Douglas or Translog, which 
must be specified in the parametric frontier approach. Overall, there is some 
debate between practitioners as to whether PFA or DEA provides greater insights 
in estimating productive efficiency of farms. This research, however suggests 
that given each method’s restrictive assumptions, both methods are employed to 
fully explore the issue of efficiency.
This chapter discusses both the theoretical construction of DEA and its 
application to the 82 Kandaleru shrimp farm sample in six sections. Section 6.1 
presents a brief review of the literature and discusses international evidence on the 
origin of scale economies in agriculture. Some conjectures are also made regarding 
the shrimp farm sector based on local conditions. Section 6.2 presents the linear 
programming problem and the formal DEA model. A brief overview of the data is 
presented in section 6.3. The empirical estimation of total, pure technical and scale 
efficiency is presented in section 6.4. In addition, the importance of farm size is 
discussed and the origins of scale economies in Indian shrimp farming are 
examined. In this respect, the role of past and current policies in determining the 
observed productivity relationships is examined. Section 6.5 concludes with a brief 
comparison between PFA and DEA methods and results.
6.1 Overview of the literature
6.1.1 International Experience
There appears to be a general consensus in the literature suggesting that 
economies of scale do not exist in agriculture and most empirical studies conclude 
that farms exhibit constant returns to scale (Johnson and Ruttan, 1994).2 When 
scale economies do exist, however, the source is attributed to factors such as lumpy 
inputs (i.e. mechanisation and managerial experience), missing or imperfect 
markets (i.e. a lack of access to credit) and/or the existence of plantation type
2 See Binswanger et al. (1993) for a comprehensive review o f efficiency studies with respect to 
agriculture.
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fanning which combines crop production and processing on a given farm.3 
Managerial skills and increasing farm mechanisation, access to credit, diffusion of 
risk and on-farm ancillary industries are typically associated with farms with larger 
land holdings. Several studies have shown that the marginal cost of total farm 
operation often reaches its minimum over larger farm areas (Binswanger et al., 
1993). That is, larger farms are more efficient than smaller farms.
There is general consensus that market imperfections often produce an 
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. This occurs especially if 
more than one market is imperfect. Binswanger (1995:4) concludes that,
:.:if credit is  rationed according to farm size, but all other markets are perfect, land and labour 
market transactions will produce a farm structure that equalises yields across farms of different 
operational size. But, if there are imperfections in two markets, land rental and insurance, or credit 
and labour, a systematic relationship can arise between farm size and productivity.
In contrast, there are numerous studies in the developing country literature, and 
particularly on South Asia, that conclude that smaller farms are more productive 
and more efficient than larger farms per unit cropping area. Binswanger et al. 
(1995) suggest that this is true since labour relations in smaller farms are generally 
better organised and incentive structures are clear. This is particularly true as 
smaller farms rely on family labour or locally hired hands when additional labour 
requirements are needed. This notion is supported by several other well known 
farm studies.4
However, Binswanger et al. (1993) argue that when economies of scale 
arise as a result of unequal access to farm machinery, to managerial expertise and 
to credit, the minimum efficient farm size increases by less than expected. This, 
they argue is a result of rental markets. The opportunity of renting farm machinery 
such as tractors tends to close the efficiency-size gap. Similar to farm machinery 
rental markets, it is possible that small farmers may also benefit from specialised 
public advisory services, extension services or private consultation not available to
3 Plantation type farms do not exist in this region. Corporate farms tend to have the farming and 
processing operations in different localities. This is mostly a result o f poor infrastructure (i.e. 
electricity for cold storage, roads for easy transportation, etc.) available along brackish water 
areas to support ancillary industries.
4 See Binswanger et al (1993); Binswanger and Kinsey (1993); Binswanger and Elgin (1992) 
and Berry and Cline (1979).
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larger farms (Binswanger et al, 1995). In addition, inter-linked credit markets that 
offer tied credit to small and marginal farmers discourage them from exiting the 
sector. With respect to the shrimp farm sector, it is unclear which effects dominate.
6.1.2 Local Experience
Commercial shrimp farming is distinctly similar in many ways to that of 
commercial agricultural production. Therefore, the size-efificiency debate that 
takes place with respect to agriculture probably transfers to the shrimp farming 
sector. However, there are as many differences between traditional agricultural 
production and shrimp production as similarities. Several are mentioned briefly.
First, in agriculture, small farms are often credit constrained. This is a 
result of imperfect rural credit markets and the fact that finance institutions are 
unwilling to lend to farmers without collateral. While rural credit by India’s 
national bank for agriculture and rural development (NARBARD) and government 
grants exist for small and marginal shrimp farmers, it is unclear as to their impact. 
Second, in agriculture, mechanisation and managerial experience increase with 
farm size. Shrimp farming appears to follows a similar path. Larger shrimp farms 
tend to use mechanical aerators and water pumps and employ university educated 
technical specialists and temporary consultants. Smaller farms, however, require 
fewer capital inputs and are less mechanised. While small and marginal farmers do 
have limited access to government extension programs, it is clear that only a 
minority benefit from these services (BFDA, 1997). Third, while risk is usually a 
decreasing function of size in agriculture, the opposite may be true of shrimp 
aquaculture. The data suggest that larger farms are engaged in more intensive 
culture practices (see Chapter 3). Moreover, intensive culture practices are alleged 
to cause aquatic environmental pollution and crop disease when the carrying 
capacity of the pond is breached (APO, 1995). Fourth, smaller shrimp farms 
employ family labour and hire local inhabitants while larger farms tend to hire 
employees from outside the region. This is unlike local agriculture, which tends to 
hire locally. Overall, it is difficult to discern which effects dominate.
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The question remains, what is the overall net effect of competing 
advantages and disadvantages due to farm size and the intensity of culture? An 
answer to this question lies in conclusions drawn from answers to several questions 
posed in the literature with respect to shrimp farming. They include,
• What is the range of productive efficiency of shrimp farms?
• Do scale economies exist in shrimp farming? And if so, do shrimp farms 
exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns?
• What are the origins of scale economies in shrimp farming?
• What relationships exist between efficiency and characteristics associated with 
environmental sustainability?
These questions are discussed in the context of the data envelopment analysis 
model applied to Kandaleru shrimp farm data in Section 6.4 of this chapter.
6.2 Data Envelopment Analysis: Method & Model
6.2.1 The Method
The non-parametric method used to measure the efficiency of Indian 
shrimp farms is called data envelopment analysis (DEA) and based on the 
seminal work of Farrell (1957). The Farrell (1957) approach employs a linear 
programming procedure to determine the frontier of best-practice firms and then 
to determine the efficiency of each production unit relative to that frontier. The 
efficiency frontier is defined by minimising the mix of input requirements to 
produce a unit of output. It is defined such that all firms in the sample are 
measured relative to the efficiency frontier unit isoquant, Y* illustrated in Figure 
6.0 below.
204
Figure 6.0 
Farrell (1957) Efficiency Measurement
Input X:
O
Input X,
The isoquant Y* is comprised of the locus of efficient points using the 
minimum required mix of inputs to produce the unit level of output. It represents 
the frontier of best practice farms. In the figure above, firms B, C and D are 
firms found to be efficient and therefore, in part, define the unit isoquant, Y*. 
As Y* represents the efficiency frontier, all firms that fall on Y* are efficient. The 
linear programming problem presented in section 6.2.2 formally defines the 
construction of the isoquant of best-practice firms. In contrast to firms B, C and 
D, non-frontier firm A uses more of both inputs X! and x2 to produce the same 
unit of output as efficient firm D on Y*. Firm A is therefore inefficient. The 
question remains, by how much?
The segment OD represents the lowest mix of inputs x, and x2 that firm A 
could use and still reach the isoquant, that is produce the same unit output, using 
its own factor combination. In a sense, it would ideally like to be like firm D. 
The segment OA represents the actual combination of inputs used by firm A. 
Farrell's radial measure of technical efficiency for firm A is OD/OA, a value that 
falls between zero and one. Thus OD/OA measures total efficiency, and includes 
both technical and scale effects.
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6.2,2 The Model
Farrell’s measure of technical efficiency can be formally expressed as,
F t(y,x) = Min ©
 ^  ^ where[Gx ^R+(YJ\
where Fj(y,x) is the measure of technical efficiency for farm i given the minimum 
combination of x  inputs used to produce a given level of y  output; © is a 
minimised parameter that represents the amount by which the observed input 
combination can be reduced. The boundary of the set R+(Y) represents the best 
practice unit isoquant. As discussed earlier, the unit isoquant defines the 
minimum combinations of inputs required to produce some unit output level, Y. 
The level of efficiency for each farm i is defined as the solution to the linear 
programming problem in (1) and subject to the following constraints,
(la) ziYi >  output constraint
(lb) z,X,  < ©x,. input constraint
(lc) z t > 0 ensures non-negative intensity parameters
where x  is a (n x 1) vector of inputs, y  is a (m x 1) vector of output, Y is a (m x k) 
matrix of output, X  is a (n x m) matrix of input combinations and z is the vector of 
farm-specific non-negative intensity parameters used to construct combinations of 
observed inputs and outputs. In this model, i indexes each of the 82 farms in the 
sample. © determines the minimum combination of each input needed to produce 
a given level of output by radial scaling the original observations and their convex 
sets.
Each constraint plays an important role in estimating technical efficiency. 
Constraint (la) is an output constraint. The left hand side constitutes a theoretical 
efficient farm against which the Ith farm output is compared. Constraint (lb) is the 
input constraint which consists of two parts. The ZgX, represents the minimum 
combination of inputs needed to produce an efficient outcome. The right hand side 
component, ©x, defines the actual level of inputs needed to produce output y  for 
the 1th farm, multiplied by ©, the amount by which the observed input
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combination can be reduced. A farm is considered totally efficient when 0  = 1. 
As a result, the component ziXj is exactly offset by ®xf. Therefore, the level and 
combination of inputs of the z* farm are the same as the theoretically efficient farm. 
A farm is considered inefficient when © < 1, which indicates that the theoretical 
minimum level of inputs is less than the actual input level of the z* farm. The final 
constraint, (Id) ensures that the vector of farm-specific intensity parameters are 
non-negative.
6.2.3 Decomposing Technical & Scale Effects
The objective of separating scale effects from total efficiency is to assess 
the degree to which (i) farms operating at an inappropriate size and non-optimal 
scale of culture operation, and (ii) farms are using less than efficient culture 
methods. The total efficiency index for each farm can be separated into scale 
efficiency and scale-adjusted efficiency or pure technical efficiency. 
Straightforward separation of pure technical and scale efficiency from the total 
efficiency index is not possible by parametric estimation techniques. The most 
common approach to determining returns to scale of estimated production 
functions such as the Cobb-Douglas specification is to sum the coefficients or 
output elasticities of the estimated model. A sum greater, equal and smaller than 
one indicates increasing, constant and decreasing returns respectively. While this 
approach is standard in empirical production economics, Binswanger (1995) 
warns against this procedure since inappropriate conclusions are easily drawn as 
a result of simple model misspecifications. As non-parametric models do not 
require specifying a particular functional form, the method in which returns to 
scale is measured is less vulnerable to problems arising from model 
misspecification.
Models in the non-parametric DEA approach are independent of any 
specific functional form and therefore less restrictive than parametric methods. 
Furthermore, the data used in DEA is unit neutral which means that it is not 
necessary for all firms to have positive values for all possible inputs or outputs. 
The major disadvantages of this approach, however is the lack of straightforward
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hypothesis tests, the extreme sensitivity of the model to an additional input or 
output vector and its sensitivity to outliers.
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) suggest an extension to Farrell’s linear 
programming problem from which pure technical (PTE) and scale efficiency 
(SE) is separated out from total efficiency (TE). While TE takes the output level 
as given, SE is concerned with choosing the maximum output level possible 
given the available mix of inputs. In measuring the scale effect, constant returns 
to scale is assumed to be the long-run equilibrium condition. This means that 
firms are assumed to operate at the minimum of the total cost curve in the long- 
run. By relaxing this assumption in the short-run, Fare et al. (1985) show that the 
level of total efficiency for a farm Fs(y,x) can be decomposed into pure 
technical efficiency, PTEj(y,x) and scale efficiency, SEj(y,x) according to the 
following relationship,
(2) Fi(y,x) = PTEi(y,x)SEi(y,x)
Following this model, PTEi(y,x) is calculated as a programming problem in 
which constant returns to scale is not imposed. Pure technical efficiency is 
therefore measured independently of scale effects. This is achieved by adding an 
additional restriction to the original programming problem formulated by Farrell 
(1957). The problem therefore becomes a straightforward extension of (1) and 
subject to constraints (la), (lb), (lc) with an additional constraint,
(id> 5>i=i
where the sum of Zj across all i inputs is constrained to equal one. This extra 
constraint on the z vector has the effect of enveloping the data more closely. It also 
allows for variable returns to scale to be exhibited. SEj takes on a value between 0 
and 1 where SEj=l identifies scale efficiency under local constant returns to scale 
and SEj<l indicates that the firm under investigation is not scale efficient (i.e. it
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does not produce at a scale exhibiting local constant returns).5 However, the degree 
to which it is scale inefficient is measured by its distance from one.
Figure 6.1 below uses a production function representation to illustrate 
this result. This representation is an alternative output maximisation formulation 
of the problem with firms on the production function defining the frontier and the 
efficiency of other firms being measured relative to it.6 With output Y  and input 
X, the constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier is denoted by the straight line total 
product curve, OP, which passes through the observations for the efficient firms 
B and C. Firms A and D are inefficient as they lie below the CRS frontier. 
When the constant returns to scale assumption is relaxed, the technical efficiency 
frontier, shown by the solid line segments, X \B,C,D, is concave. In addition to 
firms B and C the input-output combinations of firms A and D are also 
technically efficient.
Figure 6.1
Decomposition of Pure Technical & Scale Efficiency
With this representation, scale efficiency, SEj(y,x), is calculated as 
Fi(y,x)/PTEi(y,x), since F;(y,x) includes both technical and scale efficiency
5 Affiat (1972) is one o f  the first to show that by restricting the intensity vector to sum to one 
permits increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale to be exhibited.
6 See Varian (1984) for a comprehensive discussion o f the dual and prim a l approaches to 
efficiency measures.
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effects. Extracting the pure technical efficiency effects from total efficiency 
leaves scale efficiency. Therefore as depicted below, firm A is scale inefficient 
by OX/OX*. Although it exhibits pure technical efficiency, firm A is considered 
too small. Firm D also exhibits pure technical efficiency, but is too large. It is 
scale inefficient by OX*VOX***. Finally, firm E is technically inefficient by 
OX*/OX** and scale inefficient by OX/OX*. It’s total level of inefficiency 
relative to the best-practice frontier is OX/OX**.
6,2,4 Returns to Scale
Returns to scale is a technical property of technology. It refers to the 
relationship between the combination of inputs and output as all inputs are varied 
in the same proportion. There are three types of returns to scale that a firm can 
exhibit: constant, increasing, and decreasing. All have well defined properties 
(see Varian, 1984). As discussed earlier, the linear programming model presented 
in (1) with its associated constraints, (la-ld) can be adjusted to relax the constant 
returns to scale assumption. Non-constant returns to scale are exhibited when 
SE>1. To determine the direction of non-CRS, an additional constraint which 
imposes non-increasing returns is defined, namely (le).
Earlier, the constraint on the z vector, (Id) z, = 1 was imposed to relax 
the CRS assumption and allow for variable returns to scale by enveloping the data 
more closely. This constraint, however, does not determine whether the non­
constant returns are increasing or decreasing. It simply informs that non-constant 
returns to scale are exhibited. To identify whether non-constant returns to scale are 
increasing or decreasing, the earlier constraint (Id) is replaced by a more powerful 
scale constraint, (le). The new and final programming problem becomes,
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(1)
Fifyx) -  Min 0  
where]®x eR+(Y)]
subject to
(la)
(lb)
(lc)
(le)
zX  > y.t output constraint
ziXi < 0x, input constraint
z, > 0 ensures non-negative intensity parameters
^  z, <1 defines returns to scale
All variables and constraints are as previously defined in Section 6.2.2.
In Figure 6.1, with output Y and input X , the constant returns to scale 
frontier is denoted by the total product curve, OP which passes from the origin 
through efficient firms B and C. The efficiency measure, © for firm A is the same 
relative to the constant returns to scale and non-increasing returns schematic in 
Figure 6.1, but higher relative to the variable returns to scale technology. If the 
efficiency measure under constant returns and non-increasing returns are not the 
same, then the returns to scale are decreasing (DRS). The literature states that 
firms exhibiting constant returns to scale are thought to be efficient; those 
exhibiting increasing returns are thought to be producing too little; and firms 
producing at decreasing returns to scale are considered too big.
The empirical non-parametric investigation of shrimp farm efficiency in the 
Kandaleru basin is based on the same 82 shrimp farm primary data set used in the 
parametric analysis. Total shrimp output per farm is measured in kilograms. The 
five primary inputs used in producing shrimp are seed, feed, land, labour and 
aerators. The total amount of seed used by each farm is represented by the total 
number of PL20 (20 day old post larvae or shrimp seed) purchased. Total farm 
feed requirements are measured in kilograms. The land variable represents the 
culture area in water spread hectares. Labour requirements are measured in person- 
days per farm. The average number of aerators used in each pond multiplied by the
6.3 The Data
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total number of ponds on the farm represents the total number of aerators used per 
farm. The data corresponds to the second and final culture period of the 1996 
bumper season. A detailed account of the data collection method is presented in 
Chapter 2. Summary statistics of the data are presented in Chapter 5.
6.4 Empirical Results
The non-parametric DEA frontier results are summarised in Table 6.0. 
Approximately nine percent of the farms in the sample lie on the best practice 
frontier which suggest that the frontier is not determined bv a couple of outliers. 
As discussed earlier, non-parametric frontier measures are constructed using all the 
data provided on all the farms in the sample. In addition, a specific production 
technology is not assumed in the calculation of the efficiency indices. The 
efficiency index for each farm is measured relative to a frontier that shifts 
depending on which farms are included and excluded from the sample. As a result, 
the efficiency measure for each farm is susceptible to some degree of fluctuation. 
However, this analysis includes each of the 82 shrimp farms and excludes none.7
This empirical investigation moves beyond the discussion offered in the 
previous chapter which focused primarily on the relationship between farm and 
managerial characteristics and total efficiency in Kandaleru shrimp farming. In this 
section, we focus on the relationship between farm size, culture intensity and pure 
technical, scale and total efficiency. The idea is to attempt to link the concept of 
efficiency and sustainability together with respect to the development of shrimp 
farming. This is of particular interest following the December 1996 Indian 
Supreme Court ban on shrimp farming.
The results presented in this section are structured around an investigation 
of answers to four key questions presented in section 6.1.2 and repeated here. First, 
do scale economies exist in shrimp farming? Second, if scale economies do exist, 
do shrimp farms exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing returns? Third, what are 
the origins of scale economies in shrimp farming? Finally, how can knowledge of
7 Including all 82 farms enables direct comparison with PFA results. This comparison is 
presented in the final section o f this chapter.
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efficiency measures provide insights to effectively regulate the shrimp farming 
sector along sustainable lines? The first of these four question raised is discussed 
next.
6.4.1 The Importance of Shrimp Farm Size and Scale of Operation
Data envelopment analysis confirms that the scale of operation is a crucial 
factor in explaining shrimp farm efficiency. In Table 6.0, pure technical and scale 
efficiency is extracted from total efficiency. The results suggest an inverse 
relationship between farm size, scale inefficiency and pure technical efficiency in 
the Kandaleru shrimp faiming sector. While small and medium size farms are on 
average technically efficient, they remain largely scale inefficient. In contrast, 
while large and corporate farms are on average scale efficient, they remain largely 
technically inefficient.
The existence of scale inefficiency among farms in the sample implies 
that Kandaleru farms are not culturing at the optimal scale of operation to ensure 
maximum total efficiency. More formally, microeconomic theory suggests that 
these farms are not operating at the minimum of average cost. They are 
essentially constrained by their scale of operation, and most likely, their size. 
This further suggests that if farms were scale-adjusted, overall total efficiency 
could increase. In fact, when scale-adjusted, the pure technical efficiency for 
small and medium farms is 99 percent and 87 percent, respectively. In contrast, 
large and corporate farms, while over 90 percent scale efficient, are on average 
severely technically inefficient.
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Table 6.0
Pure Technical, Scale & Total Efficiency Indices in the Shrimp Farming Industry
(contribution o f  pure & scale inefficiency to total inefficiency in parenthesis; %)8
Mean Mean Mean
Total Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency
Smallest Farms 
less than 2 wsha 65.6 99.9 65.7
N =11 (0.30) (99.7)
Medium Size Farms 
between 2 and 5 wsha 53.1 87.1 65.1
N=34 (27.0) (73.0)
Large Farms 
between 5 and 10 wsha 48.1 54.7 90.9
N=22 (83.3) (16.7)
Corporate Farms 
above 10 wsha 57.9 64.1 92.9
N=15 (83.5) (16.5)
All Farms Average 
N=82 54.4 76.3 76.9
(50.6) (49.4)
In all cases, average total efficiency in each size category falls below 
approximately 66 percent. The average efficiency of the sample is 54.4 percent. 
The mean total efficiency for the smallest size farms is 65.6 percent. This 
suggests that these farms are scale inefficient and do not operate at the most 
efficient size to ensure maximum total efficiency. Adjusted for farm size, the 
average pure technical efficiency of these farms is at a high level, 99.9 percent. 
This suggests that scale accounts for approximately 99.7 percent of the 
inefficiency of the smallest farms in the sample. Medium size farms are 
similarly constrained by their inefficient size. Scale inefficiency is responsible 
for approximately 73 percent of these farms’ total inefficiency. Technical 
inefficiency accounts for the remaining 27 percent.
In contrast, large and corporate farms on average suffer from a lack of 
technical efficiency as opposed to scale inefficiencies. Large farms are on 
average the most inefficient group in the sample at 48.1 percent. However, less 
than 6 percent of this size group’s inefficiency is a result of scale inefficiency. 
Corporate farms are on average the most scale efficient group and the second 
most technically inefficient group in the sample. Technical inefficiency makes
8 Calculation is as follows: [(100-PTE)/(100-PTE) - (100-SE)]* 100.
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up 83.5 percent of this category’s average overall inefficiency. Scale 
inefficiencies account for only 16.5 percent of overall shrimp farm inefficiency. 
Table 6.1 makes the distinction clear between farm size and the origins of 
inefficiency in the sample.
Table 6.1
Efficiency and Farm Size, Production Intensity and Feed Use9
Scale Efficient Farms* Scale Inefficient Farms All Farms
scale-eff. Index 0.951 0.504 0.763
pure technical-eff. Index 0.604 0.997 0.766
total-eff. Index 0.576 0.502 0.542
number o f farms 48 farms 34 farms 82 farms
mean size or culture area 9.22 hectares 2.92 hectares 6.69 hectares
mean stocking density 105,212 seed 57,580 seed 87,688 seed
mean feed conversion ratio* 3.28 1.42 2.59
defined as those faims with a scale efficiency index greater than the mean, 0.763. These farms 
exhibit either constant returns (no diseconomies o f scale) or weak diseconomies of scale, \ilogram s 
o f  feed/kilograms o f output.
Table 6.1 implies that the farm size-efficiency relationship has its origin in 
both scale and technical efficiency. This is further underscored by the fact that a 
large average farm size, high stocking density and a high feed conversion ratio 
generally characterise scale efficient farms. Meanwhile, the opposite is true of 
scale-inefficient farms. While it is clear from the above results that smaller farms 
(with an average farm size of 2.92 hectares) suffer from scale inefficiencies, large 
farms are technically inefficient (as is also evident from Table 6.0). The above 
table also suggests that scale inefficient but pure technically efficient farms on 
average use feed efficiently. This is reflected by the low feed conversion ratio of 
1.42 for scale inefficient farms and relatively high feed conversion ratio of 3.28 for 
scale efficient farms. This result suggests that larger farms are more responsible for 
excess feeding which allegedly causes environmental pollution.
9 The largest and smallest farm is dropped from each farm size category.
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6.4.2 Returns to scale10
While total efficiency is determined by taking the output level as given, 
scale efficiency chooses the optimal output given a farm’s input combination. 
While it is clear that smaller farms in the sample are relatively scale inefficient 
(in comparison with larger farms), the following question of importance 
remains—does the scale of operation need to be adjusted such that a fewer or 
greater quantity of inputs are used? The answer to this question lies in whether 
farms are operating under decreasing or increasing returns to scale.
The DEA results reveal that there are scale economies in shrimp farming. 
Table 6.2 presents the number of-farms-in-each-size category-operating-under 
constant, decreasing and increasing returns to scale. Generally, a farm is scale 
inefficient if it is operating at non-constant returns to scale. This means that it is 
not operating at the minimum of the average cost function. Of the 82 farm 
sample, 14 farms exhibit local decreasing returns, which indicate that their 
productivity would be higher if they were smaller (i.e. they are too big); 61 farms 
exhibit local increasing returns which indicate that they produce too little and 
could have increased productivity had they been operating at a larger scale (i.e. 
they are too small). Only 7 farms exhibit local constant returns to scale. These 
seven farms are perfectly efficient.
Scale economies exhibited by farm size can be further decomposed by 
those exhibiting strong or weak increasing returns to scale (IRS) and decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS). The results are illuminating. There is an even 
distribution of small and medium size farms that exhibit locally increasing 
returns. In contrast there are no small farms that exhibit locally decreasing 
returns. This suggests that the smallest sized farms could become more efficient 
if they became larger.
10 In this discussion, firms exhibit local returns to scale as opposed to global returns to scale.
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Table 6.2
The Number and Percentage of Farms 
Exhibiting Constant, Decreasing and Increasing Returns to Scale
Number and 
Percentage o f Farms 
exhibiting CRS
Number and 
Percentage of Farms 
exhibiting DRS
Number and 
Percentage o f  Farms 
exhibiting IRS
Smallest Farms 
less than 2 wsha 
N = ll
1 9.1% 0 0.0% 10 90.9%
Medium Size Farms 
between 2 and 5 wsha 
N=34
2 5.7% 4 11.4% 29 82.9%
Large Farms 
-betwccn-5 and-KMvsha- 
N=22
- a -9,0% - 9 -  - . 40,9%- - 43* _ — 594% —
Corporate Farms 
above 10 wsha 
N=15
4 26.6% 2 13.3% 9» 60.0%
All Farms Average 
N=82 7 9.0% 14 17.0% 61 74.0%
* only 1 large farm and 2 corporate farms exhibit strong IRS (SE < 0.95).
Each of the 11 large and corporate farms exhibiting local DRS have scale 
efficiency indices of 0.950 or greater. This suggests that while they are 
considered too big, they are only marginally so. Similarly, a clear majority of 
large and corporate farms that exhibit IRS have scale efficiency indices greater 
than 0.90. Only three farms exhibit strong local IRS. The remaining farms are 
relatively scale efficient. Large and corporate farms are overall, operating at a 
relatively efficient size.
DEA analysis does not provide direct explanations for the advent of scale 
economies in shrimp farming. The origins of scale economies (or scale 
diseconomies) and related issues are explored next.
6.4.3 The Origin of Scale Economies
Microeconomic theory suggests that firms exhibiting local constant 
returns to scale operate at the minimum of the average cost curve. One well 
established property of the average cost curve is simply that it is a declining 
function of output under increasing returns to scale, and an increasing function of 
output under decreasing returns to scale. Chavas and Aliber (1993) suggest that
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the inverse of the scale efficiency index, approximates the average cost function 
in its interpretation. This approximation, allows for a graphical investigation into 
the origin of scale diseconomies in shrimp farms.11
In the 82 shrimp farm sample, the farm size-scale efficiency relationship is 
clear. The inverse of the scale efficiency index for the largest farms in the sample 
(those greater than ten waterspread hectares) is 1.09 as opposed to smaller farms 
(those less than ten water spread hectares) which have an average index of over 2.0. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates that while scale efficient farms exist in every size category, 
there is clear evidence that economies of scale exist for small and medium size 
farms. This is a result of the numerous farms operating far above the minimum of 
the average cost curve or 1/SE >1 (see below). The question remains, why?
Figure 6.2 
Farm Size-Eff iciency Relationship
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Farm S ize  in w a t e r  s p r e a d  h e c t a r e s
1/SE can be interpreted as the relative decrease in average cost obtainable 
from re-scaling output to the point of locally constant returns to scale. Only 18 
percent of small farms and 36 percent of medium size farms are relatively scale 
efficient.12 These farms used inputs most effectively to produce a given level of 
output. They are represented in the figure above as those farms falling directly 
on or around the value 1/SE = 1. For the remaining scale inefficient shrimp
11 Chavas and Alibar (1993) make a case for dairy farmers in the United States. The same 
technique has been applied in other farm level studies (see Binswanger et al., 1995).
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farms in the sub-sample, seed, feed, land and labour inputs remain slack. Slack 
variables are those that do not act as constraints on the linear programming 
problem derived in equation (1). Although it appears from the figure above that 
farms of the smallest size have a large variance in scale inefficiency, there exists 
a strong relationship in the data.
To investigate the exact relationship between scale efficiency and size for 
the smallest farms, the Pearson correlation coefficient is examined. The 
statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.319 in comparing the 
relationship between scale efficiency and size (for those farms under 5 water spread 
hectares) suggests that as farms become larger, they become more scale efficient. 
A similar comparison between scale efficiency and the stocking density suggest 
that the relationship is not significantly different from zero at ten percent. This 
suggests that it is farm size and not seed inputs that most likely drive the scale 
inefficiency in the smallest farms in the sample. The relationship can be 
represented by a curve, convex to the origin with a slope near one for the smallest 
farms, and that becomes slightly less steep as farm size increases.
6.4.4 Factors Contributing to Scale Economies
DEA analysis measures the efficiency of firms relative to a best practice 
isoquant. Ali and Seiford (1993) suggest that derivation of the efficiency index can 
be viewed as the first stage of a two-stage model. They suggest that one or more 
variable inputs may be slack for firms found both on and off the frontier. A slack 
input is flagged when the marginal physical product of that input is reduced to zero. 
This means that input quantities above a given level do not contribute further to 
creating additional output. A slack variable does not act as a constraint on 
production in the programming problem and this indicates excess amounts of a 
given input in the production process. To be fully efficient, a farm should have no 
slack variable input. The absence of slack inputs suggest that the minimum 
quantity of each input is used in the optimal proportion to maximise output. The 
presence of surplus inputs suggests that one way of improving technical efficiency
12 1/SE is less than 1.05 and 1-SE is less than .05 in these cases which suggest that these farms
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is to re-adjust the input combination. In fact, a slack input implies that reducing 
that input relative to the others will ensure that the farm operates at its optimum or 
most efficient point of production.
With respect to the Kandaleru shrimp farms, knowledge of input slacks 
provide (in theory) an indication of which farmers are over-stocking, over-feeding, 
using excess labour, land and capital inputs and by how much. This is, of course, 
relative to the most efficient combination of inputs to ensure maximum efficiency. 
Knowledge of input slacks can also help identify characteristics of farms most 
likely to waste inputs. Wasted inputs are not only expensive for the shrimp farmer 
(in that the farm operates above minimum average cost), but are also allegedly 
responsible for polluting discharge water. This is particularly noteworthy in the 
case of excessive feed use. Similarly, excessively large farms are allegedly 
responsible for salinity of agricultural land and well water.13
6.4.5 Environmental Implications of Input Slacks
Environmental pollution, as a direct and indirect result of shrimp farming 
is causing alarm throughout shrimp farming nations. Experts agree that water 
pollution is a direct result of excessive stocking and over-feeding (APO, 1995). 
According to a scientific report submitted to the Andhra Pradesh Pollution 
Control Board in 1996, the water quality of the Kandaleru river has deteriorated 
as a result of shrimp farming (Rao, 1996). The report, based on laboratory 
examination of water samples taken from over a fifty kilometer stretch along the 
Kandlaeru, examined eleven water quality indicators. The results suggest that at 
severed localities along the Kandaleru (which according to the report, appear to 
be near large shrimp farming clusters), the river is unable to support traditional 
plant and animal life previously living in its waters (Rao, 1996:9-15). In the 
following sub-section, input slack data generated by DEA methods are examined
are more than 95 percent scale efficient.
13 Recall the discussion presented in the first chapter which cites studies claiming the relationship 
between feed and polluted discharge water. The relationship between well water salinity and the 
number o f  ponds or water spread area is presented in Chapter 7.
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to explore whether Kandaleru shrimp farms are indeed over-stocking and over­
feeding.
Table 6.3 presents the average quantity of slack inputs per water spread 
area and the percent of excess per farm in each farm size category. A slack input 
(in this regard) can be defined as the physical amount of inputs used in excess of 
the minimum amount needed to achieve the theoretically optimal level of 
productive efficiency. It essentially can be thought of as a surplus amount of 
input. Dividing the amount of each slack input by the water spread area per farm 
enables direct comparison between farm size categories. The “percent excess” is 
the proportion of slack input to the total amount of that input actually used to 
produce the maximum output, given the input proportions.
Table 6.3
Input Slacks (total amount per water spread hectare) & Percent in Excess
Farm
Size
Seed Feed Land Labour Aerators
Small 9,758 
25.2 percent
42.7 
12.0 percent
.095 
2.3 percent
9.2
8.3 percent
.3
1.2 percent
Medium’ 14,089 
24.1 percent
195.7 
27.6 percent
.129 
12.9 percent
40.5 
27.4 percent
0.4
10.3 percent
Large 6,551 
6.5 percent
22.9 
1.5 percent
.214 
16.4 percent
15.4 
8.8 percent
1.7
45.4 percent
Corporat
e
5,823 
2.2 percent
99.9 
1.6 percent
.321
31.2 percent
12.5 
4.4 percent
1.1
10.4 percent
ALL 9,968 
19.3 percent
111.3 
27.5 percent
.213
21.3 percent
24.5 
18.7 percent
0.9
18.2 percent
note: dropping farm number 10 reduces the average feed input slack to approximately 100 
kilograms. The percent excess falls to approximately 12 percent. The other slacks remain 
relatively unchanged.
It is possible to use both the efficiency index and the level of input slacks 
(especially excess feed per water spread hectare) in assessing the sustainability of 
each shrimp fanning system. Improvements in technical know-how and 
managerial capabilities could have significant direct and indirect costs and 
benefits. Naturally, these improvements would change the way in which 
combinations of inputs are used.
In the shrimp fanning sector, much of the technology used to rapidly grow 
shrimp to its maximum size in the minimum amount of time is embedded in feed. 
Pellet feed contains growth hormones and antibiotics in addition to fish meal, its
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principle ingredient. Surplus feed (i.e. feed not consumed), settles to the pond 
bottom and degrades the aquatic pond environment. The combination of over 
stocking and over feeding can lead to crop disease. This is in turn discharged into 
common water ways via farm discharge water, or effluent. In this way, one 
infected farm can infect downstream farms by polluting common access coastal 
waters.14
Of all the principal inputs used in shrimp culture, feed requirements are 
exceeded on average by 27.5 percent or 111 kilograms per water spread hectare 
per culture cycle as compared to its minimum use to achieve the optimal 
efficiencv level. Similarlv, seed requirements are exceeded on average bv 19.3 
percent or 9,968 seed per water spread hectare per culture cycle.
It is clear from Table 6.3 that the culture method employed by corporate 
and large farms waste far less seed than small and medium size farms. Small and 
Medium size farms tend to over-stock by approximately 25 percent than if they 
were operating at maximum efficiency. In contrast, the percent excess for large 
and corporate farms is 6.5 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively—significantly less 
than smaller size farms. This is clearly a result of the large volume of inputs 
used during the production cycle. While larger farms tend to use seed inputs 
more efficiently than smaller farms, the same cannot be said of feed use.
Corporate farms, on average, over-feed by 100 kilograms per water 
spread hectare. Although this amount appears small in proportion to the total 
feed inputs used per water spread hectare (i.e. 1.6 percent), the ramifications are 
significant. For example, a corporate farm culturing over 25 water spread 
hectares, over the course of a production cycle wastes 2.5 tonnes of feed.15 This 
excess is ultimately responsible for polluting the natural environment. It is 
discharged as effluent at a specific discharge point into the common access 
waterway. The consequences can include siltation, eutrophication, oxygen 
depletion, toxicity which degrade flora, fauna and other bio-diversity of coastal 
waters (Gujja, 1997:12; Dierberg and Kiattisimkul, 1996).
14 See Chapter 1, section 1.3 for a detailed discussion
15 These comparisons are relative to the most efficient use o f feed inputs.
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Large size farms, in contrast, appear to over-feed by less than any other size 
category. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that it is the largest size farms 
that are likely to be responsible for over-feeding and thereby polluting the 
environment. One possible explanation for this result is that large farms are 
individually owned and usually managed by the owner. Corporate farms, in 
contrast, are run by hired managers. It may be the case that owner-operators are 
more likely to manage expensive inputs such as feed more efficiently. The next 
section explores this idea more fully by examining whether the differences in 
managerial and/or farm characteristics are useful in explaining differentials in scale 
efficiency.
6.4.6 The Importance of Managerial and Farm Characteristics
In addition to slack inputs, there are other factors that may contribute to 
explaining the scale inefficiency of farms. Some variables worth considering in a 
second-stage model include farm size, the number of years of managerial 
experience, location, tractor use, chemical use, the origin of feed (foreign made or 
domestically produced), farm ownership status and corporate status. A second 
stage regression, similar to that conducted in the second stage of the parametric 
analysis discussed in the preceding chapter is presented in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4
A Second Stage Regression: Explaining Economies of Scale
Variables 
% scale efficient
pooled sample
coefficient t-value
small farms
coefficient t-value
large farms
coefficient t-value
extensive culture dummy -4.7039 -0.342 -7.3418 -0.692 -6.6218 -0.423
small farm dummy -28.9634 -4.144 -36.6605 -3.823 drop drop
years o f  managerial experience 1.1328 1.434 2.9992 0.897 1.0473 0.789
location dummy -0.2117 -0.563 -5.1848 -0.698 6.9356 1.161
tractor use dummy 2.3768 1.757 9.5326 1.177 drop drop
water pump dummy -0.6581 -0.098 -6.7982 -0.655 16.910 1.576
daily water exchange (%) 1.2473 1.795 0.1842 0.159 1.7894 2.188
chemical use dummy -7.0818 -0.427 -14.9913 -0.767 -7.7128 -1.063
foreign feed dummy -0.0901 -1.201 5.6287 0.877 -0.9361 -0.360
ownership dummy -6.7036 -1.085 -17.8929 -2.466 17.1294 1.205
corporate dummy -15.3987 -1.995 -19.0345 -1.045 -18.5769 -2.298
constant 86.9145 16.481 88.1613 3.496 66.8075 3.579
N 82 45 37
R2 0.49 0.41 0.33
Adj-R2 0.41 0.25 0.10
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00
note: * t-value greater than 1.63 implies that the explanatory variable is significant at ten percent or 
better.
The OLS regression results of the pooled sample suggest that the smallest 
farms in the sample are on average" 28.9 percent less scale efficient than larger 
farms. This confirms the earlier result that the economies of scale are found in 
predominantly farms operating under five water spread hectares. The positive and 
significant coefficient on the tractor dummy suggests that those farms that employ 
tractor inputs are 2.3 percent more scale efficient than those that do not. Daily 
water exchange practices associated with more intensive culture practices also 
increases scale efficiency. Corporate shrimp farms are on average 15.6 percent less 
scale efficient than non-corporate farms. The following discussion on specific 
characteristics of the Kandaleru shrimp farming productive environment helps to 
explain some of these results.
(i) mechanisation
The use of machines at all stages of the shrimp production cycle was found 
to positively influence overall scale efficiency of farms, regardless of size. 
Specifically, those farms that used tractor inputs for pond preparation and diesel
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driven pumps and aerators for water exchange were found to be more scale 
efficient than those that did not. In the case of the smallest size farms, rental 
agreements between large and small farmers and or sharing arrangements between 
small farmers make mechanisation possible. The econometric estimation of the 
large farm sample reveals that tractor use and water pumps reduce scale 
inefficiency. Both variables are found to be significantly different from zero at one 
percent significance for the pooled sample.
(ii) managerial expertise and experience
Managers of larger farms and especially corporate farms have more formal 
educational training in shrimp culture. Corporate entities hire degree holding 
micro-biologists, fisheries scientists and MBA’s to oversee the day to day culture 
operation of the shrimp farm. In addition, larger farms sent owners and managers to 
Thailand and Indonesia for formal training programs.16 Smaller farm owner- 
operators were less exposed to formal training programs and formal education. In 
fact, group interviews with small and marginal Kandaleru shrimp farmers revealed 
that several of them dropped out of school in order to culture shrimp. Nonetheless, 
BFDA training and extension programs do exist for small farmers. However, only 
a small proportion of small farmers participated in government sponsored 
initiatives, mostly due to a lack of funding. The positive coefficient on the years of 
managerial experience variable suggest that the number of years of shrimp farming 
experience played a positive role on scale efficiency. However, this variable is not 
significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.
(iii) labour
In smaller shrimp farms, family and hired labour work closely together 
which facilitates effective monitoring. In addition, wages are not paid to family 
members which keep labour costs low. Larger farms tend to hire seasonal workers 
who may change from season to season, and year to year. They most likely face
16 This was found to be a common practice among Kandaleru shrimp farmers.
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high transaction costs in the labour market and high supervision costs not faced by 
smaller farms. According to Table 6.3, the largest and smallest farms in the 
sample use labour most efficiently given their size. Medium size farms, on 
average employ 40.5 person-days of labour in excess of the minimum required 
amount to achieve optimal efficiency. Medium size farms are by far the most 
inefficient size group at employing the optimal amount of labour.
(iv) access to land
Throughout the Kandaleru region, prior to shrimp farming’s boom, land 
adjacent to brackishwater bodies was owned by either the government or by 
members of the local population. In the 1996 season, most larger farms were 
owned and operated by private entrepreneurs or companies who came to the region 
from outside. In contrast, owner-operators of smaller farms were native to the 
region, and often from nearby villages.
Over the past ten years, local land has been purchased by outsiders for the 
sake of shrimp fanning (see Chapter 3). There has also been a fair degree of land 
owned by the government that has been leased, purchased or encroached upon by 
shrimp entrepreneurs. Generally, there is an imperfect market that does not favour 
large farmers, who may wish to expand, but are constrained, despite the financial 
resources. This is most likely a result of a recent unwillingness of local land 
owners to sell land (and thereby lose ownership rights). Instead, there has been an 
increasing prevalence in fixed-term leasing arrangements. On the other hand, small 
and marginal farmers may wish to expand, but may be credit constrained and 
therefore unable to do so.
(v) access to credit to purchase inputs
It is unclear as to the degree to which small and marginal shrimp farmers 
are credit constrained. While they may suffer from a lack of available cash to 
purchase inputs, four arrangements appear to have surfaced to diminish this 
possibility. First, many small and medium size farmers are involved in an inter­
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linked or tied credit market with feed manufacturers and processing units. The idea 
is that the feed manufacturers give pellet feed to the credit constrained farmer in 
return for exclusive right to that farmer’s harvest. Processing plants also offer 
credit in exchange for the season’s produce. In both cases, an agent is involved in 
picking up the harvest and transporting it to a processing facility. This cost is not 
assumed by the farmer. Second, government grants are made available to shrimp 
farmers of all sizes through the Brackishwater Fish Farmers’ Development 
Association (BFDA). However, data on the distribution of funds suggest that only 
a small number of farms have benefited from this scheme in Andhra Pradesh 
(BFDA, 1996).
Third, since 1989-1990 India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) has offered credit to shrimp farmers of all sizes. The 
share of NABARD’s fisheries disbursement targeted for brackishwater shrimp 
culture rose from 9.03 percent in 1989-1990 to 55.86 percent in 1994-1995. The 
latter year disbursement amounts to over Rs. 562.5 million for the sector (Pathak, 
1997). While small farmers do receive NABARD credit, it is unclear as to the 
proportion that do so. Moreover, the original farm survey did not include a 
question asking whether each farm benefited from credit.17 Nonetheless, a 
NABARD bank is located in Gudur, which is immediately adjacent to the 
Kandaleru river shrimp farms. It is thus likely that sample farmers did receive this 
benefit.
Finally, the role of informal credit amongst small farmers in this sector is 
unclear, but it most likely operates in a similar manor to that of agriculture. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the small farm dummy suggests that small 
farms are likely to dramatically increase productive efficiency by culturing over a 
larger area.
17 Details o f NABARD’s financial outlays are presented in Pathak (1997) who suggests that loan 
recovery for small and medium scale farmers is between 40-75 percent. In areas where there is a 
joint effort between NARBARD, the BFDA, and door to door recovery campaigns, the recovery 
rate jumps to as high as 97 percent (as was witnessed in Orissa).
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(vi) risk
Risk of crop loss is a direct function of stocking density and the quality of 
intake water. Unlike in agriculture, larger shrimp farms face greater risk as they 
culture shrimp more intensively. This is believed to increase the probability of crop 
disease. This is simply a result of the unfamiliarity with shrimp culture technology. 
If more intensive farms get the input combinations incorrect, the result is shrimp 
fry stress, pond water pollution and eventually disease and crop loss. We 
hypothesise that the risk-reward ratio is relatively constant and irrespective of farm 
size, but offer no further discussion.
The estimation results suggest that farms that practice extensive culture are 
slightly less scale efficient.18 This is most likely driven by the fact that smaller size 
farms are more likely to practice extensive culture than larger farms. As already 
discussed, smaller farms are disproportionately scale inefficient amongst the 82 
farm sample.
(vii) Summary
Small farms can increase their productive efficiency by culturing over 
larger areas. DEA results confirm that they are scale inefficient and exhibit 
increasing returns to scale (i.e. they are too small). Larger farms, in contrast, could 
increase productive efficiency by scaling down the intensity of culture operations, 
although scale-adjusted pure technical efficiency is a moderately acceptable 83 
percent.
6.4.7 Feed Conversion Ratio and Technical Inefficiency
DEA separates technical efficiency into pure and scale inefficiency. 
While origins of scale efficiency were discussed in the preceding sub-section, 
this sub-section examines the origins of pure technical efficiency found to exist 
amongst the largest farms in the Kandaleru shrimp farm sample. In this context,
18 However, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at ten percent.
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the relationship between pure technical efficiency and the feed conversion ratio is 
explored. This is of particular interest as shrimp farm owners and managers use 
the feed conversion ratio (FCR) as a measure of their overall productive 
performance.
Pure technical inefficiency occurs when, with the existing technology 
and input combination, a farm could produce more output with the inputs it 
employs (or the same level of output with fewer inputs). The presence of pure 
technical inefficiency as the major source of total inefficiency in large and 
corporate shrimp farms may suggest the inability of these farms to solve 
technical problems in the production process. The consequence of pure technical 
inefficiency is ultimately a reduction in output levels from what is theoretically 
possible.
The shrimp farming sector has adopted the Feed Conversion Ratio (FCR) 
as a measure of feed use efficiency. The FCR is constructed as the ratio between 
the weight in kilograms of feed used and the weight in kilograms of shrimp 
produced. Sector specialists suggest that the feed conversion ratio of shrimp 
feeds produced in India range from 2 to 5, while that of imported feeds have a 
range of 1.2 to 1.8 (Sukumaran et al., 1990). The FCR for sample Kandaleru 
shrimp farms investigated in this dissertation range from a very efficient 0.98 to 
over 9.4. A discernible pattern, however, does appear to exist: larger farms tend 
to use feed less efficiently than smaller farms. This conclusion was also 
supported by input slack data generated by DEA and presented in Table 6.3. 
The question remains, what is the exact relationship between the pure technical 
inefficiency measure constructed by DEA and the feed conversion ratio?
Large and corporate shrimp farms are technology intensive. With 
stocking densities in excess of 200,000 seed per water spread hectare and average 
feed conversion ratios at highly inefficient levels (4.83) it is likely that large and 
corporate farms are technically inefficient as a result of the excessive use of feed 
inputs.19 In fact, the efficiency index and feed conversion ratio (FCR) of sample
19 High stocking densities and intensive feed use are significantly and positively correlated with 
each other (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). Moreover, as discussed earlier, evidence exists to 
suggest that intensive seed and feed use is most likely responsible for crop disease and fish-kills. 
Smaller Kandaleru sample farms, in contrast, enjoy an average feed conversion ratio below 1.5.
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shrimp farms are negatively correlated and significant regardless of the 
modelling approach or statistical method employed (see Table 6.5). This 
suggests that the most technically efficient farms use feed efficiently. That is to 
say, the FCR of the most efficient farms, is on average 1.4 or less.20
Table 6.5
Pearson, Spearman & Kendall Measures of Correlation 
Efficiency Indices v Feed Conversion Ratio
Correlation Techniques Parametric approach DEA approach
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
total efficiency -0.63** -0.08 .
pure technical efficiency -0.29’
scale efficiency 0.25*
Spearman Rank Correlation
total efficiency -0.55** -0.01
pure technical efficiency -0.13
scale efficiency 0.25*
Kendal] Rank Correlation
total efficiency -0.39** -0.01
pure technical efficiency -0.10**
scale efficiency 0.17**
indicates significant at 10 percent level; indicates significant at 5 percent level
6.5 Comparing Non-Parametric and Parametric Results
Non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) has become increasingly 
popular in the analysis of productive efficiency. However, less effort has been 
directed toward comparisons between DEA and other competing efficiency models 
(see Hjalmarsson et al, 1996 for one recent comparison). This section briefly 
reviews the methods and the results offered by both parametric and non-parametric 
models as applied to 82 Kandaleru shrimp farms. Comparing and contrasting the 
results of each method is useful in that it reveals the advantages and limitations of 
both estimation methods and suggests when to interpret results with some degree of 
caution.
The choice of parametric or non-parametric models to measure farm 
efficiency depends on economic behavioural assumptions of both methods and data
20 See Table 6.1.
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constraints. The efficiency indices generated by parametric production frontier 
approach (PFA) are obtained by estimating the best practice frontier using 
maximum likelihood techniques. The parametric approach has several advantages, 
including its capacity to provide significance tests for inputs and an overall 
goodness of fit for the model. One disadvantage of this approach is that the model 
may be incorrectly specified and therefore yield inappropriate efficiency indices. 
Moreover, it is unable to separate scale effects from the total efficiency measure. 
Other limitations and strengths of this approach are discussed earlier in this chapter.
The non-parametric frontier is deterministic in nature and constructed from 
a linear programming model. The model is capable of handling zeros in the input 
mix and does not include a disturbance term to capture noise. The efficient frontier 
is constructed from the solutions of each linear programming problem which 
minimises inputs in the production process for a given output level. The efficiency 
level of each farm is calculated relative to this frontier as the ratio of actual to 
potential performance. One clear advantage of the non-parametric model is its 
ability to separate scale effects from total efficiency. One disadvantage is that DEA 
results are swayed by outliers. Another, is that there are no significance tests for 
inputs or an overall measure for goodness of fit. Nonetheless, DEA’s overall 
appeal is simply that it allows the comparison of each firm with a given input- 
output combination with others in the sector.
Table 6 .6  presents a breakdown of technical efficiency levels for each size 
group. The data used to construct this table comes from the estimation of all 82 
farms using both parametric and non-parametric techniques. The results are 
therefore comparable across rows and columns.
The parametric efficiency measure in (A) are derived from the general 
specification of the Translog model estimated in Chapter 5. The non-parametric 
efficiency measures in (A) represent total efficiency for each of the 82 farm sample. 
The parametric efficiency measures in (B) are derived from the preferred single- 
stage stochastic Translog model estimated in the previous chapter. The DEA 
efficiency measures used in (B) are the scale-adjusted pure technical efficiency 
measures. The results of both parametric and non-parametric results suggest that 
there appears to be an efficiency-size relationship.
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Table 6.6
Summary Efficiency Measurement 
Parametric & Non-Parametric Frontiers
(A)
PARAMETRIC 
STOCHASTIC TRANSLOG 
GENERAL MODEL
NON-PARAMETRIC 
DEA MODEL 
TOTAL EFFICIENCY
N MEAN SD MIN MAX MEAN SD MIN MAX
Small 12 0.801 0.169 0.437 0.969 0.656 0.228 0.306 1.00
Medium 34 0.902 0.071 0.638 0.969 0.531 0.163 0.311 1.00
Large 22 0.774 0.196 0.362 0.961 0.480 0.140 0.267 0.832
Corporate 14 0.323 0.222 0.001 0.747 0.579 0.286 0.179 1.00
All 82 0.747 0.260 0.001 0.969 0.544 0.199 0.179 1.00
(B)
PARAMETRIC 
STOCHASTIC TRANSLOG 
PREFERRED MODEL
NON-PARAMETRIC 
DEA MODEL 
PURE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
N MEAN SD MIN MAX MEAN SD MIN MAX
Small 12 0.776 0.181 0.495 0.971 0.998 0.266 0.995 1.00
Medium 34 0.898 0.064 0.648 0.966 0.871 0.001 0.386 1.00
Large 22 0.756 0.208 0.313 0.955 0.566 0.222 0-307 1.00
Corporate 14 0.161 0.116 0.103 0.325 0.641 0.211 0.195 1.00
All 82 0.709 0-302 0.103 0.971 0.763 0.280 0.195 1.00
note: N is the number of sample farms in each category
For a given set of data, the estimated technical efficiency indices obtained 
by fitting a stochastic frontier are usually higher than those obtained by fitting a 
deterministic frontier (Hjalmarsson et al., 1996). This is a result of the technical 
construction of DEA which is constructed such that no output values exceed it. 
In addition, noise is embedded in the inefficiency measure. DEA results are 
usually lower since only five inputs are used to construct the frontier of best 
practice farms. This often limits the effectiveness of the linear programming 
problem. Alternatively, PFA enables estimation of the efficiency index using the 
same five inputs in addition to nine other variables, including dummies.
The efficiency indices in (A) above confirm the general characteristic that 
PFA yield higher efficiency measures than DEA. Mean efficiency is 0.747 using 
parametric techniques as compared to 0.544 using the DEA approach. There are, 
however some sharp contrasts between the two approaches that may be some 
cause for alarm. First, while medium size farms are the most efficient size group 
using parametric analysis, they are the least efficient according to DEA results in
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(A). Second, parametric analysis suggests that corporate farms are over 6 8  
percent inefficient on average. DEA results reveal a mean inefficiency of no 
more than 42 percent for the same size group. The opposite holds true for the 
comparative measures in (B).
The non-parametric efficiency measures in (B) are on average slightly 
higher than that of the parametric estimates. While the parametric efficiency 
measures are similar for both the general and preferred stochastic translog model, 
they are quite different for the two non-parametric efficiency measures. Unlike 
the total efficiency measures presented in (A), the pure technical efficiency 
measures in (B) reveal that the smaller size farms are clearly more efficient than 
the larger size farms in the sample. Whereas corporate farms are by far the least 
efficient group according to the parametric results in (B), they are a close second 
to large farms according to the non-parametric approach. Small farms are 77.6 
percent efficient according to PFA while approximately 99.8 percent efficient in 
the DEA results. With differences such those mentioned above, the question 
remains, is one approach more appropriate than the other?
The literature suggests some general guiding principles. If a sector is 
subject to random shocks, the stochastic production frontier approach is 
considered more appropriate than DEA (Hajalmarsson et al, 1996). The shrimp 
farming sector does face shocks in the form of crop disease. Since the data are 
from the bumper harvest year of 1996, it is likely true that the most inefficient 
farms are those that faced some degree of crop loss as a result of disease. The 
literature also suggests, however, that efficiency measures by themselves are not 
the most appropriate for comparison. Rank order of farms (according to the 
efficiency index) may be more appropriate.
Table 6.7 presents direct comparisons between the two methods 
employed to calculate efficiency measures. The table below presents the extent 
of variations in the efficiency indices using Pearson, Spearman rank and Kendall 
rank correlation methods. The results suggest that overall, there is a weak degree 
of consistency between parametric and non-parametric approaches.
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Table 6.7
Pearson, Spearman & Kendall Measures of Correlation 
A Comparison of Parametric & Non-Parametric Efficiency Indices
Correlation Techniques
PFA 
Parametric 
stochastic single-stage
DEA 
Non-parametric 
total efficiency
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
total efficiency, DEA 0.0013** 1.0000**
pure technical efficiency^ 0.2868 0.3621**
scale efficiency -0.3087 0.4499
Spearman Rank Correlation
total efficiency, DEA 0.1304 1.0000**
pure technical efficiency^ 0.2673** 0.4156**
scale efficiency -0.3157** 0.4161**
Kendall Rank Correlation
total efficiency, DEA 0.0949 1.0000**
pure technical efficiency 0.1692** 0.3883**
scale efficiency -0.2174** 0.3555**
indicates significant at 95 percent level; indicates significant at 99 percent level 
(a) the pure technical efficiency measure is scale adjusted
The Pearson correlation coefficient suggests that there is no association 
between the efficiency indices. However, this coefficient is well known to be 
seriously affected by outliers (Newbold, 1991). Moreover, tests on it require an 
assumption of normality. Spearman rank correlation, in contrast, is neither 
susceptible to extreme values nor does it require the normality assumption. It can 
be used to test the null hypothesis of no association between a pair of random 
variables. In the table above, the result confirms that there is no association 
between the DEA and PFA total efficiency measure. In contrast, decomposing 
total efficiency into scale and pure technical and conducting the same test suggests 
a degree of association. The positive and significant rank correlation between PFA 
and DEA’s pure technical efficiency index and the negative and significant 
correlation coefficient for scale efficiency suggest that the hypothesis of no 
association is rejected.
6.6 Conclusion
While the individual efficiency results from both the parametric PFA and 
non-parametric DEA differ as a result of each model’s behavioural assumptions 
and construction, the overall trend is very clear. While generally scale-
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inefficient, the culture methods employed by small and medium size farms make 
them more technically efficient than large and corporate farms. This suggests 
that by enabling small and medium size farmers the opportunity to increase their 
land holdings, average efficiency would rise to near perfect levels. The 
inefficiency of large and corporate size farms, in contrast, is a result of mostly 
technical inefficiency and not scale inefficiency. The largest farms are on 
average over 90 percent scale efficient. They are, however, culturing shrimp 
more intensively than necessary. In fact, by boosting production intensity to 
semi-intensive and intensive levels, these farms are on average, operating below 
their potential maximum efficiency.
There are several environmental and economic implications of 
inadvertently boosting culture intensity to inefficient levels. First, over-feeding 
is known to pollute the pond environment. In conjunction with keeping stocking 
densities high, over-feeding serves as a catalyst for the appearance of several 
types of deadly shrimp viruses. Shrimp disease is transported to other farms 
through discharge water. The same discharge water is responsible for polluting 
near shore areas of coastal estuaries and other brackish water bodies supporting 
shrimp farming. Second, input use in excess of the minimum combination 
necessary to ensure a given level of output suggests that firms operate above 
minimum average cost. This implies that farms are unnecessarily spending 
money on unneeded inputs.
It is clear from the results that farms that are likely to be credit 
constrained (i.e. smaller farms) are forced to culture less intensively. Ironically, 
modified intensive culture is more likely to yield more technically efficient 
outcomes than more intensive culture operations. For this reason, the handicap 
usually associated with imperfect markets may not apply in the case of Indian 
shrimp farming. Unfortunately, the same pure technically inefficient farms are 
too small, and would benefit from becoming larger. The problem lies in the fact 
that larger farms culture more intensively, and on average exhibit a moderate 
degree of pure technical inefficiency. A trade-off is therefore found to exist 
between scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency in Indian brackish water
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shrimp aquaculture. Knowledge of this fact provides an opportunity to manage 
the growth of the sector along sustainable lines.
A strong regulatory framework capping shrimp farm intensity could 
provide a pareto improving solution to all parties concerned. Reducing culture 
intensity implies generally scaling down factor inputs, thereby saving natural 
resources. If large and corporate farms scale down factor inputs, they are likely to 
reap cost saving and profit raising benefits. The incidence of disease and 
polluted effluent discharge could be reduced from less intensive culture practices. 
Thus, the amount of stress currently placed on the carrying capacity of the 
ecosystem would lessen, easing concerns from environmentalists.
There are some drawbacks. This type of regulation constrains large farms 
that consistently operate efficiently. However, consistency, in this respect, has 
not been achieved in this sector. In fact, 1996 will be known as the year of 
India’s first nation-wide bumper harvest, although it remains to be seen if it can 
be repeated. Therefore, until better technology and managerial practices become 
known, it is perhaps in the best interest of the Indian nation to limit the intensity 
of culture operations in brackish water shrimp aquaculture.
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Part III
Assessing Social and Environmental 
Impacts of Shrimp Farming
An Introduction
In response to a social movement against brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture (shrimp fanning) initiated by S. Jaganathan, an Indian social activist, 
the sector was recently banned in India (S. Jaganathan vs G.O.I, December 13, 
1997). Indeed, the alleged intensity of social impacts on rural communities 
appears to have played a heavy hand in tipping the scale in favour of banning the 
shrimp farming sector. The Indian Supreme Court (SC) decision in December 
1996 provided fuel for activists in other countries to help shut down this sector. 
In fact, in 1997 an international embargo on shrimp produce was initiated by a 
conglomeration of western NGOs (Bundell & Maybin, 1996). While activists 
have correctly pointed out some of the social and environmental consequences of 
shrimp farming, much of the hard evidence presented to the SC on the severity of 
social impacts on rural populations as a result of this sector is anecdotal at best. 
Moreover, the many positive benefits enjoyed by poor coastal regions have not 
been taken into account. It is unclear, therefore, whether the ban on the shrimp 
farming sector is actually helping to protect, or further hindering the development 
of coastal regions.
The Indian Supreme Court’s stand is unambiguous: shrimp farming is 
responsible for degrading the environment and displacing rural people (SC 
Notification, 1997: 3). The combination of these two factors has led to its ban. 
However, as claimed throughout this thesis, substantive evidence to support its 
decision is lacking. Moreover, the field evidence presented to the court in the 
form of the NEERI Report has been discredited by international experts. 1 Other 
commissioned “expert” committee reports such as the Suresh Committee Report 
are equally anecdotal and based on observation as opposed to scientific findings.
1 See Chapter One, Section 1.4.5 for a critical review o f the NEERI Report and its findings.
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Therefore, it is perhaps fair to say that the ban is based on reasonable 
“perceptions” as opposed to scientific evidence or “facts”.
Perceptions, however are important to gauge. In fact, in the economics 
literature, Clark and Oswald (1996) suggest that there is growing evidence that 
subjective data serve as strong predictors of observed behaviour. While not 
explicitly mentioned, this argument, in spirit, was the common thread that ran 
through the SC proceedings. Based on the assumption that perceptions can 
adequately represent reality, inhabitants of twenty-six villages were asked to 
share their perceptions on the negative impacts they face as a result of the advent 
of the shrimp farming sector in their region. Based on survey results, it is 
possible to conclude whether the Supreme Court’s perceptions of the problems 
faced by coastal inhabitants match the perceptions on the ground. A first attempt 
at rigorously assessing the impacts of shrimp farming on rural inhabitants is 
therefore attempted.
Three questions are often raised with respect to the social impacts 
allegedly caused by brackishwater shrimp aquaculture. First, what exactly are 
the social and environmental impacts affecting a particular shrimp farming 
region? A major portion of the literature available on this subject tends to focus 
on attempting answers to this first question. Nonetheless, the social impacts of 
brackishwater shrimp aquaculture are sparsely documented. Second, which 
impacts are considered more problematic for a specific village or in a particular 
shrimp fanning region? The evidence amassed to answer this question is 
anecdotal at best. Our survey asked inhabitants of each village to rank each 
impact by severity. From this data an aggregate village rank was assessed and 
used to compare and contrast with other villages in the sample. Third, 
specifically, what are the determinants of the social impacts faced by a particular 
village community? To date, no empirical study has rigorously investigated this 
phenomenon. This is a result of the general unavailability of secondary data and 
the time consuming nature of generating a primary data set.
The answers to these questions are important as they enable policy 
makers to seek ways in which to minimise severe social impacts through a 
number of regulatory schemes. Equally important, however are the methods
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used to analyse and model the survey data. Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight 
attempt to provide rigorous answers to each of the three questions raised, with 
regard to coastal inhabitants of the Kandaleru region in Nellore District, Andhra 
Pradesh.
Specifically, Chapter Seven surveys the social and environmental impacts 
of brackishwater shrimp aquaculture facing rural inhabitants of the Kandaleru 
region. Each impact is identified through a primary survey of populations in 
twenty-six villages located adjacent to shrimp farming clusters. Moreover, each 
one is assessed by evaluating the rank order of impact severity. Chapter Eight, in 
contrast identifies the determinants of social impacts faced by village populations 
in the Kandaleru Region. This chapter reveals that village occupation and village 
location play an important role in defining the types of impacts faced by villages. 
Sea-based fishing villages are less likely than inland farming communities to face 
agricultural land salinity and fuelwood collection problems. They are, however, 
adversely affected by blocked access to the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, village 
socio-economic and demographic differences are important factors in explaining 
the existence and relative severity of social impacts. Moreover, structural 
characteristics of shrimp farming clusters such as their distance to the closest 
village and their total size are highly significant in explaining the degree to which 
social impacts adversely affect the well-being of communities located adjacent to 
shrimp farms.
By identifying the existence of different social impacts facing rural 
inhabitants and by assessing their relative severity, policy makers stand in good 
position to sensibly discuss the negative externalities arising from shrimp 
farming. In identifying the determinants of these impacts, it is possible for them 
to begin formulating solutions to ameliorate shrimp farming’s negative social 
impacts. However, effective policy is often limited by the methods used to 
analyse data and interpret results. This is particularly known to be true of rank 
ordered data such as that collected in our 26 village survey. The methodological 
overview presented below summarises the relevant literature used to model and 
measure impact severity.
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A Review of the Methodological Literature
The literature is rich with methods to analyse and model rank data. 
Ranking is an integral part of both non-parametric analysis and in the analysis of 
judges’ rankings of objects (Marden, 1995). The literature is abundant with 
papers addressing fundamental questions such as, How to best elicit rankings? 
What goes on in a ranker’s mind? How does one analyse such highly structured 
data? Some seminal works in the field include the Luce (1959) investigation of 
individual choice behaviour, the Arrow (1963) investigation of social choice and 
individual values, and the Coombs (1964) exploration of ordered data. Critchlow 
(1985) suggests methods with which to analyse partially ranked data. Diaconis 
(1988) presents a wealth of insights on modelling and ranking data collected 
from several different types of survey instruments.
The final two chapters of this dissertation are concerned with assessing 
impact severity based on preference ranking of social impacts. Following the 
pioneering work of Thurstone (1927), the basic unit of analysis consists of n 
individuals or judges ranking a set of M  objects, or in our case, impacts. The set 
of impacts is denoted by I ={ .., IM}. A full ranking of the impacts assigns
a complete ordering to the impacts: There is an impact that is most problematic, 
second most problematic, ..., and finally, least problematic. A rank vector lists 
the ranks given to the impacts, where “1” denotes most problematic and “M” 
denotes least problematic. An order vector lists the impacts themselves, in order 
from most problematic to least problematic. The question remains, what 
information can be extracted from such ranked data?
Rank data are multivariate data where the impacts represent the variables. 
Therefore, any multivariate method can be applied to rank data (i.e. means, 
standard deviations, histograms, cluster analysis, factor analysis, etc.). Rank 
data, however, have a natural structure that present additional challenges that 
those typically known in basic multivariate samples. For example, the distance 
between any two consecutive ranks is the same.2 An entire sub-field within the
2 See Marden (1995) for a comprehensive overview o f rank models addressing the issue of 
distance.
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literature specialises in analysing the relationship between rank data and distance 
between the ranks (see Diaconis (1988) and Critchlow (1985) for an extensive 
discussion).
While basic statistical explorations of the data help describe the preferences 
of the population examined, formal modelling of the data can provide a deeper 
understanding (Marden, 1995:110). Models on ranked data arise from theoretical 
constructs, experimental methods, and others from attempts to find a simple 
description of the population of rankers. However, according to Marden
(1995:3), “many of the models [in this field] are built, either on purpose or by
happenstance.” Two different approaches have been developed in the literature 
over the years, (i) a method to model the ranking process itself, and (ii) a data- 
analytic modelling approach to describe parametrically the distribution of 
rankings attached to a population of judges. Multi-dementional scaling models 
are abundant in the first approach. Most of these models such as those of 
Plackett (1975), Henery (1981) and Flinger and Verducci (1988) posit 
relationships between objects and judges, usually represented in some defined 
space. One well known axiom is that the closer a judge is to an object, the more 
preferred is the object (Coombs, 1964; Luce, 1959).3 In contrast to the first 
approach which attempts to explain how judges perform their ranking, the second 
approach takes the rankings as the variables to be explained by explanatory 
variables that describe the population of judges. Marden (1995:112) suggests 
that utilising both approaches has several well known benefits:
• Theory-based models can be fit and tested;
• Main features of the data can be revealed;
• Significance testing reveals whether hypothesised relationships in the model
are actually there;
• goodness-of-fit testing helps determine whether there may be additional
relationships not originally hypothesised.
Both methods are employed in this investigation of social impacts. A model 
to describe the ranking process is developed in Chapter Seven, while the data-
3 This is empirically found to hold in Chapter 8 assessment o f the determinants o f shrimp 
farming’s social impacts.
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analytic model to examine the determinants of ranks is constructed and estimated 
in Chapter Eight.
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Chapter 7
An Empirical Investigation of the Social Impacts 
of Shrimp Farming in South-eastern India
7.0 Introduction
Recently, shrimp farming has been creating concern over its degradation 
of the environment and its marginalization of local inhabitants from coastal 
resources. The markets have yet to incorporate the environmental and social 
costs associated with the rapid growth and development of brackishwater shrimp 
farming in India’s maritime states. Instead, the environmental and social costs 
associated with this sector’s negative externalities often fall on coastal 
inhabitants, who rely on natural coastal resources for their livelihood.
While the environmental consequences of shrimp farming are becoming 
more well known as a result of a growing body of scientific research, the social 
impacts of shrimp farming are less well known. For example, there are several 
experimental stations in the United States, United Kingdom, Europe and 
Southeast Asia examining how a brackishwater body’s natural carrying capacity 
can be breached as a result of intensive shrimp farming. Experiments on the 
aquatic environment are conducted in controlled scientific settings. Thus, it is 
possible to distinguish those culturing methods that are more environmentally 
friendly from those that are not. The same, however, cannot be said about social 
impacts allegedly caused by shrimp farming.
The distinction between social impacts and other impacts (i.e. 
environmental) of shrimp farming is often blurred (Hempel & Winther, 1997:61). 
Claridge (1996) for example suggests that decreased production of fish and other 
food resources, displacement of labour, credit monopoly by big business houses, 
concentration of land ownership with speculators and indebtedness as a result of 
abandoned farming areas constitute a few of the many social impacts possible as 
a result of a growing shrimp farming sector. Generally, social impacts of shrimp 
farming arise as a result of a redistribution of wealth, restricted access to
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traditionally open access areas, conflict arising as a result of competition for 
natural resources, human rights violations, and many others.
Several social impacts were cited in the documentation leading to the 
Indian Supreme Court (SC) ban of the shrimp farming sector in India. They 
include, well water salinity and desertification of cultivable land as a result of salt 
water intrusion; loss of grazing grounds for cattle; destruction of mangrove forest 
areas; manpower loss as a result of blocked access of fishermen to the sea shore; 
rising incidences of skin and eye irritations and water borne diseases (Supreme 
Court Notification, 1996:184). However, the proof underscoring each allegation 
remains anecdotal or based on personal observation of investigative teams 
commissioned by the SC.
This research attempts to analyse the extent of shrimp farming’s social 
impacts on coastal communities located in the Kandaleru region by analysing and 
modelling rank data. This is accomplished in eight sections. Section 7.1 
presents an overview of the primary data used in the empirical investigation. 
Section 7.2 identifies the social impacts faced by fishing and farming 
communities and those villages located adjacent to sea-based and creek-based 
shrimp farms. Section 7.3 discusses how each negative social impact reduces the 
well-being of Kandaleru inhabitants. It also investigates the relative importance 
placed on each impact by examining the mean rank of each impact. Section 7.4 
presents a method with which to measure the severity of social impacts in the 
region. Section 7.5 assesses the severity of social impacts facing villages in the 
Kandaleru region. Section 7.6 concludes with some discussion on the usefulness 
of the social impact index as a measure for severity.
7.1 The Data
A pre-tested survey identified the major impacts of the brackishwater shrimp 
aquaculture sector on the welfare of village populations located adjacent to 
shrimp farming clusters in Nellore District. As discussed in Chapter 2, several 
questions adopted for the survey were raised recently by NGOs and other 
concerned organisations in Indian and international forums. The overarching
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concerns stemmed from alleged negative impacts of the rapidly expanding 
brackishwater shrimp aquaculture industry on rural communities. In total, 26 
villages were surveyed and asked six principal questions regarding shrimp 
aquaculture development:
• Has aquaculture development hindered your (your family’s) access to the 
creek or beach?
• Have your village wells become saline as a result of shrimp farm 
development?
• Has aquaculture development resulted in seepage of saline water into your 
agricultural lands? Has this reduced your crop yields?
• Has aquaculture development led to unemployment problems for you or your 
family?
• Has aquaculture development led to health problems for you or your family? 
to animal populations in the village?
• Has aquaculture development hindered fuelwood or fodder collection for 
your family?
The survey was conducted in two parts. First, each respondent was asked to 
answer each of the above questions by answering “Yes” or “No”. From these 
data it was possible to determine each impact’s frequency of occurrence within a 
village. 1 Second, each respondent was asked to rank the above mentioned 
impacts according to the relative severity of the social impact on their daily lives: 
1 (most severe problem) to 6  (least severe problem). From these data, an 
aggregate rank order for each impact is calculated using the well known 
Thurstonian (1927) method.2 The results presented throughout this chapter are 
based on these aggregate ranks.
1 The method used to aggregate village responses to assess an impact’s frequency o f occurrence 
is presented in Appendix 7A.
2 The Thurstonian (1927) method is briefly outlined in the Part III summary o f this dissertation. 
For an overview o f this method and related methods, see Marden (1995:114-118).
245
7.2 Identification of Social Impacts
In this section we answer the first question raised in the literature, 
namely, what are the social impacts of shrimp farming on rural inhabitants of the 
Kandaleru region?
The survey results indicate that for the entire sample of twenty-six coastal 
villages, nineteen villages or 73% identified agricultural land salinity and 
blocked access to the creek/beach as a problem in their village; seventeen or 6 6 % 
of the villages reported that well water salinity was a problem in their village; 
fourteen villages or 54% identified unemployment as a problem; ten villages or 
38% reported fodder & fuel wood collection as a problem; and nine villages or 
35% identified health problems as a result of aquaculture development as a 
problem.3
Aggregated data for all twenty-six villages, however present a distorted 
picture of the problems faced by the region’s villages. The principal occupation 
of a village and its location are found to be important determinants of social 
impacts. Table 7.0 shows that 94% of those villages comprised of fishers 
identified blocked beach access as a problem whereas only 33% of farming based 
villages identified access as a problem. Similarly, unemployment and health 
problems affect a majority of the fishing community, 76% and 53% respectively 
but only one of the farming villages. Approximately 89% of farming 
communities identified fodder & fuelwood collection as a problem whereas only 
12% of the fishing communities did so. Well water salinity, however remained a 
problem for both 66% of fishing and farming village communities.
3 A particular village is counted among those sample villages claiming to suffer from a given 
social impact if  greater than 50 percent of the village population sampled identified it to be a 
problem facing them or their family. The methodology used to calculate the aggregate 
frequencies presented in Table 7.0 and throughout this section is presented in Appendix 7A, 
section 7A.0. Some intermediate data needed to calculate aggregate frequencies are presented in 
Appendix B.
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Table 7.0
Problems Identified by Communities Located Adjacent to Shrimp Farms in the 
____________ Kandaleru Region, Nellore District, Andhra Pradesh.
% Villages w/ Problems 
(N=26 Total Villages)
Well
Water
Salinity
Access to 
Beach or 
Creek Blocked
Agricultural
Land
Salinity
Un/under
employment
Poor
Health
Fodder & 
Fuelwood
Fishing Villages 65% 94% 65% 76% 53% 12%
(N=17) (11) (16) (11) (13) (9) (2)
Farming Villages 66% 33% 89% 11% 0% 89%
(N=9) (6) (3) (8) (1) (0) (8)
Sea-Based Villages 63% 88% 75% 81% 56% 0%
(N=16) ( 1 0 ) (14) (12) (13) (9) (0)
Creek-Based Village 70% 50% 70% 10% 0% 100%
(N=10) (7) (5) (7) (1) (0) (10)
All Villages 65% 73% 73% 54% 35% 38%
(N=26) (17) (19) (19) (14) (9) (10)
source o f data: Patil & Village Survey, 1997
The survey data reveal that 94 percent of all fishing villages in the sample 
are sea-based villages and that 90 percent of the creek-based villages are 
primarily engaged in agriculture. The impacts faced by villages categorised by 
location are therefore similar to those categorised by occupation. However, 
making this distinction reveals two important findings. First, of the two fishing 
and eight farming villages complaining of fodder and fiielwood collection 
problems, all of them are located adjacent to creek-based farms. Second, each of 
the nine villages suffering from health problems are sea-based villages. In fact, 
beach/creek access and unemployment are also separated along occupational and 
locational lines. We can hypothesise, therefore that social impacts have 
something to do with geographic location and a village’s primary occupation. 
The determinants of the social impacts discussed above are assessed and further 
discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, in response to the December 1996 Indian Supreme Court order 
banning the shrimp farming sector, only two of the ten creek-based villages 
reported that they were in favour of it. Of these two villages, one reported that 
they were worse off than five years ago and the other reported that they were 
neither better or worse off than before. Four villages reported that they were not 
in favour of the ban and the remaining four villages were indifferent (see Chapter 
2). The primary village survey conducted for this research identifies the primary 
social impacts facing sample villages. It does not, however, reveal the relative
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severity of each impact on coastal inhabitants. The severity of each impact is 
discussed in context of how the rural population perceive each social impact’s 
impact on their economic activity and overall village welfare.
7.2.1 Ranking Social Impacts by Frequency
Indian policy makers are concerned with prioritising the importance of 
impacts facing rural communities (SC Notification, 1996). The Indian SC 
notification and subsequent discussion made it clear that some impacts were 
somehow more important than others.4 In Table 7.1 each impact is ranked by the 
reported frequency of its occurrence amongst sample farming and fishing 
villages. A rank of “1” for the fishing village category in Table 7.1, for example, 
corresponds to the highest impact frequency for fishing villages, namely, blocked 
access (see Table 7.0). The ranked frequencies for the entire Kandaleru village 
sample is presented in the final column of Table 7.1.
Table 7.1
Social Impacts Ranked by Frequency
Ranked Impacts Fishing Villages 
Rank
Farming Villages 
Rank
All Villages 
Aggregate Rank
Well water salinity 3 or 4 3 3
Blocked access 1 4 1 or 2
Agricultural land salinity 3 or 4 1 or 2 1 or 2
Un/under-employment 2 5 4
Poor health 5 6 6
Fodder & fuelwood 6 1 or 2 5
note: a rank o f “3 or 4” indicates that the corresponding impact shares the same frequency as 
another with the same frequency.
The rank order and the frequency itself illustrate that the six social 
impacts face villages categorised by occupation, differently.5 This suggests that 
the policy objective may be different and based on occupational groups and/or 
location when considering methods to minimise social impacts.
4 This issues has been taken up by the Aquaculture Authority o f India created through the 1997 
Aquaculture Authority Act in March 1997.
5 The same rank order arose when villages were categorised by location.
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7.3 Impact on Economic Activity
While the previous section identifies the social impacts most common to 
fishing and farming communities and those located adjacent to sea-based and 
creek-based farms, it does not explicitly indicate the relative importance of each 
social impact as perceived by each village and the sample villages in aggregate. 
The relative importance of an impact can be assessed based on how much each 
impact reduces the overall well-being of the Kandaleru community. For 
example, while 73 percent of the village sample indicate that blocked access to 
the sea or creek is a problem facing their village, it may be of less overall 
consequence than for the 38 percent that suffer from problems of ill health. This 
may hold true since the overall welfare loss as a result of health may be greater 
than that of blocked access. The frequency of a particular problem arising 
amongst the sample villages is therefore not an adequate measure of its overall 
severity. However, an exact measure of the “costs” assumed by the village as a 
result of facing a social impact is not attempted in this research. Nonetheless, a 
method to measure the relative importance of each social problem in terms of its 
impact on the community is of interest.
Each of the social problems identified in the previous section has an 
associated impact on the economic activity taking place within the village 
community. The literature is abundant with methods with which to measure the 
severity of the impact in terms of its economic loss.6 For example, an increase in 
the amount of time required to carry out a particular economic activity may 
ultimately reduce the overall productivity of the community. Similarly, the loss 
of a necessary resource such as potable water has significant consequences on the 
welfare of a community. The loss of a resource can be valued based on its 
replacement cost or shadow price.7 However, data necessary to carry out such 
assessments in this research is lacking. A different approach is therefore needed.
6 See Pearce and Turner (1990) for a review of several methods used to evaluate the loss o f an 
environmental resource or a decline in economic activity as a result o f externalities.
7 Pioneering contributions on shadow price assessments are attributed to Arrow and Fisher 
(1974). See Dasgupta (1993) for a discussion of this issue with respect to a decline in a natural 
resource stock.
249
This section examines how each social impact can translate into a direct 
welfare loss for village communities in the sample.8 However, unlike much of 
the environmental economic literature that attempts to value the economic costs 
of each social impact, this research explores how the affected communities 
perceive the severity of facing particular impacts relative to the others. Clark and 
Oswald (1996) suggest that subjective data such as these are often strong 
predictors of reality. In this context, the ranked data analysed in this section 
provide a simple indication of the importance of each of these social impacts on 
the well-being of rural inhabitants relative to each other.
Table 7.2 presents some summary statistics on the aggregate mean rank 
score assigned to each social impact for the 17 fishing villages, the 9 farming 
villages and the entire 26 village sample, respectively. The method used to assess 
the rank order for each impact in each of the sample 26 villages is discussed in 
Appendix 7A, section 7A. 1. The method used to assign the aggregate rank order 
for each impact and used to construct Table 7.2 is simply the average of each 
aggregate village response for a given impact (see Appendix A, section 7A.2).
Comparing the means of the individual village ranks is one method of 
assessing the relative importance of each social impact in the sample. However, 
it is clear that the mean rank of the 26 village sample is skewed by the large 
sample size of fishing villages. Nonetheless, the ensuing discussion is based on 
the results presented in the table below and informal discussion with inhabitants 
of both fishing and farming villages.9
8 The thesis does not attempt to value each social impact. Valuation o f social impacts requires 
much more detailed data which were not collected as part o f this study. It is therefore beyond the 
scope o f this particular analysis.
9 See Table 7B.1 in Appendix 7B for summary ranks for villages categorised by location.
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Table 7.2
Summary Characteristics of Ranked Impact Data
Impact | Mean Rank S.D. Minimum Maximum
17 Fishing Villages
WWSALIN 2.41 1.37 1 5
ACCESS 1.58 0.87 1 4
AGSALIN 3.12 1.16 1 5
UNEMPL 3.71 1.04 1 5
HEALTH 4.59 0.39 3 6
FODFUEL 5.65 0.99 3 6
9 Farming Villages
WWSALIN 2.78 0.83 2 4
ACCESS 2.67 1.22 1 4
AGSALIN 2.44 1.13 1 4
UNEMPL 4.56 1.33 1 5
HEALTH 5.89 0.33 6
FODFUEL 2.33 1.80 1 6
26 Village Sample
WWSALIN 2.54 1.21 1 5
ACCESS 1.96 1.11 1 4
AGSALIN 2.88 1.17 1 5
UNEMPL 4.00 1.20 1 5
HEALTH 5.03 0.99 6
FODFUEL 4.50 2.06 1 6
source o f data: Patil & Village Survey, 1997. Note: wwsalin is well water salinity; access is 
blocked access; agsalin in agricultural land salinity; unempl is unemployment; health is health 
related problems, foduel is fodder and fuelwood collection problems. The mean values range 
from 1 (most severe impact in relation to the others) to 6 (least severe impact relative to the 
others).
(i) Blocked Access
Blocked access has the lowest mean score of the six social impacts for the 
26 village sample. It can be said to be the most important impact faced by the 
sample village’s surveyed in the region. For fishers, in particular, blocked access 
is the most significant impact they face. Since the advent of shrimp farming, 
fishers claim to require more time and energy to gain access to their boats which 
are kept on the beach (SC Notification, 1996). Previously, fishers had a direct 
path to their fishing crafts. With shrimp farms situated between fishing villages 
and the beach and occupying several dozen hectares of land, direct access 
between the beach and the village has been blocked. This has had several other 
implications such as a longer and more difficult transport route of fish catch to 
the local village market. According to semi-formal discussions with female 
fishers, this was of particular concern to women. For farming and creek-based
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communities, blocked access is the third most significant impact they face, albeit 
for different reasons than for fishers. Discussions with inhabitants of farming 
communities suggested that blocked access to the Kandaleru creek was 
problematic since areas traditionally used to collect fodder and fuelwood were 
blocked.
(ii) Fodder & Fuelwood Collection Problems
A mean score of 2.33 suggests that farming villages identified fodder and 
fuelwood collection problems as the most problematic impact they face. The 
demands on village females’ daily chores are strained as a result of fodder & 
fuelwood collection problems. Semi-structured interviews suggest that in 
farming communities, women spend more time searching for cooking fuel and 
fodder to feed their animals. They indicated that this was a result of the growing 
number of shrimp farms occupying wasteland once used to graze animals and 
collect fuelwood. With the growth of the shrimp farming sector along the 
Kandaleru river, large areas of thorny bushes (used as a source of fuelwood) were 
cleared. These problems are of little importance to sea-based communities. In 
fact, each of the sixteen sea-based villages ranked collection problems as the least 
important impact that they face. 10 This is as a result of the geographic location of 
the sea-based villages. This is further discussed in the next chapter.
(Hi) Well Water Salinity
According to the village survey, both sea and creek-based communities 
have experienced salinity problems with their drinking water supply. This is also 
confirmed by Rao (1996) who scientifically tests several dozen village wells in 
the Kandaleru region and reveal that salinity concentrations were higher than the 
acceptable limit. The mean rank for water salinity given by sea-based and creek- 
based villages in our sample is 2.56 and 2.50, respectively. Therefore, based on
10 See Appendix 7B.
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the mean score, well water salinity is the second most important impact facing 
villages in each location.
The salinity levels of village well water are reportedly rising as a result of 
saline pond water seeping through the pond bottom and into groundwater 
reservoirs from which village tube wells draw their water (Joseph, 1996). The 
force of this impact falls on women who are usually in charge of water collection 
for the household. In many cases, less than fifty percent of the village wells were 
left idle as a result of salinity problems.11 In extreme cases where all the village 
wells were contaminated, women were required to walk up to two kilometres to 
fetch potable water from the nearest uncontaminated well. It appears, however, 
that well water salinity is seasonal and related to the intensity of the monsoon 
season. 12
(iv) Agricultural Land Salinity
Salinity of agricultural land is another problem faced by both farming 
communities involved primarily in agricultural production and some fishing 
communities that rely on the productivity of small vegetable plots for private 
own consumption. Approximately 90 percent of the farming villages in the 
sample complained of land salinity and specifically, falling paddy, casuarian and 
small vegetable crop yields on plots directly adjacent to shrimp farms. The 
overall mean rank of this impact 2 .8 8 , which makes it the third most important 
social impact facing Kandaleru villages.
11 We observed that most of the wells that the village population indicated as useless were located 
nearest to shrimp farms. However, while salinity of well water may be determined partly by 
distance, scientific studies have indicated that geography and characteristics o f the underground 
aquifer are important determinants o f salinity (see Joseph, 1996).
12 An extended monsoon period tends to dilute the village well salinity level to tolerable limits. 
To me, village wells which were identified as never having been contaminated were salty. We 
suggest that there is a thresh-hold of acceptable water salinity levels that varies among villages in 
the region, but do not explore this further.
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(v) Unemployment and/or Underemployment
Employment issues tend to affect fishing communities much more than 
farming communities. Although shrimp farms continue to hire a steady stream 
of rural inhabitants for seasonal employment, inhabitants of sea-based fishing 
villages complain that the direct purchase of wild seed has declined rapidly over 
the past year. This is most likely a direct result of the growth of operational seed 
hatcheries in the nearby vicinity.13 Whereas shrimp farms in the region once 
relied solely on wild caught seed purchased from fishers, with the growth and 
development of hatcheries, farms have a steady supply of seed at a rate that 
depends on quantity purchased as opposed to per individual seed. The result is 
that once informally employed seed collectors are now out of work.
(vi) Poor Health
Finally, fishers’ productivity and general well being are also affected by 
health related problems caused by shrimp farm effluent discharge from jetties 
into the near shore area where they fish. 14 In addition, they complain that their 
nets get cut by the effluent discharge pipes that extend up to fifty meters into the 
sea. Creek-based farming villages unanimously ranked this problem as the least 
important of the six impacts. The mean rank of fishing villages, however is 4.59, 
which suggests that it is of some concern.
7.3.1 Ranking Social Impacts by Mean Score
Each impact is ranked by the mean of the ranked data assessed in the 
previous section. The social impact with the lowest average mean can be thought 
of as the most problematic impact facing that occupational group. This is 
possible since each impact is assigned a rank between one and six based on the 
responses given by populations in each village in the sample. Even though a
13 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
14 Shrimp farm effluent is known to be contaminated from excessive biological and chemical 
inputs used in production.
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majority of the village claim that they do not suffer from, say two of the six 
impacts, these last two impacts are still ranked relative to each other based on the 
relative frequencies as discussed in Appendix A, section 7A.1. Table 7.3 
presents the order of rank for impacts assessed by mean score.
Table 7.3
Social Impacts Ranked by Mean Score
Ranked Impacts Fishing Villages 
Rank
Farming Villages 
Rank
All Villages 
Aggregate Rank
Well water salinity 2 4 2
Blocked access 1 3 1
Agricultural land salinity 3 2 3
Un/under-employment 4 5 4
Poor health 5 6 5
Fodder & fuelwood 6 1 6
note: a rank o f “1” indicates that this impact on average is the most important facing the 
category.
It is clear that social impacts can translate into a direct welfare loss for 
village communities in the sample. The mean of the ranked data (Table 7.2) and 
the assigned rank for each social impact (Table 7.3) provide some indication of 
the relative importance of each of these social impacts on the well-being of rural 
inhabitants. It does not, however, indicate the absolute severity of these impacts 
on inhabitants of the Kandaleru region. The next several sections suggest one 
way in which the ranked impact data can be translated into a severity index.
7.4 Assessing the Severity of Social Impacts
The six major negative impacts common to most villages in the 
Kandaleru region as a result of the growth and development of shrimp farming in 
the region are well water salinity, blocked access to the creek or beach, 
agricultural land salinity, unemployment and underemployment problems, health 
problems, and fodder and fuelwood collection problems. At this stage, it is not 
possible to adequately determine the extent to which each impact distresses 
Kandaleru inhabitants. Previously, section 7.1 identified social impacts faced by 
different communities and the number of villages in the sample that claim to find 
that particular negative etemality a problem. Moreover, section 7.2 discussed
255
how each negative impact reduces the well-being of Kandaleru communities. 
The mean rank provided a simple indication of the degree to which each impact 
is problematic. Neither of these, however, explicitly measure the severity of 
social impacts. Together, however, these data provide necessary information to 
construct an index of impact severity.
This section develops an index with which to assess the severity of social 
impacts, given the data collected using the village survey. The Social Impact 
Index (SII) is constructed and applied to sample village data to discover the 
severity of each social impact on (i) villages categorised by a particular 
occupation or location; and (ii) the entire village sample. It requires use of data 
identifying both the frequency of a particular problem existing amongst sample 
villages and the relative rank order assigned to each impact.
7.4.1 Social Impact Index
The severity of a given impact is the weighted average of the relative 
ranking of each social impact problem for each village, scaled by a parameter 
that weights the index by the number of villages reporting that particular impact 
as disruptive to their general well-being. More formally, the Social Impact Index 
of an impact i faced by village n belonging to category k is defined as,
ZK'V’*)
(1) 57/*=   n=l,2,3..... N; i = l,2,...M
( t A"yi
where N  is the total number of villages surveyed. M  is the total number of 
impacts identified as posing a problem in the region. K  is the total number of 
categories by which we can organise the sample villages, k e ( l , 2 , 15 A"’* 
is assigned a value of “1” or “0” according to its given properties (see Appendix 
7A, section 7A.0 for the method used to assign A”* its value). Essentially, if the 
aggregated village response reveals that impact i is not a problem facing village
15 For example, we set k=l  if  the principal occupation in the village is fishing and k=2 if  the 
principal occupation in the village is farming. In this example, K=2. If we wanted to analyse the
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n, then A”,k = 0. In contrast, if the aggregated village response reveals that
impact i is indeed a problem facing village n, then A”,k = 1. Special properties 
for the case when (1) is undefined are presented in Section 7.4.4.
r",k is the rank order assigned by village n categorised by k to impact i
relative each of the other M  social impacts and bounded by, 1 < r",k < S , where 
S  is the numerical rank order identifying the least disruptive social impact 
relative to the others. The numerical value of S is equal to M. r”,k can therefore 
be thought of as the degree to which impact i is disruptive to the well-being of 
village n relative to each of the other social impacts. If impact i is found to be 
the most problematic social impact facing village, then r",k=1. By contrast, if 
impact i is the least problematic social impact facing village n, then r",k= S. The
method used to assign values to r"’k is presented in Appendix 7A, section 7.A1.
The numerator in (1) is interpreted as the sum of the relative rank orders 
of impact i assigned by all N  villages if and only if impact i is found to disrupt 
village n (i.e. A”’k= 1). The denominator in (1) is comprised of (i) a weight,
N
X  A”’k which counts the number of villages in each category k that responds
i
such that A”,k= 1; and (ii) an exponent# which serves as an exponential scaling 
parameter that takes a numerical value such that 1 < 6  < E  and # e  (1,2, . . . E ) .
It therefore serves as a mechanism to give greater weight to a given social 
impact for which a greater number of villages reported it as disruptive to their 
well-being. It is bounded such that 1 < 6 < E  and defined such 
that# e (1,2,...is ) . If# =1, then the expression in (1) reduces to a simple average 
of the relative rank orders assigned by each village for a particular social impact, 
i. As # -»  E , the expression in (1) gives greater importance to the number of 
villages responding that an impact is problematic in their village, A”,k = 1. In the 
empirical estimation of (1) discussed in Section 7.5 of this chapter, # = 2. A 
simulation experiment on the SII for different values of # is conducted in
SII for villages categorised by geographical location from the sea (i.e. North, South, and West), 
then we could define k=l (North), k=2 (South) and k=3 (West). In this example, K=3.
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Appendix 7F. The results of the simulation experiments help justify the 
inclusion of theta as a component in the index and justify the value assigned it.
7.4.2 The Aggregate Social Impact Index
As discussed above, the Social Impact Index (SII) of impact i defined in
for villages of category, k and scaled by an exponent of the number of villages 
reporting that particular impact as disruptive to their general well-being. Next, 
an aggregate social impact index across all K categories is constructed. The 
aggregate social impact index of an impact i faced by all N villages belonging to 
one of K  categories is defined as,
average of the social impact indices over all K categories. Each of the K 
categories are given equal weight. All variables and parameters in (2) are as 
previously defined.
There is a significant difference between the index values obtained from
(2) and the results obtained from simply taking the average of the Social Impacts 
Indices across all N villages. The SII as defined in (2) gives equal weight to each 
k category. 16 An average of the SII for a given impact across all n villages would 
unnecessarily give greater emphasis to the category k with the greater number of 
villages. We suggest that each of the K categories be given the same weight 
despite the possibility of an unequal number of villages in each category. We
16 We define SII (with no superscripts or subscripts) as the generic Social Impact Index which 
can refer to either 577* or SII;.
(1) is the weighted average of the relative ranking of each social impact problem
N
SHi ((2) 1 )N
i=1,2,3 N; i = k = 1,2,3,...K.
where SIIj is the aggregated Social Impact Index for impact i. It is weighted by 
the size of category k and scaled by the number of villages positively identifying 
impact i as a problem. The Sample Social Impact Index in (2) is essentially an
258
choose this approach under the assumption that each of the K categories are of 
equal importance.17
7.4.3 A Justification for 6
As discussed earlier, 0 serves as an exponential scaling parameter that 
takes a numerical value such that 1 < Q < E and where 0 e ( l , 2 . It serves 
as a mechanism to give greater weight to a given social impact for which a 
greater number of villages reported it as disruptive to their well-being. It is 
bounded such that 1 <0< E . As 0-> E , the expression in (1) gives greater 
importance to the number of villages responding that an impact is problematic in 
their village, A”,k = 1. A simulation experiment on the SII for different values of 
6 is conducted in Appendix 7E. The results of the simulation experiments help 
justify the inclusion of theta as a component in the index and justify the value 
assigned to it in empirical application (in the empirical estimation of (1) 
discussed in Section 7.5 of this chapter, 0 = 2). It is clear that the value taken 
by 6 clearly matters.
7.4.4 A Property of the Social Impact Index
There are several important theoretical properties of the Social Impact 
Index worth noting. The first property arises from the result that (1) and (2) are
N
undefined when A”,k = 0, because division by zero is not possible. To
i
eliminate this complication from the model we introduce the following 
proposition:
Proposition 1:
N
I f  A",k = 0 for any impact i we then define,
/
(3) SII* = max SII* + j ,  (max SII*) for any i.
17 Some caveats and assumptions made regarding the SII are presented in Appendix 7D.
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where max SIIk is the maximum numerical value of the Social Impact Index for 
any impact i. The expression in (3) ensures that an impact identified as not being 
a problem for all villages in a particular category receives a numerical value
higher by a factor, 77 (max 57/*) than the highest calculated SII value. This
N
ensures that if there is a case such that A",k = 0 for all n, then the SII for
i
impact i is not undefined and that the impact i receives the lowest ranking of all 
M  impacts, namely, S. By introducing (3), the model as described by (1) and (2) 
becomes operational.
7.4,5 Evaluating Boundary Conditions of the SII
L’HopitaTs rule is employed to evaluate the Social Impact Index at its 
extreme values. Generally, L’HopitaTs rule evaluates the limit of the function, /  
m(x)(x) = --------  as x —> a (where a can be either finite or infinite), when the
n{x)
numerator m(x) and the denominator n(x) either (1) both tend to zero as x-> a, 
thus resulting in the 0/0 form, or (2 ) both tend to ± 00 as x —> a , thus resulting in
an expression in the form of */'+00.
Even though the limit cannot be evaluated in these cases, its value can be 
determined by taking the first derivative of the function and evaluating the limit 
as x -> a ,
m(x) m’(x)
[L’Hopital’s Rule] lim ——— = lim ———
n{x) n (x)
In order to evaluate the SII at its theoretical boundaries, we define
N  N
m(x)= 2 ] (A^,krln,k) and n(x) = A”,k )G. Following L’HopitaTs rule the limit 
1 1
of the functions represented in (1) and (2 ) are evaluated by first taking its 
derivative,
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N(4) lim ■ 7}-----------= lim
Next, the expression in (4) is evaluated as a tends to its extremes, namely a=0
such that, (i) ^  A",k -» 0; and a = oo such that, (ii) ^  A”,k -» qo  . Under
limit tends to zero.
7.4.6 Defining Social Impact Severity Classes
We have shown how the SIIk and the aggregate SII, are constructed and 
how they can be used to rank the severity of each social impact faced by groups 
of villages. The SII can essentially index the severity of a given social impact on 
a particular category of village (i.e. fishing or farming) or the entire aggregated 
rural community sample. However, one problem remains. The numerical value of 
the Social Impact Index remains meaningless unless a scale is developed with 
which to interpret it. In this section we suggest one possible scale with which to 
interpret the severity of social impacts. This scale places the numerical value of 
each Sllj for all i into an Impact Severity Class (SC) which identifies the degree 
to which that particular social impact is disruptive to the well-being of a rural 
community.
We begin by defining a scaling system comprising of J+l intervals 
bounded by two constructed cut-off points. We call each bounded interval a 
Severity Class. Severity Class j (SC(j)) is therefore the interval defined by,
N N
scenario (i) the limit of the function tends to infinity and under scenario (ii) the
(5)
max SIIk + (max SIIk)
<  scu) z max 57/* + -jj (max SIIk) 2j
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where j=0,l,2, ... J.; M is the total number of social impacts under investigation; 
SC(j) is the severity class within which impact i falls. There are three important 
properties associated with the Severity Class as defined in (5),
(i) The Number o f Severity Classes
There are J+l Severity Classes in total. The specific number of Severity 
Classes required is defined by restricting J+1=M. Theoretically, with this 
restriction, the number of severity classes has an upper limit of M and a lower 
limit of 1. In empirical application, however, we suggest that the maximum 
number of Severity Classes be restricted when M> 10 toM/ 2 and when M is an 
even number and Nf- when M is an odd number. 18
(ii) Upper & Lower Bounds
From (5), max 577* represents the Social Impact Index for any impact i 
with the highest numerical value; the expression,
defines the lower bound of each and every severity class, SC(j). The upper 
bound of the interval is defined by,
18 The number o f Severity Classes in some empirical studies may benefit from relaxing the strict 
rules suggested by the SII model. We suggest the restriction J+1=M as one possible rule to 
follow, but fully suggest that the restrictions vary depending on the nature o f the research.
(6)
max SII * + j j  (max SII *) 
2 j
(7)
max 577* +-^ (max £77*) 
2 ^
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The expression, max 577* + jj (max S l l f ) ensures that any impact i for which 
none of the n villages defined by category k identify as a problem is not given a 
zero value, which would distort the SII and the eventual ranking of that impact. 19
(Hi) The Size o f SC(j) Decreases with j
The denominator of (7) ensures that the numerator is scaled such that the 
size of each Severity Class decreases with j. Essentially, the interval defined by 
SC(0) is twice the size of the interval defined by SC(1), which in turn is twice the 
size of the interval defined by SC(2), etc. SC(J) is therefore bounded by the 
smallest interval defined by (5). This property ensures that the most severe social 
impacts are stringently classified.
(iv) A Special Case o f (5)
In the special case where Proposition 1 is evoked, the weak inequality ( 
< ) of the lower boundary for the lowest Severity Class, SC(0), is exchanged by 
the strong inequality (< ). This ensures that the numerical value of the social 
impact i in question falls outside the specified severity classifications. In other 
words, this ensures that under this special case, the impact in question is not 
inappropriately classified.
(v) Interpreting SC(j)
The numerical value of SII falls within a Severity Class defined by (5) 
and is loosely interpreted using the conversion table below. Each Severity Class 
corresponds to the degree of severity faced by a village or group of villages for a 
given social impact. For example, if M=6, then we could identify six severity 
classes with the following corresponding conversion interpretation for each
SCO).
19 See Proposition 1 in Section 7.4.4.
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Severity Class-Impact Intensity Conversion Table
Severity Class j Intensity o f Social Impact
j=5 social crisis
j=4 very severe
j=3 severe
j = 2 moderate
j=l problematic
j = 0 nuisance
For J+l greater than or less than six, the interpretation of each severity class will 
change from the second column suggested above. We can, however, restrict 
J+l = 6  throughout without any significant loss to the interpretation of the 
empirical results. In fact, there may not be too much advantage gained from 
identifying more than six severity classes as interpretation of the results may 
become cumbersome.
(vi) A Caveat
The Impact Severity Classes defined above are only one possible way of 
evaluating the numerical value of the index. In addition, the “impact intensity” 
categorisations set out in the Severity Class-Impact Intensity Conversion Table 
are also discretionary. Nonetheless, it provides a first attempt at qualifying a 
numerical value defined to represent impact severity with respect to the data 
available.
7.5 A n Em pirical Application
This empirical examination measures the Social Impact Index for each 
known impact and assess the severity of each impact on rural inhabitants. The 
twenty-six villages in the Kandaleru sample are categorised by principal 
occupation, namely, fishing and farming villages. There are seventeen fishing 
villages and nine farming villages. In this investigation social impacts are 
measured for both fishing and farming villages separately before assessing the 
impact severity over the entire twenty-six village sample.
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7.5,1 Measuring the Severity of Impacts Facing Kandaleru Villages
Following equation (1), the SII for each of the six social impacts 
affecting the welfare of inhabitants of seventeen fishing villages is,
IlMV)
(1.1) SII)= - Lf7  n=l,2,3,...,17; i = 1,2,3,4,5,6; k = l ; 0 = 2
l
where the parameters are respectively, N=17, M=6 , K=2 and E=2. The SII for 
each of the six social impacts attributed to the advent of shrimp farming for all 
nine farming villages in our sample is defined as,
E(4”’V'2)
(1.2) SIlf=  - L"9----------  n=l,2,3..... 9; i = 1,2,3,4,5,6; k = 2 ; 0 = 2
( 2 > f 2)2l
where the parameters are as defined in (1.1) with the exception of N=9 and k=2. 
The severity of social impacts facing the Kandaleru region is represented as,
17
(2.1) SII/ =
Z « ’‘'V'“2
i  ------------ / = 1,2,...6; K=2
(EA"-M)2 (2>,”'‘=2)2
with k = l  indicating that the village is a fishing village and k = 2  indicating that 
the village is a farming village, 9 = 2  and all other variables as previously 
defined. Table 7.4 presents the results.
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Table 7.4
Social Impact Indices by Villages’ Primary Occupation
SII INDEX W ell Water Blocked Agricultural Land Un/under Poor Fodder &
Salinity A ccess Salinity em ploym ent Health Fuelw ood
Fishing Villages 0.149 0.090 0.248 0.272 0.440 0.750
(N=17) OD (16) (11) (13) (9) (2)
Farming Villages 0.471 0.443 0.281 1.00 1.75* 0.235
(N=9) (6) (3) (8) (1) (0) (8)
All Villages 0.310 0.266 0.264 0.636 1.22 0.675
(N=26) (17) (19) (19) (14) (9) (10)
source o f  data: Patil & Krishnan, 1997; note: the number o f villages in parenthesis; * represents 
the special case discussed in (iv) o f  section 7.4.6. The numerical SII value is therefore 
determined evoking proposition 1 from 7.4.4. Note: A smaller number (closer to zero) indicates 
that the particular social impact is more severe for villages o f a given category.
7.5.2 Assessing the Severity o f Social Impacts
As previously discussed in sub-section 7.4.6, the Social Impact Index is a 
numerical value that falls into one of J+l Severity Classes defined by (5) and 
that can be interpreted using the scaling factor outlined in the Severity Class- 
Impact Intensity Conversion Table. In this empirical application five Severity 
Classes are defined with the following upper and lower boundaries,
Table 7.5
Severity Class-Impact Intensity Conversion Table
Severity Class j Range Intensity of Social Impact
j=5 0.000<SC(5) <0.055 social crisis
j=4 0.055< SC(4) < 0.109 very severe
j=3 0.\09<SC(3)<0.2\9 severe
j=2 0.2\9< SC(2) <0.438 moderate
j= l 0.438< SC(1) <0.875 problematic
j=0 0.875< SC(0) < 1.750 nuisance
For the seventeen fishing villages in the sample, blocked access to the 
beach is a very severe social problem; well water salinity is a severe problem; 
agricultural land salinity and un/underemployment are problems with a moderate 
severity; poor health is problematic and difficulties in fodder & fuelwood 
collection are the least severe problem or simply an overall nuisance. No social 
crisis was identified using our method of indexing social impacts.
Overall, the distribution of Social Impact Indices for farming villages is 
skewed towards less severe impacts than fishing villages. The problems of
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fodder & fuelwood collection and agricultural land salinity arising from the 
advent of shrimp farming are moderately severe for farming villages. Blocked 
access to the brackishwater source (either creek or beach) and well water salinity 
are problematic. Un/under-employment is a nuisance whereas, Poor Health is at 
most a nuisance to farming communities.
The aggregate social impact index is a weighted average of social impact 
indices scaled by the number of villages in a particular category k, reporting that 
a particular impact is disruptive to their general well-being. For our sample of 
twenty-six villages, agricultural land salinity, blocked access and well water 
salinity are of moderate severity. Un/under-employment and problems in 
collecting fodder & fuelwood are problematic. Health problems are generally a 
nuisance overall, and considered the least severe problem faced by the entire 
village sample.
7.5.3 Ranking Social Impacts by Severity
Each impact is ranked by the numerical value of the SII for fishing 
villages and farming villages. These results are presented in the first two columns 
of Table 7.6. The rank order for the severity of impacts for the entire Kandaleru 
village sample is presented in the final column of the table below. The exact 
method used to construct rank orders for these impacts is discussed in Appendix
7F.
Table 7.6 
Impacts Ranked by SII
Ranked Impacts Fishing Villages 
Rank
Farming Villages 
Rank
All Villages 
Aggregate Rank
Well water salinity 2 4 3
Blocked access 1 3 2
Agricultural land salinity 3 2 1
Un/under-employment 4 5 4
Poor health 5 6 6
Fodder & fuelwood 6 1 5
note: a rank o f “1” suggests that the associated impact is the most severe impact facing that 
category o f villages.
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7.6 How Useful Is the Social Impact Index?
We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the Social Impact 
Index as a useful measure of impact severity, and for ranking purposes. 
Knowledge of each impact’s severity and its rank order based on the social 
impact index is useful to policy makers. First, separation of villages into 
categories based on common characteristics enable policy makers to devise 
targeted strategies for each group. By assessing the aggregate severity index for 
each impact, policy makers are able to formulate an overall strategy to alleviate 
the most severe social impacts facing the entire Kandaleru region. By focusing 
on the index value of impacts of a specific category (i.e. occupation or location) 
policy makers can target the most severe impacts facing a particular group of 
villages.
This research suggests that it is not enough to only discover the extent to 
which villages suffer in some capacity to different social impacts (see Table 7.0). 
Moreover, the mean rank score provides important information beyond that of 
assessing whether an impact is a problem facing a village or not (see Table 7.2). 
It is one way of generally assessing the relative importance of each social impact. 
The Social Impact Index provides a numerical and qualitative measure for 
severity of a social impact on the well-being of a village community. It differs 
from simply taking the mean of the village ranks as it gives more weight to the 
impacts that a greater number of villages declared to be problematic. Secondly, 
it provides a method to assess social impacts of villages grouped by common 
characteristic such as location or occupation. As each impact is assigned a 
severity index, the impact shown to be most severely disrupting the livelihood of 
inhabitants can be addressed with urgency.
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Appendix 7A 
Assessing Responses of Individuals in A Given Village
7A.0 Constructing An Aggregate Village Response & Measure of Frequency
This section presents the methodology used to construct an aggregate 
village response to the question of whether a particular social impact i is 
disruptive to a given village n. The aggregate response, A"* is defined by the 
following rules,
(IA) l f - L- p ^ > T l =>4"* =1
This suggests that in aggregate, village n does find a given impact i more likely 
to be problematic. The alternative,
2 >;■'
(IB) p S — zT , = > A ?= 0
suggests that in aggregate, village n does not find impact i problematic. In the 
above expressions, the response to the first question by each individual of the 
sample population in a given village n is denoted as a",p. The sample population
of village n is denoted as P ". Each p  respondent in village n, is one individual 
living in a village with population P and p e (1,2,..P). K is the number of 
categories with which the sample villages can be separated (see Section 7.4.1).
The expressions in (1A) and (IB) are essentially the proportion of the 
sample population (in percentage terms) that claim that the impact in question is 
a problem faced by their family. This expression therefore takes a value between 
1 and 100. Tt is the thresh-hold assigned to denote whether the aggregate village 
response suggests that impact i is problematic for village n of category k. In this 
analysis, the thresh-hold value assigned is Ti = 50. This value is assigned for 
both creek-based villages for which individual response data is available and sea-
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based villages for which the dis-aggregated data is not available. As mentioned 
earlier, individual data collected from sea-based villages are held by the Central 
Institute for Brackishwater Aquaculture and unavailable for further inspection 
due to the collaborative agreements made between myself and CIBA.
Each cell of Table 7.0 is therefore filled by the result of the following 
calculation, namely,
NI A'*
(1C) Aggregate Frequency = _>--------
N k
where JV* is the number of villages in the sample and where all other variables are 
as previously defined.
While it is clear that the value assigned to the thresh-hold has a direct 
impact on the aggregate frequency of a particular impact (Table 7.0 would be 
slightly changed given a different thresh-hold), based on simulation experiments, 
the relative rank of the impact frequencies remain the same when the thresh-hold 
level is raised to 60 and 70 or lowered to 40. The present level of Tt = 50 seems 
reasonable in this initial investigation of social impacts.
7A. 1 Defining A Particular Village Impact’s Rank Order
The rank order assigned to each impact for each sample village depends on the 
proportion of the sample population that claim an impact to be most disruptive to 
their overall village welfare according to the ranking game. The ranking game 
asks each individual a in village n to rank each social impact by his/her 
perception of its disruption to their overall welfare. The game is played in six 
rounds. As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.4. of this dissertation,
...the assembled household heads were asked to rank in order o f importance each 
impact drawn from the discussion and the questionnaire. This was accomplished 
by asking each individual in the assembled group to indicate which impact was - 
most important to them by raising their hand when it was announced. For 
example, we asked “please raise your hand if  you think well water salinity is the 
most important problem you face from the six major problems discussed.” Next, 
we inserted “agricultural land salinity/loss o f agricultural crops” for “well water 
salinity” and repeated the question. We did the same for all six impacts. Next, 
we asked individuals to raise their hands when the second most important impact 
to their general well-being was called out. Again the above mentioned question
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was repeated for each impact. We used this line of questioning in six rounds until 
all six impacts were ranked.
The results of the ranking game for Gummaladabba village are presented in 
Table 7A.1 below. It is clear from the results that the rows do not necessarily 
add up to 100 percent. The last column in the table indicates the amount (in 
percentage terms) that the row sum deviates from 100 percent. In Rounds One, 
Two, Three, Four, and Six the rows sum to greater than 100 percent. This 
suggests that some individuals voted more than once. In Round Five, the row 
values sum to less than 100 percent. This suggests that some individuals did not 
cast a vote throughout this round of the game.
Because each individual’s response was not followed throughout the 
game (we counted hands as discussed in Chapter 2) it is impossible to tell who 
voted multiple times and who didn’t vote at all. This is one clear limitation of 
the ranking game adopted in the village survey. Nonetheless, from the 
percentage scores in each cell it is possible to rank each impact according to how 
problematic the sample population viewed each impact relative to each of the 
others.
For example, using the results of the ranking game, a village aggregate 
rank can be constructed for Gummaladabba village. The highest rank is given to 
the impact with the most number of votes according to Round One. Therefore, 
using these data, blocked access is awarded a rank of “1”, suggesting it is the 
most problematic of all the impacts. The second highest rank is awarded to the 
impact with the highest number of votes in Round Two. Thus, well water 
salinity is awarded a village rank of “2”. Using this method for the remaining 
rounds, poor health is awarded a rank of “3”, agricultural land salinity is 
awarded a rank of “4”, unemployment is awarded a rank of “5” and fodder and 
fuelwood collocation problems is awarded a rank of “6 ”. A similar table to that 
of Table 7A.1 can be constructed for each of the remaining villages in the 
sample.
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Table 7A.1
Results of the Ranking Game for Gummaladabba Village
% WWSALIN ACCESS AGSALIN UNEMPL HEALTH FODFUEL +/-
Round
One
18 82
rank (1)
0 0 8 0
+ 8
Round
Two
72
rank (2 )
14 15 0 14 0
+15
Round
Three
4 2 35 0 6 6
rank (3)
0
+7
Round
Four
0 1 63
rank (4)
35 3 2
+4
Round
Five
0 0 23 53
rank (5)
4 8
- 1 2
Round
Six
0 0 14 33 5 55
rank (6 ) +7
source o f data: Patil & Village Survey, 1997; note: bold number represents winner of each 
round; number in parenthesis is the aggregate village rank awarded for each impact; percentages 
rounded to the nearest whole number. The percentage value in each cell is calculated as the 
number of votes received divided by the sample population. The sample population surveyed in 
Gummaladabba village was 137 individuals.
Formally stated, if impact j  is found to be the most problematic of all M  impacts 
for village n, then
(ID) r ’= l
The aggregate village rank of impact j  for the village is therefore assigned a rank 
value of “1”. The impact with the highest frequency in Round Two is given a 
rank of “2”. The remaining M impacts are ranked in this way. The value
assigned to r" is used to construct the Social Impact Index (see Section 7.4.1).
7A.1 Defining the Mean Rank Score for Villages Belonging to Category k
The average rank score assigned to impact i for villages belonging to 
category k is defined as,
z  K *
(IE)  
N
where all variables are as previously defined.
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Appendix 7B
Summary of Individual Respondents of Creek-Based Village Survey
Table 7B.1
Summary Statistics of Surveyed Creek-Based Villages
VILLAGE NAME OCCUP* POP“ HH“ AVG.
SIZE
% POP SURVEYED***
Gummaladabba fishing 1123 250 4.49 12.2
Lingavaram farming 100 23 4.34 41.0
Venkatreddypalem farming 88 20 4.40 60.2
Momidi farming 120 32 3.75 31.6
Tikkavaram farming 240 68 3.52 40.0
Krishnapattanam fishing 510 95 5.36 9.4
Bestapalem farming 1265 284 4.45 8.3
Puddiparti farming 240 54 4.44 36.3
Thirumalampalem farming 600 273 2.19 17.0
Tippaguntapalem farming 64 24 2.66 65.6
source: ‘denotes data from Patil & KAA Database, 1997; “ denotes data from BFDA, 1996; 
“ ‘denotes data from Patil & Village Survey, 1997.
Table 7B.2
%  of sample population that indicated social impact is problematic
CREEK-BASED
VILLAGES
WWSALIN ACCESS AGSALIN UNEMPL HEALTH FO D FU L
Gummaladabba 73 92 62 86 45 59
Lingavaram 64 62 68 32 12 87
V enkatreddypalem 72 77 75 26 9 94
Momidi 54 23 28 21 0 66
Tikkavaram 23 34 14 34 0 78
Krishnapattanam 45 66 58 41 48 56
Bestapalem 87 19 72 37 17 81
Puddiparti 94 71 51 24 26 55
Thirumalampalem 82 24 89 31 12 69
Tippaguntapalem 19 10 9 19 0 66
source o f data: Patil & Village Survey, 1997; note: the value in each cell determines the value
taken by A"'h as discussed in Appendix 7A.
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Appendix 7C 
Summary of Ranked Mean Score
Table 7C.1
Summary of Ranked Impact Data by Village Location
Impact Rank Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
16 Sea-Based Villages
WWSALIN 2 2.56 1.36 1 5
ACCESS 1 1.63 0 .8 8 1 4
AGSALIN 3 • 3.00 1.09 1 5
UNEMPL 4 3.43 1 .2 1 1 5
HEALTH 5 4.43 0.81 3 5
FODFUEL 6 6 .0 0 0 .0 0 6 6
10 Creek-Based Villages
WWSALIN 2 2.50 0.97 1 4
ACCESS 3 2.51 1.26 1 4
AGSALIN 4 2.70 1.33 1 5
UNEMPL 5 4.90 0.31 4 5
HEALTH 6 6 .0 0 0 .0 0 6 6
FODFUEL 1 2 .1 0 1.19 1 4
26 Vil lage Sample
WWSALIN 2 2.54 1 .2 1 1 5
ACCESS 1 1.96 1 .1 1 1 4
AGSALIN 3 2 .8 8 1.17 1 5
UNEMPL 4 4.00 1 .2 0 1 5
HEALTH 6 5.03 0.99 3 6
FODFUEL 5 4.50 2.06 1 6
source o f data: Patil & Village Survey, 1997
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Appendix 7D 
Some Assumptions & Caveats
There are two elementary aspects of most indicators: (i) a conceptual 
aspect which defines what is exactly being measured, and (ii) a data aspect which 
can limit the strength of the indicator by the lack of availability and/or lack of 
quality of relevant statistics. Moreover, McGranham et al (1985:5) suggest that 
most indicators are not necessarily direct and full measures of what they are 
intended to indicate but often indirect or incomplete measures. To minimise this 
problem, we define social impact index as an impact of severity, given several 
assumptions and caveats briefly discussed in this appendix.
The SII has some additional meaning not offered by simply comparing 
the frequency or the mean score of aggregate village responses. This is because 
the index employs both data which captures frequency and rank data in its 
construction. However, there are several caveats and assumptions made to make 
our measure of impact severity a functional index, given the nature and quality of 
the data.
7D.0 Perceptions differ among villagers and between villages
It is not possible to conclude that the severity of an impact is perceived as 
the same in two villages where an impact i is ranked as “M”, for example. This 
is a well known problem discussed in the literature, but not necessarily 
problematic to ordering ranks (Gibbons et al, 1977: 4-12). Several studies have 
shown that despite the fact that each individual in a given population has a 
different set of tastes and preferences, it is possible to rank the order of 
preferences in a meaningful way (see Marden, 1995: 97-112 for a review of some 
well known studies).
7D.1 Loss of information due to aggregation
In constructing the Social Impact Index, some important information may 
be lost due to aggregation. For example, due to the nature of the survey
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instrument, data collected from each member of the village population is 
aggregated to form a village rank of each impact. This rank is based on the 
relative frequency of an even being problematic. There may also be some loss 
of information due to the nature in which aggregation takes place. For example, 
their could be the case that one village (in aggregate) may suffer heavily from 
one or all six impacts (that is, the percentage of respondents answering “yes” to 
the question, Do you or your family face impact i? is high—80 percent or 
above). The second village may suffer only mildly (that is, the percentage of 
respondents answering “yes” to the question, Do you or your family face impact 
i? is lower—50 percent, for example. Nonetheless, the SII captures both 
villages’ aggregate response asA ^k =1 in the Social Impact Index.
7D.3 Ranks preferred to frequency
There is no question that the frequency data generated from the responses 
of the ranking game (see Appendix 7A, section 7A.1) is not ideal as a result of 
irregularities. Nonetheless, constructing aggregate ranks while losing some 
information, does order each impact in a uniform way across all villages in the 
sample. In this respect, using ranks as opposed to the frequency in building the 
model seems appropriate.
While the percent values presented in Table 7B.1 could serve as a severity 
index in itself, the unavailability of similar data on sea-based villages (at present) 
make the aggregated rank order more useful for comparisons across the 26 
surveyed villages. As an aside, the denominator in (1) or (2) takes into account 
the possible situation where both villages’ aggregate rank of an impact i is “M”, 
but one of the villages actually suffers from the impact while the other does not.
7D.2 Homogeneity based on socio-economics or demography
Following Diaconis (1988, 1989), creating K groups based on socio­
economic or demographic lines addresses some of the criticisms concerning 
ordering data elicited from populations with no known common or hypothesised 
perceptions. The assumption that sea-based fishing villages face similar problems
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to each other than they do to farming villages seems reasonable. Similarly, 
farming villages, are more likely to face similar problems to other farming 
villages. Moreover, this was found to be true of the 26 village sample (see Table 
7.0). • This result suggests a homogeneity between villages of a particular 
occupation or location. In the case of our sample, occupation usually defines 
village location, and vice-versa. In this respect, their may be some value to 
assessing severity based on groups of villages clustered by some common 
characteristic, rather than individually. This seems particularly true for policy 
recommendations (Gibbons et al, 1977:273-280).
7D.4 All villages are given equal weight
The Social Impact Index in (1) is constructed on the assumption that each 
village in the sample is given equal weight. This means that the concerns of a 
village such as Gummaladabba with a population of 1,123 inhabitants is 
weighted equally to the concerns of a village such as the less populated 
Tippaguntapalem (64 inhabitants). In assessing the social impacts of the 
Kandaleru region, we therefore assume that there are an equal number of fishing 
villages as farming villages.
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Appendix 7E
Comparing Ranks Based on Frequency, Mean Rank Score and 
Simulation Experiments on 0
In this section some results of simulation experiments on theta are 
presented. Next, we compare the ranks based on the relative frequency of 
occurrence of a social impact, the mean score of the ranking game and the 
numerical value of the social impact index (for selected values of theta) and for 
each impact. This, in part, justifies the use of the Social Impact Index over 
general statistical methods of organising and comparing data.
7E.0 Choosing a Value for Theta
It is clear that the value of theta changes the numerical value of the SII as 
defined in (1). The question remains, what value of theta is sensible to use in 
assessing impact severity? We suggest that by assigning theta = 2, the 
necessary criteria to ensure that an impact that (i) faces a greater number of 
villages, and (ii) is ranked higher relative to the others (i.e. the highest rank is 
“1”). Table 7E.1 presents the numerical values of the SII for different theta
values.
Table 7E.1
Simulations on Theta (Fishing Villages Only)
SII WWSALIN ACCESS AGSALIN UNEMPL HEALTH FODFUL
Theta=0.0 18.000 23.000 30.000 46.000 36.000 3.000
Theta=0.5 5.427 5.750 9.045 12.758 12.000 2.121
Theta=0.6 4.270 4.358 7.117 9.872 9.633 1.979
Theta=0.7 3.360 3.303 5.599 7.638 7.733 1.847
Theta=0.8 2.643 2.503 4.406 5.910 6.207 1.723
Theta=0.9 2.080 1.897 3.466 4.573 4.983 1.608
Theta=1.0 1.636 1.438 2.727 3.538 4.000 1.500
Theta=1.1 1.287 1.089 2.146 2.738 3.211 1.400
Theta=1.2 1.013 0.826 1.688 2.118 2.578 1.306
Theta=1.3 0.797 0.626 1.328 1.639 2.069 1.218
Theta=1.4 0.627 0.474 1.045 1.268 1.661 1.137
Theta=1.5 0.493 0.359 0.822 0.981 1.333 1.061
Theta=1.6 0.388 0.272 0.647 0.759 1.070 0.990
Theta=1.7 0.305 0.206 0.509 0.588 0.859 0.923
Theta=1.8 0.240 0.156 0.401 0.455 0.690 0.862
Theta=1.9 0.189 0.119 0.315 0.352 0.554 0.804
Theta=2.0 0.149 0.090 0.248 0.272 0.444 0.750
note: data is for the 17 fishing village sample only
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As discussed in Section 7.4.5, the Social Impact Index is smaller for 
higher values of theta. Moreover, the numerical value of the SII is smaller (i.e. 
that is, the impact is more severe) for a given impact if a greater number of 
villages report that particular impact as more problematic relative to the others 
through the ranking game (i.e. the frequency is higher). The value assigned to 
theta determines the importance assigned to the frequency of reporting a given 
impact as problematic. Figure 7E.1 illustrates that the value of theta is important 
in both determining the numerical value of the SII which we qualify as an index 
of severity and for ranking purposes.
Simulation experiments on the SII for different values of theta reveal that 
each social impact maintains its rank order for values of theta greater than 1.65. 
This means that the rank order does not “switch” for a marginal increase in theta. 
Similar simulation experiments conducted on the farming village sample reveal 
that the “switching” value of theta after which impacts maintain their rank is 
1.60. The “switching” value of theta for the total village sample is 1.65.
Figure 7E.1 
Identifying the “Switching” Value of Theta
# w w sa lin  
m access  
agsalin  
unempl 
x health 
»  fodfuel
The Intensity of Six Impacts (Simulations on Theta)
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
Possible Theta Values
note: The above figure represents the scaling parameter for fishing villages only.
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7E.1 Comparing Ranks
Overall, the rank order of impacts as delineated by the social impact 
index (with 0=2) is equivalent to the ranks based on the arithmetic mean of the 
sample but clearly favoured over the relative frequency (see Table 7E.2).
The ranks given by the mean score and the SII (Theta =2) are the same. A 
similar relationship holds for farming villages. That is to say, that the ranking 
determined by adjusting theta square with the information provided by the 
frequency and the mean score value for values of theta higher than 1.7 (see 
Figure 7E.1). The theta value chosen to assess impact severity is therefore, two.20
Table 7E.2 
Selected Methods to Rank Impacts
WWSALIN ACCESS AGSALIN UNEMPL HEALTH FODFUL
frequency 0.647 0.941 0.647 0.765 0.529 0.118
(3 or 4) (1) (3 or 4) (2) (5) (6)
mean score 2.412 1.588 3.118 3.706 4.588 5.647
(2) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ratio of rank
sum to number 3.727 1.688 4.818 4.846 8.667 48.000
of vill reporting 
a problem with 
Theta=0
(2) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SII, Theta=0 18.000 23.000 30.000 46.000 36.000 3.000
(2) (3) (4) (6) (5) (1)
SII,Theta=0.5 5.427 5.750 9.045 12.758 12.000 2.121
(2) (3) (4) (6) (5) (1)
SII, Theta=1.0 1.636 1.438 2.727 3.538 4.000 1.500
(3) (1) (4) (5) (6) (2)
SII, Theta=1.5 0.493 0.359 0.822 0.981 1.333 1.061
(2) (1) (3) (4) (6) (5)
SII. Theta=2.0 0.149 0.090 0.248 0.272 0.444 0.750
(2) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
note: ranks in parenthesis; these figures pertain to fishing villages only
20 The severity index was calculated and compared using values o f theta greater than the thresh- 
hold value and up to two. In each case, the degree o f severity as assessed by the severity impact 
conversion table for each impact remains the same. Even fodfuel and health remain in the same 
category, despite the divergence in their severity index value after the thresh-hold value o f 1.65.
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Appendix 7F 
Ranking Social Impacts
Identifying both the severity of a problem and its rank relative to other 
problems can give policy makers an indication of which impacts require 
immediate attention. Given the data collected from the village survey, a method 
is employed to rank social impacts by severity.
7F0 Ranking Impacts for A Particular Village
The rank order of a given social impact i is determined relative to the 
assigned rank of the other M-l social impacts under investigation. For a specific 
village n, the rank order of any impact i is determined through the method 
presented in Appendix 7A. 1.
7F.1 Ranking Impacts for Villages with A Common Trait, k
The rank order of a given social impact i for a group of villages 
categorised by a common characteristic k, is determined relative to the assigned 
rank of the other M-l social impacts under investigation for the group. For a 
group of n villages, the rank order of social impact z is determined through the 
following rules,
(IF) R" = A”r” n=l,2,3, for all i = 1,2, ...M
where A” takes a binary value as discussed earlier according to Appendix 7A.0 
and the numerical rank value of r” is as determined in Appendix 7A. 1. R" can 
take any value between 0 and S. It can take the value 0 only if A" = 0. Social 
Impact z, SIIkz is given a ranking of “1”, if and only if,
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Z R"/ Z r?*
(1G) — ----------  < — ----------  for all i ^ z
(Z^/y ( Z ^ ri
i= l,2 ,3 ,...z,...M ; n=l,2,3,...,N; k e  (1,2,... Z) andl < k < K
N
where ^  Rnz,k = Az,kr",k is the sum of the rank orders of problematic impact z
i i
for all n villages categorised by k. The denominator of (1G) is comprised of (i) a
n
weight, ^  A”,k which counts the number of villages in each category k that
i
N
responds such that A",k = 1; and (ii) an exponent# which deflates ^  K ’k based
i
on the number of villages reporting impact z as disruptive to their general well­
being.21 All other variables and parameters are as previously defined.
7F.2 Ranking Impacts for the Aggregated Sample
Finally, we wish to rank the aggregate Social Impact Index, Sllj for all N  
villages across all K  categories of our sample. Similar to the case described 
above for a category of villages, the rank order of a given social impact z for all 
villages in our sample is determined relative to the assigned rank of the other M-l 
social impacts. For all N  villages, the rank order of social impact z is determined 
through the following adaptation of (2). Impact z is given a ranking of #1, if and 
only if,
N  N
Z nn,k  ' V ' 1 nn,kK z  i  K  2 - t
(1 H ) ± Z ^ ~ —  < ■N1 for all / ^  z
( 1
21 In our empirical estimation of (6) we define 6  = 2.
282
where z  is one of M  social impacts under investigation and all variables and 
parameters are as previously defined.22
22 The left hand side o f (7) is simply the numerical value o f the Social Impact Index o f impact i,
1
Chapter 8
Identifying the Determinants o f Shrimp Farming’s Negative Social 
Impacts on South-eastern Indian Coastal and Inland Villages
8.0 Introduction
The transformation occurring in the coastal regions of India as a result of 
shrimp farming has affected the lives of its inhabitants. However, its effects have 
been poorly documented. Nonetheless, during the past ten years, the shrimp 
farming sector has developed an increasingly bad reputation among those 
concerned with the well-being of rural peoples. This is partially a result of 
flagrant violations of the law by shrimp farmers (SC Notification, 1996). It is 
also partially a result of leaving the sector to operate in absence of clear laws 
governing operating practices. In absence of clear guidelines, there have been 
increasing conflicts between those operating shrimp farms and those inhabiting 
villages adjacent to them.
These conflicts have arisen as a result of the various stresses placed on the 
environment and the way in which these stresses have directly or indirectly 
affected the well-being of local inhabitants. For example, shrimp production has 
been blamed for ground water abstraction (NACA, 1994:46); the loss of animal 
grazing and fodder collection areas due to land conversion (NEERI, 1996); 
agricultural land and village well water salinity (Flaherty & Kamjanakesom, 
1995); the rise in health problems inflicting fisher-folk (PREPARE, 1996); and 
blocked access to major waterways as a result of barbed wire fences and guards 
(Maybin et al, 1997).1
This chapter assesses the impacts of the shrimp farming sector on inhabitants 
of the Kandaleru region. Specifically, three questions are explored employing 
probit and ordered probit analysis:
(i) What are the determinants o f the social impacts faced by coastal and inland 
communities as a result o f shrimp farming?
1 See Chapter One for a detailed description o f these externalities.
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(ii) What farm and village characteristics, i f  any, explain why some villages are 
more or less likely to suffer from the negative consequences o f a given social 
impact?
(iii) What impact does a small change in a significant village or farm 
characteristic have on the probability that the region (the villages in the 
sample) suffers from a particular socio-economic or environmental 
problem?
This empirical investigation is presented in four sections. Section 8.1 presents 
a brief review of some relevant literature. Section 8.2 presents an overview of 
the methodology used in this assessment and a description of the data. Section
8.3 formally presents two established statistical techniques, probit and ordered 
probit models used to analyse village responses. Section 8.4 presents the 
explanatory variables and a statistical summary. Finally, section 8.5 presents the 
estimation results and offers some policy prescriptions and general conclusions.
8.1 A Review of the Literature
The use of probit and ordered probit models in analysing “rank” data 
from household surveys is prolific in the literature as a result of the ease with 
which qualitative data can be examined. These studies are often interdisciplinary 
in nature and span the psychological, sociological and economic literature.2 
Specifically, a growing literature exists on the economics of well-being. Within 
this field, the determinants of happiness are often explored (Oswald, 1997). In 
these studies, ordered or ranked classifications of well-being, happiness, or 
satisfaction are used to approximate neo-classical “utility”.
A second prolific application of probit and ordered probit models has 
been in the field of labour economics. Oswald and Clark (1996), for example 
examine whether employee job satisfaction follows a U-shaped behaviour with 
respect to age. Blanchflower and Oswald (1997) examine the effect of 
unemployment on the happiness of youth in Eastern Europe. More specific to 
Indian rural employment behaviour, Simmons and Salinder (1995) examine the 
degree to which the pattern of non-farm employment has changed in the Punjabi
2 see Marden (1995) for a review o f such studies.
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countryside. Specifically, they examine the determinants of decisions made by 
rural households to participate in non-farm activity using probit models.
It is less evident how both probit and ordered probit models are 
constructed to assess socio-economic and environmental impacts on rural 
inhabitants. Nonetheless, it is a straightforward extension of its more traditional 
applications: The left-hand side variable is a vector of ordered rankings and the 
right-hand side variables (usually characteristics of the population in question) 
are used to explain them. This study, therefore is similar in spirit to the previous 
body of work employing probit and ordered probit models. However, it crudely 
analvses the relative deeree to which negative externalities are reducing the 
welfare of village communities located adjacent to shrimp farming clusters.
At present, the literature is devoid of any village impact assessment 
studies with respect to brackishwater shrimp aquaculture. It is unclear whether 
characteristics of shrimp farms (i.e. their size, for example), socio-economic or 
demographic characteristics of villages (i.e. their wealth or average household 
size, for example) or a combination of both help to explain why certain impacts 
are relatively more problematic within a particular village, and why certain 
impacts are more severe for the entire region. Employing probit and ordered 
probit analysis identifies key factors that adequately explain village survey 
responses. Given the nature of the data, Probit and Ordered Probit models 
facilitate this kind of investigation.
8.2 Constructing the Data Set: A Review
The objective of this analysis is to identify the determinants of the social 
impacts faced by rural inhabitants of the Kandaleru region as a result of shrimp 
farming. Three types of data are required, namely, shrimp farm cluster 
characteristics; socio-economic and demographic data on sample villages; and 
data identifying the existence of and relative severity of social impacts facing 
sample villages. From these data, it is possible to determine which specific farm 
and village characteristics explain the responses elicited via the village survey.
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8.2.1 Shrimp Cluster & Village Characteristics
Both primary and secondary data were collected to construct profiles for 
each of the twenty-six shrimp clusters and their adjacent villages. Shrimp farm 
cluster characteristics for creek-based farms were collected by primary survey 
from over 500 shrimp farms operating along the Kandalera creek. Equivalent 
data on sea-based farm characteristics were made available from the BFDA. 
Socio-economic and demographic data collected from each village were collected 
via formal survey and the BFDA.3
8.2.2 Social Impacts
Six major social impacts adversely affect the well-being of the Kandaleru 
region’s inhabitants. They include well water salinity, agricultural land salinity, 
blocked access to the Kandaleru creek or Bay of Bengal, the conversion of 
traditional areas originally used for fodder and fuelwood collection to shrimp 
farms, unemployment and poor health. Each impact was identified using 
community survey and rapid rural appraisal techniques. First, respondents were 
asked for a definitive “Yes” or “No” answer to the following question: Has 
aquaculture development led to your village suffering from (say, impact A)? 
Second, respondents were asked to rank the relative severity of each social 
impact on their overall well-being.4
Thus, two distinct pieces of information were obtained. First, the 
availability of a “Yes/No” response enables the construction of a binary 
(one/zero) dependent variable used as the dependent variable in the probit model. 
It reveals whether a particular social impact is problematic in a given village. 
Second, the aggregate village ranking of social impacts enables construction of 
an ordinal variable that serves as the dependent variable in the ordered probit 
model. It provides a way in which to compare how villages perceive each social
3 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description o f the data.
4 An aggregate village relative ranking o f each of impact is constructed from individual responses 
according to the method described in an earlier chapter.
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impact relative to the others. Moreover, both pieces of information are necessary 
for completeness.
Data used to construct the binary dependent variable in the probit model 
and the ranked data used in the ordered probit model are subject to distortions or 
“noise”. One type of distortion that affects the rank order of a given impact as 
defined by the ranking game discussed in Chapter 7, Appendix 7A, Section 7A.1. 
A second distortion is important to the binary value assigned to the left-hand side 
variable of the Probit model. This distortion is a result of compensation schemes 
introduced by the government that force shrimp farmers to pay villages for 
environmental and social damages. This introduces a bias in the response of the 
first question asked relative to the answer provided by the rank. For example, 
the first question requires a definitive, “yes” or “no” answer to whether the 
village is facing a given problem, say well water salinity. It is entirely possible 
that each and every well in a given village is saline and therefore abandoned. 
Consequently, when asked whether the village has polluted wells, the answer is a 
clear “yes”. However, because this particular village is receiving drinking water 
trucked in daily at the expense of some adjacent corporate shrimp farm, the 
village ranks well water salinity as the least important problem facing the village, 
relative to the other five impacts. The effect of compensation schemes are most 
likely embedded in responses to the ranking game. It is therefore necessary to use 
both pieces of data in the attempt to identify the determinants of social impacts 
and to identify reasons behind their relative severity.
8.2.3 Caveats, Assumptions and Objectives
The method of ranking, measuring and explaining subjective measures of 
severity is taken with a degree of caution in the economic literature. However, 
the frequency of using this approach is growing (Oswald, 1997). Several areas 
of concern, or caveats raised by economists are briefly addressed in the context 
of this analysis. First, the subjective rank given for each impact by a village 
population is not equivalent to assigning a level of severity to that impact. 
Second, perceptions among differ people within a village and between villages
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are undoubtedly different from one another. The question remains, how 
different? Finally, each individual’s perception of the actual intensity of a given 
negative impact is likely to vary. However, are they similar enough to warrant 
aggregation? Despite these obvious philosophical musings and in absence of 
rigorous environmental and socio-economic data, it is still possible to unveil 
findings of an unexplored, but highly exposed area of investigation.5
This study merely uses one method to assess the impacts of shrimp 
farming on rural producers. Given the data, the method employed in this study is 
complementary to more traditional impact assessments. Moreover, this method 
enables quantifying and analysing subjective notions of well being, given that 
data necessary for concrete environmental impact assessments are unavailable. 
Even more difficult, however is assessing social impacts. Nonetheless, there is 
growing evidence that subjective data serve as strong predictors of observed 
behaviour (Clark and Oswald, 1996).
The contribution of this study to the empirical literature is three-fold. 
First, it provides a first attempt at identifying the existence of impacts faced by 
coastal communities as a result of shrimp farming. Second, it assesses the 
determinants of shrimp farming’s alleged social impacts. Finally, it offers some 
explanation as to the magnitude of each impact on sample villages.
8.3 Probit & Ordered Probit Models
8.3.1 The Probit Model
The probit model uses maximum likelihood techniques to estimate models with 
binary dependent variables. In this analysis, the probit model is specified as
(1) Pr{A”'k *0 ) = F(x/3)
where A"* takes a zero or one value based on the answer given by village n to 
the following question, have you or your family suffered from impact i as a result 
o f shrimp farming? If the aggregated village response reveals that impact i is not
5 Other important caveats and assumptions worth noting are discussed in Chapter 7, Appendix
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a problem facing village n, then A"’k = 0. In contrast, if the aggregated village 
response reveals that impact i is indeed a problem facing village n, then A",k = 1.6 
F(xj3) is the cumulative normal distribution function with a mean of zero and a 
variance of one. Jt is a vector of explanatory variables and /? is a vector of 
associated estimated coefficients.
Interpreting the coefficient results of the estimated probit model is often 
difficult since it requires thinking in the z-metric. For example, a strict 
interpretation of a coefficient of an explanatory variable, say xx is that each one 
unit increase in xx leads to increasing the probit index by its estimated 
coefficient.7 A transformation of the probit indexTcTachange in the probability 
evaluated at the mean, provides a more intuitive and meaningful interpretation. 
Technically, this is accomplished by the following transformation,
for all i. The coefficient of the transformation in (2) is specifically interpreted as 
the change in the probability (evaluated at the mean) for an infinitesimal change 
in x. In value, it is the height of the normal density function at the mean score, 
corresponding to the probability of a success (i.e. A”* = 1), and multiplied by the 
Xj coefficient. As the value of (2) approaches unity, the greater the impact that x{ 
has on the aggregate response of villages in the Kandaleru region.
8.3.2 The Ordered Probit Model
Ordered probit models are used to estimate relationships between an 
ordinal dependent variable and a set of independent explanatory variables.8 For 
example the aggregate relative village rank of each social impact affecting a
given village, r"** takes on an ordinal rank between one (least severe problem)
6 Appendix 7A in Chapter 7 describes the method employed to create aggregate village 
responses.
7 For further clarification on the interpretation o f the probit score, see Greene (1993).
(2) d.x
7D.
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and six (most severe problem).9 In the Ordered Probit model, the probability of 
observing a particular outcome corresponds to the probability that the estimated 
linear function plus a random error term falls within a range of cut off points 
estimated for the outcome. The probability of observing a particular outcome as 
determined by the Ordered Probit model can be represented in the following way,
(3) Pr(r"'* = r\xj) = Pr < Y,Pjxj +Uj <er 
v j
(  \  (
= F er - Y .P jxi ~ F e r - \ ~ 1L P jxj
r = 1,2,...6
where s  r are threshold parameters or cut points; the fij are the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables, Xjto be estimated; r”'k are the rank orders assigned by 
village n categorised by k to impact i, relative to each of the other social impacts. 
The error terms Uj are assumed to be normally distributed. In the 
parameterization used to empirically estimate (3), the constant term appears in 
the output as the value of the first cut point. This is merely a result of the 
statistical package used to estimate the Ordered Probit model.10
While the coefficients of the ordered probit model indicate whether 
villages with a larger quantity or value of the explanatory variable are more or 
less likely to suffer from negative consequences of the given social impact, they 
say nothing about the explanatory variable’s impact on the magnitude of the 
problem. A transformation of the ordered probit model is needed to assess the 
magnitude of an impact given a marginal change in an explanatory variable. 
Following Long (1997), the coefficients of the ordered probit model are
8 An ordinal variable is one that is categorical and ordered.
9 Please note that this ranking representation is the reverse of that used in determining the 
severity o f social impacts in Chapter Seven. For the purpose o f consistency with empirical 
estimations o f  the Probit and Ordered Probit model, the ranking data were reformulated such that 
a rank equal to one represents the least severe impact and a rank equal to six, the most severe 
impact.
10 Intercooled Stata 5.0 is used to estimate both probit and ordered probit models.
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transformed to reflect the probability of falling into each rank category, given a 
marginal change in the value of an explanatory variable.11
8.4 Explanatory Variables & Data Summary
There are several key variables used to assess the determinants of the 
responses to the village survey. Table 8.0 presents a roster of shrimp farm cluster 
characteristics and coastal village characteristics used as explanatory variables in 
this analysis.12
11 Greene (1996) illustrates the mechanical way in which to transform ordered probit coefficients 
in this way. Long (1997), however, made this more accessible by writing and distributing the 
computer program for this transformation.
12 Several variables identifying shrimp farm cluster characteristics are highly correlated to each 
other. To avoid the problem o f multi-collinearity, several o f these variables are dropped in the 
specification o f the full general Probit and Ordered Probit models (see Appendix 8B).
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Table 8.0
V A R I A B L E A Roster of Explanatory Variables Mean S.D.
C L S T S Z
SHRIMP FARM CLUSTER CHARACTERISTICS 
size of shrimp farming cluster in hectares 268 197
W S A size of shrimp farming cluster’s water spread area in hectares 180 156
C L S T D S T distance in kilometres from shrimp farm cluster to the adjacent village 1.02 0.4
S E A D S T distance in kilometres from shrimp farm cluster to the Bay of Bengal 8.0 12.7
T P N D S the number of ponds in a shrimp cluster 216 178
T O U T P T total output of shrimp cluster in metric tonnes 152 139
T C O R P total corporate and private limited companies in each shrimp farming cluster 2.8 3.2
T I N D r V total number of non-corporate shrimp farms in each shrimp farming cluster 21 26
T F A R M total number of farms in each shrimp farming cluster 23 26.7
T O W N total number of farms producing on land owned by operator in each cluster 11.3 18.6
T L E A S total number of farms producing on leased land in each cluster 2.3 5.9
T T R A N total number of farms producing on government transferred land in each 9.0 25.2
W E A L T H
cluster
COASTAL VILLAGE CHARACTERISTICS
average household asset wealth in 1000s of Indian Rupees (see Appendix 8C) 39.6 25.9
P U C P R O P
P O P
the proportion of pucca houses in each village (a proxy for wealth) 
village population 394 372
V D L SZ village size; number of households in village 113 118
H H S Z average size of household; number of inhabitants per household 3.6 0.83
O C C U P occupation of village dummy; 0 denotes farming; 1 denotes fishing 0.65 0.48
B A S E D location of village dummy; 0 denotes creek-based; 1 denotes sea-based 0.61 0.45
W S A L I N
SOCIAL IMPACTS (Ranked)
villages reporting well water salinity problems; ranked impact 4.46 1.21
A C C E S S villages reporting blocked access to the beach or creek; ranked impact 5.03 1.11
A G S A L I N villages reporting salinity of agricultural land; ranked impact 4.11 1.17
U N E M P L villages reporting unemployment or underemployment; ranked impact 3.00 1.20
H E A L T H villages reporting problems with health; ranked impact 1.96 0.99
F O D F U E L villages reporting problems with fodder & fuelwood collection; ranked impact 2.50 2.06
W S A L I N
SOCIAL IMPACTS (Yes/No)
proportion of villages reporting well water salinity problems 0.65 0.48
A C C E S S proportion of villages reporting blocked access to the beach or creek 0.73 0.45
A G S A L I N proportion of villages reporting salinity of agricultural land 0.73 0.45
U N E M P L proportion of villages reporting unemployment or underemployment 0.54 0.50
H E A L T H proportion of villages reporting problems with health 0.34 0.49
F O D F U E L proportion of villages reporting problems with fodder & fuelwood collection 0.38 0.50
note: The mean and standard deviation o f the Social Impacts (Ranked) are different from those 
presented in Chapter Seven. The ranks in this table were reversed to coincide with the general 
set-up o f  the ordered probit model. Therefore, the most severe impact is now ranked “6” as 
opposed to “1”.
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8.5 Estimation Results
Appendix tables 8A.1 to 8A.6 report the results of the estimated models 
for each of six social impacts: well water salinity, agricultural land salinity, 
blocked access, fodder & fuelwood collection problems, health related problems 
and unemployment. First, the general specification of both ordered probit13 and 
general probit models are estimated. Next, the a reduced form of each model are 
estimated. The results reveal which shrimp farm and village characteristics are 
important in explaining village survey responses.
8.5.1 Well Water Salinity
Sixty-five percent of the total twenty-six village sample claim that they 
are adversely affected by well water salinity. In each of these villages, water 
drawn from at least one communal well is either not fit for local inhabitants’ 
consumption and therefore left idle or known to be deteriorating. Semi-structured 
group interviews with household heads in each village suggest that shrimp 
farming is the alleged cause. This is a result of water seepage through the pond 
bottom into the groundwater. Table 8A.1 presents the estimation results which 
reveal important factors contributing to drinking water salinity problems. 
Overall, the results suggest that richer and larger villages suffer less, and that 
cluster distance to the village and its size matter.
The negative and significant coefficient on the wealth variable of the 
reduced probit model suggests that villages with higher average household 
wealth suffer less from well water salinity problems. This is not to say that wells 
in more wealthy villages are not saline, but rather, that this disruption affects 
them less than those inhabitants in poorer villages. In fact, the transformed 
wealth coefficient in the reduced probit model suggests that the probability that
13 Because o f the ordinal nature o f the dependent variable, the following interpretation on the 
estimated coefficient is possible: a positive (negative) and significant coefficient o f an 
explanatory variable suggests that villages with a larger quantity or value o f  that explanatory 
variable are more likely (less likely) to rank a given social impact as more severe relative to other 
social impacts than villages with smaller quantities o f that variable.
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villages face well water salinity problems falls by 60 percent for a marginal 
increase in village wealth.14
Larger villages are less likely to be adversely affected by well water 
salinity than smaller villages. This is evident from the negative and significant 
coefficient on village size in both general and reduced ordered probit models. 
This may be because larger villages tend to have several communal wells and are 
therefore less concerned if only one of the wells becomes saline. In contrast, 
smaller villages were observed to have only a few wells.15 Even if one well 
becomes saline, it is not surprising that the entire village population feels the full 
impact of the loss of this resource.
The distance between villages and their adjacent shrimp farming clusters 
is also an important determinant of reported well water salinity problems. The 
marginal effect of a change in distance in the reduced probit model is -0.523 and 
significant at ten percent. This suggests that the probability of Kandaleru 
villages facing well water salinity problems falls by 52.3 percent when located 
marginally further away from its adjacent shrimp farming cluster. The village 
distance from its associated shrimp farm cluster is therefore a key factor in 
explaining the occurrence of well water salinity problems. The corresponding 
ordered probit model suggests, however, that distance is not significant in 
explaining the relative rank given by each village. This is not surprising given 
the fact that some villages are receiving compensation for their loss (see the 
example provided in section 8.2.2).
Finally, villages located adjacent to shrimp farming clusters with larger 
water spread areas are less likely to face water salinity problems than villages 
adjacent to clusters with smaller water spread areas. Intuitively, the opposite 
result is expected as a result of direct pond water seepage into village wells. 
However, salinity of well water is known to be a function of the salt 
concentration of the groundwater (Rao, 1996; Joseph, 1996). As sub-soil 
groundwater reservoirs are often expansive, it is likely that seepage from several 
shrimp farming clusters contribute to its salinity.
14 Strictly speaking, this result is for an infinitesimal increase in village wealth, evaluated at the 
mean. Interpretation o f  each transformed coefficient, dF/cbc is similarly defined.
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Information on the characteristics of the groundwater reservoirs could 
perhaps provide a more scientific explanation of why villages next to large water 
spread areas suffer less from well water salinity phenomenon. Unfortunately, 
these data are unavailable. In contrast to this result, the hypothesise that the 
opposite relationship holds for agricultural land salinity problems is tested next. 
That is, villages located closer to farming clusters with larger culture areas are 
likely to face problems of agricultural land salinity. Moreover, the relative 
severity of agricultural land salinity is likely to be greater.
8.5.2 Agricultural Land Salinity
Seventy-three percent of the sample villages reported that agricultural 
land salinity is a problem in their village. Agricultural land salinity most likely 
arises as a result of two possible factors, (i) direct seepage of pond water through 
the pond bottom and into adjacent agricultural plots; (ii) breaches in the bunds 
which quickly drain pond water directly onto agricultural land. Salinity of 
agricultural land inhibits the growth of agricultural crops which in turn causes a 
loss of farm income and/or declines in own-consumption. Both farming and 
fishing communities were found to rely heavily on maintaining small agriculture 
plots for own consumption.
Households in primarily agriculturally based villages were found to own 
or lease small patches of agricultural land. These plots were used to maintain 
small vegetable gardens for own consumption. Moreover, FAO (1991:38) 
reports that approximately 74 percent of fishing households in Nellore District 
engage in some form of agricultural based activity. In most cases, respondents in 
our survey report that their small vegetable plots, like larger farm land, are 
located on the outskirts of the village. Oftentimes, these plots are located closest 
to the shrimp farming cluster.16 Table 8A.2 reports the estimation results for
15 Based on personal observation & official CIBA records (see CIBA, 1997).
16 The small agricultural plots maintained by fishing households are located on government 
classified “wasteland”. The same wasteland is converted by shrimp farmers for shrimp culture. 
Therefore, a significant proportion o f  small agricultural plots are located directly adjacent to 
these ponds. The fact that these plots are located next to ponds were found to explain why 
agricultural land salinity problems are such a big problem in villages.
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village responses on the existence and relative severity of agricultural land 
salinity problems.
The estimation results suggest that the size of the culture area in water 
spread hectares and the primary village occupation explain the existence and 
severity of agricultural land salinity. The significant and positive coefficient of 
total culture area in the reduced probit model suggests that villages located 
adjacent to larger water spread clusters face agricultural salinity problems. The 
marginal effect, however is small at 0.1 percent. Moreover, the significant and 
positive coefficient on both ordered probit models suggest that villages located 
adjacent to shrimp farming clusters with large water spread areas are more likely 
to rank agricultural land salinity as a more severe problem (relative to other 
impacts) than villages adjacent to clusters with smaller water spread areas. 
However, the marginal effect is small.17
Occupation is also important factor in explaining why villages are more 
or less likely to suffer from agricultural land salinity. The negative and 
significant coefficient on the occupation dummy variable of the ordered probit 
model suggests that coastal fishing villages are less likely to rank agricultural 
land salinity as a more severe problem than fanning based inland villages. This 
underscores the fact that while both farming and fishing communities rely on 
private plots to grow crops for own consumption, farming villages naturally place 
a greater importance on the degradation of this resource. Moreover, this becomes 
evident from the fact that the average rank given by fishing villages is 3.88 
compared to the 4.55 average rank of farming villages.
8.5.3 Blocked Access
For coastal inhabitants that rely on fishing as a primary or secondary 
source of income, easy access to the creek and sea is vital. With the advent of 
shrimp farm development, direct water access has been severely restricted 
because shrimp farms operate on lands located squarely between villages and the
17 The probability that a village increases its rank o f  agricultural land salinity from 5 to 6 
increases at a insignificant rate o f 0.5 percent for a marginal increase in culture area. See 
Appendix 8D.
297
Bay of Bengal or Kandaleru creek. In fact, seventy-three percent of the survey 
villages report that blocked access to the brackishwater body is a problem faced 
by their village. Further investigation revealed that it adversely affects their 
income generating activities and impedes on their overall well-being.
With each kilogram of cultured shrimp reportedly valued between Rs. 95 
and Rs. 150 at the farm gate, shrimp farmers are naturally protective of their 
crop.18 Concerned with the possibilities of theft and pond contamination as a 
result of foul-play, larger shrimp farms tend to employ guards to restrict 
pedestrian access through the farm. Sea-based villages are particularly affected 
by restricted access to the Bay of Bengal since fishing activity requires daily 
access to the beach where fishing craft are kept. Fisher-folk complain that 
blocked access results in longer commutes to their fishing craft and greater 
difficulty in transporting their morning catch to the local market. Both 
restrictions impede their ability to maximise their already meagre income. The 
estimation results of both probit and ordered probit models presented in Table 
8A.3 reveal three important findings discussed below.
Not surprisingly, village occupation is found to be a significant indicator 
in explaining the existence and relative severity of blocked access. The positive 
and highly significant coefficient in the reduced probit model underscores the 
fact that fishing villages are adversely affected by blocked access. They are also 
more likely to rank the negative consequences of blocked access to the water as a 
more severe problem than primarily agriculturally based villages.
The distance between shrimp farm clusters and villages is also an 
important determinant of problems arising from blocked access. Ordered probit 
estimation results reveal that villages located further away from the shrimp 
farming cluster are more likely to rank blocked access as a more severe problem 
than villages located closer to the cluster. This is most likely due to the fact that 
the further the village is located to the sea, the greater number of obstacles 
necessary to navigate in order to reach it. A transformation of the ordered probit 
coefficient suggests that the probability of a village ranking blocked access as the
18 For comparative purposes, a kilogram o f rice is sold locally for approximately Rs.35; Salt and 
groundnut command a per kilogram sale price o f Rs. 5 and Rs. 20 respectively.
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most severe negative etemality facing that village increases by 40.2 percent for a 
marginal increase in distance.
Finally, village size is found to be a significant factor in explaining 
welfare loss as a result of blocked access. However, transformation of the 
coefficient in the reduced probit model reveals that given a marginal increase in 
village population, the probability that the severity of this impact increases only 
slightly (less than one percent). The magnitude of this variable’s impact is 
therefore very small.
8.5.4 Fodder & Fuelwood Collection
One primary responsibility of village women is to collect fuelwood used 
for cooking and heating. Nearby shrubs and thorny bushes, the primary sources 
of fuelwood and one time growing in abundance next to the Kandaleru creek on 
government and private “wasteland” have been cleared for shrimp farm 
development. As a result, the abundance of this resource and relative ease of 
collecting it has significantly declined. Similarly, before the advent of shrimp 
fanning, domestic animals grazed on open access wasteland. As a result of 
shrimp farm encroachment of this land, nearby grass and fodder for animal 
consumption has become increasingly more scarce.
Thirty-eight percent of the village sample reported that fodder and 
fuelwood collection has been a problem as a result of shrimp aquaculture 
development in the region. However, whereas only twelve percent of fishing 
villages report this as a problem, an overwhelming majority of the farming 
villages (eighty-nine percent) report it as a significant disruption to their overall 
well-being. This is not surprising given the occupational and locational 
differences between farming and fishing communities. First, farming villages 
tend to own many animals such as cows and water buffalo, while fishing 
communities do not. Second, fishing villages are located predominantly near the 
sea, while farming villages are located near the Kandaleru creek. Whereas 
shrimp farms obstruct the access of fisher-folk to the sea, they do not tend to 
obstruct access to areas where these inhabitants collect fuelwood. The opposite 
seems to hold true for farming villages. Creek-based farms are located between
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fanning village and the creek and therefore occupy land traditionally used for 
grazing animals and for fuelwood collection.
These facts are underscored by the econometric results presented in Table 
8A.4. The estimation of both general and reduced form ordered probit and probit 
models suggest that inland farming villages engaged in agriculture and located 
further from the Bay of Bengal are more likely to identify fodder and fuelwood 
collection as a more severe problem than sea based villages engaged in fishing or 
farming activities. Village location and occupation therefore drive this result.
Secondly, the size of a shrimp farm cluster is found to be significant. The 
negative and significant coefficient in the reduced probit model suggests that 
villages closer to larger shrimp farm clusters face fewer fodder and fuelwood 
collection problems. It’s impact is very small, however. Finally, villages located 
further from shrimp farms are likely to face less severe problems than those 
located closer. In fact, the transformed probit coefficient suggests that given a 
marginal increase in distance, the probability that fodder and fuelwood 
collection is a problem falls by 24 percent. Moreover, the transformed ordered 
probit results suggest that the probability of villages falling into the least severe 
rank category increases by 64 percent for a marginal increase in distance. The 
estimation results are therefore consistent and logical.
8.5.5 Unemployment
There is considerable agreement in the literature that shrimp farming is 
displacing traditional employment opportunities for coastal inhabitants. This is 
particularly alleged for agricultural labour.19 This research suggests, however, 
that contrary to popular opinion, it is not farming communities that are facing 
unemployment or underemployment as a consequence of shrimp farm 
development, but rather fishing communities. The survey results indicate that 
seventy-six percent of all fishing communities reported that they have somehow 
suffered from unemployment or underemployment as a result of shrimp farming
19 A review o f  the relevant literature is presented in Chapter 1; An investigation o f the changing 
land use pattern on agricultural labour is presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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development. In contrast only one of ten farming villages in the survey reported 
the same.
The results of the reduced probit model presented in Table 8A.5 confirm 
that that sea-based villages are more likely to suffer from unemployment than 
inland creek-based villages. However, the negative and insignificant coefficient 
on the occupation dummy suggests that they are not any more likely to rank 
unemployment as a more severe problem facing their village than farming 
villages.
The positive and significant coefficient on clstdst in the reduced 
ordered probit model suggests that larger villages are more likely to face more 
severe unemployment than smaller villages. Moreover, those villages located 
further away from the Bay of Bengal (i.e. farming communities) are less likely to 
rank unemployment as more problematic than those closer to the Bay. Moreover, 
villages closer to the shrimp farming cluster are less likely to rank unemployment 
as more problematic.
While the results underpin the fact that fisher-folk are hit harder than 
farming communities, the estimated models do not answer the question, why? 
Two explanations are offered. First, for the past several seasons, wild fry 
purchases by shrimp farmers have steadily declined as a result of the abundance 
of hatchery seed. This implies a loss of indirect employment for women who 
engaged in this economic activity. Moreover, supplemental household income 
has therefore necessarily fallen. Second, at the time of the survey, the Supreme 
Court ban on shrimp fanning forced all shrimp farmers in the region to halt 
production. Locally hired labour from adjacent villages for jobs such as pond 
preparation and other earthworks projects were therefore no longer required. 
Farming communities engaged in shrimp farm labour were most likely less 
severely hit by the ban since demand for agricultural labour is relatively constant 
in the region.20
20 Based on discussions with agricultural workers.
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8.5.6 Poor Health
There has been increasing concern voiced by NGOs over the deteriorating 
health of local inhabitants as a result of shrimp farm development. Several NGO 
based studies have suggested that village populations adjacent to shrimp farms 
face greater exposure to mosquito related illnesses (PREPARE, 1995). These 
studies argue that shrimp farming has attracted a large number of mosquitoes as a 
result of the growing number of stagnant ponds. Other studies claim that local 
inhabitants suffer from skin irritations directly related to exposure to effluent 
discharge water released into common water ways (TWN, 1997).
In the sample survey of villages, fifty-three percent of the fishing villages 
reported that they face some type of health problems as a result of shrimp farm 
development. The health problems reportedly faced by fishing communities 
include light skin irritation. They believe that this problem is a result of effluent 
discharge into the near shore areas where they fish. Near shore fishing requires 
full contact with the water for several hours per day. One observation made by 
the survey team was that fisher-folk using this method purposely fished near the 
discharge pipes. The team was told that the pipe made it easier to employ this 
method of fishing. Also, a concentration of wild fish are found feeding near the 
discharge pipes since effluent contains particles of unconsumed shrimp feed. In 
contrast, none of the farming villages reported health problems as a result of the 
activities of nearby shrimp farms.
The estimation results presented in Table 8A.6 suggest that wealthier 
fishing communities and those with smaller size families face more severe health 
risks than poorer fishing villages and villages with larger size families. In fact, 
the transformed probit coefficient on wealth suggests that given a marginal 
increase in average village wealth, the probability that poor health is a problem 
among Kandaleru fishing villages increases by 60 percent. Moreover, a similar 
finding is confirmed by the transformation of the wealth coefficient in the 
reduced ordered probit model. A marginal increase in average village wealth will 
result in a 77 percent probability that villages initially ranking health as the least 
severe impact will now rank it as the second least severe impact. One possible
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explanation is that populations enjoying a higher standard of living are less 
tolerant toward illnesses.
Transformation of the reduced probit model coefficient on average 
household size suggests that for a marginal increase in average household size, 
the probability that villages face health related problems falls by 28 percent. In 
addition, as distance increases between villages and shrimp farming clusters, 
problems of poor health become more severe. This is evident from the positive 
and significant coefficient on the associated variable in the reduced ordered 
probit model.
8.6 Conclusions
Probit and Ordered Probit analyses reveal that both socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of villages and shrimp cluster characteristics help 
explain the existence and severity of social impacts faced by rural inhabitants. 
While the explanatory variables included in the econometric models are not an 
exhaustive list, they do however, jointly explain village responses at ten percent 
significance or better for each of the preferred models. Therefore, bias arising 
from omitting important variables is not readily apparent. Nonetheless, 
additional factors would undoubtedly improve the robustness of the results.
Village location and occupational status are crucial factors in explaining 
the existence of social impacts faced by village communities in the probit 
models. Similarly, the two variables are often significant in explaining the 
relative severity ranking of village impacts in the ordered probit models. In fact, 
either location or occupation were found to be significant determinants in 
explaining both the existence and severity of social impacts for each impact, 
excluding well water salinity. Policy makers, therefore ought to be aware that the 
problems faced by rural populations are far from uniform across villages. Any 
compensation or regulatory schemes must be devised along village location and 
occupational lines.
The relative average wealth of villages is an important determinant of 
whether villages face problems of well water salinity and whether they are
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bothered by health problems. Wealth does not play a significant role in 
identifying or assessing the existence or severity of the other investigated 
impacts. Poorer villages are more likely to face well water salinity problems. 
Wealthier villages, however, are more likely to complain of health related 
illnesses. Unfortunately, data limitations do not enable further investigation of 
the relationship between average household wealth and these two impacts.
Finally, it is clear from the results that some minimum distance between 
shrimp farm clusters and villages is needed in order to protect cultivable land 
from salinity. First, 73 percent of the sample villages report it to be a problem 
that they face. Second, the average rank given to this problem is high at 4.11. 
Regulation of this kind could most likely improve the overall well-being of the 
region’s inhabitants.
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Appendix 8A
Empirical Results of Estimated Probit & Ordered Probit Models
Table 8A.1
Factors Explaining Well Water Salinity Impacts
WSALIN Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered 
Probit
Probit Reduced Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 
WEALTH
-0.806
(-1.091)
-1.875*
(-1.816)
[-0.541]
-2.001**
(-2.101)
[-0.609]
VELLLAGE SIZE: 
POPULATION
-0.004*
(-1.707)
-0.004**
(-2.087)
-0.005
(-0.970)
[-0.005]
AVERAGE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
-0.104
(-0.309)
-0.309
(-fr.586)
[-0.089]
TOTAL CULTURE 
AREA: CLUSTER
-0.003*
(-1J93)
-0.002**
(-1.923)
-0.005*
(-1.745)
[-0.001]
-0.003
(-1.596)
[-0.001]
DIST. BETWEEN 
CLUSTER & VILL
-0.846
(-1.397)
-1.733
(-1.572)
[-0.500]
-1.722*
(-1.778)
[-0.523]
DIST. BETWEEN 
VILLAGE & SEA
0.009
(0.358)
-0.035
(-0.801)
[-0.010]
OCCUPATION
DUMMY
0.776
(1.053)
-0.985
(-0.761)
[-0.242]
CONSTANT, £,
%
*4
3.816**
(2.041)
-2.894
(-1.611)
-2.310
(-1.284)
-0.875
(-0.494)
2.708**
(4.218)
-1.840
(-3.471)
-1.311
(2.673)
-0.0460
(-0.102)
-0.985
(-0.761)
3.823**
(2.596)
N=25
MEAN
PSEUDO-R2
Log LIKELIHOOD
ITERATIONS
CHl2(#)
0.162
-30.93
3
11.99
0.102
-33.15
4
7.54
0.650
0.398
-9.44
5
12.46
0.650
0.331
-10.49
4
10.37
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluatec 
percent level; * significant at 10 percei 
model; Interpretation o f ordered prc 
significant coefficient o f an explanatory 
o f the explanatory variable are more I 
given social impact. Interpretation o f  
problem falls (if the sign is negative) 
increase in the explanatory variable, ev
at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5 
it level, # is the number o f explanatory variables used in the 
>bit coefficients and their signs: a positive (negative) and 
y variable suggests that villages with a larger quantity or value 
kely (less likely) to suffer from negative consequences o f the 
dF/dx and their signs: the probability that water salinity is a 
ncreases (if the sign is positive) by [(dF/dx)*\W\ for a finite 
aluated at its mean.
Chi-squared (Chi2) tests suggest that the joint explanatory power o f each model is greater than zero 
at the ten percent significance level. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test suggests that both reduced form 
models are preferred to the general specification.
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Table 8A.2
Factors Explaining Agricultural Land Salinity Problems
AGS ALIN Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered Probit Reduced Probit
Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 0.036 -0.512
WEALTH (0.051) (-0.453)
[-0.105]
VILLLAGE SIZE: -.0002 -0.001
POPULATION (-0.101) (-0.044)
[-0.000]
AVERAGE 0.371 0.375 0.352
HOUSEHOLD SIZE (1.078) (1.215) (0.706)
[0.073]
TOTAL CULTURE 0.003* 0.003* 0.007 0.005*
AREA OF CLUSTER (1.834) (1.868) (1.590) (1.667)
[0.001] [0.001]
DIST. BETWEEN 0.376 0.125
CLUSTER &VILL (0.646) (0.155)
[0.025]
DIST. BETWEEN 0.014 0.126 0.139
VILLAGE & SEA (0.518) (0.069) (0.959)
[0.026] [0.031]
OCCUPATION -0.670 -0.870* 0.816 1.103
DUMMY (-0.936) (-1.825) (0.035) (0.598)
[0.197] [0.293]
CONSTANT, £\ -0.541 0.074 -2.781 -2.81
p (-0.316) (0.057) (-0.811) (-0.956)
1.083 0.469
% (0.633) (0.363)
£a 2.276 1.654
(1.271) (1.216)
3.378 2.727
(1.876) (1.961)
N=25
pseudo-R2 0.105 0.094 0.221 0.196
Log LIKELIHOOD -33.28 -33.67 -11.55 -11.6
ITERATIONS 3 3 6 5
CHl2(#) 7.82 7.02 6.54 5.82
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluated at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5
percent level; * significant at 10 percent level, # is the number o f explanatory variables used in the
model;
Chi2 tests suggest that only the joint explanatory power of variables in the reduced ordered probit
model is greater than zero at the ten percent significance level. The joint explanatory power o f the
variables in the other models is no different from zero at the ten percent significance level or better.
The Likelihood Ratio test suggests that both reduced form models are preferred to their respective
general models.
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Table 8A.3
Factors Explaining Impacts from Blocked Access to Water Body
ACCESS Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered Probit Reduced Probit
Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 0.204 -1.597 -1.493
WEALTH (0.255) (-1.012) (-0.976)
[-0.212] [-0.234]
VILLLAGE SIZE: -0.001 -0.001 0.114 0.011*
POPULATION (-0.554) (-0.577) (1.391) (1.699)
[0.002] [0.001]
AVERAGE -0.084 0.673
HOUSEHOLD SIZE (-0.227) (0.823)
[-0.037]
TOTAL CULTURE -0.004 -0.001
AREA: CLUSTER (-0.238} (-0.485)
[0.000]
DIST. BETWEEN 1.021 1.015* 1.362 0.944
CLUSTER & VILL (1.453) (1.604) (1.111) (0.825)
[0.206] [0.148]
DIST. BETWEEN 0.011 0.034
VILLAGE & SEA (0.401) (0.694)
[0.01]
OCCUPATION 1.342* 1.172** 4.272 2.596**
DUMMY (1.752) (2.406) (1.515) (2.706)
[0.980] [0.618]
CONSTANT, ^ -0.333 -0.432 -6.899 -2.058
O (-0.180) (-0.577) (-0.934) (1.501)2 0.868 0.946
(.479) (1.261)
*3 1.664 1.831
(0.902) (2.31)
N=25
PSEUDO-R2 0.135 0.132 0.570 0.538
LOG LIKELIHOOD -26.87 -28.14 -5.91 -6.98
ITERATIONS 3 3 7 6
CHl2(#) 8.38 8.77 15.72 16.32
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluated at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5
percent level; * significant at 10 percent level, # is the number of explanatory variables used in the
model;
The Chi2 Tests suggest that the joint explanatory power of variables in the reduced probit model
(model 2) is greater than zero at the ten percent significance level; The variables in both general and
reduced ordered probit models have a joint explanatory power greater than zero at the five percent
significance level. The LR Test suggests that both reduced form models are preferred to their
respective general specifications.
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Table 8A.4
Factors Explaining Fodder & Fuelwood Collection Problems
FODFUL Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered 
Probit
Probit Reduced Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 
WEALTH
-1.716
(-1.069)
-0.752
(-0.715)
[-0.267]
VILLLAGE SIZE: 
POPULATION
0.008
(1.515)
0.001
(0.40)
[0.000]
AVERAGE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
(0.584)
(0.064)
0.276
(0.55)
[0.098]
TOTAL SIZE:
- OTTTM1K 4T> n  |T C T T ? noluVUVlr vLiUo Xl!iK
-0.014
(-4.400)
-0.065**
(-2.231)
-0.003
{-L4*>
[-0.001]
-0.004**
W
[-0.001]
DIST. BETWEEN 
CLUSTER & VILL
-4.453**
(-2.089)
-15.816**
(-1.990)
-0.787
(-1.04)
[-0.280]
-0.691
(-0.95)
[-0.244]
DIST. BETWEEN 
VILLAGE & SEA
0.206**
(2.264)
0.401*
(1.896)
OCCUPATION
DUMMY
-7.788**
(-2.220)
LOCATION
DUMMY
Predicts
Perfectly
Predicts
Perfectly
CONSTANT,
%
*4
5.983
(1.498)
-5.457
(-1.398)
-3.635
(-0.977)
26.995**
(2.101)
-25.716
(-2.010)
-19.905
(-2.162)
0.249
(0.11)
1.257
(1.366)
N=25 
PSEUDO-R2 
Log LIKELIHOOD 
ITERATIONS 
CHl2(#)
0.613
-9.66
8
30.70
0.777
-5.57
9
38.89
0.194
-13.17
4
6.33
0.175
-13.46
4
5.74
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluated at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5 
percent level; "“significant at 10 percent level, # is the number o f explanatory variables used in the 
model;
Chi2 Tests suggest that the joint explanatory power o f variables in the ordered probit models are 
greater than zero at the one percent level; the joint explanatory power o f variables in the reduced 
probit model is significant at ten percent whereas the joint explanatory power o f variables in the 
general probit model is no different from zero. The Likelihood Ratio Test suggests that the reduced 
form o f each general model is preferred to the general specification.
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Table 8A.5
Factors Explaining Unemployment Impacts
UNEMPL Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered 
Probit
Probit Reduced Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 
WEALTH
-0.466
(-0.536)
-0.715
(-0.663)
[-0.058]
VILLLAGE SIZE: 
POPULATION
0.007**
(1.990)
0.006**
(2.108)
0.010
(0.921)
[0.001]
0.008
(1.330)
[0.004]
AVERAGE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
-0.386
(-0.782)
-0.763
(-0.664)
[-0.031]
TOTAL SIZE:
- nT T T * TTI m  / i i  u n n p T ^ no i lK lM r  U L U a lb K
0.001
/ n n o j AyV/.UO*?/
TOTAL CULTURE 
AREA: CLUSTER
0.001
(0.033)
[0.000]
DIST. BETWEEN 
CLUSTER & VILL
1.822*
(1.835)
1.559*
(1.672)
0.569
(0.357)
[0.041]
DIST. BETWEEN 
VILLAGE & SEA
-1.414**
(-2.052)
-1.357**
(-2.163)
-0.438
(-1.216)
[-0.032]
OCCUPATION
DUMMY
-6.515
(-0.260)
-6.130
(-0.574)
LOCATION
DUMMY
1.404
(0.629)
[0.087]
3.020**
(2.321)
[0.794]
CONSTANT, £\
%
%
*4
8.488
(0.339)
-6.638
(-0.264)
-5.227
(-0.208)
-3.829
(-0.152)
6.681
(0.663)
-4.939
(-0.491)
-3.670
(-0.364)
-2.369
(-0.233)
0.055
(0.010)
2.870*
(-1.704)
N=25 
PSEUDO-R2 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
ITERATIONS 
CW2(#)
0.515
-15.98
12
34.01
0.502
-16.88
11
33.98
0.608
-6.71
9
20.86
0.478
-9.36
6
17.17
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluated at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5 
percent level; *significant at 10 percent level, # is the number o f explanatory variables used in the 
model;
Chi2 tests suggest that the joint explanatory power o f variables in each o f the models presented above 
is greater than zero at the five percent significance level. The LR test indicates that both reduced 
models are preferred.
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Table 8A.6
Factors Explaining Reported Health Problems
HEALTH Ordered Probit Reduced Ordered 
Probit
Probit Reduced Probit
AVG HOUSEHOLD 
WEALTH
2.866*
(1.891)
2.146**
(1.903)
1.640
(1.467)
[0.110]
1.742*
(1.876)
[0.604]
VILLLAGE SIZE: 
POPULATION
-0.003
(-1.384)
(-0.001)
(-0.480)
[-0.000]
AVERAGE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE
-2.064**
(-2.266)
-1.465**
(-2.600)
-1.458*
(-1.694)
[-0.097]
-0.809**
(-2.050)
[-0.281]
TOTAL SIZE: 
SHRIMP CLUSTER
-0.002
(-0.764)
[-0.000]
TOTAL CULTURE 
AREA: CLUSTER
-0.009
(-0.275)
DIST. BETWEEN 
CLUSTER & VILL
2.633**
(2.181)
2.268**
(2.059)
1.777
(1.466)
[0.119]
0.915
(1.197)
[0.317]
DIST. BETWEEN 
VILLAGE & SEA
-1.401
(-1.548)
-1.413
(-1.535)
-0.288
(-1.242)
[-0.019]
OCCUPATION
DUMMY
3.433
(1.305)
2.831
(1.516)
Predicts
Perfectly
Predicts
Perfectly
CONSTANT, £y 5.415
(1.339)
-1.614
(-0.466)
-0.664
(-0.191)
3.129
(1.431)
0.032
(0.061)
0.973
(0.502)
3.871
(1.185)
0.852
(1.394)
N=25 
PSEUDO-R2 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
ITERATIONS 
CHl2(#)
0.617
-11.97
10
38.21
0.593
-13.05
9
38.03
0.470
-8.655
8
15.36
0.241
-12.72
4
8.09
t-ratios in parenthesis; dF/dx evaluated at the mean in brackets for probit models; **significant at 5 
percent level; * significant at 10 percent level, # is the number of explanatory variables used in the 
model;
Chi2 tests suggest that the joint explanatory power o f variables in each of the above models is greater 
than zero at the five percent significance level. The LR test suggests that the reduced ordered probit 
model is preferred to the general model whereas the general probit is preferred to its reduced 
specification.
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Appendix 8B 
Collinearity Amongst Explanatory Variables
The degree of association between variables is determined to identify 
potential problems of multi-collinearity. Simple diagnostic tests reveal that the 
following variables are correlated to the extent that if simultaneously included in 
either Probit or Ordred Probit models, they would pose statistical problems. First, 
CLSTSZ and WSA are positively and almost perfectly correlated. Second, t p o n d s , 
t f a r m s , TCORP are also positively and significantly correlated with each other 
and significantly correlated with CLSTSZ and WSA at one percent. The correlation 
coefficient for each is above 0.90. Therefore, in specifying the general model 
either c l s t s z  or w s a  is used and t p o n d s , t f a r m s , t c o r p  are dropped.
Similarly, since the population of the village, POP and the number of 
households per village, v il sz  are also found to be positive and significantly 
correlated with each other, we include only v il sz  to represent the size of each 
village. Finally, WEALTH was found to be almost perfectly correlated with the 
proportion of pucca houses in a village, p u c p r o p . A s information is available for 
the proportion of pucca houses for each of the twenty-six villages surveyed and 
only the asset wealth for twenty villages, pu c pr o p  is used as a proxy for village 
asset wealth (see Appendix 8C for the methodology used to construct a village 
wealth index).
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Appendix 8C
Constructing An Index o f Wealth for Coastal Fishing & Farming Villages
In this section we present the methodology used to construct an index of 
average household wealth for each of our sample of twenty-six villages. The 
wealth index essentially takes into account the value of major structural and 
occupational assets in each village and is used as an explanatory variable in 
assessing the determinants of social impacts ranked by household heads in our 
village survey.
For each of the seventeen fishing villages surveyed data were available on 
the total number of fishing crafts and nets owned by village members and the 
total number of pucca houses constructed in each village. Data on fishing crafts 
and nets/tackle are further categorised by the type of fishing craft (i.e. country 
crafts or mechanised boats) and type of net (i.e. simple nets and/or complex nets 
with multiple hooks attached). In addition, data on the purchase/construction 
cost (imputed from number of man-hours of labour in addition to the purchase 
price of raw materials) for each type of boat and net are obtained from the Bay of 
Bengal Program office in Madras, India (FAO, 1991). Construction costs per 
household for pucca housing is obtained from the same source. From these data 
we construct an index of aggregate village wealth (in terms of assets) from the 
following equation,
(1) K = Z  + Z  XnjC) + X  Hnkc\
where i=l,2,3; j=l,2,3; k=l,2; n=l,2, ...N 
where W is the index of wealth for village n; Bn, is the total number of boats of
type i owned by village n; Cj is the average cost in Indian Rupees for a boat of 
type i; N nj is the total number of nets of type j  owned by village n; C] is the
average cost in Indian Rupees for a net of type j; Hn k is the total number of
households in village n, C\ is the cost to construct a dwelling of type k. If k=l, 
the dwelling is primarily constructed from mud and straw; If k=2, the dwelling is
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a pucca house or dwelling with a cement foundation. C\ is the subsidised cost in 
Indian Rupees needed by the household to pay the Indian government to 
construct a dwelling of this type; N  is the total number of villages surveyed; 
i=1 indicates that the boat is a simple three to four log kattumaram (catamaran), 
i=2 indicates that the boat is a large kattumaram with an out board motor; i=3 
indicates that the boat is a mechanised navas fishing craft; j - 1 indicates that the 
net is a small mesh monofilament gillnet used primarily by small kattumarams, 
y=2 indicates that the net is a large mesh gillnet used by large kattumarams and 
mechanised navas; j=3 indicates that the net is a shore seine net.
The wealth variable used in our analysis is simply an average household 
wealth index which is defined as follows for each village community,
(2) =/„ —  v  ^IX
where con is an index of average household assets in village n and ^ H n k is the
total number of households in village n. Details on the types of fishing craft, 
fishing gear, coastal dwellings and their asset value are obtained from the Bay of 
Bengal Programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1991:10) 
and presented in the following table.
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Table 8C.1
Primary Assets Owned by Fishing Communities in Andhra Pradesh
Village Asset Variable Asset Value Brief Description
(Rupees)
Fishing Crafts b 5 C1
small kuttumaram 1=1 3,500 5-6 meters long, made from 3-4 logs, 3 crew
large kuttumaram 1=2 8,000 8+ meters long, made from 5-6 logs, 4 crew
navas 1=3 30,000 8+ meters long, large mechanised craft, 6 crew
Fishing Gear N, C2
small gillnet j= l 13,000 11 panels, 14 cm nylon mesh nets
large gillnet j=2 33,000 50-60 panels, 10 cm mesh nets made from nylon; 
hooks attached to each panel.
shore seine net j=3 2,200 1-2 cm cotton mesh nets
Housing Hit C3
hut k=l 1,000 dwelling made from mud and straw
pucca house k=2 22,000 cement foundation; single or multi-floor 
dwellings
Data on the average household assets for farming villages are unavailable. 
However, the proportion of pucca houses in each fishing village was found 
positively and significantly correlated (r=0.47; p=0.02) with the average 
household asset value, con. The proportion of pucca houses in each farming 
village is therefore used as an equivalent index to proxy the average value of 
household assets in each farming village. This assumption enables the use of a 
wealth index in the analysis.
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Appendix 8D 
Changes in Predicted Probabilities
Table 8D.1 presents the transformed coefficients of only the significant 
ordered probit results. It follows the transformation method programmed by 
Long (1997), but mechanically presented in Greene (1996). The value of each 
cell in the table is interpreted as: the probability o f falling into that rank category 
given a marginal change in the explanatory variable.
Table 8D*1
Marginal Effects of Significant Ordered Probit Coefficients, %
1 2 3 4 5 6
WWSALIN
VILSZ 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
WSA 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.06
AGSALIN
WSA -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.05
OCCUP 8.6 7.9 7.8 -14.4 -9.9
ACCESS
CLSTDST -18.7 -12.7 -8.7 40.2
OCCUP -25.0 -17.1 -11.6 53.7
FODFUL
CLSTSZ 0.18 -0.07 -0.01 0.00
CLSTDST 58.1 -21.7 -35.7 0.66
OCCUP 78.5 -29.3 -48.3 0.89
UNEMPL
VILSZ -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
CLSTDST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SEADST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HEALTH
WEALTH -77.2 27.8 4.0 0.4
HHSZ 50.2 -47.4 -2.6 0.26
CLSTDST -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
OCCUP -158.0 149.6 8.2 0.82
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PartIV
Conclusion
Previous to this dissertation there was a lack of comprehensive knowledge of 
the productive efficiency of the shrimp farming sector and the extent of the sector’s 
impact on rural inhabitants. This was due to a lack of quantitative data to objectively 
examine a variety of hypotheses regarding the shrimp industry and the sector’s 
interaction with rural people. The primary and secondary data assessed in this 
research provide the first analysis of the efficiency of the shrimp farming sector and 
its socio-economic and environmental impacts on rural communities. Overall, the 
farm level production data are not dissimilar to shrimp farms operating elsewhere in 
India. Secondly, the village impact surveys are comprehensive in that they cover 
twenty-six villages in the Kandaleru region and are indicative of what many villages 
throughout India’s shrimp farming belt may be facing. Together, they provide the 
first comprehensive study on Indian shrimp farming and its impacts. Moreover, the 
results of each investigative area may provide policy makers with some direction with 
which to regulate brackishwater shrimp aquaculture along sustainable lines. This 
section therefore extracts the most important conclusions reached in the dissertation.
The prevailing literature states that shrimp farming has displaced traditional 
agriculture and thereby displaced agricultural labour. It also suggests that the amount 
of labour needed for paddy farming is greater than that of shrimp farming. This 
research supports both claims. However, the extent to which agriculture or the rural 
labour force is being displaced is of little significance overall. First, merely 0.2 
percent of cultivable agricultural land has been converted to shrimp farms in Nellore 
district. Secondly, an average of approximately 300 person-days of labour per water 
spread hectare per year are needed for shrimp culture as opposed to 346 person-days 
of labour per sown hectare in paddy cultivation per year. The difference is 
significant. However, when considering the fact that the majority of shrimp farms 
were constructed on non-agricultural land, it is clear that shrimp farming is providing 
significant employment opportunities for rural inhabitants. However, the analysis 
presented in Part III of this dissertation suggests that while a proportion of rural 
inhabitants enjoy employment through shrimp farming, the population as a whole 
suffer from an array of socio-economic and environmental impacts.
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There are six negative social impacts of shrimp farming that are of significant 
consequence to rural inhabitants located adjacent to shrimp farming clusters: village 
well water salinity, agricultural land salinity, restricted and/or blocked access to 
public access areas for income generating activities and/or fodder and fuelwood 
collection, unemployment or underemployment problems as a result of lay-offs and 
poor health due to exposure to shrimp farm effluent. The health issue is not surprising 
considering the finding that across Kandaleru farms, feed inputs—which pollute the 
aquatic environment—are used in excess and ultimately are discharged as effluent in 
areas used by fisher-folk. Each impact, however, was found to vary in its overall 
severity. Moreover, the importance of each impact was also found to vary by a 
village’s primary occupation and/or location. It is clear that the problems faced by 
rural populations are far from uniform across villages. While identification of 
impacts is one important contribution of this research, assessing each impact’s 
severity on rural villages is another. The Social Impact Index serves as a mechanism 
to assess the severity of impacts facing Kandaleru villages.
The Social Impact Index reveals that well water salinity, blocked access, and 
agricultural land salinity are moderately severe impacts facing the region. Problems 
of linemployment and fodder and fuelwood collection are of lesser consequence for 
the region. However, both the Social Impact Index and Ordered Probit and Probit 
analysis reveal that occupation and location are key determinants of the degree to 
which villages are facing a particular social impact. While fishing villages identified 
blocked access to the beach, agricultural land salinity and poor health as very severe, 
moderately severe, and problematic problems respectively, the remaining impacts 
were of little consequence. Farming villages identified fodder and fuelwood 
collection problems from a lack of available natural resources (due to shrimp farm 
construction or blocked access) as a moderately severe problem. Well water salinity 
was found to be problematic. The remaining impacts were found to be of little 
overall consequence to villages categorised by occupation, despite the fact that a few 
individual villages in each category may have claimed the opposite.
Probit and Ordered Probit analyses also affirms that both socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of villages and shrimp cluster characteristics help explain 
the existence and severity of social impacts faced by rural inhabitants. Location 
and/or occupation were found to be significant determinants in explaining both the 
existence and severity of social impacts for each impact, excluding well water
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salinity. It is clear that compensatory or regulatory schemes formulated by Indian 
policy makers must be devised along village location and occupational lines. 
Moreover, the relative average wealth of villages was found to be an important 
determinant of whether villages face problems of well water salinity and whether they 
are bothered by health problems. Poorer villages were found to be more likely to face 
well water salinity problems. Wealthier villages, however, were more likely to 
complain of health related illnesses. Finally, it is clear that some minimum distance 
between shrimp farming clusters and villages is needed in order to protect cultivable 
land from salinity. Regulation of this kind could most likely improve the overall well­
being of the region’s inhabitants.
Shrimp cultivation can easily pollute the environment. Farmers increase 
intensity levels by raising stocking densities and feed inputs per unit pond area. Over­
feeding in conjunction with high stocking densities invariably leads to pollution of the 
pond environment and to shrimp disease. Shrimp disease forces an early harvest or at 
worst, destroys the entire crop. Either way, the polluted pond water discharged from 
the farm into a common waterway has two major consequences. First, it is used as 
fresh intake water by downstream shrimp farmers. This infects the downstream 
farmer’s crop. Second, pollution of common waterways has dire consequences to 
plant and fish species and to marine biodiversity. Moreover, there are spill-over 
effects to the local inhabitants who rely on these species as a source of food or income 
generating activities. Naturally, the Indian Supreme Court voiced its concern in its 
decision to ban the shrimp farming sector. However, this decision appears to be a bit 
harsh. The analysis of shrimp farm efficiency in Part II revealed several important 
findings that may help to effectively regulate Indian shrimp farming along sustainable 
lines.
Parametric and non-parametric approaches were used to measure shrimp farm 
efficiency and discuss issues of scale economies in this sector. The PFA approach 
enabled a first attempt at assessing which managerial practices improve efficiency 
(i.e. mechanisation, a smaller pond size, smaller farm size) and those that reduce it 
(i.e. over-feeding, downstream location). The DEA research identified and confirmed 
the existence of scale economies in shrimp farming. In fact, an inverse relationship 
was found to exist between farm size and efficiency. Moreover, a trade-off between 
scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency was found to exist in brackishwater 
shrimp farming.
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A regulatory framework limiting the intensity of shrimp production could 
provide a pareto improving solution to all parties concerned. Reducing culture 
intensity implies a general scaling down of factor inputs. This places less stress on 
the internal pond and natural aquatic environments. If large and corporate farms scale 
down factor inputs, they are likely to reap cost saving and profit raising benefits. 
Moreover, the incidence of disease and polluted effluent discharge could be reduced 
from minimising intensive culture practices. The stress currently placed on the 
ecosystem’s natural carrying capacity would invariably be reduced and therefore ease 
the many concerns raised by environmentalists. However, regulation unfairly 
constrains the large (and intensive) farms that are consistently operating efficiently. 
However, until better technology and managerial practices become known, it may be 
in the best interest of the Indian nation to limit the intensity of culture operations in 
brackish water shrimp aquaculture.
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